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• Preface.
• A Select Collection of Early English Tracts On Commerce
• Thomas Mun, a Discoverse of Trade From England Vnto the East-indies: Answering to Diuerse Obiections Which Are Vsually Made Against the Same.
• Lewes Roberts, the Treasure of Traffike, Or a Discoourse of Forraigne Trade.
• Thomas Mun, England’s Treasure By Forraign Trade. Or. the Ballance of Our Forraign Trade Is the Rule of Our Treasure.
• Chap. I.: The Qualities Which Are Required In a Perfect Merchant of Forraign Trade.
• Chap. II.: The Means to Enrich This Kingdom, and to Encrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. III.: The Particular Ways and Means to Encrease the Exportation of Our Commodities, and to Decrease Our Consumption of Forraign Wares.
• Chap. IV.: The Exportation of Our Moneys In Trade of Merchandize Is a Means to Encrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. V.: Forraign Trade Is the Only Means to Improve the Price of Our Lands.
• Chap. VI.: The Spanish Treasure Cannot Be Kept From Other Kingdoms By Any Prohibition Made In Spain.
• Chap. VII.: The Diversity of Gain By Forraign Trade.
• Chap. VIII.: The Enhansing Or Debasing Our Moneys Cannot Enrich the Kingdom With Treasure, Nor Hinder the Exportation Thereof.
• Chap. IX.: A Toleration For Forraign Coins to Pass Currant Here At Higher Rates Then Their Value With Our Standard, Will Not Encrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. X.: The Observation of the Statute of Imployments to Be Made By Strangers, Cannot Encrease, Nor Yet Preserve Our Treasure.
• Chap. XI.: It Will Not Increase Our Treasure to Enjoyn the Merchant That Exporteth Fish, Corn Or Munition, to Return All Or Part of the Value In Money.
• Chap. XII.: The Undervaluing of Our Money Which Is Delivered Or Received By Bills of Exchange Here Or Beyond the Seas, Cannot Decrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. XIII.: The Merchant Who Is a Mere Exchanger of Money By Bills Cannot Increase Or Decrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. XIV.: The Admirable Feats Supposed to Be Done By Bankers and the Merchants Exchange.
• Chap. XV.: Of Some Excesses and Evils In the Commonwealth, Which Notwithstanding Decay Not Our Trade Nor Treasure.
• Chap. XVI.: How the Revenues and Incomes of Princes May Justly Be Raised.
• Chap. XVII.: Whether It Be Necessary For Great Princes to Lay Up Store of Treasure.
• Chap. XVIII.: How Much Treasure a Prince May Conveniently Lay Up Yearly.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Some Different Effects, Which Proceed From Naturall and Artificiall Wealth.
• Chap. XX.: The Order and Means Whereby We May Draw Up the Ballance of Our Forraign Trade.
• Chap. XXI.: The Conclusion Upon All That Hath Been Said, Concerning the Exportation Or Importation of Treasure.
• Samuel Fortrey, Englands Interest and Improvement.
• England’s Great Happiness; Or, a Dialogue Between Content and Complaint.
• Britannia Languens, Or a Discourse of Trade
• The Preface.
• The Introduction.
• Section I.: Trade National Or Private, Home Or Forreign Treasures Imported By Trade, Thence Land-rents, Populacy Increased, the Revenues of All Ranks of Men Depend Upon Trade, People and Treasure Make National Strength, Particular Advantages In Treasure,
• Sect. II.: The Several Kinds of Forreign Trade, of Trading With Home Or Forreign Navigation, Some General Application.
• Sect. III.: Of Forreign Trade Consisting In Exportation, of the Advantages of Home Manufactures, and Manufactures, Incidently Other Home Trades, and Imployments Are Considered; and Which of Them Enrich a Nation; of the Fishing-trade, and the Annual Export
• Sect. IV.: Of Forreign Trade From Port to Port, the Nature and Advantage of It, Differs From Meer Carriage, and Meer Importation; the Necessity of a Home Storehouse: the Ordinary Exporting of Money Or Bullion, of Dangerous Consequence; How to Be Avoided:
• Sect. V.: That Our Home and Forreign Market Is Incumbered, and Prejudiced By Extraordinary and Unequal Charges, and Cloggs In Our Merchandize Above What Are In Our Neighbour-nations, Viz. In the Building and Furniture of Our Ships, Victuals, Sea-mens Wa
• Sect. VI.: Other Cloggs On Our Trade, Viz. the Late Acts of Navigation, Which, With the Other Difficulties, Have Begot Monopolies; Made Our Navigation Yet Dearer, So Forreign Materials of Manufacture Cause Meer Importations, Hinder Our Forreign Vent of
• Sect. VII.: Forreigners Eased In Trade; Other Clogs and Difficulties Upon Ours; Want of Populacy, Incidently of Extream Prizes of Victuals, and How the Duration of Land-rents May Be Secured, Our People Restrained From Manufactures; the Abuse of the Act
• Sect. VIII.: That a Nation May Grow Poor By Forreign Trade, Viz. By an Excess of Meer Importations, Illustrated By Some Observations: This Facilitated By Exporting Money Or Bullion; the Fatal Consequences and Symptoms of a Consumptive Trade, Decay of Ma
• Sect. IX.: That a Consumptive Trade Must Render a Nation Still Weaker and Weaker: How Far the Meer Establishment of Absolute Power, Or Meer Liberty and Property, May Alter the Case.
• Sect. X.: Further Presumptions of Our Late National Overballance In Trade; an Account From the Mint In November 75. and Thence Our Former Ballance of Trade Estimated.
• Sect. XI.: Particular Decays In Our Exportations, and the Beneficial Parts of Our Trade; Instances In the Decay of Our Foreign-trade For Woollen Clothing, In the Several Countries and Ports We Traded To, In the Sinking of the Foreign Price of This Manufac
• Sect. XII.: Instances In Late Increases and Excesses of Our Forreign Importations, and Therein of the Decay of Some Other of Our Own Manufactures Which Supplyed Our Home Uses, Viz. In Linnens of All Sorts, More Dear Fine Linnens Used; Incidently of the
• Sect. XIII.: That a Considerable Part of Our Late Treasure Is Exhausted: Application to Our Publick and Private Revenues: Objections Answered, Viz. the Plenty of Money to Be Let On Securities, Stores of Money In London, Stocks In Merchandize, the Over
• Sect. XIV.: People and Treasure the True Pillars of the National Strength: the Odds In the Different Vse and Imployment of People. the Absoluteness of the French Monarchy No Cause of the Present French Grandure: the Late Application of the French Co
• Dudley North, Discourses Upon Trade
• The Preface.
• A Discourse Concerning the Abatement of Interest.
• A Discourse of Coyned Money.
• Postscript. Upon Farther Consideration of the Foregoing Matters, I Think Fit to Add the Following Notes.
• Considerations On the East-india Trade
• To the Reader.
• Chap. I.: The Objections Against the East-india Trade; Viz. the Exportation of Bullion For Manufactures to Be Consum’d In England; the Loss of the Labourer’s Employment; the Abatement of Rents Are Enforc’d.
• Chap. II.: The Exportation of Bullion For Indian Manufactures, Is an Exchange of Less For Greater Value.
• Chap. III.: A More Open East-india- Trade, Is More Profitable to the Kingdom.
• Chap. IV.: The East-india Trade Does Not So Much Diminish the Riches of Some Private Persons, As It Increases the Riches of the Kingdom.
• Chap. V.: The East-india Trade Is the Way to Increase Our Bullion.
• Chap. VI.: The East-india Trade Must Increase Our Exportations.
• Chap. VII.: Notwithstanding the Idleness of the Mint, the Money and the Bullion Are Increas’d.
• Chap. VIII.: The Increase of Paper Money Is to Be Ascrib’d to the Increase of Real Money, Rather Than the Apparent Plenty of Money to the Increase of Current Paper.
• Chap. IX.: The Kingdom Is Not More Impoverish’d By the Consumption of Indian Than of English Manufactures.
• Chap. X.: The East-india Trade Destroys No Imployment of the People Which Is Profitable to the Kingdom.
• Chap. XI.: The East-india Trade Is the Most Likely Way to Inlarge the Business In the Present Manufactures.
• Chap. XII.: By Being the Cause of the Invention of Arts and Engines, of Order and Regularity In Our Manufactures, the East-india Trade, Without Abating the Wages of Labourers, Abates the Price of Manufactures.
• Chap. XIII.: The East-india Trade Is the Most Likely Way to Set On Foot New Manufactures For Imployment of the People.
• Chap. XIV.: The East-india Trade Does Not Abate the Rents, By the Exportation of Bullion, By the Diminution of Consumers, By the Abatement of Wages; the Importation of Indian Manufactures Is Less Likely to Abate Rents Than the Importation of the Unwro
• Chap. XV.: The Importation of Indian Manufactures Abates Only the Price of Labour, But Raises the Price of the Produce of the Estate.
• Chap. XVI.: And This Is Confirm’d By Examples.
• Chap. XVII.: The East-india Trade Does Not Abate the Rents of the Landholder By Destroying His Monopoly.
• Chap. XVIII.: The Fishing-trade Is Not So Profitable As the Importation of Irish Cattel, Or of Indian Manufactures; and Is More Likely Than Either to Abate the Rents of England.
• Chap. XIX.: The Herring-fishery Not Practicable In the Present Circumstances of England; the Dutch Can Sell Cheaper.
• Chap. XX.: The Way to Bring England to Be Contented With As Little Profit In the Fishing-trade As Holland.
• Chap. XXI.: That the Way to Enable England to Catch and Cure Their Herrings As Cheap As Holland, Is, First to Have Materials For That Trade As Cheap: and That This Is Most Likely to Be Done, By Discharging the Customs Upon Such Things, By Making the T
• Chap. XXII.: The Way to Make English Labour In the Fishing-trade As Cheap As That of Holland; That the People Here Must Cohabit As Close Together; and the Most Probable Methods For Effecting This, Are to Erect a Free-port, to Impower Parishes to Send

CHAP. III.

A more Open East-India-Trade, is more profitable to the Kingdom.

’TIS objected, and deny’d, That the East-India-Trade, as at present manag’d, is an Exchange of less for greater Value; for that the Emulation of two Companies contending one against another, has utterly destroy’d the Profit of the Trade, has driven the Trade so very close, has run the Prices of things so high in India, so very low in England, that no more can be imported from India for any sum of Money, than will be made in England for the same Money. Bullion, and so much Manufacture as can be purchas’d for it, are equivalent. Wherefore for any quantity of Bullion, if no more can be imported from India, than wou’d be made in England, the Exchange is not of less for greater value; the Kingdom is not the richer for this Exchange.

First ’tis answer’d,The Bullion is exchang’d for more Manufactures, than will be made in England for it. That the Merchant still carries on his Trade to the East-Indies; wherefore upon the return of his Manufactures, he finds sufficient value to pay the Freight and Cargo outwards, sufficient to pay the Customs of the King, and some Profit to himself besides; and still he is able to sell the Indian, cheaper than he can buy an equal English Manufacture. Therefore notwithstanding the Emulation of two Companies, notwithstanding the Prices rais’d in India, and abated in England, still the Bullion is exchang’d with India for more Manufactures than will be made in England for it; still the Exchange is of less for greater value.

But for a farther Answer to this Objection of two Companies trading one against another, it must be said, That the East-India-Trade, the more open, and the closer driven, must needs import more Profit to the Kingdom, and less disturb the English Manufactures.

’Tis very probable the profit of an open Trade is a great deal less in proportion to the Stock imploy’d in it, and therefore the Merchant that feels the difference, will be very ready with his Complaints; ’tis without doubt, more profitable for a Merchant to imploy his Stock in Trade, so as at the end of the Year to receive his Principal again, with Gain besides of twenty for every Hundred, than to imploy as much Stock for half as much Profit. But ’tis better and more profitable for the Kingdom, that 300l. should be imployed in Trade for the profit of 10 per Cent. than but 100l. for the profit of 20 per Cent. wherefore, less in proportion and more in quantity, must be esteem’d as greater profit.

This then will be the consequence of the East-India Trade,Companies trade at more charge than private Persons. laid more open and closer driven; the profit will be less in proportion but more in quantity. ’Tis reasonable to believe, that a Company cannot trade so much to the publick Benefit; a Company of Merchants trading with a Joint-stock, is but one only Buyer, one only Seller; they manage their Trade with the pride and charge that become the State of Kings; they expect to be follow’d by the Market, and therefore never stir beyond the Warehouse, whither if Customers come, they are forc’d to wait till the Auction is ready to begin; in an open Trade, every Merchant is upon his good Behaviour, always afraid of being undersold at home, always seeking out for new Markets in Foreign Countries; in the mean time, Trade is carried on with less Expence: This is the effect of Necessity and Emulation, things unknown to a single Company. A Trade so far extended, so much better husbanded, however less profitable in proportion to the Merchant’s Stock, must needs import more absolute Profit to the Kingdom.

Also,Other Examples. the Examples of parallel Cases make it very credible, that a more open East-India Trade and closer driven, tho’ it may be less profitable in proportion to the Bulk of it, will yet be more profitable to the Kingdom. In the time of Sir Thomas Gresham, perhaps he was the only Merchant in England: Wonderful things are storyed of Trade and profit of Trade in that Age; for every Hundred Pounds at the end of the Year, besides the Principal return’d again, Two or Three Hundred Pounds are said to have been divided between the Customs of the King and the Merchant’s Gain. ’Tis scarce credible, that at this time more than the profit of 20 or 30 per Cent. can be divided between the Merchant and the King; but then from the difference of Customs, and for other Reasons, we may very well believe, that for every Hundred Pounds in the Age of Sir Thomas Gresham, Ten Thousand Pounds are now imploy’d in Trade; and consequently, for every Hundred Pounds gain’d in that Age, at least a Thousand Pounds are gain’d in this; indeed a great deal less in proportion to the Stock, but more in quantity. The African Trade was very lately like that of the East-Indies, carried on by the Joint-stock of one single Company: it is not laid quite open now, only private Traders are admitted upon payment of a Mulct to the Company; the consequence of this is, that Ten ships are imploy’d in that Trade for one before, Ten hundred Pounds for one before. It will hardly be pretended by the Company, that when the Trade was all their own, they divided more to the King and Company than 100 per Cent. And it will hardly be deny’d by the present Traders, that 20 or 30 per Cent. is divided to the Customs and their own Profit: and this is likewise less in proportion to the present Bulk of the Trade, yet more in quantity. Now, if this has been the consequence of other Trades enlarg’d and closer driven, why should it not be the same of the East-India Trade enlarg’d and closer driven.

But indeed,Also of the East-India Trade, prove an open Trade most profitable. this is the consequence: The East-India Trade enlarg’d by the Emulation of two Companies, may be less profitable to the Merchant; certainly it must import more profit to the Kingdom. While one only Company enjoy’d that Trade, I will believe, that every Hundred Pounds exported into India, return’d in value besides the Principal, 50l. to the Customs, and double that Sum to the Merchant’s Gain; in all 150l. this was great Profit. But at this time, the Stock in that Trade is four times as great as ’twas before, that is, Four hundred Pounds for one; Four hundred Pounds must now return in value, besides the Principal, as much in proportion to the Customs, in all Two hundred Pounds, and something over to the Merchant’s Gains, perhaps One hundred Pounds for all the four. And thus the Trade is four times as great as ’twas before; the Profit is only doubled; the Profit is less in proportion to the Bulk of the Trade, but more in quantity.

Less Profit in proportion but greater in quantity, is greater Profit; from Reason, from the Experience of other Trades, and even of this very Trade, it appears, the more open the same shall be, and closer driven, it may indeed import less Profit in proportion to the Bulk of the Trade, yet must import more in quantity, and consequently must needs be more profitable to the Kingdom: And thus again, notwithstanding the prices of things rais’d in India, abated here, the Bullion is still exchang’d for greater value.

’Tis true,Tho’ driven so close as to be left off. if this Trade shall be carried on with the greatest freedom, if every one shall be permitted to imploy his Stock in it, by degrees it will be driven so very close, that nothing of Profit will be glean’d from it; the Merchant will be disabled to import the Indian Manufactures cheaper than as good things may be made in England. Then there will be truth in his Complaint, the Exchange will be unprofitable, and must be given over. But then ’tis fit the Merchant should be told, that the East-India Trade is not carried on for his sake, but for the Kingdom’s: when Manufactures are not to be imported cheaper from India than they can be made in England, our End is gain’d; we have reap’d the utmost Profit that is to be obtain’d by that or any other Trade; our Manufactures will then be quiet; they will not be disturb’d by the cheaper Indian Manufactures; these will not rule the price of ours, neither in our own nor foreign Markets: And thus one of the great Objections against this Trade wou’d be answer’d; the East-India Trade the more open and closer driven, will less disturb the English Manufactures, and import the greatest Profit into England.

Yet against a more open East-India Trade will be objected,Objections that a more open East-India Trade not good. That the Trade is not to be carried on at all without Forts and Factories; that these are not to be maintain’d without the Joint-stock of a Company; and ’tis but reasonable the Company that bears the charge, shou’d reap the Profit of the Trade. Wherefore ’tis every day insinuated, That the late Act for erecting a new Company, was gain’d by Violence and Injustice; that it is continu’d only for the sake of the Loan to the Government, at excessive Interest; that to be restor’d to their former Right of the whole Trade, the Old Company is ready to pay the Loan, and will be content with half the Interest; and ’twill be unreasonable, if an English Parliament shall refuse to do a piece of Justice so very profitable to the Kingdom, where as it ought to be done tho’ to our greatest Disadvantage. And besides, Political Reasons concur with this, that the Kingdom may be once more at quiet. What Heats and Animosities have been caus’d by this Division? What Distractions in the Publick Counsels? Our Elections are not free, neither our Debates of Parliament. The Publick Business is very often at a stand; every one is engag’d on the side of the one or the other Company. If either can be gain’d to the Publick Interest, this is sure, tho’ for no other reason, to meet with Opposition. Indeed of late, the Resolutions have been brave; the King has been Address’d to enter into great Alliances, for the preservation of our Selves, our Neighbours, our Religion, and the Peace of Europe. Nevertheless it cannot presently be forgotten, that it was some struggle to resolve upon the Peace of Europe, that Speeches were made in favour of the Duke of Anjou’s Title to the Crown of Spain, and that it has been thought almost crime enough for an Impeachment, to advise the King to disown it. All which is imputed to the Quarrel of the two Companies; Men are afraid, that this in time may clog the Wheels of the Government; so that we may be forc’d to stand still, and see a coalition of France and Spain, the Empire broken, Holland devour’d in one or two Campagnes, and England left alone to deal with all this Power. Our Mediterranean Trade is already at the mercy of this Conjunction; when Holland’s gone, the French are Masters of all the Coast upon the Continent; our Baltic Trade and all our Naval Stores are gone. Our East and West-India Trades might languish yet a little longer, but must decay for want of Places to take off our Returns, and may yet be sooner broken by this united Power. But why shou’d we be in any Disquiets for our Trade, as if that alone were in danger? If this Conjunction holds, we must submit our selves, and be contented with Laws and Vice-Roys, such as France will please to send us. ’Tis said, that this Division of the Companies must certainly disable us to use our Naval Strength, to harass the Coasts of France and Spain, to cut off their Communication with their Indian Kingdoms, to intercept and confiscate their Treasures there to the use of a War so necessary; leave must be had of both the Companies to spirit the Discontents of Spain, to encourage the Friends of the House of Austria to shew themselves, and call aloud for change of Government: These and an hundred other invidious things, are charg’d upon this Division; if they are true, we pay too dear for this Enlargement of our Trade; ’twere far better that both the Companies were broken, and all the Profit of the Trade were lost for ever.

But certainly,Answer’d. to break both Companies is not the way to lose the Profit of the Trade; the Trade is then laid open, the Profit thereof must needs encrease; the necessary Forts and Castles may be as well maintain’d at the Publick Charge; and this may be better paid by the greater Gain of an open Trade. The want of Factories can be no Complaint: A greater Trade must needs increase these; it has done so in every Country; the Reason is alike in all; our Factories must be as well secur’d by Forts and Castles, under the immediate care of the Government, as if the same were maintain’d by the Joint-stock of a Company.

If it has really enter’d into the Thoughts of any Gentleman of the Old Company, to offer to advance this Loan to the Parliament at half the interest for all the Trade; if this is intended to be propos’d to the Wisdom of a Nation as a beneficial Bargain, this of all things is most extravagant and amazing. The Kingdom, that is, the Body of the People, is neither richer nor poorer, whether an Hundred thousand Pounds per Annum be paid to a Company of English Merchants, or remain at the disposal of the Government. But the Nation possibly, is by half a Million yearly richer, as long as this Trade is so much enlarg’d by the Emulation of two Companies, than if ’twere reduc’d to the Joint-stock of one. If so great a yearly Profit is not to be given up to Peace and Justice, ’twill never be given away for nothing; the Wisdom of Parliament will never be so far over-reach’d by the cunning of Merchants.

I rather hope to hear of Ways and Means to pay this Loan of both the Companies, to buy their Forts and Castles, and whatsoever is their Right of Trade: These might be valu’d by a Jury of Twelve indifferent and understanding Men; whatever by these shou’d be Awarded, wou’d soon be paid by the Customs of this Trade: And thus the Trade wou’d be laid quite open to all the good People of England; by this means no Injustice wou’d be done, and these Advantages wou’d be obtain’d.

First of all,The dissolution of the Companies, the way to destory Stock-jobbing, an end wou’d be put to the Trade of Stock-jobbers; unskilful and unwary Men are entic’d away, from certain Profit to pursue uncertain Hopes; after great Revolutions of the Game, their Hopes at last are disappointed, their Stocks are left among the Artists, their Industry is lost to the Kingdom, their Families are undone. ’Tis in vain to forbid the thing by Laws; Laws are eluded by the subtlety and cunning of Men; the thing is practis’d more than ever: To break both Companies, is not only to forbid the Corruption, but to tear it up by the very Roots.

Stocks in the Warehouses of private Merchants rise and fall, and no Man knows it but themselves;To restore Freedom to the publick Debates, however, they rise in value in spight of Wars. Companies are frighted by Wars and rumours of Wars; the Joint-stocks fall, and every one must hear it: And this engages the private Interest of some, the Fear of others, to disturb the publick Resolutions; to be rid of this inconvenience were worth a great deal to the Nation; to break both Companies were half the way to do it.

Of Companies,To put an end to many Corruptions, Committees have always separate interests of their own; Commands of Ships, Places, and Governments to sell; however it fares with the Joint-stock, the Trade to these Men is always profitable. These do not care to part with their places; and this perhaps has chiefly held off the Union of both the Companies. The Corruptions which they have practis’d themselves, they have learn’d to practise upon greater Men than themselves. Vast sums are gone, which are not yet, nor ever will be brought to account. To break both Companies, is the surest way to break these Practices; to make Men honest, is to take from them all Temptations to be otherwise.

By this,To restore Peace among the People. our Heats and Animosities will be remov’d, our Breaches heal’d, the Kingdom once again in peace. If such Mischiefs have been created by the distracted Counsels of both Companies, what may be fear’d from the united Strength of both?

To purchase these Advantages, nothing is given away that’s valuable; the Trade already enlarg’d by the Emulation of two Companies, by the dissolution of both, will yet be more enlarg’d. A Trade more open and closer driven, will be more profitable to the Kingdom. Prices of things may be rais’d in India, abated here; nevertheless, as long as this Trade shall be carried on, the same will be an exchange of less for greater value; and when it ceases to be such, ’twill then be time to give it over.