Front Page Titles (by Subject) CHAPTER II.: ENDS AND MEANS. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 9 (Constitutional Code)
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CHAPTER II.: ENDS AND MEANS. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 9 (Constitutional Code) 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 9.
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ENDS AND MEANS.
Art. 1. Of this constitution, the all-comprehensive object, or end in view, is, from first to last, the greatest happiness of the greatest number; namely, of the individuals, of whom, the political community, or state, of which it is the constitution, is composed; strict regard being all along had to what is due to every other—as to which, see Ch. vii. Legislator’s Inaugural Declaration.
Correspondent fundamental principle: the greatest happiness principle.
Correspondent all-comprehensive and all-directing rule—Maximize happiness.
Art. 2. Means employed, two—aptitude maximized: expense minimized.
Correspondent principles—1. The official-aptitude-maximization principle. 2. The expense-minimization principle.
Correspondent rules. Rule 1. Maximize appropriate official aptitude.
Rule 2. Minimize official expense.
For the manner in which these rules second one another, see Ch. ix. Ministers collectively. Section 15, Remuneration. Section 16, Locable who. Section 17, Located how.
Art. 3. Included in the matter of expenditure is the matter of punishment, as well as the matter of reward.
Art. 4. The matter of punishment is evil applied to a particular purpose.
Art. 5. The matter of evil is composed of pain and loss of pleasure.
Art. 6. The matter of reward is the matter of good applied to a particular purpose.
Art. 7. The matter of good is composed of pleasure and exemption from pain.
Art. 8. Consistently with the greatest happiness principle, evil cannot be employed otherwise than as a means: as a means of producing, in the character of punishment, or otherwise, more than equivalent pleasure, or excluding more than equivalent pain, or producing the one, as well as excluding the other.
Art. 9. Employed in the character of punishment, it cannot, according to the greatest happiness principle, be employed otherwise than as an instrument of coercion: coercion, by fear of future punishment in case of future delinquency: coercion, for the production, as above, of more than equivalent good.
Art. 10. According to this same principle, pleasure is at once an end and a means: as an end, aimed at on every occasion: as a means, employed on particular occasions, to wit, when the matter of it is employed as a matter of reward.
Art. 11. Employed as the matter of reward, the matter of good cannot, according to the greatest happiness principle, be employed otherwise than as an instrument of inducement.
Art. 12. Of the matter of reward necessary to be employed as an instrument, or say a means, of government, it is but in small proportion that it can be obtained, otherwise than by the help of evil employed in the way of punishment, and otherways as a means: witness, taxation: hence, under the greatest happiness principle, the necessity of minimizing expenditure, in the case of reward, as well as in the case of punishment.
Art. 13. To render the conduct of rulers conducive to the maximization of happiness, it is not less necessary to employ, in their case, the instrument of coercion, than in the case of rulees. But, the instrument of coercion being composed of the matter of evil, and the instrument of inducement of the matter of good—rulers are by the unalterable constitution of human nature, disposed to maximize the application of the matter of good to themselves, of the matter of evil to rulees.
Art. 14. Appropriate aptitude may be considered as having place in the case of rulees, as well as in the case of rulers: in both cases, according to the greatest happiness principle, it is aptitude for the maximization of happiness. But, in the case of rulers, it has a more particular signification: it is aptitude for the maximization of happiness in a particular way; namely, by a system of operations performed on rulees.
Art. 15. Of appropriate official aptitude, elements, or say, branches, three—moral intellectual, and active; of intellectual, again, two—cognitional and judicial: knowledge and judgment.
Ratiocinative. Enactive. Instructional.
Art. 16. Rules for maximization of appropriate moral aptitude.
Rule I. The sovereign power give to those, whose interest it is that happiness be maximized.
Rule II. Of the possessors of subordinate power, maximize the responsibility—namely, as towards the aforesaid possessors of the sovereign power.
Note that, only by expectation of eventual evil (punishment included) can responsibility be established: neither by expectation of eventual good, nor by the possession of good (reward included) can it be established.*
Ratiocinative. Enactive. Instructional.
Art. 17. For official aptitude, cognitional, judicial, and active, joined to minimization of expense, principles employed are three.
Principle I. Probation, or say public-examination principle.
Principle II. Pecuniary-competition principle.
Principle III. Responsible-location principle—location of subordinate by effectually responsible superordinate.
Inseparable is the connexion between all three principles. See Ch. ix. Ministers collectively. Section 15, Remuneration. Section 16, Locable who. Section 17, Located how. Ch. xii. Judiciary. Section 28, Locable who.
Art. 18. For the functions exercised by the several functionaries, in the exercise of their several powers, and the fulfilment of their respective trusts, see the indication given in the chapters headed by the denomination of the several classes of functionaries: as per table of chapters and sections hereunto annexed.
Art. 19. In relation to every official situation, a recapitulatory indication will be found given, of the securities herein provided for the maximization of appropriate aptitude, in all its above-mentioned branches, on the part of the functionary, by whom it is filled. See, in the several chapters, the several sections entituled Securities for appropriate aptitude.
Art. 20. Considered in respect of its immediate effects, responsibility is distinguishable into punitional, satisfactional, and dislocational; in respect of its source, into legal and moral,—legal, produced by the legal sanction; moral, by the moral sanction, as applied by the public-opinion tribunal, as per Ch. v. Constitutive. Section 4, Public-Opinion Tribunal—its Composition. Of the satisfactional mode, the only generally applicable submode is the pecuniarily-compensational—say, for shortness, the compensational.
Art. 21. Compensational responsibility has the effect of punitional, in the ratio of the sum parted with, to the remainder left. By it, wounds inflicted by the wrong are curable: it is on this account, preferable, as far as it goes, to simply punitional, by which, though employed for the hope of preventing greater future evil, pain is the only effect produced with certainty.
Art. 22. Legal responsibility is distinguishable into judicial and administrational: judicial, where, in the shape of punishment, the effect is produced by the judicial authority, on the ground of moral inaptitude; administrational, where, by superordinate authority, dislocation is applied on the ground of inaptitude, intellectual or active, pure of moral. By dislocational, evil from the like inaptitude on the part of the dislocatee is prevented with certainty; of punishment, except in the singular case of physically disabilitative punishment in the instance of the individual offender, the preventive effect is clouded in uncertainty.
Art. 23. To pecuniary compensation, pecuniary responsibility to a corresponding extent is necessary. But, beyond that extent, in proportion to its extent, obstruction is afforded by it to its own efficiency, as well as to that of punitional and dislocational. In other words, up to the amount of his debts, a man’s responsibility to the purpose of his being made to afford compensation in a pecuniary shape is, indeed, in the direct ratio of his opulence; but, when a man’s opulence exceeds the amount of his debts, this effective responsibility is rather in the inverse than in the direct ratio of it: this, even under a system, legislative and judicial, which has for its end the maximization of the happiness of the maximum number; much more, under a system by which, to the happiness of the ruling one, in conjunction with that of the ruling and otherwise influential few, that of the subject-many, is, in intention and effect, constantly sacrificed. In the monarch, in whose situation opulential responsibility is maximized, effective responsibility, punitional, satisfactional, and dislocational, is nihilized.
Art. 24. As to moral responsibility, imperfect as it is, this species of security against misconduct is the more necessary to be brought to view, inasmuch as, in monarchies in general, were it not for this, there would be no responsibility at all: and, in other words, the monarch would be altogether without motives for compliance with the laws, even with those of his own making, which are, at all times, all such as, and no other than such as it is agreeable to him to make. It is by this source of restraint alone that the English form of government—a mixture, composed of monarchico-aristocratical despotism, with a spice of anarchy—has been preserved from passing through the condition of France, Russia, and Austria, into that of Spain and Portugal. Even without the assistance of a posse of his own creatures, acting under the name of a parliament, he may kill any person he pleases, violate any woman he pleases; take to himself or destroy anything he pleases. Every person who resists him, while in any such way occupied, is, by law, killable, and every person who so much as tells of it, is punishable. Yet, without the form of an act of parliament, he does nothing of all this. Why? Because, by the power of the Public-Opinion Tribunal, though he could not be either punished or effectually resisted, he might be and would be, more or less annoyed.
[* ][Responsibility.] Partly with, partly without design, the ideas, attached to the word responsibility, and its conjugate responsible, have come to us enveloped in a thick cloud: and from this cloud has flowed, it will soon be seen, practical evil—evil in the shape of waste, depredation, and corruption, covering the whole field of government. In a word, by it has been promoted, and in no small degree, the success of those designs, by which, instead of being, as it ought to be, minimized, official expense has, under so many governments, though under no other in so high a degree as under the English, been maximized. The time for the employment of this important word having here arrived, the operation of clearing it from the delusion of which it has been made the instrument, could not any longer be delayed.