The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface
• Key to Abbreviations and References
• Introduction
• 1.: The Manuscript
• 2.: The Lectures
• 3.: Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages
• 4.: Rhetoric and Literary Criticism
• 5.: System and Aesthetics
• Bibliographical Note
• Lectures On Rhetoric and Belles Lettres: Lecture 2D.
• Lecture 3D.: Of the Origin and Progress of Language 1
• Lecture 4tha
• Lecture 5. A
• Lecture 6.THA: Of What Is Called the Tropes and Figures of Speech. B
• Lecture. 7. A
• Lecture. 8. A
• Lecture. 9tha
• Lecture. 10tha
• Lecture. 11 a
• Lecture. 12.THA: Of Composition
• Lecture. 13 a
• | Lecture. 14 a
• Lecture 15tha
• Lecture. 16th. a
• Lecture XVII. A
• Lecture Xviii a
• Lecture. Xixth. a
• Lecture. XX.THA
• Lecture Xxist. a
• Lecture Xxiida
• Lecture Xxiiida
• Lecture Xxivtha
• Lecture XXV. A
• Lecture Xxvitha
• Lecture Xxvii a
• Lecture Xxviiitha
• Lecture Xxix a
• Lecture. Xxx a
• Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages,&c. &c.1
• Appendix 1 (see P. 32) the Bee, Or Literary Weekly Intelligencer, For Wednesday, May 11, 1791.
• Appendix 2 Table of Corresponding Passages

Lecture XXIV^tha

Mond.^y Jan.^ry 24 1763

sine Libro except what he Read from Livy

Having in the two foregoing Lectures made all the observations I think necessary on the first Sort of Eloquence viz. the Demonstrative I come now to the 2^d Sort, The ^b Deliberative. But before I enter particularly upon it; it will be proper to make some observations on a spe<c>ies of writing more Simple than eithe<r> it or the Judicial. I mean the Didactick; In which the design of the writer is to Lay Down a proposition and prove this by the different arguments which lead to that conclusion.

If there be but one proposition ne<c>essary to be proved, there can be nothing more simple; the best method here undoubtedly is; 1^st To lay down the proposition, and afterwards advance the Severall arguments that tend to prove it; which may be summed up, or brought to conclude in the same terms as the Proposition. It is proper to begin with laying down the | 126 proposition, as the arguments advanced will by that means make a greater impression on the mind, as it is evident at what they point, than if they were delivered without informing us what was to be the conclusion.—But it will often happen that in order to prove the capitall pro<po>sition it will be necessary to prove severall subordinate ones. In this case we are first to lay down the proposition, and then shew in what manner the truth of it depends on that of some other propositions, and having proved these summ up the whole as before.

{Tis in this manner Lord Shaftesbury proceeds in his enquiry into the Nature ^c of Virtue 1 and also in that where he endeavours to prove that virtue is our greatest happiness. Whether his Reasoning be sufficient or not, his method is perfect; and if the subbordinate propositions are clearly proved the principall one must necessarily be true.}

We are to observe however that these subordinate propositions should not be above 5 at most. When they exceed this number the mind can not easily comprehend them at one view; and the whole runs into confusion. Three or there about is a very proper number; and it is observed that this number is much more easily comprehended and appears more complete than 2 or four. In the number 3 there is as it were a middle and two extremes; but in two or | 127 four there is no middle on which the attention can be so fixt as that each part seems somewhat connected with it. The Rule is in this matter the same as in Architecture; 2 the mind can not there comprehend a number at sight and without counting above 9 or 10. Three is the number of all others the most easily comprehended; we immediately perceive a middle and one on each side. {Swift proposed a panegyrick on the number three 3 and this was one of the articles of its commendation. There is un[n]doubtedly something in this number that makes it more agreable than others. In Architecture, there being a middle one to which we first turn our eyes, is a sufficient reason, tho it appears whimsicall when applied to writing. There are more sermons and other discourses divided into this number of heads than into any other.} In four there is no middle and tho in numbers of Windows or Columns it may be easily enough comprehended yet it seems ^d awkward; and in Architecture there is one evident defect as there is no regular place for the Door; 5 is easily comprehended, 1 in the middle and 2 on the sides or three in the middle and one on each side. Six and seven are in the same manner not difficult to comprehend, and in the same manner 9 as it may be divided into 3 times 3. But tho in Architecture we can comprehend this number with tollerable readiness, we cannot in writing reach so far. Columns and windows are things exactly similar and are for that reason more easily compre| 128hended as when we know one or two we know the whole. But the Propositions which are brought as secondary to the primary one are often noways connected but as they all tend to the same point; and we have not only the number but also the nature of each proposition to remember.—It may often happen that it will be necessary to prove 14 or 15 subordinate propositions in order to confirm the principall one. In this case it is much better to form three or 5 propositions ^e on which the truth of the principal one evidently depends; and under each of these propositions to arrange 5 or 3 of those which are necessary to confirm the primary one. The mind will much more easily comprehend the 18 ^f propositions in the one case or the 20 in the other, than it will 15 which immediately depend on the principall one without any intermediate steps. In the same manner in Architecture, the architect generally makes one part of the building some way distinguished from the rest, either | 129 throws the middle farther back or advances it further forwards than the sides; that is in case there be above 3 (or 5) windows or other parts. By this means one may ^g with tollerable ease remember at least 15 or 16 Propositions, whereas in the other case the mind finds a considerable difficulty in going above half that length. There are however sermons wrote about the time of the Civil wars, which have not only 15^th or 16^th, but 20^thly, 30^thly or 40^thly.

In architecture we can not only comprehend a considerable number of parts by subdivisions, but by Sub–sub–divisions etc. we can go still farther. Thus if a building was to contain 81 windows or columns, let these be thrown into 3 27s distinguished remarkably from one another, the two side ones being similar; let each of these be again divided into 3 9s, and these into 3 3s, and let each subdivision be remarkably distinguished from the rest by a differen<t> order of architecture, or some other variety; and one, tho’ not of very quick appre| 130hension will, if placed at a proper distance readily conceive the order and number of the severall parts. But in writing it is otherwise; Subsubdivisions etc. are not at all easily remembered; they always run into confusion and become too intricate for our memory to comprehend. For this reason one who was to read Aristottles Ethics or indeed any other of his works ten times over would hardly have a distinct notion of the plan; the divisions, subdivisions and subsub etc. divisions are carried so far that they produce the very effect he intended to have avoided by them Viz. Confusion.

These Divisions and Subdivisions are very usefull not only in such didactic writings as have in view the Proof of a Single proposition, but even in those where the Design is to Deliver a System of any Scien<c>e e.g. Naturall Philosophy; the divisions assist the memory in tracing the connection of the severall parts. In Judiciall Eloquen<c>e it is often indispensably necessary. Facts and Points | 131 of Law often occur which cannot be decided without the proof of severall previous propositions and in this case the Divisions and subdivisions are to be applied in the same manner as that above mention’d. But in Deliberative Eloquence there is seldom any occasion for it. This is not to say that no order or method <is> to be observed, which there is without doubt, but only that the arguments to be used in this case where we would persuade others either to do or not to do something, to make peace or continue war, to fight or not to fight, ^h are either so evident and conclusive and make it so plainly appear to be honourable, attainable, and for the advantage of those we would persuade, that there is no occasion for ranging them in a set order. Or if they happen not to be entirely plain and conclusive ⁱ it is the business of the Orator to make them appear so. Now, a long chain of metaphysicall arguments one deduced from another do not promise to have this appearance in the opinion of such people as an audience where these | 132 orations are delivered generally consists of. And altho the arguments were really conclusive, yet the appearance of so much subtility and Laboured trains of argument would make it very much to be suspected that the arguments were not altogether solid and conclusive.

{Aristotle 4 makes no use of Division and Subdivision in any of his Deliberative Orations tho he frequently does in his Judicial ones. Cicero in those which are the best in the Deliberative makes no divisions, and very sparingly in any of that Sort.}

There are two methods in which a didacticall writing ^j containing an account of some system may be delivered; Either 1^st we Lay down one or a very few principles by which we explain the severall Rules, or Phaenomena, connecting one with the other in a natural order, or else we beginn with telling that we are to explain such and such things and for each advance a principle either different or the same with those which went before. Virgil in his Georgics follows the latter method; His design is to give us a System of Husbandry; in the 1^st he gives us directions for the Cultivation of corn, in the 2^d of Trees, in the 3^d of Cattle and in the 4^th of the Insects called the Bees. If Virgill had | 133 begun with enquiring into the pri<n>ciple of vegetation, what was proper to augment it and e contra; In what proportions it was in different soils and what nourishment the different plants required, and putting all these together had directed us what culture and what soil was proper for every different plant, this would have been following the 1^st method which is ^k without doubt the most philosophicall one. In the same way in Nat<urall> Phil<osophy> or any other Science of that Sort we may either like Aristotle go over the Different branches in the order they happen to cast up to us, giving a principle commonly a new one for every phaenomenon; or in the manner of Sir Isaac Newton we may lay ^l down certain principles known 5 or proved in the beginning, from whence we ^m account for the severall Phenomena, connecting all together by the same Chain.—This Latter which we may call the Newtonian method is undoubtedly the most Philosophical, and in every scien<c>e w<h>ether of Moralls or Nat<urall> phi<losophy> etc., is vastly more ingenious and for that reason more engaging than the other. | 134 It gives us a pleasure to see the phaenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable ⁿ all deduced from some principle (commonly a wellknown one) and all united in one chain, far superior to what we feel from the unconnected method where everything is accounted for by itself without any referen[e]ce to the others. We need <not> be surprised then that the Cartesian Philosophy (for Des–Cartes was in reality the first who attempted this method) tho it does not perhaps [perhaps] contain a word of truth, 6 and to us who live in a more enlighten’d age and have more enquired into these matters it appears very Dubious, should nevertheless have been so universally received by all the Learned in Europe at that time. The Great Superiority of the method over that of Aristotle, the only one then known, and the little enquiry which was then made into those matters, made them greedily receive a work which we justly esteem one of the most entertaining Romances that has ever been wrote.

The Didacticall ^o method tho undoubtedly the | 135 best in all matters of Science, is hardly ever applicable to Rhetoricall discourses. The People, to which they are ordinarily directed, have no pleasure in these abstruse deductions; their interest, and the practicability and honourableness of the thing recommended is what alone will sway with them and is seldom to be shewn in a long deduction of arguments. ^p

As there are two methods of proceeding in didacticall discourses, so there are two in Deliberative eloquence which are no less different, and are adapted to very conterary circumstances. The 1^st may be called the Socratick method, as it was that which, if we may trust the dialogues of Xenophon and Plato, that Philosopher generally made use. In this method we keep as far from the main point to be proved as possible, bringing on the audience by slow and imperceptible degrees to the thing to be proved, and by gaining their consent to some things whose tendency they | 136 cant discover, we force them at last either to deny what they had before agreed to, or to grant the Validity of the Conclusion. This is the smoothest and most engaging manner.

The other is a harsh and unmannerly one where we affirm the thing we are to prove, boldly at the Beginning, and when any point is controverted beginn by proving that very thing and so on, this we may call the Aristotelian method as we know it was that which he used.

These 2 methods are adapted to the two conterary cases in which an orator may be circumstanced with regard to his audience, they may either have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of that which he is to prove. That is they may be ^q prejudiced for or they may be prejudiced against. In the 2^d Case we are to use the Socratic method, in the 1^str the Aristotelian. I do not mean by this that we are to suppose that in any case the Orator and his audience are to hold a dialogue with each other, or that they | 137 are ^s to go on by granting small demand<s> or by boldly denying what the other affirms; but only that when the audience is ^t favourable we are to begin with the proposition and set it out Roundly before them as it must be most for our advantage in this case to shew at the first we are of their opinion, the arguments we advance gain strength by this precaution. On the other hand if they are prejudiced against the Opinion to be advanced; we are not to shock them by rudely affirming what we are satisfied is dissagreable, but are to conceal our design and beginning at a distance bring them slowly on to the main point and having gained the more remote ones we get the nearer ones of consequence.—The 1^st is exemplified in the Oration of ^u Titus Quinctius Capitolinus and the latter in that of Appius Claudius Crassus, in Livy. 7

[a]MS XXIIId

[b]Judicial deleted; Deliberative written large, so also Didactick (below)

[c]Nature inserted by Hand B in blank left

[1 ]An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit, Treatise iv in Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711). This treatise had first appeared in an unauthorised edition as An Inquiry concerning Virtue in two Discourses (1699). Cf. i.10 n.10 above. Also Treatise vi, Miscellany iv.1; and Treatise v, The Moralists, Part II.

[2 ]This passage rests on the ancient mnemonic system recommended to orators, by which they associated parts of their speech with places and images, especially with parts of a building, e.g. a temple. See Rhetorica ad Herennium (LCL), III.xxiii–xxiv; Cicero, De Oratore, I.xxxiv.157, II.lxxxvii–lxxxviii; Quintilian, XI.ii.17–26. Frances A. Yates brings the history of the idea up to the seventeenth century in The Art of Memory (1966), especially chapters VI–VII, XV–XVI.

[3 ]In A Tale of a Tub, Section I, The Introduction, §4, Swift mocks the mysticism of numbers: ‘. . . Philosophers and great Clerks, whose chief Art in Division has been to grow fond of some proper mystical Number, which their Imaginations have rendered Sacred. . . . The profound Number THREE is that which hath most employ’d my sublimest Speculations, nor ever without wonderful Delight’. He has in the press ‘a Panegyrical Essay of mine upon this Number’, rescuing certain things from its ‘two great Rivals SEVEN and NINE’.

[d]to be deleted

[e]which deleted

[f]18 is clear

[g]not only deleted

[h]last twelve words vertically in margin

[i]then deleted

[4 ]Error for Demosthenes.

[j]is delivered deleted

[k]MS in

[l]MS law

[5 ]This interlined word, confused with descenders and ascenders in the adjacent lines, had not been correctly read when WN (see 3, 769 n 17) was published in this series.

[m]deduce deleted

[n]for deleted

[6 ]On Smith’s views on Descartes cf. The Letter to the Edinburgh Review (EPS 244), TMS VII.ii.4. 14, and Astronomy IV.61 ff. (EPS 92).

[o]the scribe, in error, has Rhetoricall

[p]There are 2 metho deleted; then new paragraph

[q]either deleted

[r]replaces latter

[s]either deleted

[t]un deleted

[u]Appius deleted

[7 ]Respectively VII.xl (speeches of Marcus Valerius Corvus and Titus Quinctius to their opposing troops, ending in reconciliation), and V.iii–vi (the ‘practised orator’ Appius Claudius addresses the Quirites during the Veientine campaign).