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CHAPTER VIII.: PRIME MINISTER. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 9 (Constitutional Code) 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 9.
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Fields of Service.
Art. 1. Co-extensive with that of the Legislative is the Prime Minister’s local field of service.
Art. 2. Under the Legislature, to the Prime Minister’s logical field of service belongs, as per Ch. iv. Art. 4 and 5, whatsoever portion of the Legislature’s logical field of service does not belong to the Judiciary Department, headed by the Justice Minister. For the particulars of the Prime Minister’s service in this field, see sections 2, 3, 4.
Art. 3. By the Prime Minister’s logical field of service, understand that ideal space, within which is to be found the aggregate of the several persons and things constituting the subject-matter of the operations performed, and correspondent functions exercised by him,—together with the aggregate of the operations, which he is empowered to exercise, in relation to those same persons and those same things.
Art. 4. So, also, in the case of the several Ministers: as per Ch. ix. Ministers collectively. Section 2. Ministers and Sub-departments.
Art. 5. Question. Prime Minister why thus denominated?
Answer. Reasons. Because by this denomination, his situation is more appositely designated than by any other: and, by incorrect ideas,—if associated with the denomination of the functionary occupying so important a situation,—evil results in practice would, to no inconsiderable amount, be liable to be produced.
Art. 6. Minister is from the Latin, and means servant. All functionaries belonging to the Administrative are, as such, servants—located and dislocable servants—of the Legislature: so much for the word Minister. In this same Department, of all other functionaries belonging to it, this functionary is the superordinate: so much for the adjunct Prime. He is, to those immediative servants of the Constitutive, what, in a Monarchy, the functionary of this same name is to the Monarch. Thus it is, that, with reference to one of those different authorities, his is subordinate; with reference to the other, superordinate.
Art. 7. For significance and adequacy, no other denomination can compete with this. By the Spanish denomination Gefe Politico (Political Chief,) employed in some cases, superordination only is presented to view: subordination, not.
Art. 8. So as to the denomination President: a denomination which, from the precedent set in the Anglo-American United States, has been but too extensively adopted. To this denomination, that same objection of inadequateness, that is to say, of incompleteness, from whence comes incorrectness, applies with equal force.
Art. 9. In the case of these same United States,—it is on another account inapposite. To preside—from the Latin præ and sedeo—is to sit before, or above, a number of other persons, who, in the same place, are sitting at the same time. Now, this is what the President of the United States never does, nor ever can do. He is on purpose, and to a very wise purpose, placed at a perpetual distance from Congress, the body with which he communicates, and from which he receives mandates. By “Message” only—that is the word—are communications to them made by him. Thence comes the good consequence that, never taking part in their Debates, never does he expose himself to those angry feelings and imputations of sinister conduct, from which, consistently with the nature of man, and the nature of the case, debates, especially when on political subjects, can seldom be altogether free.
Art. 10. The conception, naturally presented by the name President, to foreigners, is that of a person sitting in Congress, presiding over the proceedings of its two Assemblies, or one of them, just as the sort of functionary, called in English the Chairman, does in all formal meetings, private and non-official, as well as public and official. By men of the United States, this misconception has every now and then been noted as a mark of relative ignorance on the part of the thus misled foreigners. But the error, such as it is, lies, (it has been seen,) at the door—not of the foreigners, but of the natives. The foreigners take the word of the natives, and by this confidence it is that they are led into the mistake. The natives, at the same time, lose the credit of the arrangement, and the foreigners the benefit of the instruction derivable from it: they even receive misinstruction instead of it.
Art. 1. To the Prime Minister, exercisable within his logical field of service, belong the functions following: namely,
I. Executive function. Exercise is given to it, in so far as, within that same field, he gives execution and effect, to any ordinances, emanating, whether immediately or unimmediately, from the Legislature: thus giving corresponding execution and effect to the rightly presumed will of the Constitutive.
Art. 2. II. Directive function. In the exercise of this function,—by him, is the business of the Administrative Department conducted: by him, with the assistance of the several Ministers and their respective subordinates, performed. Under his direction they all are. In their functions may be seen his functions. For theirs, see Ch. ix. Section 4, and Ch. xi. in the several sections headed by the names of their respective officers.
Art. 3. Locative function. In the exercise of this function, by him are the Ministers, all of them, located.
Art. 4. Promotion is location: location to wit, in a situation higher than that which, before such promotion, the person so promoted occupied.
Art. 5. Dislocative function. In the exercise of this function,—by him are the Ministers, all of them, eventually dislocable:—provided that in the room of each one dislocated, a successor is by the same act, lest the service of the Sub-department should be at a stand, located: provided also, that any person who is then officiating, or has officiated, in the situation of Depute in that same office, as per Section 4, may be so located, in such sort, that his term of service, as per Section 5, in the situation of Minister Principal, shall continue, until the operations preliminary to location, as per Ch. ix. Ministers collectively, Section 16, Locable who, and Section 17, Located how, have been gone through, and no longer.
Art. 6. So likewise their respective subordinates of every grade.
Art. 7. Suspension is temporary dislocation.
Art. 8. Imperative function. In the exercise of this function, to him belongs the command in chief of the whole Land Defensive force. For its constituent parts, see Art. 8, 9, and Ch. x. Defensive Force.
Art. 9. So, of the whole of the Sea Defensive force. As to this, see Ch. x. Section 16, Sea Defensive force. As to other functions, see Section 3, Relation to Legislature, and Section 4, Self-suppletive function.
Art. 10. Power in relation to grades. As to those in the Radical or say Non-stipendiary Land force, or in one word Militia, see Ch. x. Section 3.
Art. 11. As to those in the Ingrafted, or say Stipendiary Land Defensive force, or in a word the Stipendiary branch of the Army,—of every functionary thereto belonging, the grade is at all times at his entire disposal. Private or officer, he may at any time either locate, or to any superior situation, without exception, promote. So also, to any co-equal situation, transfer. So also suspend, or, subject to appeal as per Art. 16. dislocate.*
Art. 12. To be an apt possessor of this function, it is not necessary that the functionary should be a military man. In the United States’ Constitutional Code, these same offices are given to the President: and, since Washington’s time, no military man has borne that office: the object is—to place the force, in case of necessity, at his disposal. On any such occasion he would act, of course, by professional advice.
Art. 13. So, as to the Stipendiary Sea Defensive force: or in one word Stipendiary Navy.
Art. 14. Except it be in the actual presence of an enemy,—every such act of location, promotion, transference, dislocation, and suspension, must, to be valid, be evidenced by an instrument, authenticated by his signature; or, if in the presence of an enemy, as soon afterwards as may be.
Art. 15. Of every such instrument, exemplars* will, in the way of manifold writing, as per Section 9, be written and disposed of as follows:
1. Kept in the Prime Minister’s Office, one.
2. Kept by the Prime Minister himself, one.
3. Delivered with all practicable promptitude to the functionary so located, promoted, transferred, dislocated, or suspended, one.
4. Transmitted to the Registrar,—of the Office, into, in, or from, which the location, promotion, dislocation, or suspension has been made, one.
5. In case of promotion,—transmitted to the Registrar of the Office, from which the promotion has been made, one.
6. Transmitted to the Legislation Minister’s Office, one.
Art. 16. Any person,—who, by any such act of location, promotion, transference, dislocation, or suspension, regards himself as aggrieved,—may, for redress, or clearance of his character, apply as per Ch. ix. Ministers collectively, Section 21, Oppression obviated. But, how completely soever cleared, by no decree of the Judicatory so constituted will he be relocated. Whether to relocate or not, the Prime Minister, on perusal of the evidence, will, on his responsibility, determine.
Relation to the Legislature.
Art. 1. Exceptions excepted, no otherwise than by epistolary discourse, to wit, by Message, does the Prime Minister address the Legislature. For reasons, see Section 1, Fields of service, Art. 9. No place has he in the Legislation Chamber. For the places which the several Ministers have therein, see Ch. ix. Ministers collectively. Section 24, Legislation-regarding functions.
Art. 2. Exception is—if, on some extraordinary occasion, for the purpose of explanation, he has been invited or ordered by the Legislature to a personal conference.
Art. 3. On the occasion of a Message sent by him to the Legislature, functions exercisable by him are the following:
I. The Informative: to wit, when an occasion occurs, on which the Legislature has need of information concerning a state of things, the particulars of which would not otherwise be so clearly, correctly, comprehensively, and trust-worthily learnt from any other quarter.
Art. 4. Examples are—
1. A state of things resulting from a negotiation with an Agent of any foreign power.
2. Facts indicative of need of melioration, in the constitution of any part of the Official establishment, or in the conduct of any functionary thereto belonging.
Art. 5. II. The Indicative or Suggestive function. In the exercise of this function, he proposes, in general terms, subject-matters for the consideration of the Legislature.†
Art. 6. III. The Initiative function. In the exercise of this function, he proposes, in terminis, the tenor of any proposed ordinance or order, which, with or without amendment, appears to him to be in its purport, fit to receive the Sanction of the Legislature.†
Art. 7. Of the exercise of this function, the effect may be produced by the Prime Minister, either by Message in his own name,—or through the instrumentality of a Minister, in the name of the Minister,—or through the instrumentality of a Deputy, in the name of the Deputy.
Art. 8. For any definite and serious evil, which can be shown to have had place, or to be in imminent danger of taking place, for want of his having given exercise to any one of the above functions, he is responsible.
Art. 9. Except where, for release from this responsibility, it may be advisable for him to communicate, by Message,—communication by the instrumentality of a Minister, in the name of the Minister, if consenting and approving, will be the more eligible course: to wit, in respect of its leaving the freedom of the Assembly less exposed to disturbance.
Art. 10. IV. The Statistic function. In the exercise of this function, at the commencement of every year,—the Prime Minister will, in the form of a Message, lay before the Legislative Assembly, the general condition of the State, according to his view of it, pointing their attention, in general terms, to any measures which present themselves as conducing to the conservation or the melioration of it.
Art. 1. Lest the business of his office should be at any time at a stand,—to the Prime Minister belongs the power of self-supply; with the obligation of keeping it in exercise. It is exercised by the location of an at all times dislocable Depute.
Art. 2. By a Depute, understand in this case a functionary, who, being thus located and dislocable, exercises, on the occasions on which the business would otherwise be at a stand, the functions belonging to the office; location of subordinates excepted.
Art. 3. These occasions are—
1. Inaptitude of the Principal, by reason of infirmity, whether of body or mind.
2. Vacancy of the office.
Art. 4. Exception excepted, as per Art. 2, to every branch of the service of the Principal, does the power of the Depute extend.
Art. 5. Punitionally, as well as compensationally and dislocationally, for the acts of the Depute, is the Principal responsible. By acceptance of the office,—not simply for performance, but for apt and complete performance, of the functions, does he contract: irresponsible, he might safely commit any breach of trust, in any shape, by the instrumentality of any person consenting to subject himself to the risk.
Art. 6. Punitionally: that is to say, to the purpose of being subjected to punishment,—suffering under the name of punishment, over and above the suffering produced by the exaction of compensation: or, in lieu of it, in those cases in which compensation cannot have place: for example, where there is no individual specially wronged. Compensationally: that is to say, to the purpose of being compelled to yield compensation. Dislocationally: that is to say, to the effect of being dislocated.
Art. 7. Within [NA] days after his own location, a Prime Minister is expected to locate such his Depute: and thereafter, immediately upon the dislocation of a preceding, a succeeding one.
Art. 8. The instrument of location, with the year, month, and day of the month, will be signed by the principal, and in token of acceptance, by the Depute. Exemplars three: disposed of as per Section 1. Art. 15. Nos. 1, 2, 3.
Art. 9. The Principal and the Depute will not officiate at the same time. The power of this office must not, without necessity, be shifted from hand to hand. If, on any day, an instrument has been signed by the Principal, an instrument signed on that same day by the Depute is of no validity; unless on the sudden incapacity or death of the principal: in either of which events, in case of urgency, an instrument, signed by the Depute, stating the event and declaring the urgency, may be valid. But, in this case, the Principal cannot act on the same day as that on which, by the act of his Depute, he has, as above, been declared incapable.
Art. 10. On the decease of the Principal, the functions of the office, the locative excepted, as per Art. 2, are exercised by the Depute, until a successor has been located; to wit, as per Section 3, by the Legislature.
Art. 11. Dislocable at any time is the Prime Minister Depute by the Principal: as likewise by either of the authorities by which the Principal is dislocable.
Term of Service.
Art. 1. Of a Prime Minister, the term of service is [four] years.
Art. 2. No Prime Minister is re-eligible, until there are in existence, at the same time, out of whom choice may be made [two ro three] quondam Prime Ministers, he being one.
Art. 3. [NA] Days before the cessation of a Prime Minister’s term of service, the election is performed: as to which, see Section 8.
Art. 4. If, antecedently to the expiration of a Prime Minister’s term of service, the Legislature has omitted to make a fresh Election, the omission is, on the part of all by whose default it has had place, an anti-constitutional offence, tending to substitute a Representative Democracy, Monarchy, or Aristocracy; and, punitionally, as per Ch. vi. Section 28, as well as dislocationally, every offender is responsible.
Enactive. Ratiocinative. Instructional.
Art. 1. The Prime Minister’s pay is [NA] a-year, paid quarterly in advance. From unwilling hands, receipt of ulterior emolument is extortion: from willing, corruption.
Art. 2. As to this possessor of the supreme single-seated situation, note, that though he is at all times subordinate to the majority of the Members of the Legislature in their aggregate capacity, yet is his power incomparably greater than that of any one, taken apart: inferior, in respect of his dislocability,—he is superior even to the whole Legislature, in respect of the agreeable and desirable nature of one part, to wit, the locative part, of the power exercised by him,—the extent to which, and frequency with which, the exercise of it is called forth, and the longer duration, as per Section 5, of his term of service.
Art. 1. Exceptions excepted,—in this office, any person, who, in the judgment of the Legislative authority, is, in respect of all points of appropriate aptitude taken together, most apt, is locable.
Art. 2. Excepted are,
I. All Monarchs, and every person, connected by any known tie of consanguinity, or affinity, with any Monarch.
Art. 3. II. Every person, who has not, either in a resident or migratory state, passed at least [NA] years, in some part or other of the territory of this State.
Art. 1. Located is this functionary, by those, to whose will it belongs to him to give execution and effect. He is located by the Legislature.
Art. 2. Next after pronouncing respectively the Inaugural Declaration, as per Ch. vii. or their adhesion thereunto,—the Members of the Legislature proceed to vote for the Election of the Prime Minister. The votes are given—first in the secret mode, as per Election Code, Section 8, Election how:* then immediately in the open mode.
Art. 3. Given in the secret mode, the votes are not counted, looked at, or in any other manner, any of them, known,—till after the result of the votation in the open mode has been declared.
Art. 4. If, of the two different modes, the results be in favour of different persons, he who has the majority in the open mode is located.
Art. 5. If he who, in the open mode, has the comparative majority, has not the absolute majority,—he, and the person whose number of votes comes next to his, are thereupon voted for, without the others. On this latter occasion, in case of equal numbers, lot decides. For the mode, see Ch. ix. Ministers collectively. Section 17, Located how.
Art. 6. For the sake of instruction by experience, is this double mode of election here proposed. Neither in the shape of delay, vexation, or expense, nor in any other shape, does evil present itself, as likely to be produced; at any rate, in quantity, capable of outweighing the good, attached to whatsoever instruction may be the result. Of this instruction, the particular nature seems not, however, very easy to be anticipated. By the open mode, each man’s vote is subjected, at the same time, to the seductive influence of his Co-Deputies, and of the several Candidates, for the situation to be filled: on the other hand, so is it to the tutelary influence of the Public-Opinion Tribunal,—organ of the Constitutive authority. By the secret mode, it is exempted from both these antagonizing influences: on the other hand, it is subjected to the seductive influence of the personal interests, and affections sympathetic and antipathetic, of each individual voter. After a certain length of experience—the Legislature for the time being, under the guidance of the public voice, will be in a condition to pronounce, on the ground of experience, between the three competing modes: to wit, the two simple ones, and the compound, composed of both.
From the application of the same course of experiment to the Prime Ministers of the several Sublegislatures, the instruction obtainable from this source will, in the proportion of their number, receive diversification and increase.
Art. 1. Dislocable is this functionary at any time, by that authority, for the giving execution and effect to whose will, he has been located. He is dislocable by the Legislature.
Art. 2. So, by the Constitutive authority, as per Ch. v. Section 2.
Art. 3. Other efficient causes of dislocatedness in this case, are the same as in the case of a Member of the Legislature, as per Ch. vi. Legislature. Section 30, Dislocable how, No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.
Art. 1. For the more commodious, correct, prompt, uniform, and all-comprehensive performance of the process and function of Registration in all the several departments and subdepartments,—as likewise on the part of the Prime Minister, for the correspondent receipt by him of all documents, the receipt, and, as occasion calls, the perusal of which may be necessary to the most apt exercise of the several functions belonging to his own office,—he will, as soon as may be, cause to be established and employed in practice in the several offices of the several departments and their sub-departments, the Sublegislative included, the mode of writing styled the Manifold mode.*
Art. 2. Particular uses of the manifold mode of writing are as follows—
By the multitude of exemplars, produced at an expense, which, with the exception of that of the paper, is less than the expense of two in the ordinary mode, it affords means for furnishing, at that small expense, to parties on both sides, for themselves and assistants, all such documents as they can stand in need of.
Art. 3. Every exemplar being, to an iota, exactly and necessarily the same as every other,—the expense of revision by skill and labour is thereby saved, as well as unintentional aberration rendered impossible.
Art. 4. An exemplar, kept in the Registrar’s Office, will serve as a standard, whereby a security will be afforded against all intentional falsification, on the part of the possessor of any other exemplar.
Art. 5. By the reduction thus effected, in the expense of all judicial writings, emaning from the Judicatory,—the protection, afforded by Judicature in its best form, to wit, that which has for its ground orally elicited and immediately minuted evidence, will be brought within the reach of a vast proportion of the whole number of the people, to whom it could not otherwise be afforded.
Art. 6. A collateral benefit—a degree of security hitherto unexampled, against destruction of judicial documents, by calamity or delinquency, may thus be afforded, by the lodging of exemplars, in divers offices in which they would be requisite for other purposes: exemplars of documents from the Immediate Judicatories being, at the Appellate Judicatory, requisite for the exercise of its judicial functions; and, in the office of Justice Minister, for the exercise of his inspective and melioration-suggestive functions. So also in the other Departments.
Art. 7. To save the expense of custody, and prevent the useful from being drowned in the mass of useless matter,—the Legislature will make arrangements for the periodical destruction or elimination of such as shall appear useless: care being at all times taken for the preservation of all such as can continue to be of use, either eventually for a judicial purpose, or for the exercise of the statistic and melioration-suggestive functions, as per Ch. ix. Ministers collectively, Sections 9, 11, 12; Ch. xi. Ministers severally, Section 2, Legislation Minister; and Ch. xii. Judiciary collectively, Sections 19, 20, 21, 22.
Art. 1. By the publication system, understand that, by which the several matters of fact, acquaintance wherewith is in any wise material to the business of the Sub-department or Department in question, are rendered, or endeavoured to be rendered, at all times, present, to the mind of every person in whose instance such presence is likely to be in any way of use. The greater the number of the persons, to whose minds, at any given point of time, it is actually made present, the greater the extent given to the publication—to the publicity thus effected.
Art. 2. Exceptions excepted,—in every Sub-department and Department, and in every Office belonging to each Sub-department and Department, publicity will at all times be maximized.
Art. 3. Exception 1. The evil, produced by the unavoidable expense, preponderant over the good produced by the extent proposed to be given in the instance in question to the publicity. Antagonize thus one with another the two principles, and the rules respectively prescribed by them.
Rule 1. Maximize publicity.
Rule 2. Maximize frugality.
Rule 3. By every deduction made from the amount of the expense, the extent given to publicity may, with clear advantage, be increased. Hence, one advantage of the manifold writing mode, as per section 10, Registration System.
Art. 4. The good produced by publicity is of two sorts: to wit, 1, the general; 2, the particular. The general consists in the efficiency it gives to the force of the law, and to that of the Public-Opinion Tribunal: to wit, in the character of an instrument of security for appropriate aptitude on the part of all public functionaries: the particular consists in the particular use derivable from the information, afforded concerning each particular matter of fact, to the several individuals, whose happiness may be promoted, or their conduct beneficially influenced by it.
Art. 5. Exception 2. Where, in this or that particular case, in addition to the evil of expense, if any, the evil of the publicity would, in the instance of this or that particular person or class of persons, be preponderant over the good.
Art. 6. Of the Sub-departments in which this preponderance is most apt to have place, examples are the following:
1. The Constitutive Department: to wit, in respect of the evil that would result from its being known which way the several voters, or any of them, gave their votes. For the reasons for which the evil of publicity would, in this instance, be destructive of the Constitution, and not accompanied by good in any shape, see Election Code,Preliminary Explanations (vol. iii. p. 558.) The thing requisite is—that, of each voter, the inward wish be expressed by his vote: to wit, on the presumption, that, in so far as, by the direction given to it, he sees no probability of advancing his own at the expense of the general interest, he will give to it such direction as, according to what he thinks or has heard, will be most for the advantage of the general interest. But, in so far as this direction were known, and he apprized of its being so, the wish expressed by his vote would be—the wish of whatever person he had most to fear or hope from: and, as the number of the persons, who have most to fear or hope from a man, will be in the conjunct proportion of his legal power and his opulence,—hence, supposing votes public, a constitution, democratical in appearance, may be aristocratical in effect: and the happiness provided for—not that of the many, but, at the expense of the many, that of the few.
2. The Army Bis-subdepartment: to wit, by making known to the enemy of the State the strong and the weak points of its means of defence.
3. The Navy Bis-subdepartment: the two together constituting the Defensive Force Sub-department: to wit, by information given as above.
4. The Preventive Service Sub-department: to wit, in respect of the like information given to delinquents.
5. The Health Sub-department: to wit, in respect of any such evil as may be liable to result from its being known who the persons are who have been labouring under any disease to which disrepute is attached.
6. The Foreign Relation Sub-department: to wit, by information given, to those, who at any time are liable to become enemies, and who are at all times, in one way or other, rivals.
7. Add the Judiciary Department, as to which, see Ch. xii. Judiciary collectively, Section 14, Publicity, &c.
Art. 7. In each several case, in so far as secrecy is provided for, the assumption is—that, in that case, publicity would be liable to become subservient to hostile purposes:—to the support of this or that interest, in hostility with the interest of the greatest number in this State. In the case of the Defensive Force and Preventive Service Sub-departments, the effect of the publicity might, if extended to certain persons, be the giving aid to hostile designs already entertained, and endeavoured to be carried into effect: in the case of the Foreign Relation Sub-department, it might be—either the giving aid to such designs, if already entertained, or even the giving birth to the like designs.
Art. 8. In each such case,—a point of time will however be assignable, after which the evil at first producible by publicity, will have ceased to be thus producible. But, at no time can the good produced by publicity cease to exist or to operate. For, at no time can the operation of the tutelary power of the Public-Opinion Tribunal—that judicial power to which the publicity furnishes its necessary evidence—cease to be needed. If it be known, that, upon the cessation of the particular demand for the secrecy, it will cease,—the obstruction afforded by it to the operation of the legal as well as Public-Opinion Tribunals, and the evil produced by it, will be minimized, and the quantity much reduced.
Art. 9. Thus it is—that, under this system, to the extent of the publicity thus requisite and thus ordained,—and thence to the correspondent and necessarily previous registration,—there are no limits,—other than those which are set to it by one or other of two considerations: the one is—the expense necessitated by the operation; a consideration which applies to all cases: the other is—the demand for temporary secrecy:—a demand, the nature and extent of which are produced and regulated by various special causes, depending on the nature of the business of the department or sub-department.
Art. 10. As there are not any limits other than as above, to the extent of the demand for publication, so neither are there to that of the good derivable from it. As to this, see the sections intituled Securities, &c. in Ch. vi. Legislature; Ch. viii. Prime Minister (this present chapter); Ch. ix. Ministers collectively; and Ch. xii. Judiciary collectively. Ch. xxv. Local Headmen; Ch. xxvi. Local Registrars. For particulars, in the case of the Administrative Department, see Ch. ix. Ministers collectively: Section 7. Statistic function.
Art. 11. Considered in respect of its extent, publication may be distinguished into internal and external.
Understand by internal or say special, that mode of publication, the operation of which is confined to the particular official situation, or the particular Sub-department, in the course of the business of which the facts in question came into existence; by external, that produced by the conveyance of the information, to persons other than those belonging to, or having business with, that same Office, Department, or Sub-department: of external publicity the benefit therefore is not confined to any other limits than those which apply to the numbers of mankind at the time in question, and all succeeding ones.
Art. 12. Of internal publication, the appropriate instrument will be the manifold writing apparatus, as per Section 10; of external, the printing press, by which to the degree that has been seen, the expense is diminished.
Art. 13. To both these modes and degrees of publication, the Registration System is not only subservient but necessary; and in this subserviency may be seen its only uses, over and above those which consist in the information, which, in the case of each official situation, is afforded, to the functionary, by whom, at the time in question, it is occupied.
Art. 14. Rules for limitation of the exceptive rules, by which secrecy is prescribed.
Rule 1. The exemption from publication should not go beyond the reason for it: the concealment, beyond the demand for concealment: that is to say, beyond the extent of the evil liable to be produced by divulgation.
Rule 2. The evil from divulgation depends partly upon the situation of the persons by whom the information is received; partly upon the time at which it is received.
Rule 3. Limitation as to persons. In the case of a Department or Sub-department, the business of which may present a demand for secrecy,—the exclusion from information should not extend to any functionary, in whose instance information is necessary to the due performance of his official service: especially if at his hands no communication is likely to be made to any person, who is likely to employ it in giving rise or existence to the evil apprehended.
Rule 4. But, as every addition made to the number of the persons possessed of the information, adds to the probability of promiscuous or otherwise mischievous communication,—by no person should the communication be suffered to be received, other than him or them, in whose instance the receipt of it is necessary to the due performance of the services in question, as above.
Art. 15. Limitation as to time.
Certain Sub-departments there are, in which the nature of the business seems scarcely to admit of any limitation to the time during which the good of the service may require the secrecy to be observed. These are—1. The Defensive Force Sub-department. 2. The Foreign Relation Sub-department. In these instances, for preventing the concealment from being continued longer than the good of the service requires, two arrangements present themselves.
I. Let it be part of the business of the Prime Minister from time to time—say at the beginning of each year,—to make a Report to the Legislature, stating the instances in which, in these several Sub-departments, the demand for secrecy has, in his opinion, ceased, that divulgation may be made accordingly.
Art. 16. II. In like manner, and on the same principle, let the Legislature annually appoint a Committee for the same purpose: that its Report may serve as a check to the Prime Minister’s Report: for which purpose, it should make known all instances, if any, in which continuance is given by him to any concealment, which, in their opinion, is not necessary.
Art. 17. On both occasions,—instead of, or along with, the instances, in which the concealment requires to be continued, the Report may have for its subject-matter, those in which it may, without prejudice to the service, be discontinued, and divulgation substituted. In every instance in which such continuance is recommended, such mode of designation will, of course, be employed, as shall suffice for preventing all such disclosure as is not intended.
Art. 18. Note, that the greater the proportion of new members is in each successive Legislature, the less the probability is, that concealment will be continued beyond the duration of the exigency.
Securities for appropriate aptitude.
Art. 1. For maximization of appropriate aptitude on the part of the Prime Minister, securities here provided are as follows:
1. The Registration system, as per Section 10; whereby, as in the case of the Members of the Legislature, his several official acts, including all those of his subordinates, which, by his authorization or acquiescence, are rendered his—are, at the pleasure of his superordinates: to wit, the Legislative authority, and the Constitutive,—submitted to their cognizance.
2. The Publication system, as per Section 11; whereby with no exceptions,—other than those respectively made, by the consideration of the expense, and by the demand presented by special cause for temporary secrecy,—those same acts will be promptly, regularly, constantly, and effectually, presented to the cognizance of those same superordinate authoririties.
3. Dislocability by the Legislature as per Section 9, Art. 1.
4. Dislocability by the Constitutive authority as per Section 9, Art. 2.
5. Responsibility, for insufficiency in the exercise of his several functions, informative, indicative, and initiative, as per Section 3, Relation to Legislature.
6. Dislocability, by acceptance or retention, of any other office belonging to the Official Establishment of this State: as in the case of a Member of the Legislature, as per Ch. vi. Section 31, Securities, Art. 13.
7. So, by acceptance or retention, of any office, gift, or factitious honour or dignity, at the hands of any foreign government, as in that same case, as per Ch. vi. Section 31, Art. 14, 15, or at the hands of any individual foreigner, for favour received of the Prime Minister, or expected to be done by him, in the exercise of any function belonging to his office.
8. Obligation to keep in exercise a Depute or Deputes; coupled with responsibility for their aptitude, as per Section 4, Self-suppletive function.
9. Responsibility, for the aptitude of his immediate subordinates, as per Art. 2, 3, 4, here ensuing.
10. Securities applying to the several situations of these his subordinates and instruments, as per Ch. ix. Ministers collectively. Section 25, Securities.
11. In particular, checks to arbitrariness, in his choice of subordinates,—by means of the evidence of appropriate aptitude necessitated on the part of all persons locable in the Administrative Department, as per Ch. ix. Ministers collectively, Section 16, Locable who, and the pecuniary competition, necessitated as per Section 17, Located how.
12. Functions, statistic, censorial, and melioration-suggestive, exerciseable by all persons, as Members of the Public Opinion Tribunal, in relation to his situation and his conduct therein, as in the case of the Legislature and its Members, as per Ch. v. Constitutive, Section 5, Function of the Public-Opinion Tribunal.
13. Dislocability and responsibility, punitional and compensational, for criminal delinquency, as in the case of a Member of the Legislature, as per Ch. vi. Section 28, Legislation Penal Judicatory.
Art. 2. If, from any person, offering adequate security for eventual responsibility, information has, publicly or privately, been received by him, of indication of misconduct, or inaptitude, in any shape, on the part of any Minister, as manifested by any individual occurrence,—to the Prime Minister it thereupon belongs, forthwith to take remedial measures, by inquiry instituted.
Art. 3. At the requisition of any such indicator, his name and personality may be, and at his desire ought to be, provisionally kept secret: subject nevertheless to disclosure, for the purpose of judicial pursuit or public exposure, in case of mendacity, insincerity, or falsehood accompanied with temerity, in respect of the indication so afforded.
Art. 4. To the case of all existing Ministers located by any predecessor of his, this responsibility of the Prime Minister extends, as well as to the case of those located by himself: if originally unapt, the functionary ought not to have been located: if become unapt, he ought not to have been continued.
Art. 5. To the Prime Minister accordingly with relation to those his immediate subordinates, apply the several securities established in those instances in relation to the several subordinates: as per Ch. ix. Ministers Collectively. Section 25, Securities. &c. Art. 13, 14, 15, 16.
[* ]Still more unlimited, according to the construction put upon the clause in question, (namely, United States’ Constitution, Article 11, Section 11, Clause 1,) is, I have been assured by distinguished functionaries, the power understood to belong to the President in relation to the whole defensive force of the Union, including Army and Navy of the Union, and Militia of the several States “when called into the actual service of the United States.” Yet, for this construction, the only support I can find is that afforded by the words, “Commander in chief.” Edition of 1811. Bookseller, Jonathan Forbes. Place, Winchester. Say more unlimited the power, because in that case there is no such Appeal clause as in the present case, by Art. 13.
[* ][Exemplars.] Not copies, nor transcripts: they being all alike originals.
[† ]In the Anglo-American United States, such is the practice.
[* ]See vol. iii. p. 577.
[* ]In the original edition there is here a description of the mode of executing manifold writing, which will be found already printed in vol. v. p. 406.—Ed.