CHAPTER I.: OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 1 (Principles of Morals and Legislation, Fragment on Government, Civil Code, Penal Law) 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 1.
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- Errata—vol. I.
- General Preface.
- Introduction to the Study of the Works of Jeremy Bentham;
- Section I.: Bentham’s Style and Method of Thinking.
- Section II.: The Greatest-happiness Principle and Its Application to Morals and Legislation.
- Section III.: The Pursuit of Truth.—fallacies.—principles of Evidence.
- Section IV.: System of Government.
- Section IV.: Law Reform.
- Section VI.: Principles of Punishment.
- Section VII.: Poor Laws, Education, and Other Institutions For National Amelioration.
- Section VIII.: International Law.
- Section IX.: Political Economy.
- Section X.: Logic and Metaphysics. †
- An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
- Chapter I.: Of the Principle of Utility.
- Chapter II.: Of Principles Adverse to That of Utility.
- Chapter III.: Of the Four * Sanctions Or Sources of Pain and Pleasure.
- Chapter IV.: Value of a Lot of Pleasure Or Pain, How to Be Measured.
- Chapter V.: Pleasures and Pains, Their Kinds.
- Chapter VI.: Of Circumstances Influencing Sensibility.
- Chapter VII.: Of Human Actions In General.
- Chapter VIII.: Of Intentionality.
- Chapter IX.: Of Consciousness.
- Chapter X.: Of Motives.
- Chapter XI.: Of Human Dispositions In General.
- Chapter XII.: Of the Consequences of a Mischievous Act.
- Chapter XIII. *: of Circumstances Influencing the Degree of Alarm.
- Chapter XIV.: Reasons For Considering Certain Actions As Crimes. *
- Chapter XV.: § 1. General View of Cases Unmeet For Punishment.
- Chapter XVI.: Of the Proportion Between Punishments and Offences.
- Chapter XVII.: Of the Properties to Be Given to a Lot of Punishment.
- Chapter XVIII. § 1.: Classes of Offences.
- Chapter XIX.: § 1. Limits Between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation.
- I. Essay On the Promulgation of Laws
- Essay On the Influence of Time and Place In Matters of Legislation.
- Introduction. *
- Chapter I.: Principles to Be Followed In Trans Planting Laws.
- Chapter II.: Regard to Be Paid to Subsisting Institutions.
- Chapter III.: Rules Respecting the Method of Transplanting Laws.
- Chapter IV.: Laws Appear the Worse For Being Transplanted.
- Chapter V.: Influence of Time.
- A Table of the Springs of Action:
- A Fragment On Government;
- Preface to the First Edition, Published In 1776.
- Historical Preface, Intended For the Second Edition.
- Three Letters On the Fragment On Governmen
- Letter the First. of an Examination Into the Merits of a Critique On Blackstone’s Commentaries, Lately Published Under the Title of a Fragment On Government.
- Letter the Second. of an Examination Into the Merits of a Critique On Blackstone’s Commentaries, Lately Published Under the Title of a Fragment On Government.
- Letter the Third. By John Lind, Esq. Afterwards Barrister At Law, to D., Author of Two Letters * On a Fragment On Government.
- Introduction. *
- Chapter I.: Formation of Government.
- Chapter II.: Forms of Government.
- Chapter III.: The British Constitution.
- Chapter IV.: Right of the Supreme Power to Make Laws.
- Chapter V.: Duty of the Supreme Power to Make Laws.
- Principles of the Civil Code.
- Part I.—: Objects of the Civil Law. *
- Chapter I.: Of Rights and Obligations.
- Chapter II.: Distinct Objects of the Civil Law.
- Chapter III.: Relation Between These Objects.
- Chapter IV.: Of Laws Relative to Subsistence.
- Chapter V.: Of Laws Relative to Abundance.
- Chapter VI.: Propositions of Pathology Upon Which the Advantage of Equality Is Founded.
- Chapter VII.: Of Security.
- Chapter VIII.: Of Property.
- Chapter IX.: Answer to an Objection.
- Chapter X.: Analysis of the Evils Resulting From Attacks Upon Property.
- Chapter XI.: Security and Equality—their Opposition.
- Chapter XII.: Security and Equality—means of Reconciliation.
- Chapter XIII.: Sacrifices of Security to Security.
- Chapter XIV.: Cases Subject to Dispute.
- Chapter XV.: Examples of Attacks Upon Security.
- Chapter XVI.: Of Forced Exchanges.
- Chapter XVII.: Power of the Laws Over Expectation.
- Part II.
- Chapter I.: Of Titles Which Confer a Right to Property. *
- Chapter II.: Another Mode of Acquisition—consent.
- Chapter III.: Another Means of Acquisition—succession.
- Chapter V.: Of Wills.
- Chapter V.: Of Rights Respecting Services—means of Acquiring Them.
- Chapter VI.: Community of Goods—its Inconveniences.
- Chapter VII.: Of Distribution of Loss.
- Part III.: Of the Rights and Obligations Attached to Different Private Conditions.
- Chapter I.: Of Master and Servant.
- Chapter II.: Of Slavery.
- Chapter III.: Of Guardian and Ward.
- Chapter IV.: Of Parent and Child.
- Chapter V.: Of Marriage.
- Appendix.: of the Levelling System. *
- Principles of Penal Law.
- Part I.: Political Remedies For the Evil of Offences.
- Chapter I.: Subject of This Book.
- Chapter II.: Of Direct Methods of Preventing Offences.
- Chapter III.: Of Chronic Offences.
- Chapter IV.: Of Suppressive Remedies For Chronic Offences.
- Chapter V.: Of Martial Law
- Chapter VI.: Of the Nature of Satisfaction.
- Chapter VII.: Reasons Upon Which the Obligation to Make Satisfaction Is Founded.
- Chapter VIII.: Of the Different Kinds of Satisfaction.
- Chapter IX.: Of the Quantity of Satisfaction to Be Granted.
- Chapter X.: Of the Certainty of Satisfaction.
- Chapter XI.: Of Pecuniary Satisfaction.
- Chapter XII.: Of Restitution In Kind.
- Chapter XIII.: Of Attestative Satisfaction.
- Chapter XIV.: Of Honorary Satisfaction.
- Chapter XV.: Remedies For Offences Against Honour.
- Chapter XVI.: Of Vindictive Satisfaction.
- Chapter XVII.: Of Substitutive Satisfaction, Or At the Expense of a Third Party.
- Chapter XVIII.: Of Subsidiary Satisfaction At the Expense of the Public Treasure.
- Part II.—: Rationale of Punishment.
- Book I.: General Principles.
- Chapter I.: Definitions and Distinctions.
- Chapter II.: Classification.
- Chapter III.: Of the Ends of Punishment.
- Chapter IV.: Cases Unmeet For Punishment.
- Chapter V.: Expense of Punishment.
- Chapter VI.: Measure of Punishment.
- Chapter VII.: Of the Properties to Be Given to a Lot of Punishment.
- Chapter VIII.: Of Analogy Between Crimes and Punishments.
- Chapter IX.: Of Retaliation.
- Chapter X.: Of Popularity.
- Book II.: Of Corporal Punishments.
- Chapter I.: Simple Afflictive Punishments. *
- Chapter II.: Of Complex Afflictive Punishments.
- Chapter III.: Of Restrictive Punishments—territorial Confinement.
- Chapter IV.: Imprisonment.
- Chapter V.: Imprisonment—fees.
- Chapter VI.: Imprisonment Examined.
- Chapter VII.: General Scheme of Imprisonment.
- Chapter VIII.: Of Other Species of Territorial Confinement—quasi Imprisonment—relegation—banishment.
- Chapter IX.: Of Simply Restrictive Punishments.
- Chapter X.: Of Active Or Laborious Punishment.
- Chapter XI.: Capital Punishment.
- Chapter XII.: Capital Punishment Examined. *
- Book III.: Of Privative Punishments, Or Forfeitures.
- Chapter I.: Punishment Analyzed.
- Chapter II.: Of the Punishments Belonging to the Moral Sanction.
- Chapter III.: Forfeiture of Reputation.
- Chapter IV.: Of Pecuniary Forfeitures.
- Chapter V.: Forfeiture of Condition.
- Chapter VI.: Forfeiture of the Protection of the Law.
- Book IV.: Of the Proper Seat of Punishment: Or Say, of Mis-seated Punishment.
- Book V.: Of Complex Punishments.
- Chapter I.: Inconveniences of Complex Punishments.
- Chapter II.: Of Transportation.
- Chapter III.: Panopticon Penitentiary.
- Chapter IV.: Felony.
- Chapter V.: Of PrÆmunire.
- Chapter VI.: Outlawry.
- Chapter VII.: Excommunication.
- Book VI.: Miscellaneous Topics.
- Chapter I.: Choice of Punishments—latitude to Be Allowed to the Judges.
- Chapter II.: Of Subsidiary Punishments.
- Chapter III.: Of Surety For Good Conduct.
- Chapter IV.: Defeazance of Punishment.
- Appendix—: On Death-punishment. ∥ Jeremy Bentham to His Fellow-citizens of France.
- Part III.: Of Indirect Means of Preventing Crimes.
- Chapter I.: Methods of Taking Away the Physical Power of Injuring.
- Chapter II.: Another Indirect Method—hinder the Acquisition of Knowledge Which May Be Rendered Injurious. †
- Chapter III.: Of Indirect Means of Preventing the Will to Commit Offences.
- Chapter IV.: Problem I. to Divert the Course of Dangerous Desires, and Direct the Inclination Towards Those Amusements Which Are Most Conformed to the Public Interest.
- Chapter V.: Problem II. to Make Such Arrangements, That a Given Desire May Be Satisfied Without Prejudice, Or With the Least Possible Prejudice.
- Chapter VI.: Problem III. to Avoid Furnishing Encouragement to Crimes.
- Chapter VII.: Problem IV. to Augment the Responsibility of Individuals, In Proportion As They Are More Exposed to Temptation to Do Wrong.
- Chapter VIII.: Problem V. to Diminish Sensibility With Regard to Temptation.
- Chapter IX.: Problem VI. to Strengthen the Impression of Punishments Upon the Imagination.
- Chapter X.: Problem VII. to Facilitate the Discovery of Offences Committed.
- Chapter XI.: Problem VIII. to Prevent Offences, By Giving to Many Persons an Interest In Preventing Them.
- Chapter XII.: Problem IX. to Facilitate the Recognition and the Finding of Individuals.
- Chapter XIII.: Problem X. to Increase the Difficulty of Escape For Delinquents.
- Chapter XIV.: Problem XI. to Diminish Uncertainty With Regard to Procedure and Punishment.
- Chapter XV.: Problem XII. to Prohibit Accessory Offences, In Order to Prevent Their Principals.
- Chapter XVI.: Of the Cultivation of Benevolence.
- Chapter XVII.: Employment of the Motive of Honour, Or of the Popular Sanction.
- Chapter XVIII.: Of the Employment of the Religious Sanction.
- Chapter XIX.: Uses to Be Drawn From the Power of Instruction.
- Chapter XX.: Use to Be Made of the Power of Education.
- Chapter XXI.: General Precautions Against the Abuse of Authority.
- Chapter XXII.: Measures to Be Taken Against the Ill Effects of an Offence Already Committed—conclusion of the Subject.
OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS.
Every thing which the legislator is called upon to distribute among the members of the community, may be reduced to two classes:
- 1st, Rights.
- 2d, Obligations.
Rights are in themselves advantages; benefits for him who enjoys them: obligations, on the other hand, are duties; burthensome charges for him who has to fulfil them.
Rights and obligations, though distinct and opposite in their nature, are simultaneous in their origin, and inseparable in their existence. According to the nature of things, the law cannot grant a benefit to any, without, at the same time, imposing a burthen on some one else; or, in other words, a right cannot be created in favour of any one, without imposing a corresponding obligation on another. In what manner is a right of property in land conferred on me? By imposing upon every body except myself the obligation not to touch its produce. How is the right of commanding conferred on me? By imposing upon a district, or a number of persons, the obligation to obey me.
The legislator ought to confer rights with pleasure, since they are in themselves a benefit; he ought to impose obligations with repugnance, since they are in themselves an evil. In accordance with the principle of utility, he ought never to impose a burthen but that he may confer a benefit of a greater value.
In the same proportion as it creates obligations, the law curtails liberty: it converts into offences, acts which would otherwise be permitted and unpunishable. The law creates an offence, either by a positive commandment or by a prohibition.
These curtailments of liberty are inevitable. It is impossible to create rights, to impose obligations, to protect the person, life, reputation, property, subsistence, or liberty itself, but at the expense of liberty.
But every restraint imposed upon liberty is liable to be followed by a natural feeling of pain, more or less great, independent of an infinite variety of inconveniences and sufferings which may result from the particular mode of this restraint. It follows, therefore, that no restraint should be imposed, no power conferred, no coercive law sanctioned, without a specific and satisfactory reason. There is always one reason against every coercive law, and one reason which, were there no other, would be sufficient by itself: it is, that such a law is restrictive of liberty. Whoever proposes a coercive law, ought to be ready to prove, not only that there is a specific reason in favour of this law, but also that this reason is more weighty than the general reason against every law.
The proposition, although almost self-evident, that every law is contrary to liberty, is not generally recognised: on the contrary, the zealots of liberty, more ardent than enlightened, have made a conscience of combating it. And how have they done it? They have perverted the language, and will not employ this word in its common acceptation. They speak a language that belongs to no one: they say, Liberty consists in the power of doing every thing which does not hurt another. But is this the ordinary meaning of this word? The liberty of doing evil, is it not liberty? If it is not liberty, what is it then? and what word should we make use of in speaking of it? Do we not say that liberty should be taken away from fools, and wicked persons, because they abuse it?
According to this definition, then, I do not know if I have the liberty of doing or not doing any action, until I have examined all its consequences? If it appear to me hurtful to a single individual, whether the law permit, or even command it, I have not liberty to do it! An officer of justice would not have liberty to punish a thief, unless he was sure such punishment would not hurt such thief! Such are the absurdities implied in this definition.
What says unsophisticated reason? Let us seek from thence for true propositions.
The sole object of government ought to be the greatest happiness of the greatest possible number of the community.
The happiness of an individual is greater, in proportion as his sufferings are lighter and fewer in number, and as his enjoyments are greater and larger in number.
The care of providing for his enjoyments ought to be left almost entirely to each individual; the principal function of government being to protect him from sufferings.
It fulfils this office by creating rights which it confers upon individuals: rights of personal security; rights of protection for honour; rights of property; rights of receiving assistance in case of need. To these rights, correspond offences of all classes. The law cannot create rights without creating the corresponding obligations. It cannot create rights and obligations without creating offences. It can neither command nor prohibit, without restraining the liberty of individuals.
The citizen, therefore, cannot acquire any right without the sacrifice of a part of his liberty. Even under a bad government, there is no proportion between the sacrifice and the acquisition. Governments approach to perfection, in proportion as the acquisition is greater, and the sacrifice less.