The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Errata—vol. I.
• General Preface.
• Introduction to the Study of the Works of Jeremy Bentham;
• Section I.: Bentham’s Style and Method of Thinking.
• Section II.: The Greatest-happiness Principle and Its Application to Morals and Legislation.
• Section III.: The Pursuit of Truth.—fallacies.—principles of Evidence.
• Section IV.: System of Government.
• Section IV.: Law Reform.
• Section VI.: Principles of Punishment.
• Section VII.: Poor Laws, Education, and Other Institutions For National Amelioration.
• Section VIII.: International Law.
• Section IX.: Political Economy.
• Section X.: Logic and Metaphysics. †
• An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
• Preface.
• Chapter I.: Of the Principle of Utility.
• Chapter II.: Of Principles Adverse to That of Utility.
• Chapter III.: Of the Four * Sanctions Or Sources of Pain and Pleasure.
• Chapter IV.: Value of a Lot of Pleasure Or Pain, How to Be Measured.
• Chapter V.: Pleasures and Pains, Their Kinds.
• Chapter VI.: Of Circumstances Influencing Sensibility.
• Chapter VII.: Of Human Actions In General.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Intentionality.
• Chapter IX.: Of Consciousness.
• Chapter X.: Of Motives.
• Chapter XI.: Of Human Dispositions In General.
• Chapter XII.: Of the Consequences of a Mischievous Act.
• Chapter XIII. *: of Circumstances Influencing the Degree of Alarm.
• Chapter XIV.: Reasons For Considering Certain Actions As Crimes. *
• Chapter XV.: § 1. General View of Cases Unmeet For Punishment.
• Chapter XVI.: Of the Proportion Between Punishments and Offences.
• Chapter XVII.: Of the Properties to Be Given to a Lot of Punishment.
• Chapter XVIII. § 1.: Classes of Offences.
• Chapter XIX.: § 1. Limits Between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation.
• I. Essay On the Promulgation of Laws
• Essay On the Influence of Time and Place In Matters of Legislation.
• Introduction. *
• Chapter I.: Principles to Be Followed In Trans Planting Laws.
• Chapter II.: Regard to Be Paid to Subsisting Institutions.
• Chapter III.: Rules Respecting the Method of Transplanting Laws.
• Chapter IV.: Laws Appear the Worse For Being Transplanted.
• Chapter V.: Influence of Time.
• A Table of the Springs of Action:
• A Fragment On Government;
• Preface to the First Edition, Published In 1776.
• Historical Preface, Intended For the Second Edition.
• Three Letters On the Fragment On Governmen
• Letter the First. of an Examination Into the Merits of a Critique On Blackstone’s Commentaries, Lately Published Under the Title of a Fragment On Government.
• Letter the Second. of an Examination Into the Merits of a Critique On Blackstone’s Commentaries, Lately Published Under the Title of a Fragment On Government.
• Letter the Third. By John Lind, Esq. Afterwards Barrister At Law, to D., Author of Two Letters * On a Fragment On Government.
• Introduction. *
• Chapter I.: Formation of Government.
• Chapter II.: Forms of Government.
• Chapter III.: The British Constitution.
• Chapter IV.: Right of the Supreme Power to Make Laws.
• Chapter V.: Duty of the Supreme Power to Make Laws.
• Principles of the Civil Code.
• Introduction.
• Part I.—: Objects of the Civil Law. *
• Chapter I.: Of Rights and Obligations.
• Chapter II.: Distinct Objects of the Civil Law.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between These Objects.
• Chapter IV.: Of Laws Relative to Subsistence.
• Chapter V.: Of Laws Relative to Abundance.
• Chapter VI.: Propositions of Pathology Upon Which the Advantage of Equality Is Founded.
• Chapter VII.: Of Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Property.
• Chapter IX.: Answer to an Objection.
• Chapter X.: Analysis of the Evils Resulting From Attacks Upon Property.
• Chapter XI.: Security and Equality—their Opposition.
• Chapter XII.: Security and Equality—means of Reconciliation.
• Chapter XIII.: Sacrifices of Security to Security.
• Chapter XIV.: Cases Subject to Dispute.
• Chapter XV.: Examples of Attacks Upon Security.
• Chapter XVI.: Of Forced Exchanges.
• Chapter XVII.: Power of the Laws Over Expectation.
• Part II.
• Chapter I.: Of Titles Which Confer a Right to Property. *
• Chapter II.: Another Mode of Acquisition—consent.
• Chapter III.: Another Means of Acquisition—succession.
• Chapter V.: Of Wills.
• Chapter V.: Of Rights Respecting Services—means of Acquiring Them.
• Chapter VI.: Community of Goods—its Inconveniences.
• Chapter VII.: Of Distribution of Loss.
• Part III.: Of the Rights and Obligations Attached to Different Private Conditions.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Of Master and Servant.
• Chapter II.: Of Slavery.
• Chapter III.: Of Guardian and Ward.
• Chapter IV.: Of Parent and Child.
• Chapter V.: Of Marriage.
• Appendix.: of the Levelling System. *
• Principles of Penal Law.
• Part I.: Political Remedies For the Evil of Offences.
• Chapter I.: Subject of This Book.
• Chapter II.: Of Direct Methods of Preventing Offences.
• Chapter III.: Of Chronic Offences.
• Chapter IV.: Of Suppressive Remedies For Chronic Offences.
• Chapter V.: Of Martial Law
• Chapter VI.: Of the Nature of Satisfaction.
• Chapter VII.: Reasons Upon Which the Obligation to Make Satisfaction Is Founded.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Different Kinds of Satisfaction.
• Chapter IX.: Of the Quantity of Satisfaction to Be Granted.
• Chapter X.: Of the Certainty of Satisfaction.
• Chapter XI.: Of Pecuniary Satisfaction.
• Chapter XII.: Of Restitution In Kind.
• Chapter XIII.: Of Attestative Satisfaction.
• Chapter XIV.: Of Honorary Satisfaction.
• Chapter XV.: Remedies For Offences Against Honour.
• Chapter XVI.: Of Vindictive Satisfaction.
• Chapter XVII.: Of Substitutive Satisfaction, Or At the Expense of a Third Party.
• Chapter XVIII.: Of Subsidiary Satisfaction At the Expense of the Public Treasure.
• Part II.—: Rationale of Punishment.
• Advertisement.
• Book I.: General Principles.
• Chapter I.: Definitions and Distinctions.
• Chapter II.: Classification.
• Chapter III.: Of the Ends of Punishment.
• Chapter IV.: Cases Unmeet For Punishment.
• Chapter V.: Expense of Punishment.
• Chapter VI.: Measure of Punishment.
• Chapter VII.: Of the Properties to Be Given to a Lot of Punishment.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Analogy Between Crimes and Punishments.
• Chapter IX.: Of Retaliation.
• Chapter X.: Of Popularity.
• Book II.: Of Corporal Punishments.
• Chapter I.: Simple Afflictive Punishments. *
• Chapter II.: Of Complex Afflictive Punishments.
• Chapter III.: Of Restrictive Punishments—territorial Confinement.
• Chapter IV.: Imprisonment.
• Chapter V.: Imprisonment—fees.
• Chapter VI.: Imprisonment Examined.
• Chapter VII.: General Scheme of Imprisonment.
• Chapter VIII.: Of Other Species of Territorial Confinement—quasi Imprisonment—relegation—banishment.
• Chapter IX.: Of Simply Restrictive Punishments.
• Chapter X.: Of Active Or Laborious Punishment.
• Chapter XI.: Capital Punishment.
• Chapter XII.: Capital Punishment Examined. *
• Book III.: Of Privative Punishments, Or Forfeitures.
• Chapter I.: Punishment Analyzed.
• Chapter II.: Of the Punishments Belonging to the Moral Sanction.
• Chapter III.: Forfeiture of Reputation.
• Chapter IV.: Of Pecuniary Forfeitures.
• Chapter V.: Forfeiture of Condition.
• Chapter VI.: Forfeiture of the Protection of the Law.
• Book IV.: Of the Proper Seat of Punishment: Or Say, of Mis-seated Punishment.
• Book V.: Of Complex Punishments.
• Chapter I.: Inconveniences of Complex Punishments.
• Chapter II.: Of Transportation.
• Chapter III.: Panopticon Penitentiary.
• Chapter IV.: Felony.
• Chapter V.: Of PrÆmunire.
• Chapter VI.: Outlawry.
• Chapter VII.: Excommunication.
• Book VI.: Miscellaneous Topics.
• Chapter I.: Choice of Punishments—latitude to Be Allowed to the Judges.
• Chapter II.: Of Subsidiary Punishments.
• Chapter III.: Of Surety For Good Conduct.
• Chapter IV.: Defeazance of Punishment.
• Appendix—: On Death-punishment. ∥ Jeremy Bentham to His Fellow-citizens of France.
• Part III.: Of Indirect Means of Preventing Crimes.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Methods of Taking Away the Physical Power of Injuring.
• Chapter II.: Another Indirect Method—hinder the Acquisition of Knowledge Which May Be Rendered Injurious. †
• Chapter III.: Of Indirect Means of Preventing the Will to Commit Offences.
• Chapter IV.: Problem I. to Divert the Course of Dangerous Desires, and Direct the Inclination Towards Those Amusements Which Are Most Conformed to the Public Interest.
• Chapter V.: Problem II. to Make Such Arrangements, That a Given Desire May Be Satisfied Without Prejudice, Or With the Least Possible Prejudice.
• Chapter VI.: Problem III. to Avoid Furnishing Encouragement to Crimes.
• Chapter VII.: Problem IV. to Augment the Responsibility of Individuals, In Proportion As They Are More Exposed to Temptation to Do Wrong.
• Chapter VIII.: Problem V. to Diminish Sensibility With Regard to Temptation.
• Chapter IX.: Problem VI. to Strengthen the Impression of Punishments Upon the Imagination.
• Chapter X.: Problem VII. to Facilitate the Discovery of Offences Committed.
• Chapter XI.: Problem VIII. to Prevent Offences, By Giving to Many Persons an Interest In Preventing Them.
• Chapter XII.: Problem IX. to Facilitate the Recognition and the Finding of Individuals.
• Chapter XIII.: Problem X. to Increase the Difficulty of Escape For Delinquents.
• Chapter XIV.: Problem XI. to Diminish Uncertainty With Regard to Procedure and Punishment.
• Chapter XV.: Problem XII. to Prohibit Accessory Offences, In Order to Prevent Their Principals.
• Chapter XVI.: Of the Cultivation of Benevolence.
• Chapter XVII.: Employment of the Motive of Honour, Or of the Popular Sanction.
• Chapter XVIII.: Of the Employment of the Religious Sanction.
• Chapter XIX.: Uses to Be Drawn From the Power of Instruction.
• Chapter XX.: Use to Be Made of the Power of Education.
• Chapter XXI.: General Precautions Against the Abuse of Authority.
• Chapter XXII.: Measures to Be Taken Against the Ill Effects of an Offence Already Committed—conclusion of the Subject.

BOOK VI.

MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS.

CHAPTER I.

CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS—LATITUDE TO BE ALLOWED TO THE JUDGES.

The legislator ought, as much as possible, to determine everything relating to punishments, for two reasons: that they may be certain, and impartial.

1. The more completely the scale of punishments is rendered certain, the more completely all the members of the community are enabled to know what to expect. It is the fear of punishment, in so far as it is known, which prevents the commission of crime. An uncertain punishment will therefore be uncertain in its effects; since, where there is a possibility to escape, escape will be hoped for.

2. The legislator is necessarily unacquainted with the individuals who will undergo the punishment he appoints; he cannot, therefore, be governed by feelings of personal antipathy or regard. He is impartial, or, at least, appears to be so. A judge, on the contrary, only pronouncing upon a particular case, is exposed to favourable or unfavourable prejudices, or at least to the suspicion of such, which almost equally shakes the public confidence.

If an unlimited latitude be allowed to judges in apportioning punishments, their functions will be rendered too arduous: they will always be afraid either of being too indulgent or too severe.

It may also happen, that being able to diminish the punishment at discretion, they may become less exact in requiring proof, than if they had to pronounce a fixed punishment. A slight probability may appear sufficient to justify a punishment which they may lessen at pleasure.

There may, however, often arise, either with regard to the offences themselves, or the person of the delinquent, unforeseen and particular circumstances, which would be productive of great inconveniences, if the laws were altogether inflexible. It is therefore proper to allow a certain latitude to the judge, not of increasing, but of diminishing a punishment, in those cases in which it may be fairly presumed that one individual is less dangerous, or more responsible than another; since, as has been before observed, the same nominal punishment is not always the same real punishment—some individuals, by reason of their education, family connexions, and condition in the world, presenting, if we may so speak, a greater surface for punishment to act upon.

Other circumstances may render it expedient to change the kind of punishment: that which has been directed by the law may be incapable of application, or it may be less suitable in other respects.

But whenever this discretionary power is exercised by a judge, he ought to declare the reasons which have determined him.

Such are the principles. The details of this subject belong to the penal code, and to the legislative instructions to the tribunals.

CHAPTER II.

OF SUBSIDIARY PUNISHMENTS.

Of all the punishments which can be appointed by the law, there is none but what, from one accident or other, is liable to fail. It is obvious, that against such an event it becomes the law, in every case, to make provision. Such a failure may arise from either of two causes: unwillingness, that is, want of will to bear the punishment; or inability, that is, want of power.

The first cause, if no steps were taken to controul it, would naturally occasion the failure of all punishments, the execution of which is dependent upon the will of the party to be punished. This, among corporal punishments, is the case with all such as are either active or restrictive, one case of restrictive punishment excepted, that, to wit, in which the restraint is produced by physical means.

To give efficacy, therefore, to the mandate, of which any of these punishments is intended as the sanction, it is absolutely necessary that some further punishment should be appointed to back it through the whole of its continuance. In the first instance, this backing or subsidiary punishment, as it may be called, may be taken from those two classes, as well as from the other; and so through any number of instances, one behind another. A punishment of the active kind, for instance, might be backed by quasi-imprisonment; that, again, by banishment; or any one of those punishments, for a certain term, by the same, or another, (kind of punishment) for a further term. Ultimately, however, every such series must be terminated by some punishment that may be inflicted without the concurrence of the party’s will; that is, by some punishment of the passive kind; or if of the restrictive kind, by such restraint as is compassed by physical means.

Even such punishments, to the execution of which (so the party be forthcoming) the concurrence of the party is not essentially necessary, may fail from his want of power, or in other words, from his inability to sustain them. This is the case with all corporal punishments, not capital, that affect any parts of the body that are not essential to life. It is the case, therefore, with simply afflictive punishments, and with discolourment, disfigurement, disablement, and mutilation, in as far as they affect any of the parts just spoken of. It is also the case with forfeitures of all kinds. The only punishments, therefore, that are sure, and require no others to be subjoined to them, are the above-mentioned corporal punishments, in the cases where the parts they affect are such as are essential to life; imprisonment, and such punishments by which life itself is taken away.

Even these, like any others, may come to fail by the want of will (in the party to sustain them,) to wit, by his not choosing to be forthcoming, which is a cause of failure common to all punishments. But then this cause does not necessarily produce its effect: it does not render the punishment of the man necessarily dependent upon his will, for he may be taken and punished in spite of his wishes and endeavours to prevent it; which, when a man does suffer any of these punishments, especially death, and those other acute and heavy punishments, is generally the case. In this case, the only resource is in forfeitures, upon the contingency of a man’s having anything to forfeit, that is, within the reach of justice, or in the punishment of those whose feelings are connected with his own by sympathy, as in punishments in alienam personam.

From the differences above remarked, respecting the cause of failure in the punishment first designed, results a difference in what ought to be the quantity of the subsidiary punishment, concerning which we may lay down the following rules:—

Rule I. Where inability is manifestly the only cause of failure, the subsidiary punishment should be neither greater nor less than that which was first designed; for no reason can be given why it should be either less or greater.

Rule II. Where want of will is manifestlythe only cause of failure, the subsidiary punishment ought to be greater than that which was first designed; for the punishment first designed is that which by the supposition is thought the best: to determine the delinquent, then, to submit to this, in preference to the other, there is but one way, which is, to make that other punishment the greater.

Rule III. When the cause of failure may be want of power, or want of will, as it may happen, and it cannot be known which, the subsidiary punishment ought to be greater than the punishment first designed, but not so much greater as in the case last mentioned. This is apt to be the case with pecuniary forfeitures. If, however, it can be ascertained which of these is the cause, it ought always to be done; otherwise, on the one hand, he who fails from mere inability will be punished more than there is occasion; and he who fails wilfully, not enough.

When a man fails wilfully to submit to the punishment first designed for him, such a failure may be considered in the light of an offence. Viewing it in this light, we shall immediately see the propriety of the following rule:—

Rule IV. The subsidiary punishment ought to be made the greater, the easier it is for the delinquent to avoid the punishment first designed, (without being detected and made amenable.) For the punishment, to be efficacious, must always be greater than the temptation to the offence; and the temptation to the offence is the greater, the greater is the uncertainty of that punishment which is the motive that weighs against the profit of the offence.

Imprisonment is the most convenient and natural kind of subsidiary punishment, in cases where the offender cannot or will not submit to a pecuniary punishment. A circumstance that renders these two modes of punishment particularly apt for being substituted to each other, is their divisibility: they admit of every degree that can be desired.

Simple afflictive punishments, on account of the infamy they involve, cannot in general be eligibly employed as substitutes for pecuniary punishments.

In case of violation of boundaries of local confinement, the most eligible substitute is imprisonment. A single act of transgression may be taken as a sufficient warning that the penal mandate is not meant to be regarded.

Laborious punishments require an uninterrupted train of attention, in order to compel the delinquent to submit to them. A constant supply of fresh motives is required: to produce the desired effect, it is necessary, therefore, that these motives should be drawn from a stock of punishment that is susceptible of minute division, and capable of being applied at the moment it is wanted. Thus, whenever an inspector is appointed in a house of correction in which the individuals confined are employed in hard labour, power is tacitly given to him to inflict personal correction. The infamy by which it is accompanied is not an objection; because, by the principal punishment—the penal labour—an equal degree of infamy is produced.

We have already observed, that to pecuniary punishment, in case of inability on the part of the patient, ought to be substituted imprisonment.

But by what standard are we to estimate a sum of money by a sum of imprisonment? for what debt, or part of a debt, is each day’s imprisonment to be reckoned as an equivalent?

Let us say that the amount of the debt struck off by each day’s imprisonment shall be equal to what each day the patient might have earned, had he remained in a state of liberty. The daily income of a mechanic, sailor, soldier, artist, labourer, servant, may be calculated according to the wages of persons employed in the same profession.

The daily income of a farmer may be estimated according to the 365th part of the rent of his farm. If, besides his farm, he is engaged in any other line of business, the daily benefit arising from that business must be added to the income arising from his farm.

The revenue of a man who is not engaged in any business, or is not a manufacturer, may be calculated as being eight times the rent of his house. If he is a manufacturer, at four times the rent of his house. If he is engaged in trade, at six times that rent.

The revenue of a man that boards and lodges in the house of another may be estimated at double the sum that he so pays. If he lodges only, at four times that sum. If he is supported gratuitously in the house of a relation, as equal to the value of his board and lodging.*

The points that then require to be determined, are the three following:—

1. The income being given, what portion of the debt shall be considered as being abolished by imprisonment of a certain duration?

2. From what period, anterior to the contracting of the debt, ought the value of the income to be estimated?

3. What proofs ought to be required, by which to fix the amount of the income in question? It would be the interest of the debtor to make it appear as great as possible. During the examination, the creditor ought to be present, and to be at liberty, either by himself or his counsel, to examine the defaulter.

The more exalted a man’s rank, the greater in general are his annual outgoings; the greater, consequently, ought to be the debt abolished by a given period of imprisonment.

I confine myself, then, to the laying down the principles upon which the calculation may be made: the details of their application belong more properly to the Penal Code than to a work on punishment.

CHAPTER III.

OF SURETY FOR GOOD CONDUCT.

The obligation of finding sureties for good conduct is an expedient, the utility of which appears more problematical in proportion as it is examined more nearly. A condition which is essential to it is, that there be an ulterior punishment destined to replace this obligation, in case its fulfilment is found impossible. This subsidiary punishment is ordinarily imprisonment: this imprisonment is ordinarily indefinite as to its duration; it may be perpetual, and it is natural that it should be so. Does the accused find himself without friends ready to risk their security upon his good conduct? Imprisonment, and the ignominy that accompanies it, are means little proper for enabling him to find friends so devoted.

Suppose that he finds them: what happens then? To a properly seated punishment, a vicarious punishment is added—a punishment to be borne by the innocent for the guilty. In the nature of things, any punishment might be equally well employed for this purpose. By custom, pecuniary punishment only is employed in the first instance, which, however, changes into imprisonment, in case of insolvability, according to a general rule. It is not, however, natural that a man, especially a man who, by the supposition, has given proofs of misconduct, should find friends who will expose themselves to be punished for actions over which they have no power, unless he have wherewith to indemnify them for bearing this pecuniary punishment. Does he find them in this case? Then this expedient is useless: it would have been quite as well to have fixed the amount upon him directly. In order that this expedient may have an efficacy of its own, it will be necessary to limit its use to the case in which the incapacity of the accused to furnish this indemnity is known. Does he, after this, find any persons sufficiently generous thus to expose themselves for him? It is, without doubt, something gained in point of security; but it is a security very dearly bought. In all other cases, this expedient resolves itself into a question of account.

The support which the law receives from this expedient, springs from two sources: it operates as an additional punishment, whereby the will of the accused is influenced—this punishment consisting in the remorse which a generous mind would feel in seeing friends, who had devoted themselves for him, plunged into misfortune by his ingratitude. It is also an expedient whereby he is attacked upon the side of power: his sureties become guards, whom the danger to which they are exposed induces to watch over his conduct.

But will he, whom the fear of punishment to be inflicted upon himself has been found insufficient to restrain, be restrained by the fear of a less punishment to be inflicted upon another? Those passions which have stifled the voice of prudence, will they obey those of generosity and gratitude? They may obey it; but that they will not obey it is, I think, most natural: but if this is so, it is a very costly expedient. In the majority of cases, instead of ensuring the good of prevention, it will produce the evil of punishment—of punishment borne by the innocent.

Whilst, as to this guard, it is a security much more verbal than real—it would be a very weak security, even if the individuals were his companions, and lived under the same roof with him at all times. But it is not among such as these that sureties are selected: they are, under the English law, required to be householders, having separate establishments. Is it, then, possible, that the passion which, by the supposition, had broken through the united restraints of prudence, gratitude, and honour, should be restrained by so loose a band? Besides this, is it natural that the extremes of confidence and mistrust should be united in the same person?

The bitterness of this punishment, to which the innocent are made to expose themselves, is not taken away by calling the exposure voluntary. This willingness is owing only to the constraint which the consideration of his friend being sent, or about to be sent, to prison for life, brings with it: it is a willingness produced by torture.

In conclusion, suretyship is a resource which ought not to be resorted to without very evident necessity, if it were unattended with any other inconvenience than this, of exposing the virtue of individuals to these combats, which, in a moment of weakness, may give birth to a remorse which shall end only with life.

This expedient is much employed under the English law; but custom has caused it to exist only in connexion with judicial commination. A certain fine is determined on: the accused is made to say, I consent to the payment of this fine, if I commit a certain offence. One or more sureties are made each to say, I consent, on the same condition, to owe the same, or a part of the same sum. In this manner, as if an inevitable punishment required an extorted consent to its infliction, the accused himself is made to contract an engagement, which, if it is not always ridiculous, it is that it is sometimes unjust. Implying a claim upon his property, it serves to rob his creditors of their just rights to payment of debts contracted between the period of the engagement and the contracting of the debt.

Of this ill-contrived compound mischief, what are the effects in practice? very commonly, none. This formality is complied with, as so many others are complied with, without thinking of what it means, partly from duty, and partly from habit. Sometimes it may be useful, because it always includes admonition, and sometimes threatening, according to the proportion between the fine threatened, and the punishment which would have had place without it: sometimes, for want of sureties, it may be believed that the accused himself may go to prison: sometimes, after having found them, it may equally be believed that they may incur the fine, and that they pay it, or go to prison, with or without him. Do these misfortunes frequently happen? I know not. How can I know? This is one of those thousand things on which everybody ought to be instructed, and of which no one can find an opportunity of learning the truth.

CHAPTER IV.

DEFEAZANCE OF PUNISHMENT.

§ 1.—

Of Pardon.

It is necessary to increase the magnitude of a punishment in proportion as it is wanting in certainty. The less certain your punishments are, the more severe they must be; the more certain your punishments are, the more you may reduce their severity.

What shall we then say of a power expressly established for rendering them uncertain? I mean, the power of pardoning: it has cruelty for its cause; it has cruelty for its effect.

Among nations, as among individuals, the government of the passions precedes that of reason. The object of primitive punishments was to assuage the rage of their authors. Of this there are two proofs: the first is drawn from the multitude of cases in which the most severe punishments have been lavished upon actions which have but a slightly hurtful influence upon the happiness of individuals or society, and with respect to which, such evil influence was not sought to be established till long after these punishments were appointed: of this kind are the punishments directed against heresy. The second is drawn from the praises lavished upon clemency: for whilst the effect of an offence is only to enrage the sovereign, there is merit in his abstaining from punishing it. There is utility in his so doing, for by a privation which is borne by him alone, he spares the infliction of terrible evils upon a multitude of persons. In this consists the difficulty; for it is difficult for a man accustomed to follow the bent of his inclinations, to restrain them. Suppose the effect of a crime is to interrupt his ease, and the effect of the punishment is to repress this crime: to abstain from the application of this punishment is a treason of which the most pardonable sources are feebleness or folly. To praise the elemency of the sovereign upon this supposition, is to praise the surgeon who allows his patient to perish by not cutting off a gangrened finger. Among sovereigns, therefore, without cruelty, the use of unmerited pardons could not take place: the reason is, an enlightened love of the public welfare does not engage him in undoing with one hand what he had done with the other. If the punishments have not had, for the cause of their establishment, cruelty towards individuals, it is cruelty towards the public to render them useless—to violate his promise, the engagement which he has made to the laws to put them in execution.

I speak here of gratuitous pardons, such as all pardons have hitherto been. There are cases in which the power of pardoning is not only useful, but necessary. In all these cases, if the punishment were inflicted, the evil produced would exceed the good, and, in some cases, almost infinitely. If the legislator could have known that certain individual cases would or would not be included in the general case in which he would have wished that the punishment should cease, he would act unwisely were he to rely upon any other person for its cessation. For why should he give to another a power to frustrate his designs? But he does not possess this knowledge, unless, in quality of legislator, he acts also in that of a prophet. It follows, therefore, that he must rely upon some other.

In English law, one method by which the law gives to a party injured, or rather to every prosecutor, a partial power of pardon, consists in giving him the choice of the kind of action which he will commence. On this, or on the difference between the actions, depends a difference between the punishments: so far as the happening of this difference is concerned, the lot of the offender depends not on the gravity of his offence, but on some other foreign circumstances; such as the degree of the ill-will of the party injured, or other prosecutor, or of the knowledge of his legal advisers. The judge is a puppet in the hands of any prosecutor, which he can cause to move at his pleasure and caprice.

There are many persons, as we have seen, who exercise the power of pardoning: there are many others who possess it, who are not observed.

Among the latter class may be placed those who have the power of placing nullities in the course of procedure. In England, an attorney, or his clerk, any copying clerk at eighteen-pence or two shillings per day, may grant or sell impunity to whomsoever it seems them good.

If the individual injured can directly, or indirectly, put an end to a criminal process, otherwise than by the punishment before the judgment has been pronounced, and, in case of conviction, executed, he enjoys in effect this right of pardoning. The right of remission is, then, one branch of the power of pardoning. When the interest of the public requires that the punishment should take place, the individual injured ought not to enjoy this right: when this interest does not require it, he may enjoy it.

This power may be allowed in all cases, when the offence on which it operates, being founded only in a private quarrel, does not spread any alarm through society, or at least does not spread any alarm which the conduct of the parties does not destroy.

But in the case of corporal injuries, how trifling soever, and especially in the case of injuries accompanied with insult, this remission ought not to be allowed without the knowledge of the judge; otherwise the weakness and good-nature of some minds would serve to draw down upon them vexation from hardened oppressors.

Homicide is a case in which the power of remission ought not to be allowed to any one in particular. It would, in effect, be to grant to him an arbitrary power over the life of those whose death he might thus pardon: he might boldly employ any assassin, by exercising in favour of that assassin his power of pardoning.

If to grant to any one whatsoever, the power of taking away a reward offered by the legislator, would be regarded as an absurdity, to grant the power of taking away a punishment in the opposite case, with the reserve of specific exceptions, would be a more terrible absurdity.

This absurdity is not found in the system of rewards: no person proposes to take away a reward after the legislator has offered it; the nullitics, however, allowed in prosecutions, when he has appointed a reward for offenders, operates to this effect in the case of punishment.

The frequency of capital punishment is one of the most probable causes of the popularity of pardons.

In England, it may therefore admit of debate, whether the legislature has done most evil by appointing so many capital punishments, or the sovereign, by exercising his power of remitting them.

The essence of this power is, to act by caprice. The king, as it is falsely said,—the deputy of the king, as it ought to have been said—does not act judicially: he does not act from a knowledge of the matter; he has not the power of doing so; he has not even the power of compelling the attendance of witnesses. Is a lie told before this powerless despot? it is an unpunishable lie.

The power of pardoning is often said to be one of the brightest jewels in the royal crown: it is burdensome as it is bright, not only to those who submit to the crown, but still more so to him also who wears it.

Many cases have occurred in England, in which the counsellors of the crown have, from more or less praiseworthy motives, made use of this lawful despotism of the king, to soften the tyranny of the laws. Never was power so undoubtedly legal, though undue, employed for a mere legitimate purpose:—the result, however, has been, not that the minister has been applauded as he deserved, but that he has become the object of clamour, libels, and threats. The most correct and legitimate exercise of the powers impolitically attached to his character, has only served to draw down upon the king that treatment which a tyrant would have merited.

How much discontent and fear would have been spared, if a right, legally abusive, had given place to an enlightened and well-ordered law!

§ 2.

By Length of Time.

Ought punishment, in any cases, and in what, to be defeasible by length of time—by the time, I mean, that has elapsed since the commission of the offence?

At first view, the answer seems to be clearly in the negative; for what, it may be said, has the circumstance of the length of time to do with the demand there is for punishment?

Upon a nearer view, however, it will be found, that the utility of prescription in certain cases is maintainable by specious, at least, if not conclusive arguments.

As a foundation for these arguments, it must be admitted, that if in any case the suffering of the delinquent is not necessary for the attainment of the ends of punishment, the punishment ought not to be inflicted.

This being premised, it should seem, that in a view to one of the ends of punishment, to wit, reformation, the execution of it after a certain length of time is not necessary. A certain number of years, suppose ten, has elapsed since he committed the offence: now then, in all this time, either he has committed similar offences, or he has not. If he has not, he has reformed himself, and the purpose of the law has been answered without punishment: if he has, he has been punished for subsequent offences, and the discipline he stood in need of has been already administered to him, at a time when he stood more in need of it than he can be supposed to stand at present.

Thus stands the argument upon the ground of reformation: but of the facts alleged, one, it must be confessed, is rather problematical. If a man commit an offence, and is forthcoming ten years afterwards, it is by no means clear, from his not having been punished for any similar offences, that he has not committed any. In the same manner that he escaped detection or prosecution for the first, he may have escaped detection or prosecution for any number of other similar offences. The difficulty of detection, the death of witnesses, the subtleties of procedure, are circumstances that afford ample grounds for disputing the force of the inference, from his not having incurred punishment, to his not having deserved it.*

Upon the ground of example, there is still less to be said in favour of prescription. If the prescription is not to take place till at the end of a long period, as ten years (the number above taken for an example), it will not contribute, in any assignable degree, to lessen the apparent value of the punishment. When a man meditates a crime, his great fear is the being detected and apprehended, immediately almost upon the commission of it. The taking away the danger that would await him at the end of ten years, will add very little to his security.†

When a crime has been committed, either the person only who committed it may remain unknown, or the fact‡ itself, as well as the person. If either be unknown, it is plain no prosecution can have been set on foot: if both be known, then either a prosecution may have been set on foot or not. It is only in case of there being no prosecution, that prescription has ever been allowed. The rule is, that a man shall not be prosecuted after that interval has elapsed—not that, if he has been prosecuted and convicted, he shall not suffer.

The apprehension of danger commences at the time of the discovery. Persons who are about the criminal now understand that they have among them a thief, a robber, or a murderer: this cannot but give them some alarm. If no punishment at all is to be inflicted on him, if he is suffered to go on and live where he did before, how is this alarm to be quieted?

In crimes, the object of which is a pecuniary profit, prescription ought not in any case to operate so as to protect the delinquent in the enjoyment of his ill-gotten acquisition.

Neither ought it to operate in such manner as to leave innocent persons exposed to suffer from their terror or abhorrence of the criminal.

There are also certain crimes, in respect of which prescription ought not to be adopted in any case. Such are three species of homicide: viz. homicide for lucre, through wantonness, or from premeditated resentment; incendiarism; and the offence of sinking a vessel manned, or of laying a country under water. The mischief of crimes of these kinds is so great, that it seems paying too great a regard to the interests of the criminal to adopt a rule that may contribute, though in ever so small a degree, to lessen the apparent certainty of the punishment; and the horror or terror a fact of any of those kinds inspires when discovered, is so great, that that circumstance alone seems enough to overweigh any good that could be gained by it.

What is the good in view in prescription? It is the interest of one single person that is in question—the delinquent; the sparing of that single person from a suffering which it is supposed it may, in the case in which it is proposed the prescription should take place, not be necessary, at least not so necessary as formerly, to the purposes of punishment to inflict. Now, when it is a crime by which men are exposed to suffer in their individual capacities, it can scarcely be detected, but a multitude of persons must begin to suffer; to wit, by the apprehension of his committing other such crimes in future, of which they may chance to be the objects: and this suffering of theirs will continue till he be manifestly disabled to hurt them; the least penal method of doing which, is to send him out of the way.

Upon this slight examination, we perceive that the utility of prescription will vary greatly in respect of different offences. To discuss this topic completely, it would be necessary, therefore, to consider it with a view to the several sorts of offences. To do this fully, belongs not to our present subject: all we can do in this place is to offer a few general hints, just to put us in the way, and to serve as a clew to indicate the principal points upon which the inquiry ought to turn.

Whether a given person, detected, after such a length of time, of a crime of the sort in question, is or is not an object of terror to those around him, is a question that can be answered only by a particular inquiry: it is a matter, therefore, that ought rather to be committed to the magistrate who has the power of pardoning, than to be provided for by a general law.

§ 3.

By Death of Parties.

In pursuit of (the means of making) compensation, the business of punishment is apt to be overlooked. When one man, the party injured, is presented with what another man, the injurer, is made to pay, men are apt to take it for granted, and at first asking would be apt to answer, that there is no punishment in the case. They imagine, but hastily and erroneously, that the only person who has suffered by the offence is that party who is the immediate object of the injury. If, then, that person, by an operation of law, be made to enjoy as much as by the offence he had been made to suffer, they conclude (and justly enough, were the foundation true) that everything is set to rights, and that the law has nothing more to do. The pain which the offender is made to suffer by being made to give up what the party injured is made to enjoy, they do not look upon in the light of punishment. They look upon it as a circumstance resulting, accidentally and unintentionally, out of the operation by which an indemnification is produced to the injured party, so that it would be but so much the better if that pain could be altogether spared; and it is for want of being able to save it, that it is suffered to exist. In short, so entirely is the idea of punishment lost in that of compensation, that a law which appoints the latter, is not understood to appoint the former; is not looked upon as a penal law.

Punish, however, it must. A penal law, in one sense of the word, it must be, if it is to have any effect at all in preventing the practice which is productive of the mischief it means to cure; and it is by punishing that it does more good than by indemnifying. For of the two ends, prevention and compensation, the former, as has been proved, is by much the most important.

This neglect, however, of the principal end of laws made in restraint of private injuries, has not been attended with all the ill consequences that might at first sight be imagined. The indemnification being made to come out of the pocket of the aggressor, has produced the punishment of course. Now, under the laws of most nations, in most instances of acknowledged injuries, indemnification has been exacted, and by that means, in most cases, it has happened that punishment has been applied. Yet not in all; because compensation has been made defeasible by contingencies: I say in most, but it has not in all; for there are two events by which in all these cases indemnification is rendered not necessary in so great a degree as it was before, and, as it may appear upon a superficial glance, not necessary at all. In effect, upon the happening of either of these two events, under most laws, and particularly under our own, the obligation of making compensation has been cancelled. At the same time, compensation being the only object in view, this being taken away, punishment has of course dropped along with it. But in these cases, as I hope soon to make appear, howsoever it may stand with compensation, the demand for punishment has not been lessened by either of the events in question.

These are—1st, The death of the injurer; 2dly, The death of the party injured.

1. The death of the injurer has been deemed to take away the occasion for indemnification. The reason that occurs is, that there is nobody to give it. Had he continued alive, he ought to have given it, doubtless; but as he is gone, who ought then? why one person rather than another?

To answer these questions at large, we must make a distinction according to the nature of the offence. The offence is either attended with a transferable profit, a fruit transmissible to the representatives of the offender, or not. In the first case, the obligation of making compensation ought clearly to devolve on the representative, on the score of punishment, if on no other. In the latter case, there would still be one use in its being made to devolve on the representative, as far as the possessions he inherits from the party deceased extend, though not so great a use as in the former case.

Where the profit of a transgression is transmissible to a representative, the obligation of restoring the amount of it ought likewise to devolve on him: if not, the punishment would not, in the case in question, be equal to the profit; in fact, there would be no punishment at all, no motive for the party under temptation to abstain from it. It may occur for the first moment (but it will soon appear to be otherwise) that neither will there in contemplation of this case be any temptation; for if the injurer thinks himself about to die, there will be an end of the profit of the injury. But this is not the case: should he be made to lose it ever so soon himself, he may transmit it to those who are dear to him, so that the pleasure of sympathy, grounded on the contemplation of their enjoyment, is a clear force that acts without controul, and impels him to transgression. Besides this, the delays and uncertainty of justice add still to the force of the temptation. If he can contrive to spin out the suit so long as he lives, the whole business, from beginning to end, is clear gain to him.

2. Even though the profit of a transgression be not of such a nature as to be transmissible to a representative, there seems still to be a reason why the obligation of making amends ought to devolve on the representatives, as far as they have assets.* Such an arrangement would be eligible, as well on account of punishment as of compensation:

On account of compensation, for the following reasons: The mischief of the transgression is a burthen that must be borne by somebody: the representative and the party injured are equally innocent in this respect—they stand upon a par; but the representative would suffer less under the same burthen than the party injured, as we shall presently perceive. From the moment when the injury was conceived, the party injured, in virtue of the known disposition of the law in his favour, entertained expectations of receiving amends. If these expectations are disappointed by a sudden and unforeseen event, like that of the delinquent’s death, a shock is felt by the party injured, such as he would feel at the sudden loss of anything of which he was in possession. The eventual representative entertained no such determinate expectations: what expectation he could entertain in the lifetime of his predecessor, respected only the clear surplus of his fortune—what should remain of it after the deduction of all charges that might be brought upon it by his misfortunes, his follies, or his crimes.

On account of punishment, for the following reason: The punishment of the delinquent in his own person is a punishment which fails upon his death: the burthen thrown upon those who are dear to him, extends his punishment, as it were, beyond the grave. Their suffering, it is true, will, for the reasons above given, not be very considerable; but this is what the bulk of mankind are not apt to consider. It will be apt, therefore, in general, to appear to him in the light of punishment, and will contribute to impose a restraint on him in a case in which, otherwise, there would be none. Nor will this advantage, in point of punishment, be charged with that expense, which renders punishments in alienam personam generally ineligible; for when the burthen is made to rest on the representative who has assets, there is less suffering, as we have shown, upon the whole, than if it were to rest upon any other person.

The law of England on this head is full of absurdity and caprice. The following are the instances in which (the heir is permitted to enrich himself by the wrong-doing of his ancestor) a man is permitted to enrich his heir with the profit of his crimes:† By the wrongful taking and withholding of any kind of moveables, while, if it had been by only withholding money due, the heir must have refunded;—by the waste committed on immoveables, in which he has only a temporary interest;‡ —by selling to a prisoner for debt his liberty;—by embezzling property entrusted to him by will, though, if he had not broken any such confidence, but had intruded himself into the management of the dead man’s property without warrant, the heir must have refunded;—in short, by any kind of injurious proceeding, where the compensation, instead of being left to the discretion of a jury, is thought fit to be increased and liquidated by a positive regulation.

The death of the party injured is another event upon which the obligation of making amends is very commonly made to cease; but with full as little reason, it should seem, as in the former case. The death of the party in question is a contingency which does not at all lessen the demand there is for punishment. For compensation, indeed, the demand is not altogether so strong in this case, as in the former: the person who was the immediate object of the injury, entertained a prospect of reaping, in present, the whole profit of a compensation he expected to be adjudged to him: his representative did not, during the lifetime of the principal, entertain so fixed a prospect; he, however, entertained a full prospect of some compensation to be made to his principal; and he entertained a prospect of a part, at least, of that compensation devolving upon himself, subject to the contingencies to which his general expectations from the principal were exposed. This expectation is more than any one else was in a situation to entertain; so that there is a better reason why he should reap the profit of the punishment, than why any one else should.

The law of England has been more liberal in the remedies it has given to the heir of the party injured, than in those which it has given against the heir of a wrong-doer. It gives it to the heir in all cases, as it should seem, of injuries done to the property of the ancestor. It denies it, however, in the case of injuries to the person,* be they ever so atrocious; and, probably, in the case of injuries to the reputation. This omission leaves an open door to the most crying evils. Age and infirmity, which ought, if any difference be made, to receive a more signal protection from the law, than the opposite conditions of life, are exposed more particularly to oppression. The nearer a man is to his grave, the greater is the probability that he may be injured with impunity, since, if the prosecution can be staved off during his life, the remedy is gone.† The remedy, by a criminal prosecution, is but an inadequate succedaneum. It extends not to injuries done to the person through negligence, nor to all injuries to the reputation: it is defeasible by the arbitrary pleasure and irresponsible act of a servant of the crown: it operates only in the way of punishment, affording no compensation to the heir.

After so many instances where no satisfaction is exigible from the heir for transgressions by which he profits, no one will wonder to find him standing exempt from that obligation in the case of such injuries as, being inflicted commonly, not from rapacious, but merely vindictive motives, are not commonly attended with any pecuniary profit. Such are those done to the person, or to the reputation, or in the way of mere destruction to the property. So accordingly stands the law;‡ though there are none of them by which the injurer may not, in a multitude of cases, draw indirectly a pecuniary profit: for instance, in the case of a rivalry in manufactures, where one man destroys the manufactory of his more successful rival.

APPENDIX—

ON DEATH-PUNISHMENT.∥

JEREMY BENTHAM TO HIS FELLOW-CITIZENS OF FRANCE.

§ I.

Introduction.

Fellow-Citizens!—Hear me speak a second time!

1. Among the topics of the day§ I behold the punishment of death. Shall it be abolished?

2. This question is of the number of those which for threescore years or thereabouts have been familiar to me: for these eightand-twenty years my thoughts on subjects of this nature have had the honour and good fortune of being viewed among you with eyes not altogether unfavourable: of these thoughts some there are, which, if capable of being of use at any time, present a better chance of being so at the present than at any other; and, moreover, as not being very likely to make their appearance from any other quarter. Put together, these reasons will (I flatter myself) be regarded as affording a tolerably sufficient warrant for this address.¶

3. Now, then, as to this same question. The punishment of death—shall it be abolished? I answer—Yes. Shall there be any exception to this rule? I answer, so far as regards subsequential offences, No: meaning, by subsequential, an offence committed on any day subsequent to that which stands appointed by the law, as that after which no such act of punishment shall be performed.

4. Meantime, on the part of rulers, general custom—general at least, not to say universal—delivers its testimony in favour of this punishment. This considered, a consequence is—that to justify the abolition of it, determinate reasons are requisite: this I cannot but acknowledge.

5. Well, then, various features of inaptitude—features peculiar to itself—features such as, when taken together, will be seen to be absolutely conclusive—I have to charge it with. Inaptitude is a term of reference:—subject-matter of reference, the end in view. End in view, on the present occasion, prevention of the like acts of maleficence in future. This is, at any rate, the main end: any others, of which mention may come to be made, will be seen to be of no other than subordinate importance.

6. Features of inaptitude, or say, in other words, bad properties. Here they follow:—

i. Bad property the first—Inefficiency:—comparative inefficiency—inefficiency, in comparison with other modes of punishment.

ii. Bad property the second—Irremissibility:—incapacity of being remitted as to the remainder, after a part has been undergone.

iii. Bad property the third—Positive maleficence:—tendency to produce crimes.

iv. Bad property the fourth—Enhancing the evils produced by ill-applied pardon.—Under these several heads, explanations will follow.

7. In favour of this punishment—in support of it against the argument afforded by the proof of all these its bad properties—the only argument adducible will be found to be—that presumption of its aptitude which is afforded by the extensiveness, as above, of the acceptance given to it. This presumption will be seen repelled, by indication made of the sources of the attachment to it thus manifested by rulers—sources, among which will not be found any experience of its comparative conduciveness to the only proper ends to which it is or can be directed.

8. To the proof of the bad properties thus charged upon it, you will see added the proof afforded of its needlessness: afforded—by experiments actually made, and the experience thereby obtained.

Should all these truths be rendered manifest and incontestable, can any further reason or argument in support of the proposed abolition of it be desired?

9. But, in and for the cases in which, at present, application is made of it, a succedaneum to it will be necessary. A succedaneum preferable to it in every imaginable particular will accordingly be indicated, and proposed for your consideration.

§ II.—i.

Bad property the first—Inefficiency.

I.—1. Now, then, for bad property the first—Inefficiency: that is to say, with reference to that same end in view, namely, prevention of acts similar to that in consideration of which application is made of it: I mean, acts on the part of individuals, other than the one to whom, on the individual occasion in question, it is applied; for, as to that one, the efficiency of it in this respect cannot (it must be confessed) be disputed.

2. Causes of this inefficiency, these—

i.Cause the first. On the part of the several descriptions of persons whose co-operation is necessary to the conviction of the criminal, reluctance as to the performance of their respective parts in the melancholy drama. These persons are—

• i. The Informer or Informers.
• ii. Prosecutor or Prosecutors.
• iii. Witnesses.
• iv. Judges.
• v. Where Jury-trial is in use, Jurymen.

In any one of these several situations, let but the necessary service be withheld, the denunciation made of this punishment fails of being productive of the preventive effect looked for and endeavoured to be produced.

3. ii.Cause the second. On the part of the delinquent himself—that is to say, on the part of persons at large, considered as standing exposed to the temptation of becoming delinquents in this shape—comparative insensibility to the danger of punishment in this shape:—as to this matter, presently.

4. Look first at cause the first. Prodigious is the counteracting force with which you will see this same reluctance tending to destroy the efficiency of this mode of punishment:—prodigious, in comparison of that with which it acts in relation to any other mode.

5. And, as the dissocial affections decrease in strength, and the social increase—in a word, as civilization advances—the reluctance to contribute to the infliction of this punishment will increase: so, therefore, in the eyes of the individual in question, the apparent improbability of its infliction, and thence in his instance the probability of its being without effect.

6. Now for a measure of the degree of this same reluctance. Would you have an instructive one? Take, for the subject-matter of observation, a place, in which sympathy, for sufferings ordained by law, may be stated as being at its minimum—the heart of an English judge.

7. Case, prosecution for theft. Subject-matter, nine and thirty pieces of gold; value, nine and thirty pounds sterling: Judge’s charge,—Gentlemen of the Jury, find the value nine and thirty shillings. Note, that, in England—the verdicts of jurymen are given on their oaths; and that the breach of an oath is termed perjury; and to induce a man to commit perjury, is termed subornation of perjury.

8. For what purpose, then, this subornation? For the purpose of preventing the execution of the law:—that law which he too is sworn to execute. Why thus seek to prevent the execution of the law? Because, by the law in question, where the value of the subject-matter of a theft was as high as forty shillings, no less punishment was allowed to be inflicted than a sort of olla podrida, called felony, of the ingredients of which death was one: and at the expense of this compound of perjury and subornation of perjury, and not otherwise, the substitution of a different punishment to death-punishment, on these terms, and no others, was effectible. Recommendation, given to a jury—to this effect, and with this effect—has long been a common practice.

9. When such is the reluctance, in a heart of such hardness as that of an English judge, steeled against all generous affections by sinister interest with the accompanying prejudices, think what it must be in a heart of average consistence, in the several other situations above mentioned.

10. Fellow-Citizens! who can now doubt but that, of the reluctance thus produced, impunity in vast abundance must have been the effect? And of the impunity, increase in the multitude of the several crimes: effect actually produced, the reverse of the effect intended, and supposed to be produced?

11. Is there any other punishment, in regard to which any such reluctance can be seen to have place? No, not one.

12. Think of the multitudes of men, of so many different classes, whose breasts one inclination or other employs itself in hardening against impressions from the fear of sufferance in this shape.

i. Military men, against death by warfare.

ii. Men of education, against death by duelling. In this case, the fact of the insensibility is out of dispute: its propriety is a consideration that belongs not to the present purpose.

iii. Seafaring men, of the non-military, as well as the military class.

iv. Men engaged for subsistence, in various occupations, in greater or less degree unhealthy.

But—why all this rambling? this resort to other countries? The question is a local one. Insensibility—to what? to the fear of death. In what place? In the hearts of Frenchmen. Wanted, for the occasion, a measure for the force of this quality. Fellow-Citizens! would you have a correct one? Look at home: Look at the work of the Three Days!

§ III.—ii.

Bad Property the second—Irremissibility.

1. For this purpose, punishments may be distinguished into continuous and instantaneous: continuous, those which, being in their nature capable of continuing to be inflicted and suffered, for and during a length of time more or less considerable, may, after having been suffered for and during a part of that same time, be made to cease as to what remains of them: instaneous, such of which, if any part is suffered, so is every other part. Of the instantaneous, and in this sense, of the irremissible sort, is (as every one sees) death punishment.

2. By remission, understand—not prevention of the whole, but, after a part has been already undergone, prevention of the remainder.

3. Whatsoever, on the occasion in question, may be the demand for the remission of the punishment—death-punishment being thus instantaneous, is not capable of being remitted; consequently, in every case in which justice requires such remission, it is productive of injustice.

4. Of occasions, on which it may be manifestly desirable, that the punishment which a man has been sentenced to suffer should thus be remitted,—examples (you will see) are these:—

i. Discovery of the innocence of the supposed criminal.

ii. Special service, in some determinate shape, capable of being rendered—by the criminal in question, and not by any other person.

iii. Indication, for example, of evidence probative of delinquency, in any shape, on the part of some other person.

iv. Or, of innocence on the part of some other person, who otherwise would have been convicted of delinquency, no matter in what shape.

v. Special service, in any other shape whatsoever, in which service can be rendered to mankind.

5. Death-punishment is thus rendered unapt—in comparison, not only of all continuous, but of other instantaneous punishments; for, in the case of every such punishment—mulct, pillory, whipping, for example—after the punishment has been undergone, there the man is, in a capacity of receiving satisfaction, in the shape of compensation, and whatever other shapes may be indicated—by the nature of the supposed offence committed, the punishment undergone, and the circumstances of the individual sufferer; in such sort that, suffering and satisfaction taken together, he may be—not a sufferer, but rather a gainer, upon the balance of the account.

6. And note—that, at the charge of some fund or other, satisfaction in the pecuniary shape, say in one word compensation, the man should be made to receive, in every case; that is to say, at the charge of individual witnesses and prosecutors, one or both, wherever the falsehood, by which the conviction was produced, had evil consciousness or temerity for its accompaniment on their part: failing that private fund—then at the charge of the public fund.

7. And thus it is—that, not only is death-punishment a punishment, of the infliction of which irreparable wrong may be the consequence; but it is the only mode of punishment of which so deplorable a result is a necessary consequence.

8. The comparative inefficiency of this punishment, in consequence of men’s reluctance to contribute to the infliction of it, has just been brought to view. To that same inefficiency, this same irremissibility cannot but be, in a greater or less degree, contributory. By the thought—that, should the suffering which his testimony, if given, will be productive of, turn out to be wrongful, the wrong will be irreparable,—can it be, but that a man will be restrained from delivering such testimony, on many an occasion on which he would have delivered it, had the punishment been of no other sort than one, of which, if eventually found undue, the remainder might be remitted,—and, for the part already undergone, reparation made? Reader! whoever you are, put this question to yourself, and make answer to it.

§ IV.—III.

Bad property the third—Tendency to produce Crimes.

1. Now comes bad property the third—Tendency of this punishment to produce crime. Paradoxical as it may seem,—the proposition by which this property is attributed to this same punishment, is not the less true. For this so extraordinary a property, it is indebted to its capacity of being applied to the extinction of evidence. For, you will see immediately, whatsoever evil is producible by false evidence, that same evil is producible by extinction of true evidence.

2. By false evidence, a man may be invested with a right that does not belong to him; he may be divested of a right that does belong to him: so, therefore, may he by extinction of true evidence.

3. By false evidence, a guiltless man may be made to suffer punishment, whether in the shape of death-punishment, or any other; a guilty man may be acquittal be exempted from all punishment—and, unreclaimed, let loose upon society, to add to the number of his crimes. So likewise may evil in these shapes be produced, by extinction of true evidence.

4. But, if any sort of crime there be, to which death-punishment is attached,—then so it is—that, by prosecution, as for a crime of that sort, with false evidence for the support of it, and conviction thereupon pronounced, may a man be put out of the way,—and the evidence, which he would have delivered on the occasion of such other suit, extinguished.

5. In this case, here is a man, who has been seduced and converted into a murderer. Seduced? and by whom? Even by the law herself, who has thus put arms into his hands, having prepared the judge and his subordinates to serve him in the character of instruments and accomplices. And thus it is—that, by means of death-punishment, may be produced—wrongs and crimes to any amount, which would not otherwise have had place.

6. In a word, death-punishment puts it in the power of any ill-disposed person, by extinction put upon true evidence, to produce any evil, producible by him by means of false evidence. By no other mode of punishment can evil, in this shape, be produced.

§ V.—IV.

Bad property the fourth—Enhancing the evil effects of undue Pardon.

1. Throughout the civilized world, pardon is as yet upon an unapt footing: and of this inaptitude, death-punishment is the main cause. Fellow-Citizens! you look for explanation: here it follows.

2. Punishment is everywhere an evil; but everywhere a necessary one: punishment, that is to say, suffering applied purposely by public functionaries. No punishment, no government; no government, no political society.

3. Punishment is everywhere necessary: the application of it is everywhere a necessary part of judicial procedure. But of that same procedure, power of pardon is moreover a requisite part; power of pardon, that is to say, as above, power of arresting the hands of the judge, and preventing him from applying punishment, notwithstanding that demand for it, which the conviction of the accused has proved to have place. Requisite, I say—not necessary: for, without the existence of any such power, government might be anywhere carried on. But in this case, evils of no small magnitude would unavoidably have place—evils which, by apt application of pardon-power, may be excluded; and, by such application as is actually made of them,—are, in a degree more or less considerable, everywhere excluded.

4. On the other hand,—evils there are, which are liable to be produced by pardon-power where unaptly applied; and, unaptly applied it is,—when applied otherwise than under certain restrictions, of which presently. Not inconsiderable will these same evils be seen to be: and, in death-punishment you will see a main cause of them.

5. In what way? you ask. I answer—in this way. Whenever monarchy has place,—a public functionary there is, in whose hands pardon-power has place; and the monarch is that functionary. How the case stands in this respect under a pure aristocracy, as in Switzerland,—how, in a representative democracy, as in the Anglo-American United States,—I stay not to inquire: to the present purpose any such inquiry would be irrelevant: only that you may see they are not overlooked, is this brief mention made of those cases.

6. You—so long as you have a king—you will have a functionary, in whose hands this same pardon-power will remain lodged. But, having in hand this power, he will have in hand an instrument, with which, if death has place in the list of punishments, it depends upon him, (unless restrained by conditions which will presently be brought to view)—yes, upon him it does depend, for the gratification of whatever may at any time be his desires, to produce evil without stint. Take for example murder: applying to murder this same power,—it depends upon him—to murder any man,—and as many men, as, at any time or times, it pleases him so to deal with; to apply to that purpose—not his own hands only, but any hand or hands, which, by remuneration, he can engage to lend themselves to this service. In a word, in this same power he possesses an instrument, which (always supposing death to have place on the list of punishments,) is, in the very nature of it, a perennial source of delusion corruption, and misrule, in every imaginable shape.

7. How so? you ask. I answer, thus: Wherever, with a title such as that of king, a monarch has place,—so it is that, under the influence of fear and hope, imagination has exalted him into a being of a superior order—a sort of god. In this god upon earth, the people behold the god of their idolatry:—image, deputy, and representative, of the God which is in heaven. As such they worship him, they bow down to him, they kneel to him, they pray to him. Whatsoever it is that he bids them do, that of course they feel disposed to do, repelling as undutiful the consideration of what may be the consequences. To this maleficent exaltation, death-punishment is in a prodigious degree contributory. In the hands of the God of heaven, is the power of life and death: so accordingly is it in the hands of this god upon earth; in his hands and no others. The God which is in heaven has his attributes: some of them belong to him in severalty; others he holds in joint-tenancy, having for partner this his likeness—the god upon earth. In the import of the word mercy is included, the supposition of the existence of a power of producing pain and pleasure—of producing it in cases, in which the production of it is not required by justice; or, on any other score, by the greatest-happiness principle. Mercy is of the number of the attributes of the God of heaven: it is of the number of those, in which, by law, he has for partner, this his deputy—the god upon earth.

8. Thus mischievous is this same word mercy. In a Penal Code, having for its first principle the greatest-happiness principle,—no such word would have place.

9. Power on the one part is created by obedience on the other part: correspondent, with perfect exactness, is this same power with this same obedience: correspondent and proportionate; neither greater nor less. By whatever hand political power in any shape is holden, a perpetual operation of it is—the pushing the power onwards, in every direction in which the man finds obedience yielding to it, and in every such hand, the abuse of this same power, except in so far as kept down by appropriate checks,—rises in proportion to the quantity of it.

10. Fellow-Citizens! certain restrictions (I have said) there are, without which, by this same power, evils cannot fail to be produced. The restrictions I had thus in view, are these which follow:—

11. i. Restriction the first.—No pardon granted, but on condition—that, to the fact of its being granted, and the grounds on which it is grounded, the same publicity be given as to the fact, and ground of the conviction.

12. Proper grounds for pardon, these:—

i. Multitude of the delinquents. This applies, of course, not to any one separately considered, but to a part of the number:—a part, greater or less, according to the circumstances of the individual case.

ii. Since the conviction, discovery made of the convict’s non-guiltiness.

iii. On condition of receipt of the pardon, and not otherwise, special service in any shape rendered, or on adequate grounds expected to be rendered, by the convict; such service not being otherwise obtainable on such good terms.

iv. Special service, in the particular shape of indication made,—of not less maleficent delinquency on the same occasion, or on any other occasion, on the part of some other individual; or needful evidence afforded, such as is not extractible from the delinquent himself.

v. In case of infliction, apprehension of displeasure at the hands of the people.

vi. In case of infliction, apprehension of displeasure at the hands of this or that foreign power.

13. What! says somebody,—if the remission has for its ground—apprehension of displeasure at the hands of the people, or at the hand of a foreign power, would any such allegation be compatible with the dignity of the government? would it not be a confession of weakness? I answer—Against this evil, such as it is, the door might be shut without difficulty. Whether it has place or no, depends on the complexion given to the discourse, which on this occasion is employed: in the case where the people were in question, a tone of sympathy, or say of paternal condescension, would be the tone proper to be assumed: in the case where a foreign power was in question, a tone of civility and general desire of amity.

14. As to the time of the publicity, both that, and the time of the pardon, might and should be left to be appointed by the powerholder in question, and left to be determined by circumstances. In many, if not in most, cases of special service, what might happen is, that by the publicity the service expected would be prevented from being received.

15. ii. Restriction the second.—As to the relative time of the grant of the pardon on the ground of special service—the grant should not be made, unless and until the service had been performed: in other words, it should be made conditional; and the condition should be—actual receipt of the expected service: or at any rate, performance of so much as depended upon the individual in question towards the receipt of it. Reason—But for this condition, the ground in question might, where it had no existence, (no such service being so much as expected) be successfully employed as a pretence for pardon, in cases in which pardon was unmeet.

16. iii. Restriction the third.—In the mean time, instead of definitive, the remission might be temporary, or say—in the word commonly employed—a respite.

17. iv. Restriction the fourth.—Where, to the particular ground of the pardon—namely, the particular service thus performed—publicity is not given at the time of the publicity given to the pardon itself,—still, to the general ground—special service expected, the publicity might be given, and, on the same occasion, an engagement entered into—to give publicity to the particulars of the service, so soon as that could be done without detriment to the public interest.

18. v. Restriction the fifth.—Lest this engagement should be a pretence,—a list should be kept of all these cases of publicity delayed: and, at the recurrence of some certain period—twelve months, for example—publicity should be given to a list of those several engagements: the notice, requisite for explanations and justification, being, in the instance of each delinquent, inserted under appropriate heads.

19. From pardon-power unrestricted, comes impunity to delinquency in all shapes: from impunity to delinquency in all shapes, impunity to maleficence in all shapes: from impunity to maleficence in all shapes, dissolution of government: from dissolution of government, dissolution of political society.

20. All this while, no such sweeping results have place. Whence happens this? Only from the influence of two causes:—1. One is—on the part of those on whose hands the power of pardon is lodged, non-existence of sinister interest adequate to the production of such result: on the contrary, existence of an interest adequate to the prevention of it. 2. The other is—the preventive tutelary power of public opinion.

21. Still, only in part is it—that, by their united power, these two causes have the effect of warding off this calamitous state of things. As to the first,—to no inconsiderable degree, as you will see, the functionaries in whose hands the power of pardoning is lodged, have an interest, and that an adequate, and but too effective interest, in the production of the evils in question: as to the second—namely, public opinion,—you will see it is itself influenced and determined, by those same men, who are thus under the dominion of that same sinister interest; and that to such a degree, that they are, actually and purposely, instrumental in giving birth to these same evils.

22. Then as to death. That being the case, you will see how it is—that, in the place which death has in the list of punishments, originates so large a portion of that same sinister interest, and at the same time of the power of giving effect to it. This is what you will see immediately, when the cause of the attachment of rulers in general to this mode of punishment, comes to be brought to view: from all which you will see—how important it is that those same restrictive applications should accordingly be made.

§ VI.

Causes of the general approval of it.

1. But (says somebody)—the application so universally made of it—is not this a strong presumptive proof of the need there is of it? Is it not everywhere in use? in use under every form of government? What is more—is it not generally, is it not almost universally, approved? by some a more, by others a less extended application of it? by almost everybody, to some cases, approved, or at any rate to one case—the case of murder—the application of it? Here, then, is not public opinion thus decidedly, and to this degree, in favour of it? Exists there, then, in the whole business of government, a practice, in favour of which a more strongly presumptive proof has place, than that which is seen to plead in favour of this? Of the application made of it in practice, the cause (you say) may be seen in the interest of kings—that sinister interest which you have been holding up to view:—but—public opinion—does not public opinion likewise thus declare in favour of it? and, in the maintenance of this or any other practice in use, on the part of kings or any other rulers, can public opinion have any such, or any other, sinister interest?

I answer—the case is—that, in regard to this practice, public opinion has a sinister interest. Public opinion is—in every country, where civilization and aristocracy have place—the child and disciple of aristocracy; and, in the sinister interest, by which monarchy is wedded to this practice, aristocracy has no small share.

2. Moreover, not only, in one shape, is sinister interest created as above by power: but, in another shape also, it is created by pride; and, in this case too, aristocracy has its full share. Look now if this be not the case. Whatsoever presents itself as constituting the distinction between the higher and lower orders, the higher orders take a pleasure in the possession of: death-punishment presents itself to them as contributing to this distinction: for, wherever death has place, the lower are sure to stand more exposed to it than the higher orders.

3. Take for instance, depredation. In some cases, death-punishment has commonly been applied to this maleficent practice. What are those cases? Those in which it is more particularly the practice of the lower orders: for instance, highway robbery, house robbery, and pocket-picking, in the literal sense of the word: they having in indigence an excitement which does not so strongly apply to the higher orders.

4. In other cases, instead of death-punishment, the punishment applied to it is one, which, susceptible as it is of variation upon a scale of indefinite length—such as pecuniary punishments and imprisonment—may be at pleasure reduced to next to nothing. What are these cases? They are those, in which the maleficent forbidden practice is more particularly the practice of the higher orders: for instance, extortion, in which case it may be styled the crime of office—official situations being those by which are afforded the means necessary to the commission of it.

5. In other cases, again—instead of being punished, it is licensed and established by law. What are these cases? They are those, in which the maleficent practice is exclusively the practice of the higher orders: for instance, where sinecurism, pay of useless or needless offices, or overpay of useful and needful offices, is the shape in which it veils itself: sinecurism—a mode of obtaining money on false pretences.

6. So much for sinister interest. But, in support of death-punishment, acts, moreover, the never-failing offspring and accompaniment of sinister interest, interest-begotten prejudice.

7. Again—those who believe in the Christian religion, believe also in the Jewish religion; and under the Jewish religion, abundant was the application made of death-punishment; and thus may be seen authority-begotten prejudice operating in support of it.

8. Lastly, under all governments, from and ever since the earliest times, death-punishment has been in customary use: and thus may be seen primæval prejudice, and custom-begotten prejudice, testifying in favour of it, and operating in support of it. Several causes concurred in bringing it into, and have concurred in keeping it in, use:—1. The strength of the antipathy excited by the acts to which it was applied: 2. The influence which groundless antipathy had in the choice made of punishments in those rude ages, on which the light of the greatest-happiness principle had not yet dawned: 3. Personal interest, and aptitude for the purpose of vengeance, in the breasts of rulers: 4. The non-existence as yet of its present succedaneum—prison discipline: 5. The deficiency of prison-room, for want of the quantity of capital necessary to the establishment of it. Without need of recurring to its supposed efficiency, sufficient, surely, to account for the universality of death-punishment, is the sum of all these causes.

§ VII.

Its Inefficiency and Needlessness proved by experience.

1. Closed, on this subject, you have been seeing the eyes of rulers, and by what causes, against reason:—closed, behold them now, against experience.

2. On this subject, the following is the information, for which I find the question indebted, to our fellow-citizen—M. Lucas:—In Tuscany, in the whole interval between the abolition of death-punishment, in that Grand Duchy, by the Emperor Leopold, while Grand Duke—and the re-establishment of it—the average number of crimes was considerably less than those after that same reestablishment: length of the interval many years: and, in that same interval, assassinations no more than six: while, in the Roman States, not much larger than Tuscany, the number, in a quarter of a year, was no less than sixty.

3. For the first of these so highly instructive and interesting articles of information, we were already indebted to my friend—the illustrious Howard, familiarly known by the name of Prison Howard: for the other, I know not that we are indebted to anybody but M. Lucas.

4. That, by all this put together, the ruling few should, in many places, be engaged to abstain willingly from thus dealing with the subject many, is little to be hoped for: but, that the subject many, although the ruling few are not tired of thus dealing with them,—should, sooner or later, be tired of being thus dealt with,—and that, to such a degree as to do what depends upon them towards engaging the ruling few to cease thus dealing with them, seems not too much to hope for. If so, who can refuse to say—the sooner the oppressed bestir themselves, and the more they bestir themselves, the better?

Whatever may have been the case antecedently to this experience—subsequently to the demonstration thus afforded of the needlessness and uselessness of this so highly objectionable mode of punishment, the leaving it unabolished, was everywhere without excuse. Nor could the practice have anywhere remained unabolished, but for the original influence of the above-mentioned causes of error, and in particular, sinister interest, the progenitor of all the others. And therefore it is—that, to account for men’s thus shutting their eyes against the light,—the force, by which they appear to have been closed, has thus been presented to your view.

*∗* While these pages are under revision, comes in the London newspaper, the Spectator. A masterly article, on this subject, presenting itself as operating powerfully in support of the policy here recommended,—it is here subjoined. The No. is 182, for the week ending Saturday, May 28, 1831.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS.

Two men were hanged on Wednesday; one for sheep-stealing, the other for stealing in a dwelling-house. It was alleged, in aggravation of the crime of the former, that his character was bad,—he was what the French call a mauvais sujet; it does not appear that he had ever been tried before: the thefts of the latter had been numerous and extensive. The execution of these men for crimes unaccompanied by the slightest violence, has very naturally attracted the notice of a large and respectable class of the community, to whom the sanguinary character of our code has long been a subject of regret. It indeed appears singular, on a first view of the subject, that in free England, as it is usually called, the number of crimes punishable with death should be greater than in any other European state—that we who boast so highly of our civilization should display in our practice greater barbarism than the least enlightened of our neighbours. On a closer inspection of the case, however, the wonder will vanish. Our race of real freedom is only beginning; hitherto there has been freedom for a party—licence for a faction, but the great mass of the people have been in bondage. In purely despotic countries, the king can afford to be just. Joseph the Second abolished the punishment of death throughout his dominions. Even now it is inflicted there only for murder and treason. The emperor has his Lichtensteins and his Esterhazys, as we have our Northumberlands and our Newcastles; but Austria has no Sarums nor Gattons—the curse of the rotten boroughs has not visited her. In states, again, where freedom is a living substance as well as a form, the government can show mercy. America has almost no capital punishments: America has neither boroughs nor boroughmongers. In England, “law grinds the poor.” And why? The remainder of the line supplies the ready answer—“rich men make the law!” Here is the secret of our bloody code—of the perverse ingenuity by which its abominations have so long been defended—of the dogged obstinacy with which all attempts to wash them away has been withstood. “Whoso stealeth a sheep, let him die the death,” says the statute: could so monstrous a law have been enacted, had our legislators been chosen by the people of England? But our lawmakers hitherto have been our landlords. By the sale of his sheep, the farmer pays his rent; by the rent of the farmer, the luxury of the Member is upheld; touch one link, touch all. The price of blood, some six hundred years ago, was equal to forty pounds of our degenerate coin. In process of time, silver fell in the market, and with it the life of an Englishman, twenty-fold. Sir Robert Peel, moderate in all things, raised the sum from £2 to £5. Why not to £500—why not to £5000? In point of moral guilt, is not he who filches a shilling as criminal as he that filches a million? If we hang for example, the lesser crime is of necessity the more frequent, and most calls for repression. Besides, it is the poor—they who most require protective laws, that are the sufferers by petty plunder. There’s the rub. “Rich men make the law.” Rich men alone suffer by the abstraction of large sums—hence the bloody penalty. But the remedy is nigh at hand—it is even now come. The bill, which gives us good legislators, insures for us good laws. Men impartially chosen will judge impartially. We shall no more have one rule for the rich and another for the poor; nor shall we any longer have the pain of listening to the defence, in the high Court of Parliament, of absurdities which have long been condemned by sensible men in every other place in the empire. Reform will satisfy the yearnings of humanity as amply as the hopes of patriotism.

PART III.

OF INDIRECT MEANS OF PREVENTING CRIMES.

[* ]Example.

[* ]Any one who is at all conversant with anecdotes of notorious criminals must have observed, that nothing is more common in this country than for a man to be guilty of twenty, thirty, or forty thefts or robberies, before punishment overtakes him.

[† ]Mr. Bentham does not appear to have carried on his examination of this subject in respect to the other ends of punishment.—Ed.

[‡ ]Under the name of the fact, I would here include such and so many circumstances as are necessary to make the act in question come under the denomination of some crime.

[* ]Assets: Effects descending to them from the ancestor, and liable to alicnation.

[† ]In all these points, I depend upon the authority of Comyns’ Digest, I. 262, 263.

[‡ ]A person whom I know, having the immediate reversion of an estate, part in houses, part in land, rented the land of a person who had the life-interest in both. The life-owner letting the houses go to ruin, the reversionary, to indemnify himself, stopt the rent of the land. The lifeowner died without repairing the houses, as he was bound: the consequence was, that the reversioner (as he was advised, to his great surprise), though obliged to pay his rent, lost his remedy for the waste.

[* ]1 Comyns’ Dig. 261.

[† ]A man may be kept in gaol, and his fortune ruined by it; and if he die under the imprisonment, his family are without remedy. In some cases, the wrong-doer may not even be punishable by a criminal prosecution; or he may be maltreated in such a manner as to contract a lingering distemper, such as does not follow from the injurious treatment with sufficient speed and certainty to bring it within the crime of murder. If the prosecution can but be staved off till he die, his family are without remedy. Many years ago, a butcher was committed to Newgate, at a time when the gaol distemper was raging in that prison, upon a false and malicious charge of theft. He died there, leaving a large distressed family, who were altogether without remedy for this atrocious injury.

[‡ ]I rest still on the authority of Comyns, except in the case of injuries to reputation, in which I conclude from analogy, Comyns being silent.

[∥ ]In France, while this paper was writing, two mutually connected questions were on the carpet:—the general question—shall death punishment, in any, and what cases, be employed?—the special question—shall it be employed in the case of the Ex-Ministers? The lot of these men being now disposed of, the matter which applied exclusively to their case has been struck out.

[§ ][the day]—namely, December the 17th, 1830.

[¶ ]Not less than fifty years ago, had already issued from the press a work of mine, in which the properties desirable in a lot of punishment are held up to view:—meaning, by a lot of punishment, the quantum of it attached to the species of offence in question: and, with the requisite assortment of these properties, death punishment is not of itself endowed. But, as no objection to the use of this one instrument in particular is constituted by a deficiency which is capable of being filled up by the addition of others, the demand for the consideration of this mode of punishment, on this present occasion, has not been found superseded by anything that is contained in that former work,—or in any by which it has been succeeded, in that same or any other language.