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The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 9.

Author: Jeremy Bentham
Editor: John Bowring

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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CHAPTER X.

DEFENSIVE FORCE.

Preserved from all care about security against the ruling one, are the members of a community governed by a pure monarchy; for that which a man hath not, he cannot fear to lose.

Preserved from all care about security against the ruling few, in the same manner, are the members of a community governed by a pure aristocracy.

In none but a republic or a mixed government, therefore, can there be either security or care about security.

Section II.

Leading Principles.

Instructional.

Art. 13. In each of the two branches, so many of these desirable properties, so many principles. Under the head of each branch, follows a list of the properties, thence of the principles, belonging to it: the two lists being, for mutual illustration, placed column-wise, side by side.

I. Stipendiary Branch.		II. Radical Branch.
1.	External security maximizing.	1.	External security maximizing.
2.	Internal security maximizing.	2.	Internal security maximizing.
3.	Aptitude maximizing.	3.	Aptitude maximizing.
4.	Number minimizing.	4.	Number maximizing.
5.	Contentment maximizing.	5.	Contentment maximizing.
6.	Inequality minimizing.	6.	Inequality minimizing.
7.	Employment extending, or say diversifying.	7.	Inapplicable here.
8.	Time occupying.	8.	Inapplicable here.
9.	Expense minimizing.	9.	Expense minimizing.
10.	Preponderant detriment excluding.	10.	Preponderant detriment excluding.

Instructional.

Art. 14. In these lists will (it is believed) be found words indicative of all the several distinguishable properties which can be stated as being desirable ones: that is to say, as being contributory to the rendering the management of the branches of defensive force in question, conducive to their respective ends. But in the best form which could here be given to it, such is the imperfection of language, that antecedently to the conveying of any tolerably clear, correct, and comprehensive conception, some words of explanation it will be necessary to employ in regard to each.

Instructional.

Art. 15. I. & II. As to the security maximizing principles: external-security-maximizing, and internal-security-maximizing. To neither of the two branches (the stipendiary and the radical) of the Defensive Force establishment, could a title to the possession of the correspondent desirable properties be disallowed; for, in both instances, the propriety of the end in the character of a main end, and the necessity of rendering the means conducive to the attainment of that end, are alike unquestionable. But in the instance of the radical force, a particular import requires to be attached to it, over and above that which belongs to it in both instances. In both instances reference is made to an evil, against which, in the character of a source of evil, security requires to be provided: in both instances, this evil is composed of mischief in all imaginable shapes, considered as producible by foreigners acting in the character of enemies. But in the instance of the radical force, to this evil is added an evil of the same sort and extent, considered as producible by individuals belonging to the stipendiary force itself, acting in that same character; and against evil from this source, the only source of security is that which is afforded by the radical force.

Instructional.

Art. 16. Thus it is, that while the contributing to security in both its branches is a property common to both these branches of the National Defensive Force, in the instance of the stipendiary, the property of primary importance is that of affording security against danger from without: a property of but secondary importance is that of affording security against danger from within. In the instance of the radical force, the proportion is reversed. In this instance, the property of affording security against danger from without, is but of secondary importance: the property of affording security against danger from within—that is to say, from casual hostility on the part of the appointed guardians,—is the property of primary importance.

For the modes in which the stipendiary force may be rendered subservient to the purpose of internal security, see Section 18, Collateral employments, and Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 5, Preventive Service Minister.

Instructional.

Art. 17. III. Aptitude-maximizing principle. Of the property, or say quality, brought to view by this appellation, the subject-matters alluded to bear, (it may be observed,) in both instances, the same generic names, that is to say, persons and things: persons, constituting the personal stock of this compound branch of the official establishment; things, the material stock: of both these subject-matters explanation has been given in Ch. ix. Ministers collectively, Section 7, Statistic function. But, as in the two branches of the Defensive Force, compared the one with the other, the individuals respectively belonging to them are in every individual instance, different, so, to a considerable extent, will be the description of the properties belonging to them, or desirable in them, respectively, when considered in the aggregate.

Instructional.

Art. 18. After mention made of the property indicated by the word security-maximizing, mention of the property indicated by the word aptitude-maximizing, may seem superfluous. But that which the word security indicates is but the effect; nothing being brought by it to view in the character of a cause: whereas that which is brought to view by the word aptitude, is of that same effect the immediate cause.

3. Minimization of power and disposition, on the part of the government, to engage in offensive aggression against other states, and thence to involve this state in needless and internally pernicious warfare.

Instructional.

Art. 25. Rule 2. Maximize the radical force,—to wit, so far as is consistent with the non-employment of compulsory means for the formation or maintenance of it.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 26. Reasons for the maximization.

1. Maximization of security, and sense of security, against danger of insubordination and ascendancy on the part of the stipendiary force.

2. Giving increase to the chance and facility of affording, without expense of bounty or enlistment, or at less expense, as well as without compulsion, increase in case of need, to the stipendiary force.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 27. Reasons for the limitative proviso,—Evil effects the following:

1. On the part of the individuals to whom the compulsion is applied—the correspondent quantity of suffering.

2. Expense employed in the application of this compulsion:—the instrument which must have been employed in the application of it, if it be efficacious, being the appropriate and necessary portion of the stipendiary force: increase thence given to the quantity of this most expensive species of force, and thence to the expense of it.

3. A civil war thus raised, between one part of the people alone, on the one side, and one part of the people in conjunction with the stipendiary force, on the other side: thence, danger to the constitution, as per Art. 24.

4. If in any place, in any instance, compulsion employed on this occasion, by the civil power alone,—that is to say, by the small force habitually under the command of the judicial authorities,—has been efficacious,—it is because the degree of reluctance thus surmounted has, either in intensity or in extent not been very considerable.

Instructional.

Art. 33. A consideration obviously presented by the nature and use of the two branches of this service is—that in two cases, as compared the one with the other, the task of lessening the inequality will be a very different one. As, between commander and commander inequality increases, so of course will the magnitude and efficiency of the power of command: and the greater the inequality naturally attached to this entire system of factitious arrangements, the greater the difficulty of lessening it by any particular arrangement or arrangements, without producing preponderant evil by lessening the efficiency of the whole of that body of security, which it is the main object of this part of the establishment to provide.

Thus it is that, as with the security-maximizing antagonizes the contentment-maximizing principle, so in its own particular way does the inequality-maximizing principle.

Instructional.

Art. 34. Scarcely on any other account than that of the relation it bears to those other two principles respectively, has the inequality-minimizing principle, as applied to either branch, and in particular to the stipendiary, any claim to notice. But to put the system in possession of the correspondent desirable property, requires a distinct set of arrangements, and consequently, a distinct measure of attention, to prevent the minor from being swallowed up by the major object.

On this occasion, to secure efficiency to whatsoever means come to be employed, a particular degree of attention will be rendered needful by the opposing obstacles.

Instructional.

Art. 35. In the military branch of the public service it is, and more particularly in the stipendiary sub-branch, that the need of inequality is at its maximum. This being obvious to all eyes, hence the danger, lest, by the inconsiderate concurrence of the popular with the legal sanction, the inequality should be permitted to have place in excess. This tendency seems to be of the number of the most naturally powerful obstacles, with which on this occasion the guardian care of the legislator will have to contend.

Instructional.

Art. 36. VII. Employment-extending, or say diversifying principle: in the relation borne by this branch of the official establishment to the state of war—joined to the wide difference between a state of war and a state of peace—lies the cause of the demand which has place for the mention of this principle. In no one of the several other departments or subdepartments, is there any place for so sudden a variation as in these two subdepartments, in the quantity of the demand for appropriate official service: in time of war, never can the quantity of service capable of being rendered, be so much as equal to the quantity in demand: and by the indisputable and unchangeable nature of the service, it is rendered necessary, that of each man’s time the whole quantity should be at the absolute disposal of the directing functionary on the spot. For extra demands, provision by location of occasional deputies (a provision, in the civil branches of the service so easy and serviceable) is in this impossible. In this branch, in the time of peace, the number of functionaries being supposed the same as in war, the quantity of appropriate service demanded at their hands is, comparatively speaking, next to none. Here, there being a quantity of time left without appropriate employment, and in this sense in a state of vacuity, hereupon comes the question—in what way with most advantage to the general interest of the public, and to the particular interest of the class of functionaries in question—in what way, with most advantage to both these interests taken together, the vacancy may be filled?

Expositive.

Art. 37. VIII. Time-occupying principle. By the time here in question understand, in the case of each functionary, that portion of his time which is not occupied in the performance of his appropriate official service.

Generally speaking, it will only be this or that portion of this or that particular day: take, for the subject-matter of consideration, a series of days,—either uninterrupted or with interruptions,—and it may be considered as capable of being disposed of on the ground of the Collateral-employment principle, as to which see Section 18.

Expositive.

Art. 38. Scarcely in any other line of official service than the military, can any demand have place for the considerations which the mention of this principle is designed to bring to view. Nor, in the military line of service, does the demand apply to any other than the stipendiary branch. In the case of the radical branch, the greater part of each man’s time is employed in more uniformly necessary, or otherwise desirable, occupations. The superfluous part alone, if any, is that which, in that case, can be allotted to the occupation carried on by the performance of official service.

Expositive.

Art. 39. In speaking of the time-occupying principle, what is here assumed is, that on the day in question, by the operations strictly professional and exclusively appropriate, the whole of the disposable portion of the four-and-twenty hours will not be filled up. Remains, on this supposition, a quantity of time capable of being employed—with more or less advantage—to government, to the individual, to both, or to other purposes at large.

Instructional.

Art. 40. In relation to the application capable of being made of this principle, rules that present themselves as appropriate are the following:

1. Of the day of a functionary belonging to the stipendiary branch of the defensive force, leave not unemployed, on the account of government, any portion that can be so employed, consistently with his comfort and recreation.

2. In so far as consists with his comfort, give to his recreations all such shapes as promise to be in the highest practicable degree conducive to his appropriate aptitude, with relation to the service.

3. By recreations, understand on this occasion, such occupations, as, being conducive to present pleasure, are not detrimental to health, or in any other way to the aggregate interest of life.

4. Lest by the idea of obligation and coercion, an occupation which would otherwise be acceptable, should by the circumstance of its appearing to be prescribed by government, be rendered unacceptable,—let the choice of it, although antecedently made in a general way by the government, be on each individual occasion felt, and by each individual person understood, to be made by himself.

Instructional.

Art. 41. For this purpose, one course is the making provision of things, immoveable or moveable, adapted to the purpose of serving as instruments of the occupation in question, and placing them within his reach.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 42. Of things, by access to and use of which this purpose is capable of being served, examples are as follow:

I. For Active Occupation.

1. Ground, and appropriate furniture, adapted to the purpose of the various exercises styled gymnastic.

2. Waters, in which,—without annoyance to persons of the female sex in respect of decency,—swimming may be practised.

3. Covered places in which, and instruments by which, the exercise of fencing, broad-sword, quarter-staff, single-stick, wrestling, and other pastimes partaking of, or approaching to, the nature of military exercises, may be practised.

4. Various places, where pastimes of which balls, of one sort or other, are the principal instruments, may be partaken of.

II. For Sedentary Occupation.

5. Appropriate libraries, with their contents.

Instructional.

Art. 43. IX. Expense-minimizing principle.—Included, in this case too, is the assumption—that, for the purpose of security, external and internal, and thence of adequate appropriate aptitude and contentment, sufficient provision is made: and that, by no additional expenditure that could be bestowed on the service of any one of the departments in question, could any equivalent addition be made to the serviceableness of the whole.

Instructional.

Art. 44. For reduction, and thence for the minimization of expense in its several shapes, meaning always the balance on the side of expense,—the nature of things presents two different, and in form opposite, though in effect accordant modes: 1. Direct, to wit, by defalcation of what is needless; as to which, so far as regards the personal stock, see Section 10, Remuneration: 2. Indirect, to wit, by return in the shape of profit from the aggregate stock; as to which, see Section 18, Collateral employment.

Instructional.

Art. 45. X. Preponderant detriment-excluding principle.

This desirable property thus brought to view, with the correspondent principle, applies to the whole system taken together: and consequently to each of the several arrangements, made under the guidance of the above-mentioned principles. To be borne constantly in mind, and serve occasionally as a memento, is the use of this principle; and consequently the purpose for which the mention thus made of it is here made. Seldom will any special arrangement be anywhere suggested by it: seldom anything more than the cautions which are thus given,—in the first place, not to give existence to any arrangement, without the conception of a quantity of the matter of good in this or that specific shape, presenting itself as about to be produced by the arrangement;—in the next place, not to make any arrangement for the attainment of such good, without sufficient assurance that, by such arrangement, along with such good, evil preponderant over it in all elements of value taken together, propinquity and certainty not forgotten, will not be produced.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 46. Uses of the exhibition thus made of these principles:

1. Assisting the conception and memory of the directing functionaries, employed in the business of this compound subdepartment; to wit, by keeping constantly under their eyes a representation, as clear, comprehensive, and correct as may be, of the subject-matters calling for their attention.

2. Assisting their judgment, by keeping at the same time under their eyes, the conflicting demands made upon them by the mutually-antagonizing principles on both sides: in such sort, that to each a due, and no more than a due, regard may be paid.

3. Assisting their invention, by putting it to them to consider, whether these are all the items that belong to the account: and if not, to add such as are wanting; allotting to them, for that purpose, their appropriate denominations, with any such explanations as the nature of the case may have suggested.

Section III.

Radicals, who.

Expositive.

Art. 1. Exceptions excepted, to the Radical branch of the Defensive Force will belong, at all times, all who, being apt with respect to the performance of the appropriate exercise, are willing to join therein; none who are not willing. Appropriate denomination, accordingly, volunteers.

Instructional.

Art. 2. To all such as, being, as above, apt, are at the same time willing, the government will be disposed to afford the necessary instruments of instruction; persons and things included.

Instructional. Expositive.

Art. 3. The appropriate personal instruments of instruction will be persons of the same class as those by whom the corresponding instruction is afforded in the stipendiary branch of the Defensive Force: say, for example, for the appropriate manipulations and evolutions upon the smallest scale, drill sergeants: for the appropriate evolutions upon the larger scale, superior officers: with or without appropriate habiliments, as per Section 5, Art. 11, No. 10.

Instructional. Expositive.

Art. 4. The appropriate material instruments of instruction will be the least expensive of those which will suffice for the exercises: for articles no otherwise employed than by being instantaneously consumed—powder and ball, for example—no absolute need will, for this species of service, have place.

Exemplificational.

Art. 5. Examples are—

1. Musquets, which, having been employed or destined to be employed in the stipendiary service, have been ascertained to be unserviceable, and accordingly condemned and eliminated.

Reason 2. Avoidance of the exclusion put upon those who are unable to afford the expense: the advantage thus given to the relatively opulent, at the charge of the relatively indigent.

Principle, the inequality-minimizing.

Expositive.

Art. 12. On this occasion, as on that of the demarcation of the territories of immediate judicatories,—by near neighbourhood understand a distance, not exceeding that which, by a person not incapacitated by special infirmity of mind or body, may be traversed to and fro on the same day, without need of sleeping away from home, leaving moreover an interval of time sufficient for the performance of the business in question, at the seat of business.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 13. Why, on this occasion, and for this purpose, cannot compulsion be advantageously employed?

Answer. Reasons.

1. For procuring for this service men in sufficient number,—compulsion (it is presumed) would not be needed.

2. Repugnant would the employment of compulsion be to the several principles following: that is to say: I. Aptitude-maximizing.—II. Number-minimizing.—III. Contentment-maximizing.—IV. Inequality-minimizing.—V. Expense-minimizing.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 14. I. Aptitude-maximizing. In this case, as in every other, the greater a man’s relish for the service, be it what it may, the greater, in so far as depends upon relish, will be the probability of his appropriate aptitude in relation to it,—the less, the less: his appropriate aptitude, that is to say, in every one of its branches—moral, cognitional, judicial, and active.

Thus far as to the aptitude of the several individuals, individually considered. Now as to aptitude on the part of the whole taken together. By the supposition, on the part of this branch, appropriate aptitude will not be upon a par with what it is in the case of the stipendiary branch: if it were, no adequate reason would there be why future and contingent should be purposely substituted to present serviceableness and actual service; that is to say, no adequate reason for affording facility, as above, to the keeping on foot of the Radical branch of the national force.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 15. II. Number-minimizing. To the number of the individuals of whom the aggregate of the defensive force would be composed, so far as compulsion were applied, here would be an addition made without any proportionable addition to the efficiency of that same force. Of this addition, the amount would be, the exact number of the individuals of whom the addition in question would be composed; and of these not one would be about to enter, or fit to enter, into the stipendiary branch; not one, in a word, fit for actual service.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 16. III. Contentment-maximizing. By compulsion, to the whole extent of its application, maximized would be—not contentment, but discontentment. On the part, of the whole difference between the number raised and kept on foot by compulsion, and the number that could be raised and kept on foot without it,—discontentment to a greater or less amount, would of course have place. So many as are the individuals thus engaged, so many individuals whose endeavours, instead of joining in the service, would be employed either in avoiding the being attached to it,—or, if attached, in deserting from it. For the consequence of such a state of things in respect of efficiency and expense, see below—Arts. 18, 19, 20.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 17. IV. Inequality-minimizing. Here, again, instead of minimization, comes maximization. A state of enjoyment, the state of a few: a state of sufferance and oppressedness, the state of the many. In this case, actual service is supposed. Payment for exemption constitutes another and a very different case. In the case of payment for exemption, the inequality is not altogether unsusceptible of measurement: completely unsusceptible it is in the case of actual forced service.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 18. V. Expense-minimizing. Here, either the number will be incomplete, and to the correspondent degree the design frustrated; or deserters, originally or subsequentially such, will be to be pursued and endeavoured to be caught. But, to the expense requisite for this purpose, no assignable bounds can be found. For each deserter, pursuers more than one will be to be employed: of the whole number pursued, only a portion will be caught: in so far as the endeavour to catch them is successful, then comes the expense of prosecution; and of the number of those prosecuted, only a portion will, in all probability, be convicted; and of that portion again, only a portion punished, and forcibly aggregated to the corps. Then again, on the part of those thus aggregated will naturally remain the most anxious desire and endeavour to desert anew: and so, toties quoties.

But, while a part more or less considerable, are being thus dealt with, the whole must, and at the expense of the public, be maintained. To serve in this, or any other capacity, every man who, from property of his own, or other sources, has not wherewithal to keep himself alive, must be kept alive at the expense of the public, or he dies. But, in the distribution of the matter of pay, to find out who can, and who cannot live without it, is not in this case practicable. Pay, if given to any, must then be given to all. To the expense of hunting and catching a part more or less considerable, is thus added the expense of keeping the whole; and, for the only actual service which is looked for at their hands, not one of them as yet so fit, or so much as expected to be so fit, as those actually belonging to the stipendiary branch, to which they are designedly kept from being aggregated.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 19. Thus it is, that on willingness depend aptitude, contentment, equality, frugality—everything desirable. But willingness—on what does it depend? Answer: upon time and distance.

First, as to time. In vain would it be looked for, on the part of a man who, not having for his day’s subsistence anything but his day’s labour, is called upon to give it,—and without equivalent,—to poor and rich together. The day on which no man labours,—on which no man does anything for his subsistence,—this, if any, must then be the day, and the only day, on which a man who has no quantity of the means of subsistence in advance, can reasonably be expected to be found willing to take part in this, or any other kind of pastime. By this consideration, the possibility of obtaining men for this service without preponderant detriment, is confined to the day of general repose. Thus much as to time.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 20. Now, as to distance. In vain would willingness be looked for, on the part of a day-labourer who, to bear his part in this pastime for a small part of a day,—even though it be, as above, the day of general repose,—would have to give up the whole remainder of that same day, with part of another, and the whole of the intervening night.

Thus it is, that the possibility of obtaining men for this service,—without preponderant detriment, as above,—seems confined to the site and near vicinity of towns of considerable magnitude.

Nor, to either party, need this limitation be, all things considered, a subject of regret. In town, as contrasted with the country,—in the seat of the densest, not in that of the thinnest population,—has the nature of man, in unison with the nature of things, placed the seat of the most intellectual public. What the town pays in labour, it thus gains in influence. What the country parts with in influence, it saves in labour; and it has been seen how vast the saving is.

Nor, by this division, is the population separated into castes, with permanently conflicting interests: town remaining always open to emigrants from country; country to emigrants from town.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 21. To an English or English-bred mind, the idea of an aggregate body, the individuals of which are brought together by compulsion, with a view to land-army service,—and which is distinguished from an army by its comparative unserviceableness for the purposes for which both are intended,—presents the word militia. As to the existence of this institution, in England, and in the Anglo-American United States, it is unquestionable. To find for it anything like a use, must be the work of imagination. Two, and no more than two, uses, does this instrument (it is believed) ever bring to mind.

1. Supposable Use the first. Nursery for the army: this phrase may serve to give expression to one.—2. Supposable Use the second. Protection against the army, and those who have the command of it: this phrase may serve for the other.

As to the benefit derivable from the keeping up, at all times,—by pay, and compulsion to boot, a large body of ineffective men, with no better prospect than that of a chance of being able, with, or though it were even without, compulsion, at one time or other, to aggregate a small portion of it to the effective army, instead of aggregating to that body, on each occasion, at the minimum of expense, the number actually wanted and no more,—this first imaginable use has just been held up to view.

Instructional.

Art. 22. Under the head of contentment-maximizing, the affliction attached to compulsory service, in this line, has been brought to view. To save from all such affliction themselves and their associates, it has, of course, been the effectual care of rulers to grant exemption from it to purchasers. Price for a temporary exemption, say (for example) as under English militia law, £10; of the persons on whom the obligation is imposed, some there will be, who, having for their all this same £10, purchase the exemption, pay for it such their all, and suffer accordingly: others who, if they had had the money, would gladly have paid it for the exemption; but not having the money, serve per force, and suffer accordingly still more than those from whom their all has, as above, been taken. Thus stands the matter at the bottom of the scale of opulence. Look now to the top.

Others there are, each of whom, having a million of pounds at command, pay the 100,000th part of their property, and suffer nothing. Between these two extremes rise, in the scale of inequality, as many degrees as there are farthings between the ten pounds and the million of pounds. Nor is this highest degree of inequality regarded as sufficient. For, at the top of the scale, persons there will be sure to be, and in considerable numbers, of whom such effectual care will have been taken, that they will have the benefit of the exception without paying so much as one farthing for it. Such, under matchless constitution, is the regard paid, on this occasion, to the inequality-minimizing principle.*

Instructional.

Art. 23. Remains, the protection imagined to be afforded or affordable by the militia against the army: against the army, and thence against those who have the command of this last-mentioned instrument, the force and formidableness of which are not open to dispute.

Instructional. Expositive. Exemplificational.

Art. 11. Of the armature classes at present in use, examples are the following:

I.

Infantry.

Serving by land on foot; armed with fire-arms and bayonets.—1. Infantry of the line; intended to act in close order, and for the most part in close combat (αγχιμαχεσθαι, cominus.)—2. Light infantry, or say Riflemen; destined to act by their dispersed force, and for the most part at a distance (eminus.)

II.

Cavalry.

I.—Serving on horseback.

1. Heavy Horse, or say in French Cavalerie d’élite. Frequently Cuirassiers.

2. Light Horse. Commonly Lancers.

3. Horse Artillery; including Rockets.† Horse artillery is virtually cavalry. All artillery used in the field, or to accompany troops in their movements, should be horse artillery. Any other is an impediment instead of aid.

II. Serving amphibiously on foot or horseback.

4. Dragoons. Often confounded with cavalry in general; but improperly. They should be able, when dismounted, to form a body of infantry for close attack. All great generals have known how to derive utility from a body of men on horseback, possessing the quality of fighting on foot. Obstacle; feudal and barbaric propensity to think service on foot less honourable.

5. Light Dragoons, or say Mounted Riflemen. Principally intended for the duty of outposts.

III.

Serving for defence or attack of fortified places.

1.	Military Engineers. }	All these ought to form but one corps, viz. the Foot Artillery.
2.	Artillery Men; including Rockets. † }
3.	Miners. }
4.	Sappers. }
5.	Military Artificers. }
6.	Pontooneers, (for making bridges by boats, and otherwise.) }

IV.

Art. 38. Under the English system, in the ordinary course of practice, location of officers, from the lowest grade of the erudite class upwards, having for its ultimate cause, in each instance, the act of the monarch, as evidenced by his signature, accompanied with appropriate counter-signature,—has for its intermediate cause, to a considerable extent, the payment of purchase-money to the use of an occupant of the grade in question, who, on receipt of the money, is by his own consent dislocated; in his room the purchaser being at the same time located. Qualification-proving examination, none. Diversified and tortuous in no small degree, would the course thus taken be, on inquiry, seen to be. For the efficient and final cause of these qualities, on this occasion as on others, recourse must be had to the aristocratico-monarchical form of the government. Main object, maximization of the quantity of the matter of prosperity and means of happiness, drawn, by the ruling one, and the subruling few, from the product of the labour of the labouring many; particular and subsequent objects (as per Ch. ix. Section 17, Located, how, Art. 44, &c.) on the occasion of this as of every other part of the official establishment, is maximization of expense, coupled with minimization of appropriate aptitude. As to the particular set of arrangements which in the present instance the pursuit of these objects has had for its result;—such is the diversification and perplexity which they exhibit, that the exposition of it would occupy a far greater quantity of space than can here be afforded. Suffice it to add—that in the maximization of the expense, care is taken that the most eligible lots shall be shared, in the largest proportion practicable, among the members of noble and other aristocratical families, for whose further accommodation the quantity of aptitude necessary to location (understand of aptitude in that shape in which it is the fruit of natural talent improved by labour) is minimized. As to this, see further Section 6, Promotion.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 39. In any part of the above-mentioned arrangements is the saving of expense to Government among the objects? Plainly enough it may be seen, to how much greater an extent that object cannot but be attained by the union of the reductional with the emptional bidding (as per Ch. ix. Section 17, Art. 1 to 5) and the universality of its application to the lowest or original grade, beyond which it cannot be carried with preponderant advantage; as to which, see this Ch. Section 6, Promotion. Moreover,—to obviate the inaptitude producible by absolute deference to the joint result of the Qualification-competition and the pecuniary competition,—for this purpose, as in all the other subdepartments so in this, to an individually responsible functionary will the function of location be committed, to wit, to the minister of the subdepartment, after mention made of the cognizance taken by him of the respective results of these same competitions. And, once more, thus it is, that the union is endeavoured to be effected between maximization of appropriate aptitude, and minimization of expense.

Section V.

Term and Conditions of Service.

1. Age: Earliest, at which the enlistment of the individual shall have place.

2. Freedom: In what cases, if in any cases, the enlistment shall be compulsory.

3. Age: Latest, at which the individual shall continue on the list.

4. Reckoning from the day of enlistment, length of the time during which the individual shall stand engaged to serve: whether limited no otherwise than by the duration of his life and physical aptitude, or likewise by a certain number of years.

5. If by a certain number of years,—shall this his term of service, speaking in general language, be long or short?

6. The length of this term, shall it be subjected to any modification, in consideration of the age of the individual at the time of enlistment?

7. At its expiration, shall the term, in any and what circumstances, be renewable, at the will of the Government alone, or of the individual alone, or no otherwise than at the will of both conjointly: and, in the case of a fresh engagement, shall there be any and what variation in terms? and so in the case of each succeeding engagement.*

8. At the expiration of each such term of service, in the instance of each individual, in the case of any and what distance from his home, shall any and what provision be made for his conveyance thither? and, for this purpose, what place shall be considered as his home?

9. Remuneration—its amount: what, in the several branches, and grades in each branch, shall be the amount of it, in all shapes taken together.

10. Remuneration—its shapes: what part of it in the shape of the matter of subsistence,—food, drink, clothing, lodging, means of conveyance included: what part of it, and at what times delivered, in the shape of money or money’s worth, over and above the matter of subsistence, as above.

11. Remuneration: after the expiration of the term of service original, and in case of renewal or renewals subsequential, shall any and what such additional remuneration be given, in consideration of length of service, or length of life, or cessation or diminution of physical capacity of service?

12. Remuneration: in case of wounds curable or incurable received, or sickness contracted, in battle,—and accompanied, or not, by cessation or diminution of physical capacity for service,—shall any, and what additional remuneration be given on the ground of compensation?

13. Promotion—on what contingencies shall it depend?

14. Punishments—to what, and in what events respectively, shall the individual be subjectable;—and, in each event, in what shapes, other than those to which a non-military man is equally subjectable.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 12. Note, that whatsoever expenditure may be necessary on the score of subsistence, scarcely any part of it can, with safety, be left to be defrayed by the individual himself, out of that which is allotted to him in the shape of money. Reason—Because the fluctuation which in his situation may have place, in respect of the relative value of money, may be such that, from the insufficiency of the supply in respect of this or that article of subsistence, unexpected hardship, to an unlimited degree, even to that of loss of life, will be liable to ensue. The degree in which such enhancement is capable of having place, will be susceptible of indefinite augmentation, by the scarcity liable to be produced in time of warfare, by the circumstances of time and place.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 13. Reasons in favour of a long term, these:—for a long term, that is to say, for the longest term consistent with the individual’s continuance in a state of capacity for service, in respect of health and strength.

1. Generally speaking, with length of continuance in the service, will increase practice; and with practice, aptitude. Principle, the aptitude-maximizing.

2. Successive renewals may require correspondent bounties. Principle, the expense-minimizing.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 14. Reasons against a long term, or say in favour of a short one, these.

1. In proportion as the individual is well treated, the service will, generally speaking, answer his expectation; and, supposing it to answer his expectation,—generally speaking, he will with satisfaction join in the renewal of the engagement. Principle, the contentment-maximizing.

2. In this case, the shorter the term, the stronger will be the motive, by which the government will be solicited to make provision for good treatment to this class of public functionaries: to make such provision, to wit, by appropriate enactments, followed by execution and effect uniformly given to them in practice. Principle, the contentment-maximizing.

3. As to expense. The better the treatment in other respects, the less will be the expense needed in the articles of subsistence and pecuniary pay. Principle, the expense-minimizing.

Instructional.

Art. 15. If a pension of retreat, fixed or dependent on pleasure, be included in the terms of the engagement, it may be made greater in case of a second engagement, still greater in case of a third, and so on.

Art. 4. To the Legislature it will belong to consider whether cases may have place, in which, on the occasion of a particular enterprise, the nature of the service may render it matter of indispensable necessity that the choice of some or all of those who command under him, should, by an appropriate power, be given to the functionary who, on that same occasion, commands in chief.

Instructional.

Art. 5. In such case, the result of such temporary location might be made to expire on a day mentioned, or at an individual point of time otherwise described; in either case, renewable from time to time, until the return of peace: on the day of expiration, the grades of the persons so located remain, or become, the same as they would have been under the seniority system, had no such temporary mutation taken place.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 6. Exceptions excepted as above, why, as an efficient cause of promotion, is length of service, or say, the seniority system, proposed to be established?

Art. 15. So far as regards the command in chief of a corps, appointed on this or that particular occasion, for this or that particular purpose, the following modes of proceeding present themselves as open to the choice of the Prime Minister, or of the highest commander on the spot.

1. Appointing to the command the senior of all the officers, not as yet employed. Principle, the contentment-maximizing.

2. Appointing to the command an officer who is the senior of all who are actually employed: his seniors in a number more or less considerable, remaining on this occasion unemployed,—in which case, though passed by, they are not, any of them, placed under the command of one over whom they had been in the habit or expectation of exercising command.

3. Openly placing the officer in question over the head of others, in number more or less considerable, as per Arts. 3, 4: they serving at the same time with and under him. Principle, the aptitude-maximizing.

4. Giving the appointment in form to the senior of the officers employed; but, by secret orders, requiring him to follow, on every occasion, the advice of a chosen officer, who for this purpose is required to be attendant on him at all times: seniors to this secret director serving in any number, in the same army, at the same time. Principles, 1. the aptitude-maximizing. 2. The contentment-maximizing. 3. The expense-minimizing.

Note in this case the antagonization between the two principles, the aptitude-maximizing and the expense-minimizing.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 16. In the English navy service, an occurrence not unfrequent has been—the appointment of an officer whose grade is not higher than that of captain, to the command of a squadron of considerable force, while other navy functionaries in great number, in the several superior grades comprised under the denomination of admirals, have remained unemployed. In the histories of the times, indication of occurrences of this sort may be seen, in the appellation of commodore given to the commanding officer in such cases.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 17. In that same branch, England affords an example of a practice not likely to be found carried to so great an extent, if at all, anywhere else. This is—for the purpose of accelerating the pace of promotion for the benefit of a particular individual, without infringement of the seniority system, and thence without producing in that part of the official establishment any discontent,—pushing up, before him, and for the purpose of coming at him, his seniors, whatsoever the number of them may be: individuals, to no one of whom, at so early a time, would promotion have been given otherwise. To give to one man, whose extra services, or perhaps whose services altogether, are not worth sixpence, from £100 a-year to £1000, ten times or twenty times the money is thus given to ten or twenty others, on no one of whom, but for the sake of this one, so much as a sixpence would at that time have been bestowed. So far as regards expense, this comes of the union assumed to be inseparable between increase of power and increase of pay: as to which see Section 10, Remuneration.

Thus it is that while, with the help of the half-pay-list, in the army there are commissioned officers enough of themselves to constitute a considerable army without the help of private soldiers,—in the navy there are commissioned officers, a large portion of them admirals, enough to man a frigate, if not a ship of the line, without the help of private sailors. In the English army-service commissioned officers in more number than, in the Anglo-American United States army-service, army stipendiaries of all ranks added together, commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates.

1. In their case, preferably if not exclusively, has place the faculty of affording indication of adequate aptitude or deficiency, by the process of which examination principally consists: that is to say, affording answers in compliance with questions.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 25. After the first location, that is to say, on the occasion of promotion, the pecuniary competition will not, it is supposed, be employed. Reasons:

1. To the purpose of reduction of expense, it will not be necessary. Under the seniority system, the increase of remuneration, at the accession of each successive superior grade as often as it will occur, is foreseen, and will naturally produce its suitable and duly proportional effect. At what time each promotion may be expected, will be matter of calculation, grounded on a course of experience open to all eyes. Principle, the expense-minimizing.

2. On the other hand, suppose this sort of competition renewed on each occasion; or though it were but on a single occasion;—neither inconsiderable nor unobvious are the evil effects: and those in a great measure unavoidable.

3. By dint of opulence, a youth with little or no experience, and thence with the minimum of appropriate aptitude, might take the command from seniors, in whose instance aptitude had by experience been, by any number of degrees, raised above his. Principle concerned, the aptitude-maximizing.

4. By seniors, their juniors in unlimited numbers, over whom they had for any length of time been in the habit of exercising command, might be seen put over their heads, and to their mortification exercising command over them. Principle concerned, the contentment-maximizing.

Instructional.

Art. 26. The Legislature will determine, on what, if on any conditions, an officer having at his own instance or otherwise been eliminated out of the stipendiary service, may be relocated. On this occasion, regard will be had to any such service as may be capable of being rendered by a functionary of this class, by means of experience acquired in the meantime; either in the business of some other subdepartment, or in the service, military or non-military, of some other state. Principle, the aptitude-maximizing.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 27. From privates, the faculty of receiving promotion for extraordinary service, will not it is supposed, be withholden. Principles, 1. Appropriate-aptitude maximized; 2. Contentment maximized; 3. Inequality minimized.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 28. Under the head of promotion, as well as under that of original location,—not inconsiderable is the instruction capable of being obtained from the observation of English practice.

1. On the occasion of original location,—in the Erudite grades, enormous, though scarcely with any approach to correctness ascertainable, is the waste committed by suffering to pass into private pockets the money which on this occasion might and ought to be made to find its way into the public purse. Great was the scandal, long and elaborate the judicial inquiry in consequence,—when, in the case of the late Duke of York, the discovery was made—that through that channel money was in the habit of finding its way into the pocket of the mistress of the Commander-in-chief. But instead of the feminine, suppose the pocket had been of the masculine gender: the evil to the service—would it have been less? In that case, the transition would have been at least as easy, and the eyes of the public not so open to the abuses capable of resulting from it.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 29. As to promotion, mark the regard shown to consistency. In the British service, the seniority system has place in the scientific armature classes, that is to say, the engineers and the artillery; and also in the marines.

In those other armature classes which, for distinction’s sake, may be termed the non-scientific,—comparatively rare are the instances, in which (not to speak of demonstrated meritorious service) promotion is obtained through seniority alone: efficient cause, purchase, favour, and parliamentary influence; all these if not in undistinguishable, at any rate in hitherto undistinguished, proportions.

Instructional. Ratiocinative. Exemplificational.

Art. 30. Note, that, in the case of the scientific armature classes, antecedently to location, examination has had place. Question: Why in these classes? Answer: Because the affording admission into these classes, without that same security for appropriate aptitude, would be too hazardous.

In the non-scientific classes, examination none. Why? Because military official situations are in so high a proportion the destined patrimony of the ruling few; and because, of every official situation, the value to the occupant is in the direct ratio of the remuneration attached to it, and in the inverse ratio of the labour necessary to the attainment of it. For this cause it is,—that of the official situations in which the degree of aptitude and quantity of labour necessary are minimized, the number is maximized.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 31. Turn now to the Anglo-American United States. In the Executive Department,—the utmost plenitude of useful power being, under a democratically chosen legislature, preserved from abuse, to wit, by the most efficient responsibility,—the business of military promotion is preserved at the same time from all perplexity. Seniority in service the general rule: in particular exigencies, by the act of an effectually-responsible functionary,—the President,—departure from it at any time; and this without discontentment, because without disappointment or surprise anywhere.* Principles, 1. the aptitude-maximizing; 2. the contentment-maximizing.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 32. Note, that though in this instance under a government on which the public eye is so universally and constantly upon the watch,—and under a government so long and completely settled—no such ill effects as those here in contemplation appear to have ever been experienced,—it follows not that, with equal security, or with any adequate degree of security, without some such restrictions as those here proposed, that same power could be intrusted in any hands in a newly-formed political state.

Instructional.

Art. 33. To the Legislature it may on this occasion be matter of consideration,—whether, as to power of giving promotion out of turn, as per Art. 3, there shall be any and what difference as between peace and war. In time of peace occasions will not, in regular course, be apt to occur for the manifestation of extraordinary merit by the performance of extra-meritorious service: but by internal commotion, or by collateral employment, as per Section 18, occasion may incidentally be produced.

Instructional. Expositive. Ratiocinative.

Art. 34. To the Legislature it may also be matter of consideration,—whether, in time of peace, without prejudice to permanent precedence, the power of command might not, in this or that part of the scale of grades, be made from time to time to change hands: in such sort that for example, as between second-lieutenant and first-lieutenant, he who the former year was second, should during the second year become first, he who was first descending and taking his place: and so upwards in other grades. By this means, on each such scale of grades, each functionary will acquire experience in the business of all the grades: and whatever degree of unpleasantness may stand attached to a state of unremitted and immutable subordination, may thus be diminished.

Principles, 1. the aptitude maximizing; 2. the contentment-maximizing; 3. the inequality-minimizing.

As to the proportion, between rise in grade and increase of pay, see Section 10, Remuneration.

Instructional.

Art. 35. For the consideration of the Legislature it will be, whether, in so far as promotion is determined, not by seniority in the establishment, but on the supposition of simply meritorious or extra-meritorious service,—the functionary or functionaries by whose immediate agency the location is in each instance determined, may not receive appropriate and useful information, from the opinions of such persons as, in virtue of their relative position, (relation had to the candidate in question,) will necessarily or at any rate naturally and ordinarily have possessed opportunities of forming a peculiarly well-grounded judgment as to his appropriate aptitude, in all points: always understanding that, by appropriate arrangements for the preservation of secrecy, effectual means are afforded for screening the votes from the action of corruptive influence.

Instructional.

Art. 36. Arrangements for this purpose suppose these:—

In the land-service, in each and every battalion or regiment, on the occasion of a vacancy in any one of the Erudite grades, the lowest being in the ordinary state of things the one first entered upon, collect, in the secret mode, the votes of the several individuals belonging to the ranks following: that is to say,—

1. The privates and non-commissioned officers belonging to that same battalion or regiment, by themselves.

2. The Erudites, belonging to that same battalion or regiment, by themselves.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 37. This, for the information of the army minister and prime minister: to wit, on the principle of the qualification judicatory, applied, (as per Ch. ix. Ministers collectively, Section 16, Locable who,) with few or no exceptions, to all subdepartments of the administration department in general.

Instructional.

Art. 38. The number of the votes for the respective candidates being thus made completely known,—let the right and duty of recommendation, or say provisional choice, be, in the case of land-service in the hands of the army minister; or in the case of sea-service, in those of the navy minister: the ultimate choice in those of the prime minister: he taking either the individual so recommended, or any other, who, in his declared opinion is in a still higher degree possessed of the appropriate aptitude.

Instructional.

Art. 39. Antecedently to the collection of the votes as above,—a time will have been allowed, within which every candidate will have been at liberty to make known, by appropriate publication, any special instance of extra-meritorious service, or other grounds, if any, for promotion, which it has happened to him to have exhibited.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 40. Why, on this occasion, collect the votes of the privates?

Answer. Reasons. 1. That, in relation to appropriate aptitude in all points, the benefit may be taken of the opinion of all men so situated as that among them will, generally speaking, have been individuals to the greatest extent possible percipient witnesses of his conduct, in relation to those same points of aptitude. Principle, the aptitude-maximizing.

2. That, in the contemplation of the influence with which the state of these votations will naturally operate on the minds of the locating functionaries,—to wit, the army and navy ministers, and the prime minister,—the Erudite officers of all grades may find an adequate motive and inducement to conduct themselves with effective benevolence, in relation to those their subordinates. Principle, the contentment-maximizing.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 41. Why not render the aggregate of the opinions and wishes of these same percipient witnesses decisive?

Answer. Reasons. 1. Presumable comparative deficiency in respect of appropriate moral aptitude. The self-regarding interest which each individual has in his own comfort, being generally a stronger motive than sympathy for the public service: hence the danger lest a candidate, whose chief qualification consists in the favour shown by him to these same self-regarding interests, will be voted for in preference to those, whose qualifications are in a superior degree conducive to the welfare of the public service.

True it is, that at and during the time of actual service, on the degree of appropriate aptitude on all points on the part of officers will, throughout, depend in a more or less considerable degree the personal security of all ranks, that of private included. But the motive derived from this source is confined in its operation to the consideration of the conduct of the persons in question during that comparatively short portion of time; whereas the motive derived from the consideration of the dependence of the personal comfort of the subordinate on the conduct of the superordinate in relation to him, applies to the whole of the time during which such their relation to one another continues.

2. Presumable comparative deficiency in respect of appropriate intellectual aptitude. In each armature class, the greater the quantity of time labour and natural talent requisite to put a man in possession of the requisite degree of appropriate intellectual aptitude with relation to the service of that class,—the less, on the part of the privates, (understand such as have not been subjected to the test afforded by examination, before the General Qualification Judicatory, as per Ch. ix. Section 16,) will be their aptitude with relation to the forming a well-grounded opinion of appropriate aptitude in all its elements taken together, on the part of candidates.

Ratiocinative. Exemplificational.

Art. 42. In the early days of the revolution which gave birth to the Anglo-American United States, the officers elected were (it is said) in considerable and even principal proportions, those who engaged to put their pay into a purse common to them and the privates, and thereupon eat their meals with them in a common mess.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 43. As to the collection of the votes as above,—for the consideration of the legislator it will be, in what divisions, or say groupes, the votes of the privates shall be received, as above: that is to say, whether the only aggregate shall be that of the votes of those belonging to the individual grades next below that in which the vacancy has place,—or that of the votes belonging to that same grade throughout the whole of the battalion or regiment: or whether the votes shall be collected in both these modes: the particular object, or say end in view, being in both cases the obtaining the votes of those who, in the quality of percipient witnesses, have possessed the best opportunities of obtaining perception of the several relative facts, and of those who have been best qualified for forming a correct judgment on the ground of those same facts.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 44. On this combined plan, provision is made for the maximum of appropriate aptitude in all points taken together, without sacrificing aptitude in any point to aptitude in any other. For, to the purpose of affording, in their maximum of strength, those motives, or say inducements, by which the commanding as well as obeying ranks, to wit, the Erudite and the non-commissioned officers, are urged to have regard for the comfort of the purely obedient rank, it is not necessary that the votes of subordinates of the lowest rank, should be decisive: sufficient is the assurance that they will be taken into consideration, and, with more or less influence, operate on the minds of those to whom it belongs to decide.

Instructional.

Art. 45. In making their choice, while having before them the results of the several relations as above,—the army minister, navy minister, and prime minister respectively, will not forget to have regard to the advantage attached to the observance of the seniority system: they will accordingly take this as the generally and primâ facie operative guide to their choice: not departing from the line of conduct indicated by it, otherwise than for some special reason assignable, and accordingly assigned.

Exemplificational.

Art. 46. Such being the ends in view, which, in the Defensive Force subdepartments should, in relation to promotion, under and according to the greatest happiness principle, be the objects of pursuit, turn now to the objects which, under matchless constitution, are actually pursued.

Section VII.

Discipline Established.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 1. Of military discipline, the objects are these:—

1. The good of the service: that is to say, making the species of force in question, on each occasion, effectual to the purpose of national defence; and, to this purpose, securing to superordinates obedience at the hands of subordinates.

Art. 12. In no case will this regard fail to be bestowed on the difference between time of actual or immediately-impending war on the one hand, and time of undisturbed peace on the other; and the nature of the arrangements respectively best adapted to states of things so opposite.

Section VIII.

Oppression obviated.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 1. Against oppression in every shape, in this line of service as in every other, the most extensively applicable, and efficaciously preventitive,—in some cases even satisfactive, and in all cases the mildest remedy—is publicity. By it evidence, and thereby efficiency, is given to the judicial authority, and at the same time to the authority of the public-opinion tribunal.

Enactive. Instructional.

Art. 2. 1. Military Register. In every regiment, or other such military corps, will be kept a military register. Whether for the performance of the service attached to this office, a separate functionary not invested with any other shall be provided,—or whether the duties of this and some other office shall be executed by the same person,—the Legislature will determine.

Instructional.

Art. 3. In determining the matter of such register, and the functions and duties of the registrar, the Legislature will have regard to the functions and duties allotted to the office of registrar of an immediate judicatory, as per Ch. xii. Judiciary collectively; Section 14, Publicity, recordation, publication; Section 15, Secret intercourse obviated; Section 16, Partiality obviated; Section 17, Migration; Section 18, Incidental Complaint Book; and Ch. xxi. Immediate and Appellate Registrars.

Instructional.

Art. 4. In this register will be divers books.

Enactive. Expositive.

Art. 5. Book I. Punishment Book. In it, entry will be made of every act by which on any person belonging to the corps in question punishment has been inflicted.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 6. Good effects for production of which it is instituted, three:

1. By apt notification, the preventive influence of the punishment is maximized.

2. In case of altogether ungrounded, or over severe punishment, the persons concerned in the infliction of it are made responsible; compensationally, punitionally, or reputationally only, according to the nature of the case.

3. As far as may be, by the apprehension of such responsibility, such inflictions are prevented, and the number of them is minimized.

Instructional.

Art. 7. In prescribing heads under which matter shall be entered in the military punishment book, the Legislature will have regard to the heads prescribed for matter belonging to penal suits as per Procedure Code.

Instructional. Expositive.

Art. 8. Examples of these heads are the following:—

1. The offence, what.

2. Article offended against, what.

3. The offence when committed.

4. Offender or offenders, who.

5. Time when committed, year, month, day, hour, in so far as known.

6. Time as above, when information was first given.

7. Sufferers, actual or eventual, by the wrong, who; for example, 1. the public, in respect of the service; 2. A military functionary in the rank of private; 3. If an officer, of what grade; 4. An individual or individuals at large.

8. Judge or Judges to whom information was first given, who.

9. Witness or witnesses, who: to wit, 1. for the pursuer’s side: 2. for the defender’s side.

10. Witness or witnesses, by whom respectively called, or whether spontaneous, simply informative (as per Procedure Code, Ch. viii. Judicial Application, vol. ii. p. 33,) included.

11. Day or days of hearing; if any other than that on which the information was first given.

12. Sentence, what: to wit, the terms of it.

13. Sentence, by whom pronounced.

2. Evil the second. Persons necessary to concur in the exercise of the power, are two or more. Beneficial consequence, the danger of suppression diminished: per contrà, a quantity of naturally producible delay, in length proportioned to the number of these same persons, indefinitely increased. By the simple negative act of not choosing to act in conjunction with the rest, by each one might be exercised the faculty of producing delay to an indefinite extent: to an extent, by which, in many cases, the design of the information might be frustrated.

Art. 34. In this case as in others, complaint may have had for its object—either the system, that is to say the state of the law and official practice,—or the conduct of some determinate individual or individuals under it. When it is the system, the act of complaint will be an exercise given to the melioration-suggestive function, as per Ch. v. Constitutive, Section 5, Functions. Art. 4. Where it is the individual,—under a Code such as the present, the delivery of an instrument of complaint, as per Art. 15, will constitute the first step in a judicial inquiry.

For the experience had of the salutary effect produced in Military Judicature by the institution of appropriate publicity, see Section 13, Military Judicature.

Instructional.

Art. 35. An arrangement by which the danger of ulterior oppression in revenge for, or in consequence of complaint, may be lessened, is transference of a complainant from the corps in question to some other. But on this occasion, care will require to be taken,—on the one hand, lest, under the notion of relief, oppression in another shape be exercised; to wit, by transference of the complainant to a corps to which he is averse: on the other hand, lest, for the purpose of obtaining such transference, a groundless or frivolous complaint be instituted.

Section IX.

Minor Delinquency checked.

Enactive. Ratiocinative.

Art. 1. Minor Delinquency Book. Cases may present themselves, in which, as a check to delinquency, divulgation, more or less extensive, or simple recordation, may operate, with sufficient efficacy, without being accompanied with ulterior infliction in the name of punishment. To this purpose an appropriate register, by the name of the Minor Delinquency Book, is allotted.

Enactive. Expositive.

Art. 2. To this register may be consigned, amongst others, cases of vexation, mental or even corporal, arising out of disagreements between individual and individual, and in particular between private and private.

Enactive. Instructional.

Art. 3. For heads under which recordation of these cases may be made, see Section 8, Oppression obviated, and Ch. ix. Ministers collectively, Section 21, Oppression obviated.

Instructional.

Art. 4. Classes between which disagreement may happen to have place, and, in regard to which, the distinction between class and class may call for observation, are the following:

1. Private and private.

2. Private and officer.

3. Officer and officer.

4. Private and non-military; or complaint from non-military.

5. Officer and non-military; or complaint from non-military: as per Section 8, Oppression obviated, Art. 20.

Instructional.

Art. 5. For disagreement under the above several modifications,—in place of punishment, a more surely efficacious, and frequently upon the whole a more apt remedy may be, with or without registration as above, the transference of one or more of the disagreeing parties, they being military functionaries respectively, from corps to corps, or from place to place, as per Section 8, Oppression obviated, Art. 35. As to this matter, see Section 13, Military Judicature.

Section X.

Remuneration.

Instructional.

Art. 1. Under this head, subject-matters calling for the consideration of the Legislature, will be found the following:

1. Quantum of the matter of remuneration, how to adjust it: in the first place in the rank of private, in each branch, and in each armature class.

2. Shape and shapes, what the most proper to be, in different cases, given to that same quantum, the functionary being in a state completely fit for service.

3. Invalidship: in regard to quantum and shape, what the course most proper to be taken, in case of a deficiency, more or less considerable, in respect of fitness for service.

4. For extra service, if in any, in what shape shall extra-remuneration be allowed or allowable.

5. Smart money—on what, if on any occasions,—in what shape or shapes,—shall extra-remuneration be given for extra bodily sufferance, produced in and by performance of the service.

6. Branches of service, armature classes, ranks: diversifications springing from these sources—how far shall they serve as grounds for correspondent diversification in respect of the quantum or the shape of the remuneration?

7. Extravasational remuneration—in what, if in any cases, shall application be made of it to Defensive Force service.

8. Pecuniary competition—in the adjustment of remuneration, shall any and what application be made of it in Defensive Force service?

Instructional.

Art. 2. Circumstances on which the quantum of the matter of remuneration necessary in the shape of pay will necessarily be dependent, are the following:

1. Desirableness of the condition of the functionary, as to matters independent of the treatment bestowed upon him by his superordinates individually considered: to wit, state of the laws in this behalf, and of the official establishment.

2. Desirableness of it in respect of the treatment bestowed upon them by these same superordinates.

3. Condition of the people at large at the time of enlistment. The worse their condition, the greater in respect of intensity and extent will of course be their desire and disposition to enlist.

Instructional.

Art. 3. The effective, or say net desirableness of his condition will be—the difference produced on the side of desirableness, by the causes of undesirableness on the one side, and those of desirableness on the other.

Instructional.

Art. 4. Causes of undesirableness, the several peculiar hardships, to which by this his occupation the functionary stands exposed. These, if the treatment be such as it ought to be and may be, will be most peculiar to a time of war. Suppose no war to have place during his continuance in the service, the aggregate of them will be equal to 0.

Instructional.

Art. 5. Of the causes of comparative desirableness, examples are the following. For the production of them, the lowest rate of remuneration ever exemplified in practice will be seen to be sufficient, provided it be promptly and invariably afforded.

1. Security in respect of subsistence, over and above that possessed by the labouring and non-military classes.

2. Clothing, greatly and constantly superior in comfortableness and appearance.

3. Security against the diminution of the means of external comfort in general, which the labouring classes stand constantly exposed to, by the constantly growing excess of population over the means of subsistence.

4. Exclusive possession of the factitious dignity inseparably attached to the denomination of soldier, and to his appearance in respect of habiliments and armature.*

Ratiocinative.

Art. 21. Reasons in favour of such provision in the case of superannuation, are the following:

1. In a non-military state, the man might, to an extent more or less considerable, have possessed the faculty of making provision for this contingency by frugality and good economy: in the military service, of this there is hardly any chance.

2. In a non-military state, by passing his life in the bosom of his family connexions, he would have possessed the opportunity of engaging their affections in his favour, and finding in those affections the means of subsistence: in his military state he will, unless by accident, be cut off from this resource.

3. By these considerations—if for this contingency provision was not made by Government by the terms of the engagement,—men who were governed by prudential considerations,—and who, as such, would, in this as in any other situation, afford correspondent promise of good conduct,—might be deterred from entering into the service. Principle concerned, the aptitude-maximizing.

4. From the withholding of this provision, the sufferings inseparable from the decline of life in every situation would be aggravated; and between men at that time of life, and men at earlier periods of life, the inequality increased. Principle concerned, the inequality-minimizing.

5. Altogether different is the ground of demand in this case from what it is in the case of pensions for relatives: as to which, see Ch. ix. Ministers collectively, Section 15, Remuneration, Art. 46, p. 270.

Instructional.

Art. 22. On the occasion and for the purpose of invalidship—in the instance of each individual, care will require to be taken, by appropriate inspection and examination, to take advantage of whatever mode and degree of incomplete aptitude may have been left to him, with relation to collateral employments, suited to his particular case: collateral, that is to say, with reference to actual combat, and those manipulations, evolutions, marchings, and other modes of self-conveyance, which are preparatory to actual combat.

Instructional.

Art. 23. Of incompleteness in respect of appropriate aptitude, with reference to Defensive Force service, the efficient cause will be—absence or deficiency in respect of some one or more of those qualities, the possession and manifestation of which are necessary to the apt performance of the several operations in Art. 24 mentioned.

Instructional.

Art. 24. Qualities requisite and desirable in Defensive Force service, and more especially in the ungraded, or say the purely obedient ranks, may be thus enumerated.

I. On the part of each individual,

1. Intrepidity.

2. Exactness in obedience.

3. Promptitude in obedience.

4. Vigilance.

5. Hardiness, that is to say power, accompanied with will, to endure appropriate hardship in every shape.

6. Activity (appropriate) including appropriate dexterity, or say adroitness in the several manipulations and evolutions.

II. On the part of numbers, acting conjunctly in the same place, at the same time.

7. Simultaneity, or say, simultaneousness of motion.

Instructional.

Art. 25. In case of invalidship, as per Art. 22, the legislator will consider and determine, in relation to what invalidship-employments, military and non-military together, Defensive Force functionaries will remain apt and applicable,—after and notwithstanding deterioration of aptitude, by loss of substance or use of various limbs or organs.

Examples are as follow:

Limbs or Organs lost or disabled.		Employments, aptitude for which may be remaining notwithstanding.
1.	One eye.	1.	Serving in a garrison.
		2.	Serving as a guard to the exterior of any public edifice.
		3.	Serving as a guard in the interior of any public edifice: in particular, in a museum of any kind, to preserve the articles from theft and active destruction or deterioration.
2.	One hand or arm lost or rendered motionless.	4.	Serving as per No. 3 above.
3.	One foot or leg lost or rendered motionless.	5.	Serving as per No. 3 above.
4.	One hand or arm, and likewise one foot or leg, lost or rendered motionless.	6.	Serving as per No. 3 above.
5.	Both hands or arms, or both feet or legs, lost or rendered motionless.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 26. Of collateral employments that present themselves as suitable to the above cases of invalidship, or some of them, examples are the following:

1. Training recruits.

2. Garrison service, as above.

3. Service as exterior local guards, as above: guards (where marching, or considerable locomotion, is not necessary) for the protection of the exterior of Government or other public edifices.

4. Service as interior local guards, as above: guards placed in the interior of public edifices, such as theatres, and the several apartments in public libraries and museums of all sorts.

5. Operating in private manufacturing, and other profitable establishments conducted on a large scale: Government contributing what addition shall in the case of each individual have been found necessary, where the manufacture could not, consistently with its profit, afford pay to an amount sufficient for his subsistence.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 27. To the Erudite grades, scarcely does any such invalidship-provision,—except in the case of wounds received, or loss of the substance or use of a bodily organ, such loss being caused by actual service,—present itself as applicable.

Reasons:

1. In that rank in life, due regard to such contingencies may reasonably be expected to be had, on the occasion of the pecuniary competition.

2. Unsuitable to such their condition may be thought to be the being subjected to examination by authority, and the having their infirmities scrutinized into, for the purpose of their being distributed, as per Art. 25, among collateral employments.

Instructional.

Art. 28. In respect of making provision for a man’s subsistence,—suppose it determined that, by reason of invalidship, he is no longer in a state of complete aptitude for appropriate service, as above,—three options will call for the determination of the Legislature.

1. Retaining him on the list and aggregating him to some determinate corps, with his pay in the whole or in part continued to him, and with employments one or more assigned to him, in quality of invalidship-employments.

2. Discharging him from the service, but continuing to him, in whole or in part, his pay down to the time of his decease.

3. Discharging him from the service without pay at the expense of the public, or means of subsistence in any shape.

Instructional.

Art. 29. That in whatsoever service exercised, some employment,—profit-seeking employment,—so it be not accompanied with unwillingness,—is more conducive not only to good economy but to individual comfort than idleness is,—seems almost too obvious, as well as indisputable, to be worth mentioning. But what may be worth mentioning is, that it consists not either with good economy or with comfort, to keep in a state in which he is incapable of earning anything towards his own subsistence, any man for whom profit-yielding employment could be provided, either by those at whose expense he is so kept, or by any other employer.

Thus much as to what ought to be done. Principles concerned, 1. the contentment-maximizing: 2. the expense-minimizing.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 30. Now, as to what has been commonly done. To provide invalidship-employment in the above or any other shape, is a task requiring more attention than, under any form of government, has as yet been felt necessary, and accordingly paid by rulers, either to the financial interests of the whole community, or to the comfort of this class of the individuals over whom they rule. Whatever is given,—the course has been, to give it at this stage of life gratis: that is to say, without requiring service rendered to any person in any shape in return for it. Modes in which such gratuitous provision has been made, two: one, the granting to each of the individuals in question an annuity, styled a pension, in the shape of money; another, the keeping them congregated in large bodies, in one edifice, in such manner as would be necessary, supposing them in such sort sick as to be unable to stir out of it. Hospital being the appellative applied to designate an edifice provided for the reception and curation of the sick, Hospital has been the term applied to designate an edifice for the class of individuals in question sick or not sick.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 31. By every principle that has any application to the case, this aggregate mode of provision stands condemned. Principles, 1. the contentment-maximizing; 2. the inequality-minimizing; 3. the expense-minimizing.

1. Instead of being at liberty to choose the place most agreeable to him, and in it the society most agreeable to him,—every man so provided for is forced into a place, and kept in a society, both of which may, to any degree, be disagreeable to him; so likewise to those into whose society he is forced. So much for the contentment-maximizing principle.

2. To some of these men the place and society may to any degree be agreeable; to others, in any degree disagreeable. So much for the inequality-minimizing principle.

3. In every instance in which this Hospital mode of making provision for the superannuated or otherwise relatively unapt Defensive Force functionary has been in use,—the expense per head has, in an enormous degree, been found to exceed the expense at which, with the same degree of comfort, the individual might have been maintained, and indeed, in other instances, actually was maintained, at the expense of the same Government, in a state of liberty. So much for the expense-minimizing principle.

Instructional.

Art. 32. In every instance, regard for the interest of this portion of the subject many, has been the pretence: in every instance, regard for the interest of the ruling one and the sub-ruling few, has been either the sole, or at least the predominant cause. To the sub-ruling few, pleasure from the gratification of the correspondent taste, with praise for the goodness of that taste; and (in the shape of highly-endowed official situations in the establishment, together with the correspondent patronage) pickings out of the expense. To the ruling one, the patronage paramount, together with correspondent honour and glory, and reputation of effective benevolence. Ask, on this occasion, among all those the regard for whose interest is the assigned cause of all this addition to the expense, what is the proportionate number of those to whom a share in these pleasures, or in any of them, descends.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 33. In England, at an expense per head some number of times as great as that which is necessary to the same degree of comfort in a state of liberty,—two of these Hospital-Prisons, or say Prison-Hospitals, have for many years been kept on foot: For Army functionaries, Chelsea Hospital; for Navy functionaries, Greenwich Hospital.

In France, the practice was engendered by the ostentation of the longest-reigned of all weak-minded despots and tyrants. Witness the Hôpital des Invalides.

Once at least, if not oftener, has this topic been brought before the English House of Commons; with what fruit, Chelsea and Greenwich still declare.

Art. 39. Of warfare casualties, examples are the following:—

1. Loss of the substance of a limb or other bodily organ: eyes, for example, one or both; other organs should be distinctly specified, for the purpose of exclusion or admission.

2. Loss of the use of limb or organ.

3. Loss, complete, of aptitude for service; by loss of general health.

4. Wounds and diseases not productive of loss—complete or comparative, of aptitude; yet incurable.

5. Wounds and diseases curable.

Principle concerned, the aptitude-maximizing: resolution to encounter death and wounds without flinching, being in this function the characteristic feature of appropriate moral and active aptitude.

Instructional.

Art. 40. Of such compensation, appropriate shape—1. for casualties of the incurable class, Pension for life: 2. for those of the curable class, a sum once paid.

In the case of those of the incurable class, for means of further provision, see the Articles relative to invalidship: Art. 20 to 34.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 41. In any rank above the lowest, the Legislature will consider and determine, whether to every or any remuneration in the shape of grade and power, any and what addition shall be made in the shape of pay.

Reasons against such addition, these:

1. Grades rising one above another in such manner as is customary, are necessitated by the very nature of the service.

2. By every promotion, addition is accordingly, in the very nature of the case, made to power and dignity.

3. But, by addition of reward in one shape, it seems not easy, if possible, to say why a demand should be produced for addition in any other shape;—why money should be necessary to induce men to accept of addition to power and dignity. Subtraction of money would, if any, seem the more needful and reasonable change.

4. In this as in other cases, the less the reward looked to, the greater the relish for the service, and thence, so far the aptitude, probabilized.

5. Immense is necessarily the waste—where, while promotion follows seniority, additions to pay accompany it through a line of grades. To come at one individual,—recommended for promotion, by which soever consideration, merit or favour,—the correspondent pay is given to all his seniors, in a number to which there are no limits. See Section 6, Promotion.

6. If pay is thus made to receive additions corresponding to lengths of service, additions over and above the necessary additions made to power and dignity,—still greater should be the demand for it in the case of the private, if by him no such additions to power and dignity are received. Principle, the expense-minimizing.

Instructional.

Art. 42. True it is—that, under the pecuniary competition,—which (as per Section 4, Stipendiaries, who; Art. 34) will have had place on the first location,—any addition to pay, by whatsoever cause about to be effected, whether this or any other, will have been taken into account. But a benefit thus contingent and remote, seems more likely to be under-valued than over-valued; and the more it is under-valued, the less, under the pecuniary competition, will be the sum bid for it; the greater therefore upon the whole the expense to the public.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 43. Reasons in favour of such additions, these:

Art. 49. Officers. II. Messing. Circumstances of country and time allowed for,—to the constituted authorities it will belong to consider and determine—whether in any and what respect the amount of the expense bestowed among officers when messing together, shall be taken for the subject-matter of regulation. On the one hand, retrenchment thereby unavoidably made on liberty, may, on that part, operate as a cause of discontentment. On the other hand, if the fixation be left to individuals,—especially to individuals in higher and better paid grades,—the power of determining the question of the expense may operate as an instrument of oppression at the charge of the less opulent in the hands of the more opulent. Principle, the contentment-maximizing.

Instructional.

Art. 50. The number of officers in a grade being less and less as the grade is higher and higher, two expedients are thus presented by the nature of the case, as capable of obviating oppression in this shape.

1. Diet being the same,—the price paid may rise in proportion to the pay attached to the several grades.

2. The fixation of the price may be peformed by votes: in which case it will be in the power of the lowest paid to prevent the price from being oppressive to themselves.

Instructional.

Art. 51. Note, that without the latter expedient, the former would not suffice. For still, a superordinate, in whose instance the amount of private income bore a large proportion to the official income, might, for increase of luxuriousness, set the expense,—though in this case at his own charge,—at a mark, at which the amount of it might be oppressive to the lower paid subordinates.

Instructional.

Art. 52. Note, that for the purpose of more luxurious living than the mess afforded, the more opulent might be disposed to absent themselves from it: thereby leaving the less opulent, as it were, in a state of degradation. But if each of them were at all times obliged to pay alike, whether present or absent,—the degradation is not so marked, as not to be capable of receiving an adequate compensation from the improvement in the diet.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 53. The Legislature will judge whether, in case of the death of the functionary from wounds received in actual service, provision in any and what shape shall be made for any of his genealogical relatives; and if yes, in what mode of relationship.

Altogether different is the footing on which the demand for post-obituary provision stands in the case of this particular official situation, from that on which it stands in the case of official situations in general, as per Ch. ix. Section 15, Remuneration, Arts. 46, 47. In that general case, the provision operates as a bounty on increase of population simply: in this case, if, on the one hand, it operates as a bounty on population, on the other hand it operates as a bounty upon courage: it counteracts the bounty which nature gives upon cowardice. To this purpose, see what regards smart-money, as per Art. 38. Principles, 1. the external-security-maximizing; 2. the aptitude-maximizing.

Exemplificational. Instructional.

Art. 54. Accordant with the principle here referred to is that, by which, as to this matter, conduct appears to have been determined in the Anglo-American United States. Witness, Acts of Congress—Act of March 16, 1802: applying to smart-money, as above, and extravasational remuneration taken together.

I.

Of right to compensation.

Efficient cause—I. Disability by wounds, or otherwise “while in the line of his (the functionary’s) duty in public service.” Compensatee, or say receiver of the compensation money, the functionary so disabled.

Efficient cause—II. death “by wound received in actual service.” Compensatee in this case—

1. The “widow,” if any.

2. If no widow, “child, or the children conjointly; that is to say, if respectively,” under sixteen years of age. Quantum—for five years, half the monthly pay the deceased was entitled to at the time of his death.*

In the case of disablement, to the President for the time being, power given, for adjusting the allowance.

In the case of death, no such power. Instead of a power so given, fixation made by the Legislature itself.

Exemplificational. Ratiocinative.

Art. 55. According to appearance, the rational cause of the distinction is this. In the case of death, the alleged efficient cause of the right is an invariable quantity, and the existence of it a matter out of dispute: not so in the case of disablement.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 56. Neither on this any more than any other occasion, should be out of sight, so much as for a moment, the incontrovertible rule—That the sole proper quantum of reward in all shapes at public expense, is the least that any equally apt person will consent to serve for.

Reasons. 1. Thus, all are content: Principle, the contentment-maximizing.

2. Anything more would have to be provided—for the hundreds and the thousands, at the expense of the millions: the millions never consenting, mostly unwilling, and in so far not content. Principles, 1. the expense-minimizing. 2. The contentment-maximizing.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 57. As a means of reduction, though comparatively inadequate, note in the first place, simple sale. In English practice, in the officer grades, so great is the competition, and so many the rich individuals to whom the office is an object of ambition, with little or no reference to the amount of pay to be received,—that the possession of the grade is not only a known but an authorized subject-matter of sale: of sale, partly on Government account, partly on private account: the two modes being blended, in a manner far too complicated to admit of description here.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 58. Nor yet in the rank of private is it without example. A hundred pounds sterling was, at one time, the known price for the situation of private in the corps called the Horse Guards.* This corps, however, was not in use to be sent upon actual service, except when the Monarch himself took the field; a custom which was not broken through till towards the conclusion of the second war against the French Revolution.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 59. In the French service, sale is not in use. Of this difference between the practice under the two Governments, the efficient cause may be seen in matchless constitution. Of this fictitious constitution one fundamental principle is that which prescribes the imposition of taxes, to an unlimited and continually increasing amount, on the indigent many, for the further and further enrichment of the already opulent few. For the accomplishment of this object, the defensive force subdepartment, more particularly the land-service branch, affords a pre-eminently apt and commodious field: number of official situations maximized, number of degrees in the scale of grades maximized; quantum of needless remuneration in each situation, maximized:† by the power of sale, value of each such situation increased. Thus is depredation maximized. Of that force which should be purely defensive, but which, as against the people whom it pretends to defend, is thus rendered offensive, the magnitude is thus increased: and thus, by the same means, is oppression maximized.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 60. Now as to pecuniary competition, as exemplified in English practice. True it is—that in no instance, it is believed, in any regular form, authorized, avowed, or even generally known, has diminution in this mode, either on public or private account, received its application.

Instructional. Exemplificational. Ratiocinative.

Art. 61. 1. In the nature of the case, to an extent more or less considerable, in an irregular and unmeasured shape, it cannot but have had place.

2. Be the commodity what it may, if it be a generally known subject-matter of sale,—especially if not only in fact, but also of right,—a subject-matter of competition is what it cannot fail to be, in some way or other, to persons desirous of being purchasers.

3. In every case without exception were it brought under the auctioneer’s hammer, exactly as an annuity to the same pecuniary amount encumbered with the obligation of personal service in a military or any other shape, thus and thus only would the expense be minimized.

Art. 73. A middle course capable of being taken, is the making application of the pecuniary-competition principle, as to one part of the Defensive Force Establishment, and not as to another.

The demand for such a modification,—and the extent to which it might be advisable that it should be carried,—might in no inconsiderable degree depend upon the extent given in practice to the voluntary-service in the Radical land-service branch.

Instructional.

Art. 74. Note, that the only occasion on which, consistently with the principles respecting promotion (as per Section 6, Promotion,) application of this same pecuniary competition could be made,—is that of the original location: to wit, in the lowest of the Erudite grade.

Section XI.

Prize-money.

Instructional. Expositive.

Art. 1. In regard to prize-money, subjects of consideration for the Legislature will be the following:—

1. Subjects of capture, what.

2. Proportion, as between Government and the captors.

3. Proportion, as between rank and rank.

4. Proportion, as between armature class and armature class.

5. Proportion, as between army and navy, in a case in which both are employed in conjunction.

6. Proportion, as between one and another of the various co-operators, individually considered, on each individual occasion.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 2. I. Subjects of capture. Principle applicable, the individual-sparing principle.

Rule. Exceptions excepted,—Confine the capture to such things as are in the hands of the Government of the hostile state. Reasons:

1. Value for value, the impression made on the enemy’s strength by loss of a mass of property already in the hands of his Government is much greater than that made thereon by a loss to the same pecuniary amount, of a mass in the hands of individuals.

2. Of a given mass in the hands of individuals, it is no more than a small proportion that can be taken into the hands of Government, to be applied to the military, or any other branch of the public service.

3. Before it can have been extracted and brought into the form in which it is employed in war, and in the seat of war, some indefinite length of time must commonly have elapsed.

4. On the part of the enemy, military and non-military taken together, though the power of military aggression is so much more weakened, the suffering is less. The suffering which the military classes endure, is what they are prepared for, as well as, by the pay received, compensated for. In the case of the non-military,—preparation, none; compensation, none.

5. On the part of the enemy the less the suffering is, the less violent is the exasperation, the less strenuous the disposition, the less strenuous the endeavour, to retaliate.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 3. Exception may be—where a fortified place is to be taken by assault. Reasons:

1. Benefit to the assailants:—that without extra-remuneration, and that too derived from a source that is immediately in view, the soldiers in the attacking army will perhaps not be prevailed upon to expose themselves to the extra danger.

2. Benefit to the assailees, for minimizing the suffering:—that the existence of the acknowledged right, may induce them to come to terms before they are reduced to the uttermost extremity, and thereby prevent them from making a resistance which, on the average of cases, would be unavailing as to ultimate success, but which, in consequence of the irritation produced thereby, would almost certainly end in their private property being subjected to plunder, whether the right to plunder it were universally acknowledged and avowed, or not.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 4. II. Proportion, as between Government and the captors.

Rule.—Maximize the Government’s share; thence, of necessity, minimize the captor’s share. Reasons:

1. So says the expense-minimizing, otherwise styled the frugality-maximizing principle.

2. True it is that, by the remuneration-maximizing principle,—were that in any case, general or individual, deemed necessary to be called in,—the whole would, at first view, be allotted to the captors, none to the Government. But, without reducing the quantum of the demand so far as to render the inducement afforded by it inadequate,—no small service might, by the reservation of a portion to Government, be rendered even to the captors. When abandoned to the cupidity of each individual, much of what might otherwise have been saved for all the individuals taken together, is destroyed; and in the shares of the profit derived from that which is not destroyed, great inequality will have place: while, in the case of a scramble, cupidity converts fellow-soldiers into mutually-conflicting adversaries. In the hands of Government,—the inequality might, and naturally would, be minimized; and the greater the service thus rendered, the greater the share which for this service the parties interested would be content to see retained.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 5. III. Proportion as between rank and rank.

Directing principle,—the same as that which applies to remuneration in its regular and continuous shape: namely, the inequality-minimizing principle.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 9. As to the minimization of the evil. Whatsoever evil you allow a man to produce,—the production of it being at the same time not discreditable to him, nor inhibited by the popular, or say moral, any more than by the legal sanction,—he will have no repugnance to your knowing of it: in this case, of any repugnance which it can happen to him to feel, and have to get the better of, the only possible objects are—1. exclusion put upon any additional evil, which, for his own particular purposes, he feels inclined to produce: 2. any such trouble as it may have been rendered necessary for him to take, for the purpose of causing it to be known what the evil is which, the production of it being allowed to him, he has produced accordingly.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 10. If you prohibit the production of the supposed necessary evil,—the prohibition will include in it the effect of an order for concealment: and, under favour of this concealment, the supposed agent stands exposed by you to the temptation of producing, over and above the evil necessary to the exclusion of the supposed greater evil, evil in whatsoever shape and quantity may afford a present gratification in any manner to himself. If, for the preservation of his life, you allow him, wheresoever he finds them, to take necessaries, but not, unless in so far as the necessaries may be insufficient, dainties,—he may, and if notification is to a certain degree probable, commonly will, spare the dainties; but if you inhibit him from both, he will take not only necessaries but dainties, and perhaps slaughter the family to prevent their telling tales.

Instructional. Expositive.

Art. 11. Subject-matters, over or in relation to which it may be necessary that, on the sort of occasion in question, for a purpose such as that in question, power shall be exercised,—may be thus distinguished:

1. Things, considered simply.
2. Persons, considered simply.
3. Persons, considered in relation to things.

Instructional.

Art. 12. I. Things, considered simply. These things will be either—1. Things the use of which is subservient to warfare; or 2. Things composing the matter of subsistence. In both cases, instruments of conveyance and communication with reference to these same things, and thence the powers in question exercisable over things applicable to these purposes, may also be necessary.

Exemplificational.

Art. 13. Of a case, in which, for the purpose of subsistence, need of a power of prehension and consumption, applied to this or that portion of the matter of subsistence, may have place,—an example is the following: Soldiers, one or more on a march—that part of the country thinly inhabited; provisions, in sufficient quantity, not taken with them, or not remaining with them. Money, none sufficient for purchase; or, though sufficient, no adequate supply obtainable in exchange for it; cause of the impracticability, absence or hostile affection on the part of the inhabitants.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 14. II. Persons, considered simply. From persons not military, the services which there may be occasion to exact, may, in their nature and character, be either: 1. military, or 2. non-military.

Exaction of services of a military nature is, for the time that the course of operation lasts, compulsory enlistment; enlistment, for a time corresponding in duration to the emergency. As to this, see Section 5, Term and Conditions of Service.

A town, for example, is in a state of siege. For contribution to defence, the commanding officer causes hands to be laid on persons not military, in such numbers as to him appear necessary, and compels them to join in the labours and perils of the military functionaries. For and during the appointed time,—these persons are thus aggregated to the number of actually-serving functionaries.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 15. Of services which, not being of a military nature, there may be occasion to exact for military purposes, examples are the following:

1. Going on messages.
2. Furnishing information.

Instructional.

Art. 16. When for any such occasional and temporary purpose, a non-military person is pressed into military service, it will be for the care of the Legislature—and of the several administrative functionaries, non-professional, and professional in their several grades,—to allow to the person so impressed, in so far as the nature of the case admits, the benefit of the arrangements made, in that view, in the enlistment contract: and to furnish him accordingly with an exemplar thereof, and of the Soldier’s Code, as per Section 5, Term and Conditions of Service: and, in particular, those which regard Smart-money, as per Section 10, Remuneration.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Art. 25. On the issuing of any order for the prehension and forced employment of persons, or for prehension and forced employment, or destruction, or endamagement of serviceable things, as per Art. 11 to 17, antagonizing cautions that will require to be kept in mind are these:

1. By the terms of the order, take care to allow such latitude as may be sufficient to leave it in the power of the subordinate, by appropriate forbearance, to minimize the quantity of the evil produced by the execution given to that same order,

2. Be aware of the danger, lest, under the cover of such latitude, on the occasion of the execution given to such order,—whether through sympathy or self-regarding interest,—undue favour or disfavour be shown to an individual, at whosesoever charge; whether that of an individual, or that of the public service.

2. Maximizing, in the instance of each, the facility given to him for clear, correct, and adequately comprehensive observation: viz. as to the subject-matters themselves, and their respective values.

Art. 35. Of the evidence so recorded, and of the estimates so made, as per Art. 34, exemplars will be distributed, in this case, as in the several cases in which, throughout the course of this Code, distribution of such exemplars is ordered. In particular, for example:

1. To the party by whom, in each case, the damage is sustained, one.

2. To the military officer by whom or under whose order it has been caused, one.

3. To the next superior military officer, under and in pursuance of whose orders it has been caused, one.

4. So upwards, to the several superordinate authorities.

Instructional.

Art. 36. Against abuse, in the two opposite shapes of which it is alike susceptible, the Legislature, and the several subordinate authorities, in their several fields of service, and in particular the Finance Minister,—will, on this occasion, be respectively on their guard. These shapes are—

I. To the detriment of the individual.

1. Causation of damage beyond the extent of the necessity.

2. Undervaluation of the damage so caused.

II. To the detriment of the public, in favour of the individual.

1. In the causation of the damage, stopping short of the extent of the necessity.

2. Overvaluation of the damage so caused.

III. To the detriment of either party, or both, as it may happen.

1. Omission in not causing to be made the previous estimate, in a case in which the nature of the exigency admitted of its being made.

Instructional.

Art. 37. Of persons to whom, on any such occasion, it may happen to be competent to officiate, with or without such invitation, as above, in the character of percipient witnesses and registering functionaries respectively, examples are the following:—

1. A Judge or Judge Depute (as per Ch. xiv.) of the subdistrict, if near enough to the spot.

2. The Local Headman (as per Ch. xxv.) of the bis-subdistrict, or any person or persons by him deputed for the purpose.

3. The Local Registrar, or say Headman’s Registrar (as per Ch. xxvi.) of the bis-subdistrict, or any person by him deputed for the purpose.

4. Any person or persons officiating on the spot, in subordination to the Preventive-Service Minister; as per Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 5, Preventive-Service Minister.

5. Any person or persons officiating on the spot, in subordination to the Interior-Communication Minister; as per Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 6, Interior-Communication Minister.

6. Any person or persons officiating on the spot, in subordination to the Indigence-Relief Minister; as per Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 7, Indigence-Relief Minister.

7. Any person or persons officiating on the spot, in subordination to the Education Minister; as per Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 8, Education Minister.

8. Any person or persons officiating on the spot, in subordination to the Domain Minister; as per Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 9, Domain Minister.

9. Any person or persons officiating on the spot, in subordination to the Health Minister; as per Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 10, Health Minister.

10. Any person or persons officiating on the spot, in the capacity of a functionary under the orders of the sublegislature of the district; as per Ch. xxix. Sublegislatures, and Ch. xxx. Sublegislation Ministers, the functions of any of the several sorts of official situations herein mentioned by Numbers from 4 to 9 inclusive.

Instructional. Expositive.

Art. 38. Abuse of prehensive power, employed, as above, on the occasion or pretence of military necessity,—what? In this case, the act by which the wrong is done, will be of the number of those acts on which, under the head of Offences against individuals, inhibitions are put in and by the Penal Code.

Instructional.

Art. 39. Punishment for such abuse. In the case in question, the act being, by the supposition, unjustifiable, will, in and by this Code, have been subjected to its appropriate punishment; including the burthen of making satisfaction in the shape of compensation, and any other appropriate shape: burthen of satisfaction being, as far as it goes, placed to the account of punishment, and capable of being of itself sufficient for that purpose.

Instructional.

Art. 40. On the score of abuse of power,—application of punishment, in addition to the imposition of the burthen of satisfaction, supposes evil consciousness on the part of him by whom the abuse is effected. Of such consciousness, presumptive circumstantial evidence may be afforded—not only by positive agency employed in effecting, or endeavouring to effect, the suppression of appropriate evidence, in relation to the exercise given to the power,—but even by reluctance or backwardness as to the exhibition or procurement of such evidence. Of sincerity, on the other hand, the degres of positive exertion employed in the endeavour to render the body of appropriate evidence as clear, correct, and complete as possible, will in each case operate as a proof and test.

Enactive.

Art. 41. As to Procedure: for obtaining compensation at the charge of the public, the mode of procedure will be as follows:

1. The party by whom the damage is alleged to have been sustained, will make application to the Judge, in this case as in any other case in which, at the charge of the public, a judicial demand is made.

2. Of the service of the Eleemosynary Advocates, as per Ch. xx. if his circumstances render them needful to him, such demandant will have the benefit.

Instructional. Examplificational.

Art. 50. Under matchless constitution, arbitrary power being of course dear to both sides, the established practice is—not to establish by law the necessary powers, but to leave the powers to be exercised by practice:—by practice avowedly contrary to law: whereupon for wrong done, in all shapes, under assurance of impunity,—comes, in due season, an Indemnity Act. Alike obvious and incontestable is the convenience of this course. Had the powers been demanded of the Legislature, adequate grounds for the demand would have been looked for, and any that were produced as such would have been liable to be canvassed: and though, being made by ministers, the demand would of course have been complied with,—no instance of non-compliance being to be found elsewhere than in imagination,—still, reason (suppose) being clearly against compliance,—eyes, in some small number might, on each occasion, be opened; and the substitution of a form of Government having for its object the augmentation, to one having for its object the diminution of the aggregate of happiness—be proportionably promoted. As it is—under the assurance of the subsequent indemnification,—abuse, in all possible shapes, is of course practised: power exercised, where there is no need of any at all: and where, of a power, to this or that effect, a real need has place,—along with those operations which are needful and contribute to the desirable effect, others are performed which contribute to that effect nothing,—but to the effect of depredation, or oppression, or both, whatsoever may be desired by the operators.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 51. Thus, if by flogging or otherwise, it happens to be your wish to keep men in a state of torture till they give any such information as it may happen to you to wish for,—or till they say anything else you wish them to say,—do you apply to Parliament for power so to do? Not you, indeed; you know better things. You cause torture to be applied to them, as much as it is agreeable to you to see applied. This done, some months afterwards you state to Parliament, for its information, that extraordinary disorders require extraordinary remedies. The bill passes, and “everything is as it should be:” be it ever so bad, what has been done cannot be caused not to have been done; and by so perfectly unanswerable an argument, the satisfaction produced in the mind of every admirer of matchless constitution, is entire. On goes thus, at all times, the commodious repetend, composed of criminality and indemnity: criminality each time by wholesale; indemnity each time foreknown to a certainty—through any number of generations, till the matchless mass is dissolved in its own rottenness.

Instructional.

Art. 52. Under other constitutions, the object of law is, to secure obedience to itself: under matchless constitution, to secure disobedience to itself. Under such law, whatsoever may be the opinion as to security, security itself is an empty name; empty and useless—to all but those who make the law, and those who are partakers in the sinister interest, by the force of which it is made.*

Instructional.

Art. 53. On this, as on all other occasions, the Legislator whose all-comprehensive ruling principle is the greatest-happiness principle, looks out, with anxious industry, for the problems of the greatest difficulty, to the end that such solution as the nature of things admits of may be applied. The fee-fed Judge,—who, by every instance of evil prevented by timely legislation regards himself as robbed—beholds in every such difficulty, with hope and delight, a source of fees. Among Legislators the man in authority beholds in every such difficulty, unnoticed and unremoved, a source of safe depredation or oppression, exercisable by himself: the man in opposition, an instrument of warfare, a source of accusation against his more fortunate antagonist: of accusation, on the ground of whatsoever, under the difficulty, happens in a case of necessity to have been done: done—whether beyond the necessity, or in ever so strict conformity to it.

The evil, which an oppositionist denounces as such, he of course wishes it to be inferred and supposed, that, were he in power, he would cure. Natural enough the conclusion is; but far indeed from being a necessary one. If, according to his own estimate, it were his interest to cure it, cure it he would: otherwise, not.

Be the evil, be the abuse, what it may—be the accused who they may—whether it shall have him for defender or assailant, depends on fortune: it depends on the side on which fortune has stationed him at the time.†

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 54. Analogous to the establishment, and occasional suspension and revival, of the sort of War Code here in question, is, in English practice, the Proclamation of Martial Law anywhere; as also the various arrangements occasionally employed for prevention or quelling of insurrection in Ireland. Amplitude of powers, and scantiness of all securities against the abuse of these same powers, are two congenial properties, of which these enactments may be seen affording exemplification, as ample and instructive as can for any purpose be reasonably desired.

Section XIII.

Military Judicature.

Instructional.

Art. 1. On the occasion of the excepted judicatories (Ch. xii. Judiciary collectively, Section 1, Excepted Judicatories,) by which application is to be made of the general principles of judicature to the particular situation of the functionaries belonging to the Defensive Force, the Legislature will take for the standard of reference the several arrangements by which those same principles are applied to the rest of the community, as also to those same persons in so far as their situation agrees in other respects with that of their non-military fellow-countrymen.

It will therefore be considered—in what particulars the difference between the two situations requires a correspondent difference of arrangement in the case of the two sorts of judicatories,—to wit, non-military or say civil, and military.

In particular, it will be considered—whether, in this line of service, a many-seated judicatory, such as that customarily in use under the name of a Court-Martial, or a single-seated judicatory as in other cases under this constitution, with or without a quasi-jury sitting incidentally as a body of assessors to the judge, may be preferable. See Ch. xvi. Quasi-Jury.

Instructional.

Art. 2. Of the difference between the circumstances in which the civil judicatories, and those in which military judicatories are placed, examples are the following:

1. As to disobedience.	1. As to disobedience.
To the orders of the civil functionary, execution and effect might in a large proportion fail to be given, with comparatively small defalcation from the security which it is the object of the civil judicatory to afford.	To the orders of a military functionary, a single act of disobedience might suffice to bring ruin on the state. Still the power should not on any occasion, through negligence, be suffered to extend beyond what is regarded as necessary to provide against the supposed danger.
2. As to mischief from delay.	2. As to mischief from delay.
In the case of a civil suit, delay of considerable length will, in a considerable number of instances, not be productive of any considerable bad effects, nor any ultimately bad effect at all to any person but him on whom, in consideration of his supposed culpability, the burthen of compensation for the burthen of the suffering produced by him on the other side, is imposed.	In the case of an order given in time of war by a military commander, the delay of a moment may not be distinguishable from disobedience.
3. As to partialities and dissensions.	3. As to partialities and dissensions.
In a civil judicatory, the number of the individuals with whom the Judge would have to mix in social intercourse would, at any rate, in proportion to the whole, be extremely small: and by appropriate institution it may be, as it is here endeavoured to be, made much smaller.	In a military judicatory, the individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the Judge could not, any of them, unless by accident, fail to be known to him. They would be known to him—as in an extensive manufactory the working hands in general are personally known to the principal managing hands.
4. As to promptitude of communication.	4. As to promptitude of communication.
In a civil judicatory, the individuals subject to its jurisdiction are, with a few exceptions, all of them within the reach of the judgment-seat at one and the same time: with no other difference than that which is constituted by the distance between their respective abodes and the judgment-seat: to wit, nowhere so much as half a day’s journey.	In a military regimental judicatory, suppose one and but one Judge or set of Judges, the whole body is at all times liable to be broken into detachments, sent in any numbers to any distance from the seat of judicial authority, and from one another: decomposed thus into bodies, of which no more than one shall be effectively within the reach of this military judicatory, in the way that with small and casual exception all within his jurisdiction are within the reach of the civil Judge.

Instructional.

Art. 3. From the institution of Courts-Martial, each composed of a council of officers of different grades, two inconveniences are inseparable; to wit, 1. more or less of mutual dissatisfaction, where the same individual is by one portion of the Judges pronounced guilty, by another innocent; and 2. where the part taken by the judgment or the affections of the highest in rank, or other most influential person, is known,—comes, on the side opposite to his, the suspicion that suffrages have been procured to his side by sinister interest: to wit, by the desire of obtaining his favour at the expense of justice. In the judicatory in ordinary, as delineated in this Code, the inconvenience from mutual dissatisfaction has no place: and against the suspicion, other remedies—ample and efficient—are provided. The Legislature will inquire and consider whether, by the many-seated judicatory exhibited by a Court-Martial, advantage in any shape is in any and what cases presented, substantial enough to preponderate over the here-mentioned inconveniences.

Instructional.

Art. 4. In time of actual service, in an army which is in a state of actual conflict with an enemy, all general regulations must give way to the necessity of the moment. But if the two most efficient guardians of justice—the inequality-minimizing principle and the publicity-maximizing principle, have taken root in time of peace, no demand for implicit obedience can be so urgent, but that the pressure of the yoke may receive more or less of alleviation from regard paid to those same salutary principles, and the corresponding rules.

Instructional.

Art. 5. In military legislation and judicature, as compared to civil, a sort of opposition has been commonly regarded as having place, between the interest of justice and the interest of power; in so much that to security, ab extra, in military legislation and judicature, a sacrifice to an extent more or less considerable, must (it is supposed) be, and is accordingly made, of justice: regulations which, in a civil case, would be established with a view to justice, are accordingly, in this or that military case, made to give way to others, which are regarded as most conducive to the maximum of efficiency on the part of the national force. This sort of conflict being admitted,—follows the observation—that in time of war, the demand for corroboration of power is at its maximum; the demand for justice at its minimum; in time of peace the demand for justice is at its maximum; the demand for corroboration of power at its minimum. What at the same time is observable, is—that whatever punctuality of obedience is necessary in time of war, is so in time of peace: for if a habit of disobedience takes root and gains strength during the one period, it will naturally, and little less than necessarily, remain and operate during the other period, or at any rate at the commencement of it. If between the state of the law in this respect in time of peace, and its state in time of war, there be in this particular a difference, the mischief produced by suffering, through neglect, the establishment of a habit of disobedience, will be the greater the longer the habit has continued: and thence the longer the country has continued in a state of peace.

Instructional.

Art. 6. Note, that among military and non-military persons taken together,—the case of disagreement, as between class and class, is susceptible of the following diversifications.

1. Disagreement as between individual and individual, both being in the private ranks.

2. In the several officer-grades, disagreement between individual and individual in the same grade.

3. In all ranks and grades, disagreement as between the individual of one rank or grade and the individual of another.

4. In some cases, more particularly as between landsmen and seamen, and between both and marines,—between the functionary of any rank or grade and the functionary of any other, in two different armature classes.

5. Disagreement, as between a military functionary in the rank of private, and a non-military individual.

6. Disagreement, as between a military functionary in any grade below the highest stationed on the spot, and a non-military individual.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 15. Example I. Desertion. Under this one name—desertion, are commonly included two species, widely different in degree of maleficence. These are—1. Simple desertion; 2. Transfugitive desertion. Simple, when the deserter merely quits his own service: transfugitive, when, in quitting it, he passes over to an enemy’s service.

In time of full peace—(war, neither actual nor apprehended as impending)—transfugitive desertion has no place: remains capable of being exemplified no other species than the simple: mischievous effect, exceptions excepted, inconsiderable, and easily reparable: exception is—where, by the operation of some cause, instances to a certain degree numerous, are produced, at or about the same time. Now, admitting that in time of war, for transfugitive desertion death may be an apposite punishment, and the option of applying it may be given to the Judge,—still, for simple desertion, scarcely can there be any need of giving to the Judge any such option to be exercised in time of peace.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 16. Example II. Disobedience of orders. In time of peace, to such a degree indeterminate and diversified is the nature of the offence thus denominated,—that the maleficence of it varies upon a scale beginning at 0, and ending at a degree not inferior to that of transfugitive desertion. But in this scale, lines may be drawn, below which there cannot in time of peace, be any demand for any such punishment as death.

Instructional.

Art. 17. For the purpose here in question, one line of distinction requisite is—that which separates simple disobedience of orders, from that which is specially maleficent. By specially maleficent understand, productive of any act placed on the catalogue of offences, whether in the general Penal Code, or in the Military Code.

Instructional.

Art. 18. Take it unaccompanied with special maleficence, as above,—it will either be or not be accompanied with evil consciousness:—consciousness of the contrariety of the conduct maintained, to the conduct lawfully prescribed: and, when in this sense wilful,—the offence may receive a punishment, which shall be the same in all cases: the offence will, in this case, consist in the disregard manifested by the subordinate as towards the authority of his superordinate: contempt is the name given, in English law, to the disregard, when,—the functionary towards whose order it is manifested, being a judicial functionary,—it is dealt with on the footing of an offence.

1. In general practice, the Judges being many, (in English practice for example, thirteen or fifteen,) are taken from the corps to which, at the time of the alleged offence, the defendant belonged.

2. But, in this case, whether conviction or acquittal has place, unpleasant are the sentiments and sensations left, in the breasts of all persons, by whom respectively any part in the judicial drama has been performed, defendants to wit, prosecutors, judges, witnesses: and, by the contemplation of their future contingent affections and conduct—influence, detrimental to justice, cannot but, to a greater or less extent, be exercised. In every one of these cases, the smaller the number of the persons exposed on the one hand to suffering, on the other hand to sinister interest in the shapes in question—the better. In the case of witnesses, no reduction does the nature of the case admit of. Not so, in that of Judges. Without any assignable detriment to justice, the number may, it should seem, be reduced to one.

3. By the addition made, as at present, to number one, arbitrariness in the exercise of the power in question, is (it may be said) more or less reduced. True: but in general practice, appeal has not place; and no reason can be assigned why, if on the judgment-seat there be but one functionary, appeal from his decision should not have place in the class of suits furnished by this particular section of the community, as well as in the suits furnished by the aggregate of all the other sections.

4. In what way soever the suit terminates, transference of the defendant from the corps in question to another community, presents itself as a desirable result. Person by whose authority and order the transference is made, the army minister. Persons at the instance of any, of whom it may be made—1. the Judge immediate by whom the terminative decree was issued; 2. any one, or at any rate any two, of the members of the corps in question; 3. the defendant himself, whether acquitted or convicted.

Section XIV.

Recruitment.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 1. In providing and keeping up a supply of functionaries for the stipendiary branch of the National Defensive Force, the Legislature will bear in mind the positions following:—

I. Of two persons in other respects equally apt, the one unwilling to serve in the situation in question, the other willing,—he who is willing will, on that account, other things equal, be the more apt upon the whole.

Art. 15. Reasons against this same mode of location, these:—

1. On the part of parents, and other relatives, discontentment may at all times, to any degree of extent, and on the part of each to any degree of intensity imaginable, have place, without its coming, at any rate in all its details, under the cognizance of the legislature.

2. So on the part of the conscripts themselves; especially if enlisted at a time of life some years later than that of birth, in such sort as to be susceptible of appropriate observation and reflection,—of observation, in particular, of the effect produced by the arrangement on the language and deportment of their parents, as above.

3. If the time of enlistment be that of birth,—in this case, true it is, that on the part of the conscripts themselves, the danger of discontentment is minimized: still, will it be far from being excluded.

Art. 2. During peace, the better prepared a community appears to be for the renewal of war, by resistance made to actual aggression,—the better, other circumstances equal, will be its chance of preventing such aggression, by fear of the evil consequences to the aggressor. By this consideration will the operation of disbandment be, of course, in a main degree regulated. Of the force which at the close of the war the Government had on foot, retained will be, in preference, that portion which, on a renewal of war, it would require the longest portion of time to bring to a state of adequate appropriate aptitude. Or say, disbanded, in preference, those portions which in the shortest portion of time are capable of being brought to that same desirable state. In addition to promptitude, certainty, it is true, is an element which may present itself, as claiming to be taken into the account of value. But, forasmuch as the state of the community in question must be extraordinary indeed, if those portions of the defensive force which it had at one time, could not, sooner or later, be brought into existence at another time,—for simplicity’s sake, the consideration of certainty may accordingly, generally speaking, be discarded from the account, and that of promptitude alone set down for consideration.

Principle applying to this particular case, say the Difficult-replaceability principle, or the Easy-replaceability principle: with equal propriety either may serve, according as retention or disbandment is the object of reference. Generally applicable principles—1. the External-security-maximizing; 2. the Internal-security-maximizing; 3. the Aptitude maximizing.

Instructional.

Art. 3. To bring the men to a state of adequate appropriate aptitude, different armature classes require different lengths of time: say different numbers of days, supposing on each day, in the case of each class as compared with every other, the same number of hours* employed in the learning of the exercises.

Hence, corresponding to the above-mentioned Difficult-replaceability or Easy-replaceability principle, comes the following Rule. Disband in preference the armature class, which, for endowing it with adequate appropriate aptitude, requires the smallest portion of time: next, that which requires the next smallest: and so on.

Instructional.

Art. 4. For this purpose, the following scale, composed of modes of operation, with corresponding comparative lengths of time annexed, will constitute an appropriate subject of inquiry for the Legislature. The blanks for the number are left to be filled up in the Military Code, by advice of professional functionaries.

Armature classes.—Lengths of instruction: time requisite in months, say two. In this number of months, total number of hours of exercise, say as follows:

I. Infantry man in general, hours [[ ].]
II. Infantry rifleman, additional hours [[ ].]

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 5. Question. The infantry, why not all of them trained to be riflemen, that is to say, marksmen, habituated to the shooting at a mark? Answer. Reason, the expense: that is to say—1. the once-paid, or say capital expense, of the rifle gun: 2. the continuous expense of powder and shot.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 6. In the case of the rifle, the time requisite for loading, and some other circumstances considered,—it has been matter of question whether any preponderant advantage would be obtained,—if to the exclusion of the ordinary musket, the rifle were employed by the whole body of the infantry. But, supposing the question determined in the negative,—it would not follow, that by no part of that body should this instrument of extraordinary efficiency be employed. For, supposing the ordinary musket preferable in the engagement between body and body, drawn up collectively, and in order, on a plain,—riflemen, in a state of appropriate distribution, might still, in the maintenance of a defile or other position, in particular in a hilly country, perform a service for which, by the ordinary infantry exercise, without the practice of aiming and firing at a mark, a man would not be so well fitted.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 7. III. Cavalry man or Dragoon.—Total of additional hours, [NA.] Particulars as follow: To the foot exercise, performed by the foot soldier as above, add the hours respectively employed, as follows: 1. Making the man master of his horse, that is to say, the men taking instruction one by one. Hours, [NA.] 2. Teaching the man to bear a part in the evolutions performed by the men in bodies. Hours, [NA.] Total of hours, [NA.] Subclasses, 1. Heavy-horse or Cuirassiers. 2. Light-horse or lancers. 3. Dragoons. 4. Mounted Riflemen. Differences, of little or no moment, as to this purpose: difficulty of instruction being, in all these instances, nearly, if not altogether, the same.

IV. Foot Artillery and Engineers.—Subclasses ranged in the order of the lengths of time requisite for aptitude, the length indicated by the smallest number denoting the smallest degree of difficulty, are,†

1. Artillerists or Gunners.
2. Artificers. Additional hours, [[ ].]
3. Pontooneers. Additional hours, [[ ].]
4. Sappers. Additional hours, [[ ].]
5. Miners. Additional hours, [[ ].]

Instructional.

Art. 8. Note, of the forementioned operations, one and no more may be allotted to each man; or to each one of any number of men, one or more of them may be attached. To the ordinary foot exercise, which consists in the discharge of balls, whether solid or hollow, from the hollow cylinder,—the foot artilleryman may add the exercise or exercises belonging to one or more of the other sub-classes.

Instructional.

Art. 9. V. Horse-artillery-man. To the exercise of the cavalry-man, the horse-artillery-man adds the firing part of the exercise of the foot-artillery-man. Additional hours [NA.] Total of hours [NA.]

VI. Marine Infantry. To the exercise of an infantry soldier, the marine-infantry man adds, in a certain degree, the exercise and habits of the seaman. Total of hours [NA.]

VII. Marine Artillery. To the exercise and habits of a marine-infantry man, the marine-artillery man adds the special exercise of working mortars on ship-board, or performing other duties connected with artillery, of a more complicated nature than those required from the seamen in general. Total of hours [NA.]

In both his capacities, he has to learn, in common with the mere seamen, the operations of landing and boarding, also the serving in gunboats, floating batteries, and fireships.

Instructional.

Art. 10. Of all these specially instructed classes, not one is there who is not qualified to perform whatsoever can be required to be performed by an infantry soldier at large, in time of peace; not one, the particular service of which the infantry soldier at large is qualified to perform. Hence the following Rules.

Rule 1. So long as an infantry soldier at large remains who can be spared, discharge not one from any one of these specially instructed armature classes.

Art. 21. Mode of voting for discharge:

1. For the whole number of the privates and non-commissioned officers, in the aggregate of all the regiments in which the number of those same functionaries is meant to be diminished, are provided an equal number of voting-cards.

2. To each regiment are allotted cards in number equal to the whole number of those same functionaries belonging to the regiment.

3. The cards, all equal or similar: dimensions (suppose) a square inch.

4. For receiving them, two equal and similar vote-receiving boxes, closed: in each a slit: depth of the box such, that the last of the cards may drop through without sticking.

5. On the lid of one, in large placard letters, the words, Discharge me: of the other, Keep me.

6. These boxes are kept in such sort near to one another, that a card may be dropped by a man into either of them, without its being possible for any other person to see into which. This may be effected in various ways: for one way see Ch. vi., Legislature, Section 8, Election Apparatus, to Section 11, Election, how: (from Bentham’s Radical Reform Bill, Section 4, to 7, vol. iii. p. 567 to 577.)*

7. Even to those who, in other particulars, have not learned to read, the difference in import and effect between the two inscriptions, has (it is taken for granted) been rendered familiar, by the view of two exactly correspondent ones kept hung up in some place or places of universal resort.

8. On the card delivered to the voter, has been stamped, or so written as not to be exposed to mistakes, his name and description, as entered in the Muster Book, with the name of the writer (for responsibility’s sake) and the year, month, and day of the month: and, on the other side, a number, different in the case of each voter: the numbers following one another in numerical order.

9. In the Muster Book, in connexion with each voter’s name, entry is made, of the act and time of his voting by the dropping in of his card.

10. The voting completed, the two boxes will be transmitted together to the seat of Government, addressed to the Army Minister.

11. The two boxes, each in a separate room, are for the first time opened, each of them by two or more persons, of each of whom it is known that he is unable to read writing.

12. By them the several cards are ranged in regular lines, each card with the comparatively plain side uppermost, having (as per No. 8) nothing on it but a number.

13. Into the room are then let in two persons, who, being able to read, range the cards in numerical order, and in an appropriate Record-book make entry of the total number contained in each box: and so successively in the case of each regiment.

14. When thus counted, the cards are dropped one upon another, in numerical order, into boxes of appropriate form, forming so many piles, each card with the numbered side still remaining uppermost, the lettered side remaining invisible to every person. To each box its lid is then immoveably attached by a certain number of seals.

15. These are the seals of so many high functionaries, to whom the knowledge of the proportion between the number of those desirous to be kept, and that of those desirous to be discharged, may be confined: suppose, the Prime Minister, the Army, Navy, and Finance Minister.

16. If the number desirous to be discharged is not greater than that which the Government is desirous to discharge, all are thereupon discharged: for this purpose, the boxes are opened; the cards read; the persons desirous thus ascertained; and, for their discharge, appropriate orders sent to the several regiments.

17. If the number desirous to be discharged is greater than that which the Government is desirous to discharge, the above-mentioned name-cards are all emptied into a box, having, instead of a lid, a cloth with a slit in it, big enough to receive a hand and arm; after having thus been mixed unseen by several successive hands, they are drawn out, one after another, in a number equal to the intended number, as above: in relation to these the orders for discharge are sent: the others remain unknown.

18. In the same manner, when the number desirous of being kept is greater than the Government is desirous of keeping, are ascertained those who shall actually be kept.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 4. I. Subject-matter of diversity the first:—the appropriate military exercises.

In the case of the land-service, the military manipulations and evolutions are capable of being performed in any places, by all persons without distinction, where physical force is adequate: and, moreover, in the radical branch, on the part of a sufficient number, adequate inducement as well as means for the performance of such exercises, may, in almost all places and times, be found.

In the case of the sea-service, in addition to the military exercises, the nature of the service necessitates others that are non-military, that is to say, those by which motion and direction are given to the vessels in which the men and things together—the personal and the material stock—have their characteristic and essential moveable abode. As to the manipulations—except in so far as those employed in the land-service happen to be exactly copied in the sea-service,—they bear no resemblance to those employed in the land-service: as to the evolutions in the sea-service, those employed in the land-service, the form and comparative smallness of the field render impossible: in the sea-service, if among such operations as are performed by the combined exertions of numbers at a time there be any to which the term evolutions is applicable, they are in the sea-service of a nature altogether different from what they are in the land-service.

While, by men, in whose instance, whatsoever may eventually be their lot, no design to engage in the practice of the military exercises in either branch, has place, the practice of the non-military sea exercises will in their quality of seamen be engaged in, to wit, on private account, or in private service,—scarcely to any of them will it happen to engage, or in the course of their sea-service to be disposed to engage, in the practice of those land exercises which are purely military.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 5. II. Subject-matter of diversity the second: circumstances relative to the Erudite grades. In Section 1, of Supplement, and Section 4, Stipendiaries, are brought to view the elementary aggregates, by the continual addition of which, in the land-service, grades rising one above another are constituted. Number of units in the smallest, or say first elementary aggregate termed a Squad, 6: component individuals, privates 5; corporal 1: a plan of aggregation this, the aptitude of which is generally regarded as being certified by general practice.

Art. 11. To the Legislature it will accordingly belong—to consider, in addition to the points of appropriate aptitude, intellectual and active, requisite in the land-service, what ulterior points shall be requisite to be possessed in the sea-service: and, in the case of a candidate for admission into the relative locable list, before an appropriate qualification-judicatory, what course of examination shall have been undergone, antecedently to his location in the lowest of the Erudite grades: in the lowest grade occupied by a commissioned officer in the sea-service.

On this occasion, in respect of the appropriate qualifications necessary,—notice will be taken of the difference, as between the scientific and the non-scientific armature classes in the land-service.

Instructional.

Art. 12. VII. Subject-matter the seventh. Officer’s previous service in the situation of private. On this occasion will be considered, how far the reasons which, as per Section 10, Remuneration, Arts. 17 and 18, apply to the land-service, apply also to the sea-service.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 13. VIII. Subject-matter the eighth—Compulsory aggregation. In case of emergency, of the Radical branch of the sea defensive force, shall the personal stock, in any and what portions of it, be liable to be compulsorily aggregated (as per Section 14, Recruitment) to the stipendiary?

Art. 19. X. Subject-matter the tenth. Notification timely and appropriative. For diminishing, and even to a considerable extent doing away altogether, the sense of suffering from compulsion,—in the case of transference of seafaring persons from private unwarlike to public warlike service, as above,—it will be the care of the Legislature to apply to this case the timely-notification principle.

3. The place at which, and means by which, at the time desired, a mandate for his attendance will reach him, in such sort as to present itself to his mind.

Instructional.

Art. 31. Necessary again to these purposes is appropriate registration. As to the heads under which, for this purpose, the matter of the information will require to be entered, they will be found to be of the number of those which have for their purpose the minimization of ship-board oppression: to the section on that subject (Section 17) they are accordingly posted off.

Instructional.

Art. 32. Applied to the Radical branch of the Sea Defensive Force, registration has four distinguishable purposes. Interests more particularly provided for and served—in the three first, that of the public: in the fourth, those of the individual functionaries. Denominations, these which follow. These may be thus denominated:

I. For public interest.

1. Financial, to wit, for the extraction of the contributions assessed on goods imported and exported.

2. Commercial: for bringing to view the effects produced on the aggregate value of those same imports and exports, by the arrangements made from time to time, whether for the maximization of this same value, or for the extraction of these same contributions of the Sea Defensive Force stock, personal and real together; to wit, by enlistment voluntary, or in default of voluntary, compulsory, as the exigency may require.

3. Defensive: for ensuring, to the several amounts, at the several times necessary, the transference of the necessary quantity.

II. For the interests of the individual functionaries—to wit, as well in the private as in the stipendiary sea service.

Art. 43. In preference to this indifference, an arrangement confining the choice to an individual taken from the college of physicians, or from that of surgeons, would be a real, an important and incontestible improvement. For without a long continued course of mental labour applied to branches of art and science, (chemistry and mechanics to wit,) of which application is made in the military line of this branch of service,—scarcely can any individual even find his way into either of those colleges: whereas, in the official situation here in question, instances have not been wanting of men not known to be possessed of any the least acquaintance with any branch of useful knowledge whatsoever,—such excepted, and that in such degree, as men of opulence not destined for any profession cannot escape from being more or less superficially acquainted with.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Art. 44. The declared situation has been rendered an appendage to an undeclared function: namely, of applying to the purposes of Parliamentary corruption, the patronage of one of the three recently united kingdoms. For, as of late has been over and over again demonstrated,—without so much as one act of the will on the part of the corruptor, the existence of a quantity of the matter of property applicable by him to the purpose of corruption, is abundantly sufficient to produce the effect.

Thus, in a certain mode of fishing,—when the fisherman has baited his hooks, and thrown them into the water, no need has he of any labour other than that of returning at the end of a competent interval of time, to take the fish off the hooks, and stow them in his basket: for the skill of the fly-fisher, this same mode of political fishing presents not any demand.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 45. In a statement recently made in the French Chamber of Deputies, by the Minister of the Sea Defensive Force subdepartment—in French practice, contrasted with a recent proceeding in the English House of Commons, an incontestably conclusive proof may be seen of the utter inaptitude of the practice of Government in England, as to the serving as a model of imitation to other nations; of the inaptitude in England,—and at the same time of the aptitude, comparative at least, on the part of the practice of Government in France.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 46. Of the French statement, the substance may be seen in the extract following, from a speech of M. Hyde de Neuville, as reported in the Morning Chronicle of the 8th of July, 1818.

“We have 30 general officers; we had 64 in 1787. According to the statements which have been already given,—if England were to trace them in the same proportion, she would have about 80—she has actually 215; France has 80 captains of ships of the line,—in 1787 she had 123; England, at the same rate, ought to have, at most 220—she has had 850. We have 120 captains of frigates: England had 868 commanders, who are equivalent. Our lieutenants de vaisseaux and enseignes together, are 728: England has 3,710 lieutenants, and 543 masters.”

Allowance made for controvertible points—on the one hand in relation to numbers requisite under each head, on the other hand for difference in the value of monies as between the two countries,—from these data, an estimate not altogether uninstructive might be made of the quantity of money, in this subdepartment alone, under “Matchless Constitution” constantly applied to the purposes of waste and corruption, at the expense of the indigent subject many, by and for the benefit of the opulent and ruling few.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 47. So much for France. Of the principles pursued in English practice, the manifestation here in question is as follows:

Every now and then, for the purpose of blinding the subject many, and preventing them from seeing that the maximization of waste and depredation is of the number of the ends uniformly pursued by those on whom everything depends,—a Finance Committee is appointed by the House of Commons; declared purpose, that of proposing reductions in the aggregate amount of the public expenditure. Of this Committee, a majority is on every occasion composed of individuals, in relation to whom the most perfect assurance has place that no considerable reduction will ever be consented to by them.

In the session of 1828, a Committee of the sort was appointed: at the close of the session, they had made four reports. In one of these reports, one single office (that of Lieutenant-General) belonging to the Ordnance—(an under sub-department, the business of which is conjunctly subservient to each of the two sub-departments, the Army and the Navy, belonging to the Defensive Force)—is stated as needless, and on that account requiring to be suppressed. On being brought before the House at large, this proposition was set aside by 204 votes to 95.

From this one example, what probability has place as to any such reduction as that held up to the view of Europe, by the statement of the French Minister as above,—may be estimated without much difficulty.

Section XVII.*

Ship-board Oppression obviated.

Instructional.

Art. 1. In the hands of a commanding officer,—in the Radical branch of the Sea-service, the power needful (it will have been seen) has place in quantity much greater than in the Radical branch of the Land-service: so likewise has the power commonly exercised. But, coupled with the sense of the need of the apt exercise, the facilities which the nature of the case affords for the abusive exercise of this same power, have been known to render the abusive exercise extensive, to a degree which calls upon the legislature for a corresponding degree of attention and endeavour employed in obviating it.

1. As to the need. Necessary—not only to the purpose of the service itself—that is to say, to the safe custody and appropriate conveyance of the cargo, but to the preservation of the lives of all on board, is the exactest subordination,—and, in time of danger, the most unqualified obedience,—on the part of all on board, whosoever they may be, to the orders of the person by whom the operations are directed, whatsoever the denomination attached to such his situation may be.

2. As to the fact: that is to say, the actual state of things. In consequence of the narrowness of the limits within which the abode of all on board is contained, not one of them all, so long as it continues to be their abode, can by possibility escape from out of the reach of the irresistible power of the all-directing functionary, so long as he continues in the exercise of such his function.

Thus then it is—that, for the sake of the individuals concerned, a demand has place for all such arrangements as may be found necessary to the securing, as far as may be, against the abuse of this power, all such individuals as, by their particular situation, stand exposed to it.

Enactive.

Art. 7. On one of the leaves, on the left side of the book (the right-hand leaf being employed as per Art. 11.) entry will be made of the name of the individual in question at full length, surname or surnames, and christian name or names, or what among non-Christians is equivalent, included: and in the same line therewith, in so many appropriate columns, matter under the several heads here following:

1. Time of birth, as far as known, according to his declaration; mentioning year, month, and day of the month.

2. Place of birth, as far as known; mentioning if within the territory of the state, the district, subdistrict, and bis-subdistrict.

3. Condition as to marriage; that is to say—bachelor, widower, or married man.

4. Time of entrance; mentioning year, month, and day of the month.

Enactive. Ratiocinative. Expositive. Exemplificational.

Art. 8. For obviating the confusion and misconception liable to be produced by the case where persons, two or more, are known by the same name,—in another column in the same line will moreover be entered a word, or figure, expressive of the place occupied by the name of the individual in question in the list of the individuals, if any such there be, before him, bearing the same name, as per this or any other Port Register. Also another word, expressive of the name of the port in which such other register is kept.

Thus, suppose Portsmouth the port, and Peter Porter, the name common to two individuals, whose names have been entered in the same year. In this case, Peter Porter, with no other addition than that of the year and Portsmouth the port of entry, being the designation of the one who was first entered, Peter Porter the second, with the addition of that same year and the port, will be the designation of the one who is next entered: and so on.

Enactive.

Art. 9. By the individual himself, in so far as able, will be written, the words expressive of his time of birth, place of birth, and condition in respect of marriage: if not, by the registrar, the individual making his mark, to which will be subjoined the words hismark, together with an attestation by the signature of at least one disinterested witness present at his making the same.

Enactive.

Art. 10. Of the entry thus made, exemplars, as per Ch. viii. Prime Minister, Section 10, Registration System, taken in the manifold way, will, at the same time, be disposed of as follows:—

1. Delivered to the individual, one.

2. Delivered to the person in command of the ship for which he is engaged, one.

3. Transmitted to the office of the Navy Minister, one. Also, delivered or transmitted to the persons or offices in question, any such other exemplars as the Legislature may have seen reason to ordain to be delivered.

Instructional. Enactive.

Art. 11. So much for entrances: follows now the mode of recordation, as applied to exits.

On the leaf which is on the right side of the book, in a line with that the contents of which have just been described, will be a set of heads, expressive of the mode and time of the individual’s ceasing to be in the condition in which he was placed on entrance. Examples are as follows:—

I. Killed. Sub-heads, under this the following—1. Day of death.—2. Place of death.—3. Persons present, if known.—4. Place at which the wound, or other cause of death, was received. In case of dubiousness as to any point, annexed will be the word Dubious, or the syllable Dub.

II. Deceased, to wit, by natural death. Supposed cause of death, as per ordinary bills of mortality. Sub-heads—1. Day of death.—2. Place of death.—3. Persons present, if known.

III. Promoted. Sub-heads—1. Condition, or say, situation into which promoted.—2. Day on which promoted.—3. By whom promoted.

IV. Dislocated. Sub-heads, whichsoever be the mode of dislocation, these—1. Day on which.—2. Persons by whom. For the several modes of dislocation, see Ch. ix. Ministers Collectively, Section 18, Dislocable, how.

In the unexpectedly-received list, will be entered the names of those who, their names not appearing either in the crew’s list or in the passenger’s list as above, are, at the time of the inspection, present, and appear as belonging to the number of the crew, or to the number of the passengers, as the case may be; together with the day of each person’s reception, and the occasion on which, and cause for which, received.

Art. 39. In reviewing the contents of this and the last preceding sections, the Legislature will consider, whether in any, and if in any, in what instances,—the arrangements herein and therein proposed, in relation to the radical branch, may be applicable with advantage to the stipendiary branch; and in what instances the arrangements so proposed in relation to the sea-service may be applicable, with advantage, to the land-service.

Section XVIII.

Collateral Employments.

Expositive.

Art. 1. By collateral employments at large, understand such as are so with reference to, and are by this name distinguished from, others, considered as the employments mainly, or say principally, carried on by persons belonging to the class in question.

On the present occasion, the employments considered as the main, or say principal employments, are those which are termed military, and consist in the use of arms, offensive and defensive, whether in actual combat against an enemy, or in the performance of any such manipulations or evolutions as are performed, for the purpose of learning how to employ such arms against an enemy with most advantage.

By collateral employments for military men, understand any such non-military employments, as are considered as capable of being performed with advantage to the state, by men belonging to the stipendiary branch of the Defensive Force, under the direction of the Army and Navy Ministers respectively; those Ministers acting on the occasion under the direction of the Prime Minister.

Expositive.

Art. 2. Neither to the radical branch of the Land Defensive Force, nor to that of the Sea Defensive Force, has that which is here said of collateral employments any application.

Instructional.

Art. 3. Leading principles serving as sources of rules applicable to this subject, are the following:—

1. The aptitude-maximizing.

2. The contentment-maximizing.

3. (Incidentally) The inequality-minimizing.

4. The expense-minimizing.

Instructional. Expositive.

Art. 4. In the stipendiary force, what is necessary is—that of each individual functionary, the whole time should be at all times at the command of Government: what is not necessary is, that at all times it should be actually employed either in actual war service or in war exercises. Here then, of that which is not necessary for either of these two purposes, is composed the quantity of surplus time, capable of being applied to employments at large, which, with reference to the main and characteristic employments, may be termed collateral.

To the hours in the day bears reference the time-occupying principle, as per Section 2, Leading Principles, Art. 37: the occupations themselves, though considered as being allotted to military men acting under military discipline, being themselves other than military. To entire days in the year, and in any number, bear reference the employments here spoken of under the name of collateral employments. By the very nature of the service, it is rendered indispensable, that, during a certain season, throughout all the days in the year, as well as throughout all the hours in a day, the occupations of all subordinates should be at the absolute disposal of their respective superordinates. This season is that of actual war, with the addition of any other portion of time during which, on the part of the Government, the apprehension of nearly-impending war has place.

Instructional. Expositive.

Art. 5. In and during a season of profound peace, a portion, more or less considerable, of the aggregate time of the military functionaries belonging to the Defensive Force Establishment, will, without detriment to the service, be capable of being disposed of, according to either of two systems—the furlough-allowing system, and the employment-allotting system.

By the furlough-allowing system, or say the furlough system, understand that, according to which the military functionaries in question are allowed to betake themselves to non-military employments, on their own account respectively.

By the employment-allotting system, or say the employment system, understand that, according to which employment is given by Government to the days of the military functionaries in question, in the same manner as in time of war; during which time they are occupied in employments other than military, though it is under military discipline that these same employments are carried on.

Instructional. Exemplificative.

Art. 6. By several governments the furlough system has been customarily pursued.

1. In the Prussian service, during three-fourths of the year, permission has been habitually given to soldiers in general to betake themselves to employments non-military, on their own account respectively: and this, without any special regard to vicinity or remoteness, with reference to the places at which the corps they respectively belong to were stationed.

2. So in the service of the Helvetic Confederacy, during about two-thirds of the year.

In neither of these cases do the functionaries thus licensed receive (it is believed) any pay at the charge of government; or if any, not so much do they receive at this time as at other times: Principle, the expense-minimizing.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 7. In English practice, in some corps, the privates have been customarily permitted thus to betake themselves to employments non-military, on their own account. But, as to pay, instead of being made—the whole or any part of it—to cease, it has been supposed to find its way into the pocket of this or that superordinate. Principle, not as above, the expense-minimizing, but the expense-maximizing: this being the principle which, under matchless constitution, is, in every department, and every subdepartment, the all-ruling principle: the aggregate of the expense constituting so much profit in the conjunct hands of the ruling one and the subruling few.

Instructional.

Art. 8. As to collateral employments, that which in relation to them is desirable is—that in this as in other cases, those should be chosen, if any such there be, by the practice and pursuit of which appropriate aptitude, with reference to the main or say principal employment, promises to be kept up and increased, or at least not diminished.

Rule. For collateral employments, other considerations being equal, choose in preference such as, with reference to the main employment, are aptitude-increasing and subsidiary: the practice of the collateral occupation contributing to make then more and more fit for the performance of the main one.

Instructional. Expositive. Exemplificational.

Art. 9. Of such appropriate-aptitude-increasing employments, conducive to the formation, preservation, and increase of the qualities of intrepidity and activity, as per Section 10, Remuneration, Art. 24, examples are the following:

Example 1. Occasional employment in acting in aid of the Preventive-Service Establishment; more particularly on the occasion of the application made of it to the prevention or suppression of delinquency accompanied with violence: as to which, see Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 5, Preventive-Service Minister.

Instructional.

Art. 10. Note, however, that only occasionally and by accident, can this species of collateral employment be furnished. At all times, for the service of that subdepartment as of that of every other, functionaries must be kept provided, in number sufficient for ordinary occasions. Only on this or that extraordinary occasion, can there be demand or use for auxiliary force from this quarter or any other: and it may be that no such extraordinary occasion shall ever have place. The extraordinary occasion will be—when, by some extraordinary occurrence, the standing provision made has been rendered inadequate.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 11. Example 2. Preventive service, specially applied to the collecting of the Revenue, under the authority of the Finance Minister: to wit, in cases where the number of co-offenders is liable to be so great as to produce a demand for aid from an armed force. So far as any defensive force functionaries are thus employed, the Army or Navy Minister’s subdepartment, as the case may be, lends its aid to the Preventive-Service Minister’s subdepartment, and the Finance Minister’s subdepartment, one or both.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 12. Example 3. Service in the character of Prehensor, on the execution of a Prehension mandate issued by a Judge, for the prehension or say arrestation of individuals, on the occasion, and for the purpose, of judicial procedure: as to which see Ch. xxviii. Prehensors, and Procedure Code, Prehension, Ch. xxii.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 13. Of collateral employments, adapted to the situation of land stipendiary defensive-force functionaries, and to the keeping in exercise the qualities in Section 10, Remuneration, Art. 24 mentioned, that of intrepidity excepted,—examples are the following:

I. Employments consisting in the performance of operations actually contributory to the service of the defensive-force subdepartment, though without danger to the operator.

1. Keeping on foot, or improving or enlarging, fortifications of fortified towns or ports.

2. Keeping on foot, or improving or enlarging, by land, or water, or both, roads for military purposes.

3. Keeping on foot, or improving or enlarging, naval works of the stationary kind, such as ports, breakwaters, slips for the construction of navigable vessels, docks for fitting out and repairing them.

II. Employments consisting in the performance of operations on subject-matters of the same kinds as the above, but applied to other purposes.

4. Roads—land roads.

5. Water roads, including purely natural, to wit, rivers and lakes; artificial, to wit, canals.

6. Bridges and underground tunnels.

7. Dykes and embankments.

Instructional. Exemplificational.

Art. 20. Of representative democracies in which, by extension given to the mass of Land Defensive Force, a reasonable promise seems to be thus afforded of a continued addition to the stock of morality and happiness,—examples are the following:—

1. Late Spanish America, throughout.

2. Late Portuguese America.

3. Haiti, and other hot countries in general, which have not yet made advances in civilisation equal to those made under the advantage of more temperate climates.

Art. 21. So even Greece, (although in this instance the circumstance of temperature, as per Art. 16, has not place:) the moral character having, by oppression inflicted and endured during so vast a length of time, suffered that moral depravation, which on the part of slaves on the one hand, and that of masters on the other, is the unhappily certain fruit of slavery.

Section XIX.

Concluding Remarks.

Instructional.

Art. 1. For the consideration of the Legislature and the subordinate authorities, it will be—what instruction may be derivable from the practice of other states and other times: in some instances the practice, although carried on with advantage then and there, will be found to be inapplicable here and now: in other instances, not.

The cases in which it will be found inapplicable, are mostly those in which the applicability depends on the state of the mind.

The cases in which it will be found to be applicable, are those in which it depends on the state of the body.

Of cases in which, it being the condition of the body that is in question, the applicability may be found to have place, example is the following:—

1. Weight which a soldier is capable of habitually carrying about him.

Weight which, according to Vegetius, the Roman foot soldiers were accustomed to carry, sixty pounds.

State in respect of maturity of age being the same, no reason appears why by a Roman at the present day, or a Frenchman, or an Englishman, the same weight should not be carried.

On the other hand, in the armies of modern times, men are admitted at ages less mature than into the Roman armies of those ancient times. The reason depends on the nature of the armature. For making use of the fire-arms in modern use, less strength is necessary than for making use of the cutting weapon and shield employed by foot soldiers in those ancient times.

Instructional.

Art. 2. Cases in which applicability depends on the state of the mind. For examples see Section 4, Stipendiaries, who; Art. 14, Ranks; Art. 19, Distinction between Ordinaries and Erudites.

In those days, in respect of martial instruction, the difference was small between rank and rank compared with what it is at present. Almost completely unknown in those times were the branches of art and science, on which, for the artillery and engineer armature-classes, appropriate aptitude in so high a degree depends.

Instructional.

Art. 3. Number of the grades. Supposing it ascertained that the number of grades in European service in general, and in English service in particular, is greater than needful, it would not follow that it could with any advantage, or even without utter ruin, be rendered so small as it was in the Roman service in ancient times.

In modern times the state of society and the nature of the armature combine in enabling commanders to employ detachments of small numbers on many different occasions for many different purposes: and consistently with the common safety and the accomplishment of the purpose, whatsoever it may be, no detachment, how small soever, can be without its commander.

On the other hand, in the ancient times in question, comparatively speaking, there was scarcely any action but in the largest bodies. The whole of the force collectible at the time on one side, met and encountered in a body the whole force collectible at the time on the other side.

SUPPLEMENT.

Section I.

Composition of troops (Infantry) in English Service.

The Company.

Unit, is the private.

5 privates and }	=a squad	{ Commanded by a corporal.
1 corporal }
10 privates and }	=a half-section.	{ a serjeant.
2 corporals, }
20 privates and }	=a section	{ a subaltern (lieutenant, 2d lieutenant, or ensign.)
4 corporals, }
2 serjeants. }
80 privates and }	=a company	a captain.
16 corporals, }
8 serjeants. }

The Battalion.

8	companies;
with 8	captains.
16	first lieutenants,
16	second lieutenants.

Commanded by a lieutenant-colonel; each half-battalion of four companies, occasionally by a field-officer, (major.)

The office of colonel, as distinguished from that of lieutenant-colonel, is null, or at all events nominal. The colonel of a regiment is always an officer of the rank of general; who derives certain emoluments from the office, but is never required to be present with the regiment, the lieutenant-colonel being in all respects the responsible officer.

2	battalions=a brigade, commanded by a brigadier-general.
2	brigades=a division, commanded by a lieutenant-general.

Section II.

*On Courts-Martial.**

A general Court-Martial in the British service consists of thirteen members at least, usually fifteen, to make allowance for sickness or other contingency.

The senior of these is President.

To him, by name, the commander, under whose authority the Court-Martial assembles, directs the warrant to assemble and try.

The Judge-Advocate is also named in the warrant.

The other members are not named, but selected by the commander, or taken from the roster at his pleasure.

The President must be superior or senior to all the others, and in case of his sickness or death, it is presumable that the next senior would officiate. Of course no man ought to vote who has not been present from first to last: though this is not so clearly defined as it should be.

The Judge-Advocate is often a civilian, or common lawyer—often a military man, selected without necessarily proving any fitness.

He holds his place at pleasure, and if a military man, his commission also, like all the members of the court.

He is paid by a per diem allowance from date of the warrant assembling the Court, till the sentence is finally returned approved by the commander who summoned the Court (or his successor in the command.)

The Judge-Advocate’s functions are diversified and incompatible. He has all the influence: but the President (backed by the court) all the authority, saving the Judge-Advocate’s right to record his opinion and dissent on any point of form, at all times, on the proceedings.

The Judge-Advocate is public prosecutor, representing the State.

He prepares the “crime” (indictment) examines for the crown, chief and cross.

Sums up, after all the proceedings for the defence as well as prosecution are closed, in an address to the Court, who, President included, then become a jury.

The Judge-Advocate is the adviser in law, and conductor of all the proceedings; though the Court is not bound to follow his counsel, and though the President is always professedly addressed as the chief authority present.

Lastly, the Judge-Advocate is supposed to be counsel for the prisoner; but the prisoner frequently provides (if an Erudite) a lawyer as his amicus curiæ, and he suggests the questions to be put to evidence—the points of law and fact that arise incidentally—and by a fiction (for lawyers quâ lawyers are not recognised in Courts-Martial) obtains leave to “read the prisoner’s defence.”

It is plain that in most cases, the Judge-Advocate must be possessed of tremendous influence and power, and must be everything in such a court. How is it then, that beyond doubt, Military Courts-Martial lean strongly towards the accused, and often baffle power and persecution?

The reason may be found perhaps in the sympathy excited by the total helplessness of one of the Court’s own class, exposed thus to such tremendous odds; and the means are clear enough, whereby this merciful (and sometimes erroneous) tendency is gratified—namely:

The secrecy of individual votes and opinions. This secrecy pervades every important proceeding of a Court-Martial. At any stage, any member has a right to “clear the court” of all, save President, members, and Judge-Advocate. The clearer then propounds his objections to any matter of law or procedure, to any question put or answer received, in short to anything.

The Judge-Advocate may record any opinion or objection he chooses, to the resolution taken by the Court; but the debate is concluded with closed doors.

The majority decides.

No record is made upon the minutes, of opinions or votes—the proceedings simply state the fact that the Court was cleared and opened again, the Court having ruled so and so. The President and members, as well as the Judge-Advocate, are bound by their oaths to secrecy with respect to the vote or opinion of any particular member of the Court.

This secrecy is the grand safety-guard of every prisoner. It has many of the advantages of ballot; and its only disadvantage of much note perhaps is, that no record is thus kept up of the reasons that swayed Courts in deciding important points of law and proceeding. Thus future Courts have no benefit from past decisions: they only know the naked facts. Perhaps this is not without advantage, considering the mischief done by precedents in the administration of law; but there is a great difference in this,—that regular Judges and lawyers have all a fellow-feeling and a common comedy to perform, and therefore bend, or affect to bend, to previous dicta; whereas the tribunal called a Court-Martial, uniting the functions of Judge and Jury, is taken, for each occasion, out of the mass of Erudites; and the occasions being but rare, each member is generally full of his vocation, and inclined to exercise the portion of power vested in him, fairly for the public weal.

Thus little difference exists in the temporary Judge-Juror’s opinion of to-day, from that of the plain man of yesterday; and thus it is, that only a few broad matters of law, procedure, and evidence, have come to be “ruled points.”

A great loss of time certainly follows this necessity of arguing everything de novo: so far this state of things is matter of regret.

A greater, because invariable, loss of time, arises from everything whatever in the proceedings being conducted in writing. Except the conclave discussions, all evidence is minuted,—opening—defence—summing up, likewise. This must be, so long as the sentence and verdict of a Court-Martial are not final, nor anywise operative until they have received the approval of the Commander who assembled the Court, or his successor; and who may correspond with the Court and the Judge-Advocate, pointing out what they should do—ordering them to reassemble and revise their “sentence,” (not “proceedings,” but “finding and sentence” only,) once, or as permitted by the letter of the Article of War, twice.

No such power exists in the navy. There, the Court’s finding and sentence are unalterable, and pronounced in court—the execution or staying of it, or commuting or pardoning, being in the competence of the Admiralty alone.

No other power should exist in the army, and then proceedings might be abbreviated. The shortest General Court-Martial now takes up several days; every question, even from a Judge-Juror, being in writing.

No sentence of death can be pronounced unless two-thirds of the Court concur in it. This comes into collision in particular cases, with the rule that the verdict, of guilty or not, is first declared by the same Court quâ Jurors, and by a bare majority; while a subsequent vote is taken distinctly as to the question of pure law; i. e. the sentence applicable to the finding of “guilty.” This second question is settled by a bare majority, save in two or three articles:—mutiny—forcing a safeguard—and cowardice are the articles in question [see Annual Articles of War]—where death is the sole punishment—no discretion allowed—yet two-thirds must concur. Suppose out of the thirteen necessary members, six against, seven find guilty of mutiny. The law is peremptory as to the punishment of death; but yet nine against four must concur in this sentence. Whence will come the two in addition to the seven, required? Not, certainly, out of the six who dissented from the verdict of guilty.*

The anomalous things above pointed out do not occur often—1. Because the penalties of most articles of war in the Code admit of great latitude—Death or such other punishment as a Court-Martial “shall award”—“Such punishment”—“Corporal punishment”—“mulcted in such proportion of his pay,” &c. &c. Such is the usual phraseology.—2. Because, both in the “finding,” and in the “sentence,” the same species of majority, viz. a bare majority, suffices in most cases. This latitude of “arbitrary punishment,” as the Scotch lawyers have it, is bad: yet it is not easy to say what can be done, where scarcely any of the offences legislated for are mala in se, but almost all mala prohibita only.

In England, none but Erudites are privileged to sit on Courts-Martial, whether general or regimental. In the navy, none under the degree of Post Captain (i. e. Lieut. Col. in the Army;) an absurd rule, originating in days when men of very inferior knowledge and education filled the lower Commission of Lieutenant, which corresponds with Captain in the army. An ensign in the army is qualified to sit on any Court-Martial. None under the degree of a field-officer (of which the lowest rank is that of Major) can lawfully be President of a General Court-Martial; nor under Captain, of a Regimental Court, and this only in case of necessity.

In India, all the native officers of a battalion, (viz. one subahdar-major, ten subahdars or captains, and ten jemahdars or lieutenants) must have risen from the ranks as private sepoys.† In this class of Hindoos and Mohammedans, (native officers,) is wholly vested the delicate function of doing justice between the sepoys and the state. All the forms are the same as in British Courts-Martial. The Code almost the same.

A Judge-Advocate, the ordinary English functionary who acts in white Courts-Martial, sits in General Courts-Martial; and in “regimental,” or “garrison,” or “line” Courts-Martial, a European officer is temporarily named to act as superintending officer, with exactly the powers of a Judge-Advocate. European and native sworn interpreters are employed. Everything is reduced to writing in English, by the Judge-Advocate. Sentence is approved by the officer who ordered the Court. Matters of life and death, equally with those of the most trifling nature, are handled by these tribunals, and no complaint is ever made of their conduct. Substantial justice is always done: and, if any slight leaning exist, it is not towards their own body, but towards the State.

The minor Courts-Martial are the worst parts of the system. Until lately they acted not under any solemn sanction of oath or other asseveration, whether on the part of Judges or evidence—nay, it is not very long since “Drumhead Courts-Martial” used to be assembled, without any record of proceedings, and sanction instantaneous lashing (five or six hundred stripes) of men taken from the ranks for some sudden offence of discipline.

Sir Francis Burdett has done indescribable good in the whole field of military justice, by drawing attention to these Courts. Punishments are now of a more judicious and merciful kind—Drumhead Courts are defunct.

All Courts now meet under sanction of oath and record.

A species of more formal regimental Court, called “General Regimental Court-Martial,” has arisen to take cognizance of offences which used to be referred to General Courts-Martial. The difference is, that the new Court has a responsible person to act as Judge-Advocate, which no minor Court formerly had; and a greater number of members.‡

In the French armies stripes have ever been unknown. Count de Narbonne, before the Revolution, tried to introduce the coup du plat de sabre, in conformity to the Germanizing rage of England and France forty years ago. Thirty thousand men are said to have deserted on the promulgation of the order, and it was abandoned. The Peine du Boulet—hard labour—ignominious dresses,—imprisonment, &c., are inflicted for smaller offences; but death is often inflicted for desertion, mutiny, &c.

In the Indian sepoy army, flogging is comparatively rare, and almost solely confined to ignominious offences, theft, &c. No flogged man is usually allowed to be retained in a corps, but is turned out. It is needless to say that such an army must be animated with a very high spirit, and that such a system could only be maintained where the status of the soldier is placed very high in general estimation. And so it is.

A sepoy considers himself, and is considered by family and neighbours, a gentleman. All the higher ranks (of natives) in the battalion are filled from the lower exclusively. Pay, clothing, food, lodging, medical treatment, invalid-pension—all are liberal and quite secure; and the natives judge and punish each other by a simple though severe code of laws. If this could be done in England, instead of filling our armies with jail-birds, the same effect would follow; and, as in Bengal, fifty aspirants would follow each battalion, waiting for vacancies.

In France, it is well known how much the military morale was raised by the unsparingness of the conscription, by the open avenues between the marshal’s and the private’s situations, by the sympathy created between officer and soldier owing to those circumstances, and to that of every officer being obliged to begin as a private soldier.

In Austria and Prussia, where they count quarters and so forth, the morale of the military machine is of the lowest grade in the scale. Yet these last are at least as dangerous to liberty and humanity, as the French or the sepoys,—as ready instruments against their countrymen—their own fathers if need be.

Is it only then, when the soldiery of high military morale look up exclusively to the Executive for promotion, protection, bread, that they are dangerous? Let us hope this is so; and that it may be possible to find the two desiderata capable of coinciding—namely, a high military feeling among the soldiery, with a preference of country, liberty, public rights, in case of collision, to the will of one.

To compass this, measures must be systematically devised to make the few stipendiaries cease to consider themselves as servants of the Executive alone, paid by it, promoted by it, dependent on it. But all this, though perfectly feasible in a really free country where representation of the people is substantive, cannot co-exist with an overshadowing aristocracy and an unreformed Parliament.

Our English volunteers might, in a political panic or other epidemy, have by accident taken part with a sovereign or minister in a direct attack upon such liberty as was possessed by their countrymen. But this delusion could not have long subsisted. So the thirty battalions of the French Parisian National Guard; 12,000 of whom long survived all political changes. So the American militia and regulars in both wars.

Remarkable fact—that in India, where the English pretend they cannot introduce criminal or civil native juries—they have introduced them from the very origin of their power—seventy years ago, in the sepoy service. No sepoy can be punished in any way but by sentence of native officers, all of whom are of his own colour and caste, and all have served for many years as private soldiers. The thing has completely answered in practice, by universal consent.

Subsidiary Observations by the Editor of the Original Edition of the Chapter on Defensive Force.

The Editor of the Chapter on Defensive Force has been offered the opportunity of appending such subsidiary observations as may appear to bear upon its general object.

He is desirous of stating, that all which is thus introduced is on his own responsibility, and in no degree involves the authority of any of the rest.

Art. 1.

On different descriptions of Land-service Defensive Force.

First in order of institution, and principal in point of magnitude, must always (or with such inconsiderable exceptions as scarcely to permit notice) be the service of Infantry.

The first instinct of man is to take care of himself. The earliest efforts of men on foot combined for war, will consequently, (and more especially where the missile weapon is one of great power and effect,) be in open or dispersed order; in which, though there may be a considerable degree of unity of operation, (as, for example, all may advance on one particular point, and at one particular time, by the arrangements of one or more leaders,) the result will be the sum of the efforts of individuals acting under the guidance of their individual courage and intelligence, rather than of discipline. Of such composition, in a great measure, were the earliest armies of France in the Revolution: such also were the Vendeans opposed to them in the West.

But when a considerable number of experiments have been made in this kind of war, it begins to be generally found out, that great effects are produced in favour of whichever side can induce large bodies of men on foot to act together with closed ranks, and thereby form themselves into compact military machines, moved and directed entirely by the will and intelligence of individual commanders. Such bodies may not supersede and totally remove the utility of the other previously-described species of force; but they are found to be immense additions to its efficacy. In short it is determined by experience, (by which everything else in this world is determined,) that a certain, and this a very large proportion, of a regular army of given numerical strength, will produce an increased result in the shape of power, by being trained to fight in close order.

What is close order, must be determined with relation to the species of arms in use. The ancients thought of nothing less than sixteen deep; because though they were not absolutely without machines approaching to the nature of artillery, these were feeble, difficult to move, and on the whole comparatively inefficient. But when armies came to be exposed to such powerful agents as modern artillery and musketry, their ranks were speedily reduced to three. For, in addition to the havoc made by the modern missiles on bodies of deeper formation, it was discovered that in no ordinary circumstances could more than three ranks employ their own missile weapons at the same time; so that, so far as the combat was to be decided by these, any ranks above three were non-effective.

When fire-arms were first introduced into armies, it was natural that an over-strained idea should be formed of their effects. The opinion therefore gained ground, that a combat between two armies of disciplined infantry, could be nothing but a mutual slaughter of two lines of men drawn up opposite to each other, and trying which should suffer longest. But by degrees it was discovered, that the power of fire-arms, great though it was, had been overrated. Fear, hurry, defect of vision from smoke, difficulty of hearing orders from noise, all tended to make the effect of a direct and continued fire vastly less destructive than might have been expected. And in addition to these negative causes diminishing the danger of the attacking party, it was found that in the extended positions occupied by great armies, the assailant had almost always, in some part or other of the field of action, the power of advancing under cover of peculiarities of ground or other advantages, and moreover of covering himself by troops in open or dispersed order, who could draw off the fire of the enemy at the same time that they were themselves comparatively covered or unexposed. In these ways it came to be discovered, that in spite of the effects of fire-arms, battles of infantry were, after all, in a great measure reducible to contests between bodies of men in close order, and at short distances,—sometimes so short as to employ the arme blanche (or manual weapon as distinguished from that which acts by means of gunpowder.)

From these circumstances arose the distinction between Light Infantry, and Infantry of the Line, or what in the continental armies are often collected into battalions under the title of Grenadiers. From their several uses it seems to follow,—that the first are the most easily formed, and may contain by preference those who have more intelligence than discipline, or who from youth, want of stature, or other causes, are deficient in athletic vigour: in this way also the radical force is most speedily and easily made to be an effective part of the public defence, and the defensive force of communities increased in comparison with the offensive,—a consummation evidently contributory to the general happiness of mankind. And—that the others, or Infantry of the Line, should be constituted by preference of those who, from habits, education, or otherwise, are most amenable to discipline, or least endued with the qualities favourable for the formation of irregular combatants; and moreover should be composed by preference, of men of stature and that species of strength which is operative in bodily contests.

Next of the service on horseback. When it had been discovered that bodies of infantry might produce striking military results by means of celerity of movement upon various parts of the enemy’s formation or position, it was but a small step to the observation, that this power of celerity might be obtained in a much higher degree by means of troops mounted on horseback. And the probability is, (both from general reasoning and from the contents of history,) that the earliest cavalry was considered as something very dangerous and irresistible by men on foot. One of the earliest military improvements, however, in all nations that have employed disciplined armies, has been the discovery, that so long as infantry in close order preserved its discipline and coolness, it was virtually unassailable by cavalry, or at all events could only be assailed with effect by means of such superior sacrifices as amounted in practice to the same thing; and the extent of this result has been increased by the introduction of fire-arms. When, indeed, infantry was intimidated and had lost its union and resolution,—when it had ceased to obey the directions of a presiding will, and the attention of the individuals composing it had been directed to the means of escape rather than of victory,—as, for instance, when it had been made to give way before the victorious infantry of an assailant,—then the power of a body of cavalry was found to be overwhelming. And even before the victory of the infantry was decided,—or, as it may be expressed, durante conflictu,—the rapid movement of a body of cavalry towards a point that was already vulnerable, or that was sure to become so in the event of the superiority of the enemy being acknowledged, was found to be a powerful instrument of success. In the earliest application of cavraly, therefore, the mere circumstance of velocity, or the power of rapid locomotion, may be held to have been the most important agent in the expected result.

But when cavalry had thus come to be employed as what may be called a flying-piece on the chess-board of war, it was speedily discovered, that there were many circumstances, in which the operations of the hostile cavalry could in no way be so well opposed or neutralized, as by moving against them with a piece of the same kind. If infantry, already engaged with an equal force of infantry, was disturbed by the rapid approach of a body of cavalry in addition,—or if it had given way before the enemy’s infantry, and was in the act of being destroyed by the cavalry that supported it,—there was manifestly no practicable way of moving with sufficient rapidity to its relief, except by attacking the cavalry with a body of the same kind. This, therefore, led to the employment of cavalry against cavalry. And here it was speedily discovered, that in combats of this nature, not only rapidity of movement, but strength was essential to success. In effect it was discovered, that the horse was the principal part of the machine, and that in proportion to its strength and vigour, was the power of the whole. And this led to the formation of a cavalry d’élite: which is, or ought to be, what is known by the distinctive names of Cavalry of the Line, Heavy Cavalry Grosse Cavalerie:—while at the same time there exists another cavalry, (which for distinction’s sake will be here called Ordinary Cavalry,) capable of performing the common services of cavalry, but less applicable than the other to contests where individual strength is of primary importance. If it should be asked, why all the cavalry should not be of the best, the answer is, that all cannot be of the best. The demand for cavalry will, in every war where a country shall be called upon to put forth its strength, be greater than there is a possibility of supplying by horses of the highest strength and quality. And so forcibly is this felt, that in most of the European armies there is a third kind of cavalry, intended principally for the service of out-posts and making observations; which goes under the name of Light Cavalry, and is mounted on horses of still smaller height and physical force. In the British army this last class of horses is non-existent; the quality and number of horses in the British islands, with relation to the number employed in war, being such as to allow of all the Light Cavalry being mounted on horses of the second class.

The Artillery (as before noted) is an accessory to whose agency little that is analogous existed among the ancients. Since the campaigns of the French Revolution, its importance has been greatly extended. As being the weapon which demands most science, it will be always a favourite arm, where the intelligence of nations in a more advanced state of society, is brought into opposition to the force of such as are in a less. And the greater the diffusion of intelligence, the greater will be the results likely to be derived from this arm. On the whole, therefore, the advantage is likely to be on the side of those states in which the power of self government is in the hands of the many.

The great and palpable division of artillery is into that which manæuvres, and that which does not; in other words, into Field Artillery, and the artillery used in the attack and defence of fortresses. With respect to Field Artillery, the inferences from modern wars are, First, That though it may be desirable and useful that all commanders of large divisions of the army should have certain limited quantities of artillery awaiting their disposal, the great effects of artillery are to be procured by employing it offensively in great masses. Secondly, (which is only a consequence from the other, and does not seem to have been so fully appreciated and developed as might have been expected,)—That all Field Artillery is, or ought to be, of the nature of cavalry, or what is commonly denominated Horse Artillery. Without the power of rapid motion derived from the artillery-men being mounted, it is impossible that it should perform the offices expected from it. Every man who has seen war, will have observed numerous instances in which the infantry, by reason of its greater power of surmounting obstacles, could get over the country faster than the cavalry,—still more, than the artillery. And the only way to enable the artillery, in even the ordinary circumstances of action, to keep up with the infantry,—is to give it the power of compensating for obstacles, by exerting the velocity of cavalry after they are overcome.

Next in importance to the artillery-men being mounted, is the simplicity of calibres. The calibres of field artillery might apparently be reduced to two;—ex.gr. the calibre of six pounds for the long gun, and of twenty-four for the howitzer intended to act with shells in positions which do not admit of direct fire. An observation deducible from tables of artillery practice, and which appears to have been much overlooked in the construction of modern artillery, is that (within certain limits) the weight of metal in a gun being supposed fixed, the effect for field service, or in other words for acting against men and horses not covered by fortifications, will be greater when the given quantity of metal is formed into a gun of smaller calibre, than into one of greater. For proof, reference is had to the tables; showing, that of two guns circumstanced as above, the smaller calibre absolutely sends its single or round shot farther with the elevations in ordinary use, and moreover expels a greater quantity of the small balls called grape at a single discharge,—which is explained by the gun’s being comparatively stronger, and enduring a comparatively greater charge. Hence, if, as may often be the case with a Defensive Force, there should be a necessity for opposing a field artillery of brass with one of iron, (in which the inferiority of the iron is, that to obtain the same strength, the weight must be increased from a third to a half,) the best way of diminishing the disadvantage will probably be by diminishing the calibre. This, therefore, is an observation tending to increase the efficiency of defensive force.

It is evident that horse artillery, considered as a species of cavalry, possesses precisely those qualities which the other cavalry has not. It can convey to a given point the faculty of overwhelming, or helping to overwhelm, a body of infantry; and when it is in combination with cavalry, the same necessity which obliges the infantry to form squares to resist the cavalry, exposes it to destruction from the artillery. Horse artillery, therefore, in localities favourable to its action, has tended to give the advantage to cavalry over infantry; or, in other words, to confine the superiority of the infantry to localities not adapted for the movement of large masses of horse artillery.

A difference discernible between horse artillery and other cavalry is, that horse artillery has the most marked power of deciding victory; cavalry, of improving it.

The use of foot artillery (or artillery where the artillery-men are not conveyed on horseback) appears to be with propriety limitable to the attack and defence of fortresses. It is, therefore, in reality, part of the science of the engineer: or—the sciences of the attack and defence of fortresses, and of the use of heavy artillery, should be combined in the same individuals.

The use of fortresses in modern war appears to be reducible entirely, or nearly so, to their effects upon communications. For example, a fortress which secures a certain passage to the possessor, and enables him to exclude his enemy from the same passage, is of the same value and effect as the possession of a gate, which lets in one man and keeps out another. It is in just continuation of this metaphor, that a fortress is sometimes styled “a key,” “the key of a country,” &c. A fortress which is the key to nothing, is in modern military estimation worth nothing, and would be better dismantled. Many ancient fortresses are thus situated, and therefore have been abandoned. But to have any effect in the way of a key, a fortress must be connected with some extensive local obstacle or difficulty, as for example, a river, or a chain of mountains. If there is to be a gate, there must also be something of the nature of a wall: for a fortress in an open country, or on a plain of ice, would be like a gate where there was no wall.

The idea that fortresses might operate as checks to an invading army, by the fear of the effect of their garrisons upon its rear, may be considered as obsolete. If a hundred thousand men retire before a hundred and twenty thousand, and as the means of checking the enemy, throw fifty thousand into fortresses,—the consequence only is, that even if the enemy leaves fifty thousand to watch them, the inequality of the active forces that remain, instead of being as five to six, will be in the proportion of five to seven, which is worse than before. But the invader will not leave fifty thousand. He will contrive that, for instance, thirty thousand, collected into larger bodies than the garrisons of the divided fortresses, shall keep the latter in check, and be ready to fall with a superior force on the first that ventures beyond it walls; and the difference (twenty thousand) he will add to his former superiority in the field, making the final proportion that of five to nine. Fortresses, therefore, considered merely as places of shelter, are not a source of strength to a retreating army in operations on a large scale, but the contrary. But as keys to communications, fortresses have a very considerable effect, though less than was anciently attributed to them. A fortress that can stop up a point of passage for a certain period against all opposition, may oblige an invading force to lose time in taking a circuitous route; and several fortresses of the same kind in succession, may cause the loss of time to amount to some weeks—and a week’s greater or less delay may determine the fate of a nation. Hence there is a substantial use of fortresses, and there is an imaginary one; and it is the business of statesmen and commanders of armies, to distinguish one from the other. And this proper use of fortresses is evidently an important consideration in relation to Defensive War.

Hitherto the subject has been that of different armatures or modes of arming, or what the French distinguish more briefly by the word arme. The next is, of the mode of applying them. And these two subjects have manifestly a degree of inter-connexion with each other. Arms of a particular kind are chosen, from an opinion that they are the most effectual for the conduct of war; and war is conducted in one certain manner and not in another, in consequence of a reference to the nature of the arms in use.

The great division which presents itself in this place, is the division into tactics and strategics. It is remarkable, that after all that has been written on the military art, men in general have not yet come to a clear and vernacular comprehension of the difference between these two things. Even Jomini (the last military author of name, and the only one who has written intelligibly on the rationale of the movements of armies* ) is not clear upon it. Tactics (from τάσσω ordino), are the preparation of the instruments. Strategics (from ϛϱατὰ[Editor: illegible character] [Editor: illegible character]γω) are how to apply them after they are made. To mix colours, prepare canvass, and choose brushes, may be said to be the tactics of a painter. Strategics are how to paint. To know how to form columns, lines, to advance, to retire, &c., is tactics. To know when to form columns, when lines, when to advance, when to retire, &c., is strategics.

There may be a small tactique and a grande tactique—a tactic of companies, and a tactic of regiments, and a tactic of corps d’armée—a tactic of infantry, of cavalry, and of artillery; but they all agree in the definition given.

The divisions existing in strategics were never clearly developed, till it was done by Napoleon. The strategic of battles was indifferently well understood before his time, and had received great improvements, as connected with the modern weapons, from the King of Prussia; but the rules for the direction of forces at a distance from the enemy, were in a very different state. The leading principle of this strategic of battles, may be stated as derived from the fact, that when a force drawn up (as in the greater number of cases, since the invention of fire-arms, forces must necessarily be drawn up) in long thin lines, was attacked by other forces which had placed themselves in the direction of the smaller dimension of the line, or in other words upon one or both of its flanks, it was almost sure to be defeated; or at all events the chances were greatly against it, unless counterbalanced by extraordinary activity in the commander and resolution in the troops. And the reason of this was, evidently, that bodies thus attacked in the direction of their smaller dimension, are under an incapacity of offering any effectual defence or opposition, without, at all events, a change of position to prepare for it; and this change of position, when to be effected under the pressure of an enemy and because the enemy makes it necessary, is a very dangerous operation, and almost sure to end in disorder and rout. What was established therefore was, that in respect of positions in actual combat, the central position was the dangerous one, and to occupy the circumference of the circle (or in other words to surround or turn the enemy) was the desirable one. And here began the mistake, which Napoleon was born to correct, and conquered the European continent in setting right. What was true of bodies of troops in positions of actual combat, was assumed to be true of bodies at great distances from each other. Because an army was in a dangerous situation when it had another army on each of its flanks within cannon shot, it was assumed, that an army in Germany was also in a dangerous situation, when it had one army on its flank in Italy, and another in the Netherlands. The First Consul was the discoverer of the fallacy contained in this assumption, and of the true principle of what may, for distinction, be called the grande stratégique, or mode of directing the movements of armies at a distance from the enemy; and he made thereby the same kind of revolution in war, that Copernicus did in astronomy. He saw clearly, that so long as there was distance enough for the central army to have time to concentrate its operations on one of the divided forces on its flanks, without its movement being instantly discovered and interrupted by the pursuit of the other—the chances were all in favour of the force occupying the central or interior position. And this (though other causes combined and aided) was the leading source of his military success, so far as it depended on the movements of armies. When his enemies had by experience become acquainted with his system, they endeavoured to paralyze it by withdrawing before him without fighting; so as to disappoint him in the object of his movement, which was to destroy a part,—and thereby leave him no result but the labour of his march. And this was attended with considerable effect, in the particular circumstances of Napoleon; because time and victory were precious to him at that period. But it does not follow that the same system is applicable to general use. Where circumstances on the two sides approached to equality, the very practice of the retreating system would be an avowal of inferiority; and the commander of the other army would find opportunities of so directing his movements, that to retreat before him should lead him to some object equivalent to a victory.

It may appear matter of interminable regret, that such a discovery, which proved itself capable of changing the face of Europe, should have produced so little benefit to mankind at large. But the results are yet to come. The discovery of Napoleon has decided the ultimate independence of nations, by demonstrating that the most civilized and liberal portion of Europe, possesses the good military position against the less civilized powers which surround it. If France, for example, should ever again be attacked by such a coalition as at the commencement of her Revolution, the military principle developed by Napoleon would give her almost the certainty of repulsing the invaders, and finding the way to their capitals in return.

A practical inference of smaller extent is, that in the case of a national resistance in circumstances like those of Spain when it rose upon the French forces dispersed over the country in 1808, the object of the insurgents should be to unite concentrically into masses superior to the separate masses by which they happen to be surrounded, and then assume the offensive without a moment’s delay, for the purpose of overpowering their enemies in detail; repeating the same process of concentration and attack, as often as circumstances shall direct. The first part of the contest must in fact be a race, to see which side can execute this kind of process with most celerity and vigour.

Art 2.—

On the Rifle, for Defensive Force.

It has been asserted that the invention of bombs decided the superiority of standing armies over citizen levies, and gave a blow to civil liberty in most of the states of Europe. The invention of the rifle appears calculated to reverse the superiority.

On this head, question may be the following:—If an army of citizen defenders were opposed to an invading regular force, in such numbers on the two sides respectively as should balance the difference in the habit of acting in organized masses, and make the chances equal,—would not a relative advantage be given to the citizens, if both sides were to receive the power of arming themselves with rifles at discretion, with time for learning the mechanical use of the instrument?

It may be maintained that there would:—1. Because, the citizens being the greatest number, the sum of all the additions that could be made to the efficiency of individuals on their side, would be greater than the sum on the other.—2. Because the additions to the power of the individual citizens, are in the same direction in which the advantage of the aggregate lay before: but the additions to the power of individuals in the regular force, (if extended beyond the comparatively small number who might be employed as irregular combatants before,) are in a different direction, and consequently for every addition to the strength of the aggregate in one direction, there is a diminution in another. Or if it be clearer, say—the tendency of the change upon the whole, is to transfer the mode of combat from that in which the regular force has most advantage, to that in which the citizens.

The Aide-Mémoire for the use of the French Artillery (edition of 1819) contains the only known statement of the relative powers of the rifle and the common musket.

The result of experiments there stated is, that the superior efficiency of the rifle (circumstances for and against, all taken into account) is, in situations appropriate to its use, as thirteen to five.*

For practical evidence of the effect of the rifle for Defensive Force, reference may be had to America. Who will make any permanent impression on the United States, with their population of riflemen? Who would dictate forms of government to France, if, in addition to her stipendiary army, she had an equal number of volunteer riflemen from her radical force?

Art. 3.—

On Military Economy.

A point which may be usefully insisted on, in connexion with a treatise on Defensive Force, is the great economy, so far as relates to the Stipendiary branch, of having everything of the best that is procurable.

Take for example the armature of the Infantry. The cost of an infantry-man in the Stipendiary branch, including pay, clothing, food if supplied distinct from pay, and armature with the common musket, is ordinarily estimated at £30 sterling (750 francs) a-year. The cost of an ordinary musket is about £1 sterling, and that of a rifle is, on a large estimate, £10; hence, if the rifle is supposed to last only fifteen years, (which is much under the truth,) and to require renewing continually at the end of that period, the additional expense of arming and keeping a man perpetually armed with a rifle, with due calculation of the value of money at five per centum, may be estimated as equal to a continual payment of £1 per annum. Hence, by a nation which has considerable capital at command, thirty riflemen may be raised, armed, and permanently kept on foot, for the same expense as thirty-one common infantry-men. But it has been shown that, in appropriate circumstances, the advantage of the rifle over the common musket is as 13 to 5. Hence, if riflemen are raised to the extent that can be employed under such circumstances, and to no greater, 5 of these riflemen will be as useful as 13 men with muskets: or, preserving the same proportion, 30 riflemen will do the service of 78 common infantry-men. But 30 riflemen are only the expense of 31 of other infantry. The expense, therefore, of 47 infantry-men out of 78 will be saved; or a given expense will be applied, with an increased final result in the proportion of 78 to 31, or upwards of 5 to 2.

In the same manner a cavalry soldier is ordinarily supposed to cost about £75 a-year. Let the horse be assumed to last on an average six years; and let the question be, of the effect of adding £20 to the purchase-money of the horse. The additional cost of purchasing and from time to time replacing such a horse, may (with allowance for the interest of money as before) be rated as equal to a continual payment of £4 per annum. Hence 75 horse soldiers mounted in the improved manner, may be maintained for the same expense as 79 of the other; or by striking off six or eight men and horses per squadron, the regiments of new cavalry will cost no more than the old. The question therefore will be, whether for certain services, such squadrons will not be more effective, than squadrons of the common kind with six or eight men and horses more in each; or whether the efficiency of the new squadrons, with equal numbers, will not be increased in a greater proportion than that of 79 to 75.

On the same principle, if it was proposed to give the rifle to a portion of the mounted troops, the comparative expense would only be in the proportion of seventy-six to seventy-five.

These considerations throw light on the expensiveness of anything that is inferior, in a permanent or Stipendiary force.

In the arming of the Radical force, the economy of using the improved instrument is not so demonstrable, nor so reducible to practical effect. If every man of military age in the United States of America can be induced or obliged by law to arm himself with a musket of the cost of £1, it does not follow that it would be feasible or proper to direct him to arm himself with a rifle of the cost of £10. But still, the advantage derivable from the weapon in the proportion of 13 to 5, is capable (more especially in a time of public alarm) of being held out as an effectual inducement to a great number of individuals, to arm themselves voluntarily in the improved manner.

[* ]Personnel, Matériel. Distinctions established in French language and practice.

[* ]True it is, that rules may be mentioned, for which in many and probably in all languages, complete expression may be found given, in and by a single word: the word employed being, in the language of grammarians, a verb, employed in the mood styled by them the imperative. But, in this one word, may be seen the matter of an entire proposition. Thus, on the occasion of the operations belonging to the military exercise, the occasion being previously understood, the word ‘Fire’ suffices for giving expression to a mandate, which, though the action commanded by it is but individual and not generic, may yet be considered as coming under the import associated to the word rule. But, by every verb in its imperative mood, is expressed, though in a thus abridged form, the substance of an entire sentence, or say proposition; sentence, in the language of grammarians; proposition, in the language of logicians; a proposition, in and by which the matter of an entire assertion is conveyed. This is as much as to say, “My will is, that you perform an act of that sort by which a person will produce the effect indicated by this word which I am speaking.”

[* ]When the French had their corvées, the English had their statute day’s labour. To add to the opulence of the opulent, every labourer, whose sole source of his day’s subsistence was his day’s labour, was ordained to starve while labouring on the road, six days out of every 365; for 365, say rather (to make allowance for holidays and sick days, as well as Sundays) 300.

This by Act of Parliament. To legislators, the misery they were organizing—was it unknown? Think, then, of their intellectual aptitude. Was it known? Think, then, of their moral aptitude.

Towards the close of the last century, (the exact year is scarce worth searching for,) on the motion of a friend of the Author of these pages, Sir Thomas Charles Bunbury, better known by the name of Sir Charles Bunbury, this disgrace to the Statute Book was expunged from it.

[† ]Per estimate for year 1826 (being on the 2d of February 1828, the last estimate) 1,129,277. This information, and what follows it, are from a diplomatic source.—“From some of the States the returns were at that time two or three years old, and in other respects defective.”

[‡ ]Note, that in so far as it is by compulsion that the four days’ attendance has been produced, it is by the local governments that this compulsion has been applied. “Congress are authorized to make laws for the organizing, arming, and disciplining of the militia, but have never exercised this power to any important extent.”

[* ]In several of the United States, serving in the Militia serves as a qualification for voting on elections.

Considered in itself, this arrangement presents itself as eminently useful, as being powerfully contributory to the superseding all need and demand for compulsion, for the purpose of engaging men to the performance of this service. So far as regards the defensive force establishment, the usefulness of it seems, therefore, eminent and unquestionable.

But qualification on the part of one description of persons, supposes on the part of another description of persons, disqualification:—an arrangement which, in proportion to the extent given to it, is inconsistent with the universality of suffrage, proposed as per Ch. vi. Legislature, Section 5, Electors, who.

[* ]In the nomenclature of English constitutional topography, certain divisions of territory are termed Wapentakes—originally, Weapontakes: the fencible inhabitants of each such division having, by law or custom, been under the obligation of occasionally meeting together, weapons in hand.

In French, the sort of class here termed a weapon class, is designated by the term arme: rather awkwardly and ambiguously.

[† ]A cannon, is a machine which can discharge a hundred and fifty rounds, say in an hour, or some other considerable time. An equal number of men (with horses, if motion from place to place is required) can conduct and manage a hundred and fifty rounds of rockets; with this further peculiarity, that the hundred and fifty rounds may, upon occasion, be all discharged at once, or in any intermediate quantity. Hence, though the accuracy of the rocket be inferior, the utility of the other quality may frequently predominate.

[* ]As to the length of the term, what follows is from an English officer, possessing, in a peculiar degree, the means of observation, accompanied with appropriate aptitude. For a first engagement in the infantry, in a country not employing its troops chiefly in distant dependencies, seven years a proper medium: in the cavalry, eight years, or at most nine: in the artillery, the same. Where there are distant dependencies, the terms may require to be increased.

In British India, for the natives, styled Sepoys, the customary terms of years vary from three years to seven years; the length of the term engaged for being, in this case, at the option of the individual enlisting. In this line of service there have been always candidates for admission, more than could be received.

In 1806, in English service,—at the recommendation of William Wyndham, then at the head of the land branch of the Defensive Force service, engagement for limited terms, for example seven years, was substituted, and to a considerable extent, to engagement for life. By this arrangement, the condition and character of this class of functionaries were, in a high and conspicuous degree, meliorated.

Since that time, the principle has been broken in upon, by admixture of life engagements with limited term engagements. For the unlimited terms, bounties were made greater than for the limited: and, to the short-term system, obstruction has been opposed in other shapes.

By the observant functionary above-mentioned, no more probable cause for this departure has been found, than the natural fondness for arbitrary power, in the breasts of the high professional functionaries, and sympathy for it in those of their civil exordinates and superordinates.

In respect of subsistence, engaged for in the articles of food, clothing, and lodging, the hardships imposed upon the functionaries of some classes, were, at one time, enormous. In the year 1797, singularly extensive and alarming was the mutiny that took place in the sea service. It had for its cause the frauds committed on the sailors, by various functionaries, in whose instance, as in every instance under matchless Constitution, delinquency was either kept out of sight, or, if known, left unpunished. The mixture of depredation and oppression in this shape, was, however, in consequence of the alarm, put an end to. But, of the mutineers, some were hanged, others flogged to death. Punishment, if any, mis-applied; appositely-applied, none: such is the all-ruling axiom.

[* ]See to this purpose the comparison made of the state of the two defensive forces, French and English, by the French minister, Hyde de Neuville. Refer to the newspapers of thelast week in July, 1828.

[† ]An individual instance, in which,—even in a republic, under the exigency of the times,—this policy was resorted to, fell once under the notice of the author of these pages. In the war which ended in the existence of the Anglo-American United States, General Puttenham, high in grade and popularity, but weak in appropriate aptitude, was, in this way, put by Washington under the guardianship of Colonel Aaron Burr. Such, at least, was the statement made by that once high-seated and extraordinary aspirant after monarchy, in the year 1807 or thereabouts, in the course of a sojournment of some months under the same roof under which this is written. Burr had, for a year or two, been about the person of Washington, in quality of aide-de-camp, or secretary.

Of the disastrous state of the army in the Netherlands, under the command of the late Duke of York, in the war against the French Revolution, mention is, of course, to be found in the histories of the time. If the account given of the matter in the year 1802 to the author of these pages, by a person high in rank and character, who at that time was about the person of his Royal Highness, be correct,—the mind of the Duke was, during that time, kept in a state of habitual confusion by the force of wine. If in that case any such secret orders had place, how far from effectual the policy was, in that instance at least, is now seen. But, in what proportion was it to the wine,—in what to the birth,—and in what to the education of the high functionary,—that what was disastrous in this case should be attributed? This is among the problems not so easily solved as stated.

[* ]In relation to this matter, the following statement was, a few years ago, at the request of the author, delivered to him by a high functionary, whose situation afforded ample security for correctness.—In the United States, the President has the entire patronage of the army. At all times, he may place every member of it, from the private to the Commander-in-chief, in any grade he pleases, and keep him or send him upon his service as he pleases: he may accordingly put any man, officer or soldier, over the heads of any officers he pleases. Notwithstanding this latitude given to power by law, no instances are known, of any extensive complaint made of any alleged abuse of it.

This being the case, the evil obviated by this state of things is obvious. A man unfit for the particular service in question,—or for occupying the grade in question, on the occasion of any service,—is not, as elsewhere, appointed to the service through fear lest the non-appointment of him should give offence to some person having influence. Then, as to grade, a man unfit to occupy this or that rank is not lifted into it on no other ground than that of his having for a certain length of time been occupying this or that inferior rank, for which he has been fit or unfit. For the sake of coming at this or that individual whom the opinion of his extraordinary aptitude, or the more easily-formed opinion of the strength of his connexions, has marked out for an advance in rank,—twenty others, who have neither the one recommendation nor the other, are not pushed upwards to make way for that one.

“The President” (says section II of article 2 of the Constitution of 1787) “shall be Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.” On the foundation of this text (and no other bearing upon the point has a careful scrutiny been able to discover) stands the above comment. Power of location is one thing; power of dislocation is another; power of command over the persons located, is a third perfectly distinct from both. That they should all three be united in one and the same hand, may, in the present instance, in the grade in question, be altogether fitting. Be it so: but, that they are not necessarily so in the nature of the case, is sufficiently evident; and that, in fact, they are not so anywhere in inferior grades, is matter of universal notoriety. Of dissension, on a point of such importance, would not prevention, to wit, be preferable to continued hazard?—prevention, that is to say, by appropriate enactment?

Note, that on this occasion, in the situation of President, the constant existence of adequate appropriate aptitude, intellectual as well as moral, is—not the less necessarily, though but tacitly—assumed. Assumed; and assuredly not without adequate reason, the appropriate moral aptitude; the number of the stipendiaries being comparatively so minute; the number of the fencible citizens, in the character of radicals, comparatively so vast; the eyes of the people, everywhere, and at all times, so widely open to the conduct of all functionaries; and more particularly of this highest.

But the intellectual branch—whence is it to come? The President, ever since the first, who could not but be a military man, has not (till the present year—1830) been so in any instance. In any of these instances, what can have been his opportunities for being acquainted with comparative degrees of appropriate aptitude on the part of military men?

The result is this. As to aptitude superior to the ordinary in any of those situations, it is not likely that, generally speaking, he should be able to form a well-grounded judgment on any other ground than that of the opinion of those military functionaries, whose conversation is within his reach; but that, for the security of his reputation on the occasion of so extraordinary and conspicuous an exercise of extraordinary power as that in question, he would be anxious to take for his leaning-stock the authority of the men of best general reputation among them, is no more than may reasonably be expected. So much as to the formation of a judgment on the question as to extraordinary plenitude of aptitude, on the part of the objects of choice. Remains the case of extraordinary deficiency. But of this, a non-military man will, in cases to no small extent, be a not inadequately qualified judge: not less so even than a military man: witness any generally conspicuous deficiency, either in moral aptitude, or in intellectual aptitude, as applied to the ordinary intercourse and concerns of life. For evil in this shape, the discretionary judgment thus allowed to the chief Executive Functionary affords a remedy: while the seniority system, if no such power be admitted, opposes an insuperable bar to all remedy.

Behold here, under a really existing constitution, which has for its end in view the greatest happiness of the community, and under which, to power in every situation, checks so efficient and adequate are applied,—the vastness of the power, which, for the purpose of maximizing security ab extra, may, without any the least danger to security ab intra, be established and conferred;—while under a fictitious constitution which has for its end in view the greatest happiness of the ruling one and the subruling few, the deficiency of useful power is joined with useless and mischievous power, in quantity so profuse.

[* ]The point d’honneur runs so high in the French army, that a soldier once degraded can never reenter the service in any capacity; any attempt to force him into it would produce mutiny among the men. For the same reason, a soldier never receives a blow, even from his officer, without resenting it sur le champ. If he did, in the first place his comrades would no longer keep company with him, and in the next, the officer that committed the outrage would inevitably be put to death.

[* ]In English practice, matter of remuneration thus employed is styled bounty.

[* ]At any rate, such it was antecedently to the horrible massacre perpetrated in the year 1827, in consequence of a mutiny exhibited by simple non-compliance, unaccompanied by any offensive or aggressive operation. In conformity to the all-comprehensive and constantly observed system of policy maintained under English government, the author of this carnage remained uncensured, and even unprosecuted.

[* ]The Parliamentary returns give no means of filling up these blanks. The gross number of In-Pensioners only being afforded. In 1839-40, it was 539.—Ed.

[† ]In Greenwich Hospital, invalided functionaries maintained—males, 2,710; females (widows of seamen, under the name of nurses) 162: total, 2,872. For keeping and governing them—members of the aristocracy, mistered, squired, and higher titled, with proportionable pickings (among whom one lordly-paid lord) 33: untitled, chiefly of the clerk class, 63. Grandees, among whom, under the title of Directors, the patronage of all these situations is shared, 24; of whom, five Lords, one of them,—on the matchless-constitution self-judicative principle—Governor over himself.

[* ]It was that of a spy, sent in consequence of his own offer—not merely to see and report, but to endeavour to corrupt and engage to desert to the service of an attacking enemy, a military officer in high command.

[* ]See Hume’s Essays—Essay on Populousness of Ancient Nations.

Under Mark Antony and the Triumvirate, the proportion of the Sub-Commander styled the centurion was indeed increased so as to be as five to one. Under Cæsar, in the course of the Gallic war, in the case of gratuities the proportion had been as high as ten times. But Cæsar, always pre-eminent in prodigality, and at that time making preparations for universal conquest, was employing himself in this way in gaining influential partisans.

[* ]Ingersal’s Digest of the Laws of the United States, from March 4, 1789, to May 15, 1820.—Philadelphia, Maxwell, 1821.

[* ]In former days, an instance of this fell within the knowledge of the author of these pages.

[† ]For a most instructive comparative view of French and English practice in this respect, see the speech of the French Minister Hyde de Neuville in the French Chamber of Deputies, as published in the French and English prints of the month of July 1828.

[‡ ]Such has been the observation made by a distinguished English officer, possessing eminent means and opportunities of observance. Volunteer colonels, “serving without pay, have behaved as well as others.”

[* ]On both these subjects useful information may be derived from English practice, as stated in the Morning Chronicle of 5th February 1825, in the case of the prize-money earned in British India, anno 1818 or thereabouts, in the war carried on under the Governor-generalship and Commandership-in-chief of Marquess Hastings.

By an English statute, 6 Anne c. 13, anno 1707, followed by a multitude of others,—the proceeds of prizes taken in the sea service by Government ships are, with wasteful heedlessness (the war was then at its height) given in the lump to the captors.

This not being deemed to extend to wars carried on in Hindostan in the name and under the immediate authority of the East India Company,—“The Crown” (it is stated in speaking of the war antecedent to the above-mentioned year 1818) “had made a grant to the East India Company of the whole of the booty—one half for their own use, to defray the expense of carrying on the war, the other half for distribution among the troops.”—“Had a similar grant been made on the present occasion, we venture to assert” (continues the article) “that the prizes taken in 1818 would long since have been distributed.”

What the article has for its object is plainly enough the exculpation of the Directors; and from their authority it wears the appearance of having emanated.

“The Court of Directors” (says an anterior paragraph) “lost no time in submitting the question to the Lords of the Treasury: but, in consequence of the legal impediments thrown in the way by the advisers of the respective parties to the appeal, their Lordships did not arrive at a decision on the point, although submitted to them in March 1819, until March 1823. It is known that the decision was in favour of the actual captors.” Thus far the newspaper article. As to the reasonableness of the decision, see the consideration alleged in behalf of it in the text. As to the delay—for anything that appears, the fault lay—not in the judges, as above, but in the system under which they had to act.

Thus it is that, under technical procedure, and the judicial establishment to which it owes its birth,—in whatsoever part of the field of business, social, political or even military, the man of law sets his foot,—obstruction and evil in all shapes spring up, in vast crops, under it. Think of these men, sitting in comfort and security, and in their manufactory of factitious delay, grinding away the value of those rewards, on the efficiency of which the service, such as it is, cannot but, in so high a degree be on all occasions dependent for its success.

[* ]In a case known to the author of these pages,—a leading member of administration, not only by tampering with Judges engaged them to break a law—thus exercising what James the Second was dethroned for, a dispensing power,—but even scrupled not to avow it in writing, to a person of opposite political principles, who was not known to him even by sight. And this violation of law—what was it for? Only to save the trouble of producing by law, an effect unquestionably innoxious and salutary, which, after all—this same illegal course having been employed and persevered in—failed of being produced.

Desired on one part, secrecy was not in this case promised on the other. But, as no good in any shape would be done by the disclosure,—and punishment, more or less, would be sure to fall on the informer—none whatever on the criminal,—no disclosure will be made.

As for punishment, a man would not be able to hold up his head for shame,—if, while in Honourable House lauding matchless constitution for the information of the lower orders, he were thought to be simple enough, in the teeth of never varied experience, to entertain in reality any such notion as that, under that same constitution, punishment in any shape, could by any possibility alight on any man, in a situation of a certain height, for anything which in that situation he has done: on any Minister for anything he has done as Minister: on any Governor, for anything he has done as Governor: on any Judge, for anything he has done as Judge.

[† ]“It is but forty days’ tyranny at the worst,” observed one day in the English House of Lords, the Law-Lord Camden, to whose purpose (his party, the Whigs, being then in power) it was more suitable that an act of necessary power should be exercised against law than under the law. The tyranny was that of suspending, by an exercise of illegally-dispensing power, the execution of a corn law.

“But forty days’ tyranny, my Lords; think of the mischief that may be done by forty days’ tyranny!” exclaimed his great rival and bitter enemy, Lord Mansfield: whose place was at the head of the Tories, then, for a short time, by an extraordinary fortuitous concourse of atoms, cast into opposition,—and who, had his place been then, as commonly, on the ruling side, would have been still more eager, in so far as his conspicuous timidity would allow him, to give maximization to tyranny and whatever profit might be to be made of it. Fee-fed and self-fed Judges, both: both, as in the higher grades are all English Judges, drafted from the class of mercenary advocates; that class which, under matchless constitution, is the nursery for the whole of the talented portion of the fraternity of self-authorized depredators and oppressors, in the shape of legislators and administrators.

[* ][Hours.]—Unless this degree of minuteness, proportioned to which is accuracy, be brought to view by the expression,—the result of experiments stated as having occupied the same length of time, may prove delusive.

[† ]As in jurisprudence and other branches of art and science, so in military tactics, a sort of science, void of information, is heaped up,—composed of appellatives, employed in posterior times to designate objects different from those which they were originally employed to designate. Examples are the following:

1. Grenadiers. This was the name originally employed for designation of a select class of infantry, whose employment consisted in throwing, in the manner of so many cricket balls, a species of hollow balls, styled grenades, so constructed, as to burst in the manner of the bombs projected from mortars. The idea appears to have originated in the war of sieges carried on for the amusement of Louis the Fourteenth. For this favoured service the tallest men were selected; and to make them look the taller, and thence the more formidable, the caps distinguished by the name of grenadier caps were employed. These portable mortars or hand-grenades being no longer employed, the consequence is—that to non-military men, the term grenadier, so far as its meaning can be collected from its derivation, is delusive. The actual meaning of grenadiers, at the present period, is a body of picked infantry of the line.

2. Dragoons, as applied to mounted troops in general. Originally, one body of men were exclusively employed on foot; another body, on horseback. The distinction had its origin in feudal times, during which, between the man who was and the man who was not, rich enough to keep a horse, a great gulph was fixed. In France, in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, a discovery was at length made, that, by using one sort of weapon on horseback, a man would not be altogether disqualified from using the same or another sort of weapon on foot. Hence came an amphibious class, to which, from their composite nature, a dragon being a serpent with the wings of a bird,—added to the terror which their experienced efficiency inspired,—was given the name of Dragons,—in English pronunciation and consequent orthography, Dragoons.

[* ]Another proposable mode is—giving to each man two cards, each with his name on the one side, but on one of the two, the words Discharge me, on the other the words Keep me. As to this, however, there could not be any adequate assurance of its answering the purpose: for, an officer might engage men under his command, to preserve each of them, for the purpose of showing him, the card that had not, as above, been employed.

[* ]In relation to disbandment, the following paragraph followed immediately on the conclusion of the Extract on the subject of the United States, which forms the note to Art. 33, in Section 6, Promotion.

Anno 1815-16, the termination of the war with England presented a case of no ordinary difficulty and delicacy. The only purpose for which a regular standing military force is meant to be kept up in the United States, is that of garrisoning a cordon of posts extending between 2,000 and 3,000 miles, for a protection against aggression from the Indians.

By the last war with England, the regular force, exclusive of the militia, had been swelled to about 15,000 men. At the conclusion of this war a determination was taken to give up every idea of keeping on foot any regular force whatever, in the character of an eventual protection against the force of England, of Spain, in short, of any other foreign nation. England, in comparison with which no other nation could present any the least apprehension, would, in the event of a rupture, be quite sure of making more or less way into the interior of the United States: and equally sure of being ultimately drowned, as it were, destroyed, or captured, in case of perseverance. Of no such perseverance would the English nation henceforward be able, at this distance, to endure the expense. From England, therefore, all apprehension is at an end.

Remains, as the only existing source of incursion, from the Indians. Against evil from this source, the above number of 7000 was and is regarded as sufficient.

The difficulty now was—how to reduce No. 15,000 to No. 7000, i. e. to less than half. Not that there were not ways enough, in any of which the thing might be done with the ultimate acquiescence of all parties concerned; but the duty fell upon the President; and the task was a most unpleasant and invidious one. No skeleton regiments were to be preserved: the reason has been already given. No war, at any rate any certain war, from any civilized nation was apprehended: therefore, in proportion as the privates were dismissed, the officers, it was necessary, should be dismissed with them.

The expedient employed was this:—the President convened a General Board, composed of seven officers, selecting, of course (for such was his obvious interest) those whose reputation he regarded as standing highest in the country. No such operation as dismissal took place, but the existing army was regarded as being completely and all at once disbanded, as being (for the purpose for which it was raised) no longer necessary. But, for a purpose of a different nature, another army as above was to be raised. Here then a choice was to be made—made at the same instant—of all the several officers, of whom the official establishment of this new army was to be composed. The board accordingly had their meetings; and it was by the concurrent suffrages of all the members, or at least of the majority, that the selection was made.

Thus the number in question were appointed, and none were dismissed: admissions, so many, dismissions, none. What could not be expected was—that by those who found themselves left out of the list, it should be regarded with a degree of satisfaction equal to that with which it was regarded by those whose names were comprised in it. But, whatever dissatisfaction was felt, none of it, it was evident, could reach the President: the whole of it fell upon the Board: and the Board—such was the strength of its composition—found no difficulty in enduring it. A Board, there has been occasion to observe elsewhere, is a screen. Against the tutelary force of the popular or moral sanction, a screen is in general a highly pernicious instrument: but in the present instance, the force against which it was employed as a screen was—not that of the popular or moral sanction—the tribunal of public opinion, composed of members whose interest is the universal interest—but the force of individual self-preference, acting in opposition to the universal interest.

Those who were not comprehended, were they neglected? No: they were not neglected. Note was taken of them: and, as opportunity offered, provision has been made for them in the civil line; several of the existing consuls have been in this number; the gentleman who serves in that character in this country is of the number. The loss he has sustained of an arm affords a conspicuous proof, and an honourable memento of it.

[* ]It will be observed that the practice, since the time when this was written, (and when the Duke of York commanded in chief,) has not been amenable to this censure.—Ed.

[* ]In some respects, the desiderata indicated in this section, have been supplied since it was written, by the Merchant Seamen’s Act, 5 and 6 W. IV., c. 19.—Ed.

[* ]Three Years’ Adventures of a Minor, &c. Vol. ii. p. 484, by William Butterworth, Esq., London, 8vo, 1808.

[† ]In vol. v. of this collection.

[* ]Taken from a letter written to the author, by a man of high professional character, now in a distant country, his friend.

[* ]Hence, the virtual effect of the two rules taken together is, that no individual shall be sentenced to capital punishment, unless two-thirds of the court concur in finding him guilty of the facts.—Ed. of first edition.

[† ]It would be a mistake to infer from the term native officer, that the individuals so named hold the rank usually considered as attached to the term officer in Europe. Their functions are undoubtedly very important: but a true description of their rank would be, that a subahdar holds nearly the same eminence in the military hierarchy, as a troop serjeant-major in a regiment of cavalry; while the subahdar-major (an officer of comparatively late invention) may be considered as possessing the dignity of the regimental serjeant-major in the same service. The youngest ensign, from the moment he joins the regiment, commands all native officers; and would do so, if the question were of taking the command of the regiment on a field of battle. A general officer sometimes appoints a native officer to act as an additional aide-de-camp; which is intended to be, and probably is, felt by the native soldiery as a personal compliment on the part of the commander. But this fortuitous occurrence involves no further consequences—Ed. of first edition.

[‡ ]The General Regimental-Court-Martial (of which the name by itself is a species of solecism) is an invention for giving to the officers of a regiment the powers (with the exception of capital punishment) for which it used to be necessary to refer to a General Court-Martial, or one composed of the officers of different regiments assembled. It is composed of thirteen officers, frequently including the youngest ensigns who have been six months with the regiment; and its usual application is to sentence soldiers to transportation, for what, before a Regimental Court-Martial, would have been called absenting themselves from their regiment, but in this case is laid as desertion.—Ed. of first edition.

[* ]Traité des grandes Opérations militaires. Par le Général Baron de Jomini; 3 vols. in 8vo, avcc atlas; 40 fr.—Paris, 1811. The book is an exposé of the military system of Napoleon. When France was invaded in 1813, Jomini went over to the Allies; and altered the subsequent editions of his book, to please his new associates. The later editions are consequently diminished in value. There are also several volumes professing to be a continuation; but of inferior interest. In 1830 the same author published, Introduction à l’étude des grandes combinaisons de la stratégie et de la tactique, kotamment au Traité des grandes Operations militaires. Anselin, Paris. 2 fr.; which is a kind of syllabus of the other, with additions.

[* ]Des épreuves comparatives, faites à Magdebourg, en mars 1814, par MM. le C. de B. Dussaussoy, etc., Officiers d’Artillerie, avec le Fusil d’Infanterie tiré avec balles de 18 et de 20 à la livre; et la Carabine, dite du calibre de 22, rayée de 7 raies en spirale, tirée avec balles de 26 à la livre, tantôt nue, tantôt enveloppée de papier ou de calepin, tirée à 1-40 de livre de poudre, pointés horizontalement à 70 toises du but,—ont donné les résultats suivans:

1°. La Carabine a plus de portée que le Fusil avec balles de 20, et presque autant que le Fusil avec balles de 18;

2°. La justesse du tir de la Carabine, et sa portée, sont d’autant plus grandes, que la balle a éte plus forcée, pourvu cependant qu’on n’outre-passe pas certaines limites;

3°. La Carabine a 4 fois plus de justesse que le Fusil avec balles de 18, et 12 fois que le Fusil avec balles de 20;

4°. Avec de bons tireurs, et dans le même temps on tire: 20 coups de Fusil, et on touche 5 fois une Cible de 5 pieds de haut sur 3 de large ... 16 coups de Carabine, et on touche 13 fois le même but.—Aide-Mémoire à l’usage des Officiers d’Artillerie de France. 5ème édition, 1819. Table des Matières, p. xxxii.

(Technical Remarks, inserted by the Editor.)—The number 26, where it appears in the first paragraph of the above, has been substituted for 16 which is a manifest misprint in the original.

The result in favour of the rifle would probably have been considerably greater, if instead of the rifle of small dimensions (as described in other parts of the Aide-Mémoire) had been employed the English military model, with barrel of thirty French inches, and balls of the same size as the French musket.

The above statement is curiously at variance with the objections presented in preceding editions of the Aide-Memoire, and allowed to continue in the last: the whole of which are founded on the supposition of mismanagement. There is no necessity for the ball being driven with violence; all that is required being, that by means of its greased cloth it should go down smoothly like the sucker of a pump. Hence the loading is easy, either on foot or horseback. The powder to be in blank cartridges, like those used in exercise; the balls covered with their greased cloth, twisted together at the ends. The ramrod of hard wood, cylindrical, of nearly the diameter of the bore; any bruise from an iron ramrod making the barrel useless ever afterwards. It is easy to add a bayonet of 28 or 30 inches long; making the whole length the same as in the musket, and without removing the power of taking aim. Many other suggestions might be added, tending to increase the ratio of the comparative efficiency of the instrument.

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CHAPTER X.: DEFENSIVE FORCE. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 9 (Constitutional Code) [1843]

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CHAPTER X.

DEFENSIVE FORCE.

Section I.

Branches, what.

Instructional. Expositive.

Expositive.

Instructional. Expositive.

Expositive. Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Expositive.

Expositive.

Expositive.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Exemplificational.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Expositive.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional.

Section II.

Leading Principles.

Instructional.

Instructional. Expositive. Ratiocinative.

Instructional. Expositive. Ratiocinative.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Expositive.

Instructional. Expositive.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.

Instructional.

Instructional.

Ratiocinative.

Instructional.

Ratiocinative.

Ratiocinative.

Instructional. Ratiocinative.