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• Preface.
• A Select Collection of Early English Tracts On Commerce
• Thomas Mun, a Discoverse of Trade From England Vnto the East-indies: Answering to Diuerse Obiections Which Are Vsually Made Against the Same.
• Lewes Roberts, the Treasure of Traffike, Or a Discoourse of Forraigne Trade.
• Thomas Mun, England’s Treasure By Forraign Trade. Or. the Ballance of Our Forraign Trade Is the Rule of Our Treasure.
• Chap. I.: The Qualities Which Are Required In a Perfect Merchant of Forraign Trade.
• Chap. II.: The Means to Enrich This Kingdom, and to Encrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. III.: The Particular Ways and Means to Encrease the Exportation of Our Commodities, and to Decrease Our Consumption of Forraign Wares.
• Chap. IV.: The Exportation of Our Moneys In Trade of Merchandize Is a Means to Encrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. V.: Forraign Trade Is the Only Means to Improve the Price of Our Lands.
• Chap. VI.: The Spanish Treasure Cannot Be Kept From Other Kingdoms By Any Prohibition Made In Spain.
• Chap. VII.: The Diversity of Gain By Forraign Trade.
• Chap. VIII.: The Enhansing Or Debasing Our Moneys Cannot Enrich the Kingdom With Treasure, Nor Hinder the Exportation Thereof.
• Chap. IX.: A Toleration For Forraign Coins to Pass Currant Here At Higher Rates Then Their Value With Our Standard, Will Not Encrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. X.: The Observation of the Statute of Imployments to Be Made By Strangers, Cannot Encrease, Nor Yet Preserve Our Treasure.
• Chap. XI.: It Will Not Increase Our Treasure to Enjoyn the Merchant That Exporteth Fish, Corn Or Munition, to Return All Or Part of the Value In Money.
• Chap. XII.: The Undervaluing of Our Money Which Is Delivered Or Received By Bills of Exchange Here Or Beyond the Seas, Cannot Decrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. XIII.: The Merchant Who Is a Mere Exchanger of Money By Bills Cannot Increase Or Decrease Our Treasure.
• Chap. XIV.: The Admirable Feats Supposed to Be Done By Bankers and the Merchants Exchange.
• Chap. XV.: Of Some Excesses and Evils In the Commonwealth, Which Notwithstanding Decay Not Our Trade Nor Treasure.
• Chap. XVI.: How the Revenues and Incomes of Princes May Justly Be Raised.
• Chap. XVII.: Whether It Be Necessary For Great Princes to Lay Up Store of Treasure.
• Chap. XVIII.: How Much Treasure a Prince May Conveniently Lay Up Yearly.
• Chap. XIX.: Of Some Different Effects, Which Proceed From Naturall and Artificiall Wealth.
• Chap. XX.: The Order and Means Whereby We May Draw Up the Ballance of Our Forraign Trade.
• Chap. XXI.: The Conclusion Upon All That Hath Been Said, Concerning the Exportation Or Importation of Treasure.
• Samuel Fortrey, Englands Interest and Improvement.
• England’s Great Happiness; Or, a Dialogue Between Content and Complaint.
• Britannia Languens, Or a Discourse of Trade
• The Preface.
• The Introduction.
• Section I.: Trade National Or Private, Home Or Forreign Treasures Imported By Trade, Thence Land-rents, Populacy Increased, the Revenues of All Ranks of Men Depend Upon Trade, People and Treasure Make National Strength, Particular Advantages In Treasure,
• Sect. II.: The Several Kinds of Forreign Trade, of Trading With Home Or Forreign Navigation, Some General Application.
• Sect. III.: Of Forreign Trade Consisting In Exportation, of the Advantages of Home Manufactures, and Manufactures, Incidently Other Home Trades, and Imployments Are Considered; and Which of Them Enrich a Nation; of the Fishing-trade, and the Annual Export
• Sect. IV.: Of Forreign Trade From Port to Port, the Nature and Advantage of It, Differs From Meer Carriage, and Meer Importation; the Necessity of a Home Storehouse: the Ordinary Exporting of Money Or Bullion, of Dangerous Consequence; How to Be Avoided:
• Sect. V.: That Our Home and Forreign Market Is Incumbered, and Prejudiced By Extraordinary and Unequal Charges, and Cloggs In Our Merchandize Above What Are In Our Neighbour-nations, Viz. In the Building and Furniture of Our Ships, Victuals, Sea-mens Wa
• Sect. VI.: Other Cloggs On Our Trade, Viz. the Late Acts of Navigation, Which, With the Other Difficulties, Have Begot Monopolies; Made Our Navigation Yet Dearer, So Forreign Materials of Manufacture Cause Meer Importations, Hinder Our Forreign Vent of
• Sect. VII.: Forreigners Eased In Trade; Other Clogs and Difficulties Upon Ours; Want of Populacy, Incidently of Extream Prizes of Victuals, and How the Duration of Land-rents May Be Secured, Our People Restrained From Manufactures; the Abuse of the Act
• Sect. VIII.: That a Nation May Grow Poor By Forreign Trade, Viz. By an Excess of Meer Importations, Illustrated By Some Observations: This Facilitated By Exporting Money Or Bullion; the Fatal Consequences and Symptoms of a Consumptive Trade, Decay of Ma
• Sect. IX.: That a Consumptive Trade Must Render a Nation Still Weaker and Weaker: How Far the Meer Establishment of Absolute Power, Or Meer Liberty and Property, May Alter the Case.
• Sect. X.: Further Presumptions of Our Late National Overballance In Trade; an Account From the Mint In November 75. and Thence Our Former Ballance of Trade Estimated.
• Sect. XI.: Particular Decays In Our Exportations, and the Beneficial Parts of Our Trade; Instances In the Decay of Our Foreign-trade For Woollen Clothing, In the Several Countries and Ports We Traded To, In the Sinking of the Foreign Price of This Manufac
• Sect. XII.: Instances In Late Increases and Excesses of Our Forreign Importations, and Therein of the Decay of Some Other of Our Own Manufactures Which Supplyed Our Home Uses, Viz. In Linnens of All Sorts, More Dear Fine Linnens Used; Incidently of the
• Sect. XIII.: That a Considerable Part of Our Late Treasure Is Exhausted: Application to Our Publick and Private Revenues: Objections Answered, Viz. the Plenty of Money to Be Let On Securities, Stores of Money In London, Stocks In Merchandize, the Over
• Sect. XIV.: People and Treasure the True Pillars of the National Strength: the Odds In the Different Vse and Imployment of People. the Absoluteness of the French Monarchy No Cause of the Present French Grandure: the Late Application of the French Co
• Dudley North, Discourses Upon Trade
• The Preface.
• A Discourse Concerning the Abatement of Interest.
• A Discourse of Coyned Money.
• Postscript. Upon Farther Consideration of the Foregoing Matters, I Think Fit to Add the Following Notes.
• Considerations On the East-india Trade
• To the Reader.
• Chap. I.: The Objections Against the East-india Trade; Viz. the Exportation of Bullion For Manufactures to Be Consum’d In England; the Loss of the Labourer’s Employment; the Abatement of Rents Are Enforc’d.
• Chap. II.: The Exportation of Bullion For Indian Manufactures, Is an Exchange of Less For Greater Value.
• Chap. III.: A More Open East-india- Trade, Is More Profitable to the Kingdom.
• Chap. IV.: The East-india Trade Does Not So Much Diminish the Riches of Some Private Persons, As It Increases the Riches of the Kingdom.
• Chap. V.: The East-india Trade Is the Way to Increase Our Bullion.
• Chap. VI.: The East-india Trade Must Increase Our Exportations.
• Chap. VII.: Notwithstanding the Idleness of the Mint, the Money and the Bullion Are Increas’d.
• Chap. VIII.: The Increase of Paper Money Is to Be Ascrib’d to the Increase of Real Money, Rather Than the Apparent Plenty of Money to the Increase of Current Paper.
• Chap. IX.: The Kingdom Is Not More Impoverish’d By the Consumption of Indian Than of English Manufactures.
• Chap. X.: The East-india Trade Destroys No Imployment of the People Which Is Profitable to the Kingdom.
• Chap. XI.: The East-india Trade Is the Most Likely Way to Inlarge the Business In the Present Manufactures.
• Chap. XII.: By Being the Cause of the Invention of Arts and Engines, of Order and Regularity In Our Manufactures, the East-india Trade, Without Abating the Wages of Labourers, Abates the Price of Manufactures.
• Chap. XIII.: The East-india Trade Is the Most Likely Way to Set On Foot New Manufactures For Imployment of the People.
• Chap. XIV.: The East-india Trade Does Not Abate the Rents, By the Exportation of Bullion, By the Diminution of Consumers, By the Abatement of Wages; the Importation of Indian Manufactures Is Less Likely to Abate Rents Than the Importation of the Unwro
• Chap. XV.: The Importation of Indian Manufactures Abates Only the Price of Labour, But Raises the Price of the Produce of the Estate.
• Chap. XVI.: And This Is Confirm’d By Examples.
• Chap. XVII.: The East-india Trade Does Not Abate the Rents of the Landholder By Destroying His Monopoly.
• Chap. XVIII.: The Fishing-trade Is Not So Profitable As the Importation of Irish Cattel, Or of Indian Manufactures; and Is More Likely Than Either to Abate the Rents of England.
• Chap. XIX.: The Herring-fishery Not Practicable In the Present Circumstances of England; the Dutch Can Sell Cheaper.
• Chap. XX.: The Way to Bring England to Be Contented With As Little Profit In the Fishing-trade As Holland.
• Chap. XXI.: That the Way to Enable England to Catch and Cure Their Herrings As Cheap As Holland, Is, First to Have Materials For That Trade As Cheap: and That This Is Most Likely to Be Done, By Discharging the Customs Upon Such Things, By Making the T
• Chap. XXII.: The Way to Make English Labour In the Fishing-trade As Cheap As That of Holland; That the People Here Must Cohabit As Close Together; and the Most Probable Methods For Effecting This, Are to Erect a Free-port, to Impower Parishes to Send

SECT. IX.

That a Consumptive Trade must render a Nation still weaker and weaker: How far the meer establishment of Absolute Power, or meer Liberty and Property, may alter the Case.

FRom what hath been said in the first Section and since, it must also follow, that a Consumptive Trade must render a Nation still weaker and weaker.

First, because it must still exhaust more and more of the National Riches, and sink the value of Mens Estates.

If the value of private Stocks or Revenues are contracted, Men will be less and less able to pay publick Taxes; it is impossible for those that have no Money to pay Money, or for those that have less to pay as much as those that have more; and less Taxes must then also be more grievous than greater were before; if a Man having 100l. per An’ or 100l. Stock, sink 40l. per Cent. of his Revenue or Stock, it is equal to any direct Tax of 40l. per Cent. and then if a Tax or publick Charge of 5 or 10l. be super-added, it is equal to a former Tax of 45 or 50l. per Cent.

It must also disable a Nation to continue the Charge of a War, because the quantity of Money diffused amongst the People will sooner be drawn out of the Home-Markets; and then they can no longer raise Taxes, and when the Taxes fail, what hope or dependance can there be in the courage of Officers, Soldiers, or Sea-men? or how shall the continual Supplies of Warlike Provisions of all sorts be purchased at home or abroad?

There are yet other Concomitants of a growing Poverty, which must render any Nation much the weaker, viz. discontents, uneasiness, and heart-burnings, which when begun, are easily fermented into Convulsions, by which a Nation may be disabled to exert even its remaining strength.

2. Perfidy and Treachery amongst all sorts; needy Men are readily tempted to make a Merchandize of their own Souls and other Mens Lives and Estates, and those who will betray one another for Money at home, will be equally wrought upon by forreign Money, and then may be brought to barter of both Princes and Countries; for being once corrupted, they must, like Women, for ever remain slavishly true to the Intrigue, lest the Gallant should tell, of which Histories give us many sad Examples.

But in a Nation where the value of Land, or Home-Commodities, are risen 40 per Cent. he that had 100l. Revenue or Stock, paying 40l. Tax, retains what he had; and if the National Treasure be much greater, it will support the charge of a War much longer, and can hardly ever be totally exhausted, where there is a considerable Annual Increase of Treasure by Forreign Trade: This exuberance of a National Treasure will also generally support and secure the Spirit and Fidelity of all sorts of Men.

It must therefore be of most dangerous consequence to a Nation impoverished by Trade, if any other neighbour-Nation hath at the same time grown much richer in Treasure, since in the case of a War it will produce the like inequality of Power; nay if any such richer Nation shall think fit to keep great Armies and Navies in pay, (though in times of Peace) so must the poorer Nation, or else be devoured at pleasure; and thus may a Nation, drained by the over-ballance of Trade, be beggered, and consequently overcome without fighting, as hath been intimated before.

So if a Nation grow generally more vitious, soft, effeminate, debauched, dispeopled, and undisciplined than before, it must be much weaker than before, wherein the danger must be much greater if any neighbour Nation grow far more warlike, more populous and better disciplined than before.

In which case the better situated, more useful, strong, plentiful, and blessed the Country so impoverished naturally is, and the more it doth abound in beautiful Buildings, Women, or other delicacies, it will the more forcibly provoke the Appetite of a stronger Nation to its Conquest, the mighty Hunters of the World are for the most desirable prey; so if a Nation thus weakned hath formerly been famous and redoubted for Arms and War; those who affect glory by Conquest, must have the greater Ambition to vassalize its People.

From what hath been said it must appear; first, That a Nation must be estimated weak or strong by comparison, with the strength or weakness of Neighbour Nations; if a Neighbour Nation grow ten times as strong as before, the Nation which only retains its usual and former strength is weak; but the Case must be yet worse, if whilst the one hath grown ten times stronger, the other hath grown much weaker.

2. That in the present state of the World a Nation cannot grow poor by a consumptive Trade with any Security.

In such a Case the meer absoluteness of a Monarchy would not prevent the approaching fatality, (which I add because Hobbs and others call it a strong Government) absolute Power may suddenly force away that Treasure which the People have, but cannot create any, nor can it carry on a War, or even support it self without continual vast expences; and then when the Treasure is drawn off into the hands of Officers and Soldiers, (who pay no Taxes) it will be found, that the People (who have it not) can no more make Brick without Straw in this Age, than heretofore; and will be naturally desirous to change their Masters upon hope to be treated with less rigor.

Nor on the other side will the meer preservation of a legal Liberty and Property secure a Nation thus impoverished, without a concurrent improvement of Trade, for the Reasons before given; the Blessings which usually attend these Freedoms wholly, or very much depend upon the Riches the People are possessed of.

It must be confessed these Freedoms make a necessary step towards the improvement of Trade; where an absolute Power is exerted, the conditions of Men are little better than that of Brutes, being continually lyable to Imprisonments, Death, and Confiscations, at the Pleasure of others; nay perhaps are worse, by the fears and terrors Men must be always under, even whilst they do not actually suffer; which will take away the edge and life of Industry, and will ruine or drive away the Merchants, and those who have Stocks in Manufacture, who neither will, nor can labour all their lives for Wealth under daily expectations of losing what they painfully get, which in this last Age hath obliged the French Monarchy to permit divers Immunities to their Manufacturers, and of late to their Fishers and other Maritime Traders, which have now gotten the reputation of established Laws; at least they are such as are satisfactory to the French Natives, who cannot have, nor are acquainted with better terms, and who are of themselves so numerous, that they stand in no need of Supplies of People from abroad; and therefore of no greater invitations of this nature to bring in Forreigners, and the rather, because their Trade is otherwise so much eased and incouraged (of which I shall have occasion to say more;) so have the great Dukes of Tuscany in this last Age been curiously vigilant to provide for the Freedom of Traders, both Domestick and Forreign: The Dutch, Venetians, Hamburghers, and other Trading States do yet farther secure the Liberties and Properties of their Natives, and others, under their several Jurisdictions, by fundamental and unalterable Constitutions.

Which being admitted, it doth not follow that a Nation which hath meer Liberty and Property, without other requisite incouragements, shall drive any great Trade; we have an Example in Genoa, at this day, a Republick, where, because they set a Custom of 16 per Cent. on Goods Imported, they lost their Trade of Forreign Merchandize to Leghorne, made a free Port by the Duke of Tuscany; what then may we hope for from the meer Liberty and Property of the English, when in England the Customs are generally higher, and our other difficulties on Trade are yet more grievous than the Customs? by the Accompt we have from our first Discoverers and Planters in America, most of these poor Nations had a Home-Liberty and Property.