Front Page Titles (by Subject) CHAPTER XXIII.: EIGHTEENTH DEVICE—DOUBLE-FOUNTAIN PRINCIPLE. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 7 (Rationale of Judicial Evidence Part 2)
CHAPTER XXIII.: EIGHTEENTH DEVICE—DOUBLE-FOUNTAIN PRINCIPLE. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 7 (Rationale of Judicial Evidence Part 2) 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 7.
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- Rationale of Judicial Evidence.
- Book V.: —of Circumstantial Evidence.
- Chapter I.: Circumstantial Evidence, What—how Distinguished From Direct Evidence.
- Chapter II.: Of Probabilizing, Disprobabilizing, and Infirmative Facts—examples of Principal Facts, With the Corresponding Evidentiary Facts—improbability and Impossibility, How Distinguished From the Other Kinds of Circumstantial Evidence.
- Chapter III.: Of Real Evidence, Or Evidence From Things.
- Chapter IV.: Of Preparations, Attempts, Declarations of Intention, and Thrlats, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinquency.
- Chapter V.: Of Non-responsion, and False, Or Evasive Responsion, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinquency.
- Chapter VI.: Of Spontaneous * Self-inculpative Testimony, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinquency.
- Chapter VII.: Of Confessorial and Otherwise Self-disserving Evidence, Extracted By Interrogation.
- Chapter VIII.: Of Confusion of Mind, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinquency.
- Chapter IX.: Of Fear, In So Far As Indicated By Passive Deportment, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinquency.
- Chapter X.: Of Clandestinity, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinquency.
- Chapter XI.: Of Suppression Or Fabrication of Evidence, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinqufncy.
- Chapter XII.: Of Avoidance of Justiciability, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinquency.
- Chapter XIII.: Of the Situation of the Supposed Delinquent In Respect of Motives, Means, Disposition, Character, and Station In Life, Considered As Affording Evidence of Delinquency.
- Chapter XIV.: Posteriora Priorum—priora Posteriorum. Fact Indicated, a Prior Event; Evidentiary Fact, a Posterior Event In the Same Series: and E Converso.
- Chapter XV.: On the Probative Force of Circumstantial Evidence.
- Chapter XVI.: Of Improbability and Impossibility. *
- Chapter XVII.: Atrocity of an Alleged Offence, How Far a Ground of Incredibility. ‡
- Book VI: Of Makeshift Evidence.
- Chapter I.: Of Makeshift Evidence In General.
- Chapter II.: Of Extrajudicially Written Evidence.
- Chapter III.: Of Unoriginal Evidence In General.
- Chapter IV.: Of Supposed Oral Evidence Transmitted Through Oral, Or Hearsay Evidence.
- Chapter V.: Instructions Concerning the Probative Force of Extrajudicially Written and Hearsay Evidence. *
- Chapter VI.: Of Supposed Written Evidence, Transmitted Through Oral; Or Memoriter Evidence. *
- Chapter VII.: Of Supposed Oral Evidence, Transmitted Through Written; Or Minuted Evidence.
- Chapter VIII.: Of Supposed Written Evidence, Transmitted Through Written; Or Transcriptitious Evidence.
- Chapter IX.: Of Reported Real Evidence: I. E. Supposed Real Evidence, Transmitted Through Oral Judicial Testimony, Or Through Casually-written Evidence.
- Chapter X.: Of Evidence Transmitted Through an Indefinite Number of Media.
- Chapter XI.: What Ought, and What Ought Not, to Be Done, to Obviate the Danger of Misdecision On the Ground of Makeshift Evidence.
- Chapter XII.: Aberrations of English Law In Regard to Makeshift Evidence.
- Book VII.: Of the Authentication of Evidence.
- Chapter I.: Authentication, What. Connexion of This Subject With That of Preappointed Evidence.
- Chapter II.: Subject-matters of Authentication, What. Modes of Authentication In the Case of Real and of Oral Evidence.
- Chapter III.: Modes of Authentication In the Case of Written Evidence.
- Chapter IV.: Modes of Deauthentication In the Case of Written Evidence.
- Chapter V.: Distinction Between Provisional and Definitive Authentication. Rules For the Legislator and the Judge, Concerning the Authentication of Written Evidence.
- Chapter VI.: Aberrations of English Law In Regard to the Authentication of Written Evidence.
- Book VIII.: On the Cause of Exclusion of Evidence—the Technical System of Procedure.
- Chapter I.: Object of This Inquiry—its Connexion With the Subject of the Present Work.
- Chapter II.: Technical Or Fee-gathering, and Natural Or Domestic, Systems of Procedure, What?
- Chapter III.: Cause of the Vices of Technical Procedure, the Sinister Interest of the Judge.
- Chapter IV.: Particular Exemplifications of the Vices Introduced By the Fee-gathering Principle Into Technical Judicature.
- Chapter V.: List of the Devices Employed Under the Fee-gathering System, For Promoting the Ends of Established Judicature, At the Expense of the Ends of Justice. *
- Chapter VI.: First Device—exclusion of the Parties From the Presence of the Judge.
- Chapter VII.: Second Device—tribunals Out of Reach: Or, Swallowing Up the Inferior Courts.
- Chapter VIII.: Third Device—bandying the Cause From Court to Court.
- Chapter IX.: Fourth Device—blind Fixation of Times For the Oplrations of Procedure.
- Chapter X.: Fifth Device—sitting At Long Intervals.
- Chapter XI.: Sixth Device—motion Business.
- Chapter XII.: Seventh Device,—decision Without Thought; Or Mechanical Judicature.
- Chapter XIII.: Eighth Device—chicaneries About Notice.
- Chapter XIV.: Ninth Device—principll of Nullification.
- Chapter XV.: Tenth Device—mendacity-licence.
- Chapter XVI.: Eleventh Device—ready Written Pleadings.
- Chapter XVII.: Twelfth Device—principle of Jargon, Or Jargonization.
- Chapter XVIII.: Thirteenth Device—fiction.
- Chapter XIX.: Fourteenth Device—entanglement of Jurisdictions.
- Chapter XX.: Fifteenth Device—means of Securing Forthcomingness, Uselessly Divfrsified.
- Chapter XXI.: Sixteenth Device—creation of Needless and Useless Offices.
- Chapter XXII.: Seventeenth Device—sham Pecuniary Checks to Delay, Vexation, and Expense.
- Chapter XXIII.: Eighteenth Device—double-fountain Principle.
- Chapter XXIV.: Nineteenth Device—laudation of Jurisprudential Law.
- Chapter XXV.: Habitual Contempt Shown By Judges to the Authority of the Legislature.
- Chapter XXVI.: Opinion-trade.
- Chapter XXVII.: Extension of the Above Devices to Substantive Law, As Far As Applicable.
- Chapter XXVIII.: Remedies Suggested For the Above Evils.
- Chapter XXIX.: Apology For the Above Exposure.
- Book IX.: On Exclusion of Evidence.
- Part I.: On the Exclusionary System In General.
- Chapter I.: Exclusion of Evidence. Its Connexion With the Ends of Justice.
- Chapter II.: Disregard Shown to the Ends of Justice Under the Exclusionary System.
- Chapter III.: General View of the Mischiefs of the Exclusionary System.
- Chapter IV.: Dicta of Judges On the Exclusionary System.
- Chapter V.: Species of Exclusion.
- Part II.: View of the Cases In Which Exclusion of Evidence Is Proper.
- Chapter I.: General View of the Cases In Which Exclusion Is Proper.
- Chapter II.: Exclusion On the Ground of Vexation, In What Cases Proper.
- Chapter III.: Exclusion On the Ground of Expense, In What Cases Proper.
- Chapter IV.: Exclusion On the Ground of Delay, In What Cases Proper.
- Chapter V.: Exclusion of Irrelevant Evidence, Proper.
- Chapter VI.: Exclusion of the Evidence of a Catholic Priest, Respecting the Confessions Intrusted to Him, Proper.
- Chapter VII.: Remedies Succedaneous to the Exclusion of Evidence.
- Part III.: View of the Cases In Which Evidence Has Improperly Been Excluded On the Ground of Danger of Deception. *
- Chapter I.: Cases Enumerated.
- Chapter II.: Danger of Deception, Not a Proper Ground For Exclusion of Evidence.
- Chapter III.: Impropriety of Exclusion On the Ground of Interest.
- Chapter IV.: Impropriety of Exclusion On the Ground of Improbity.
- Chapter V.: Impropriety of Exclusion On the Ground of Religious Opinions.
- Chapter VI.: Impropriety of Exclusion On the Ground of Mlntal Imbecility, and Particularly of Infancy and Superannuation.
- Chapter VII.: Of the Restoratives For Competency, Devised By English Lawyers.
- Part IV.: View of the Cases In Which Evidence Has Improperly Been Excluded On the Ground of Vexation.
- Chapter I.: Vexation to Individuals Arising Solely Out of the Execution of the Laws, Not a Proper Ground of Exclusion.
- Chapter II.: Enumeration of the Sorts of Evidence Improperly Excluded On This Ground By English Law.
- Chapter III.: Impropriety of the Exclusion Put Upon Self-disserving Evidence By English Law.
- Chapter IV.: Inconsistencies of English Law In Regard to Self-disserving Evidence.
- Chapter V.: Examination of the Cases In Which English Law Exempts One Person From Giving Evidence Against Another.
- Part V.: View of the Cases In Which Evidence Has Improperly Been Excluded On the Double Account of Vexation and Danger of Deception.
- Chapter I.: Impropriety of Excluding the Testimony of a Party to the Cause, For Or Against Himself.
- Chapter II.: Examination of the Course Pursued In Regard to the Plaintiff’s Testimony By English Law.
- Chapter III.: Examination of the Course Pursued In Regard to the Defendant’s Testimony By English Law.
- Chapter IV.: Impropriety of Excluding the Testimony of a Party to the Cause, For Or Against Another Party On the Same Side. Examination of the Course Pursued In This Respect By English Law.
- Chapter V.: Probable Origin of the Above Exclusionary Rules.
- Part VI.: Of Disguised Exclusions.
- Chapter I.: Exclusion of Evidence For Want of Multiplicity.
- Chapter II.: Exclusion By Limitation Put Upon the Number of Witnesses.
- Chapter III.: Exclusion Put By Blind Arrangements of Procedure Upon Indeterminate Portions of the Mass of Evidence.
- Chapter IV.: Exclusion By Rendering a Particular Species of Evidence Conclusive.
- Chapter V.: Of the Rule, That Evidence Is to Be Confined to the Points In Issue. ‡
- Chapter VI.: Of Negative Exclusions.
- Book X.: Instructions to Be Delivered From the Legislator to the Judge, For the Estimation of the Probative Force of Evidence.
- Chapter I.: Preliminary Observations.
- Chapter II.: Of Interest In General, Considered As a Ground of Untrustworthiness In Testimony.
- Chapter III.: Of Pecuniary Interest, Considered As a Ground of Untrustworthiness In Testimony. *
- Chapter IV.: Of Interest Derived From Social Connexions In General.
- Chapter V.: Of Interest Derived From Sexual Connexions.
- Chapter VI.: Of Interest Derived From Situation With Respect to the Cause Or Suit.
- Chapter VII.: Of Improbity, Considered As a Cause of Untrustworthiness In Testimony.
- Chapter VIII.: Of the Comparative Mischief In the Event of Misdecision, to the Prejudice of the Plaintiff’s Or of the Defendant’s Side.
- Chapter IX.: Ulterior Safeguards Against the Inconveniencies Which May Present Themselves As Liable to Arise From the Abolition of the Exclusionary Rules.
- Chapter X.: Recapitulation.
- Note On the Belgic Code.
EIGHTEENTH DEVICE—DOUBLE-FOUNTAIN PRINCIPLE.
How delightful, could a contrivance be found for enabling the judge to give judgment for plaintiff or defendant at pleasure! The pinnacle of perfection would be mounted at one spring. To a first glance, the idea presents itself as no better than the love-sick vision of some fond amateur of chicane.
In practice, it has not yet stretched (it must be confessed,) nor seems likely to stretch to so all-embracing an extent in the regions of jurisprudence as to cover the whole field. But, though quiet and silent in its motions, the more accurately it is measured, the more prodigious the progress of it will be perceived to be.
Sought or unsought, the effect flows naturally, and as it were of itself, from the anarchy that results from whatever degree of influence may have been preserved to the dictates of justice and common sense, in conjunction with the suggestions of this or that one among the sources of iniquity and absurdity that have already passed in review. Exquisite invention! or, at any rate, felicitous result! Reason herself pressed into the service of absurdity! Injustice could not have thus enlarged her empire, without leaving a corner of her throne to justice.
The double-fountain device derives its name from the contrivance of those jugglers, who, by an ingenious application of the laws of hydrostatics and pneumatics, serve to the customer, out of the same vessel, wine of either of two colours, white or red, at pleasure.
This device is grafted on any one of the three former devices,—the principle of nullification, the principle of fiction, and the principle of jargonization. It consists in the putting an occasional stop to the current of decision drawn from these several corrupted fountains: drawing the decision from the right fountain, pro hâc vice, instead of any of those wrong ones. Far from being diminished by this apparent departure from the ends of judicature, the advantage obtainable from these several devices receives considerable increase. No danger in any shape can ever attach—neither punishment nor so much as disrepute can ever attach upon any judge, who, in spite of any number of previous decisions given against the merits on the ground of this or that quirk, or fiction or jargon, takes upon him to decide in favour of the merits. Thus it is, that, to the extent of the ground occupied by quirk, fiction, and jargon, you possess, in virtue of those principles, alternating at pleasure with the principles of reason and justice, the faculty of giving the case in favour of plaintiff or defendant, as you incline. Praise you are sure of: all that you need consider is, which of two sorts of praise is most to your taste. Decide against the merits, on the ground of the quirk, the fiction, the jargon, you receive the joint praise of profound science and inflexible steadiness—the praise of adhering to the rule stare decisis. Decide in favour of the merits, disallowing the quirk, discarding the fiction, the jargon, you receive the praise of liberality—of attachment to the laws of substantial justice.
Bribes you cannot receive, if neither side is prepared to offer any: friendship or enmity you cannot gratify, if both parties are equally unknown to you or indifferent: but whether you do or do not turn it to account in any way, the power you possess to the extent of the ground occupied by these commodious principles, is not the less arbitrary. The fault is all your own, if, as often as you have occasion in any of these shapes, you fail of administering to your prejudice or your humour the gratification put into your hands—of profiting by the opportunity of crushing your enemy, of serving your party or your friend.
A flaw is alleged in an indictment. Are the pursuer’s party-attachments supposed to be on the wrong side? Precedents are chains of adamant to you: fiat justitia, ruat cœlum, is the word. Are the man’s attachments where they should be? You burst by inspiration from the trammels of chicane, and you quote the quirk-abjuring ejaculation which a moment of contrition wrung from the conscience of Lord Hale.
Is interest objected as a ground of exclusion to a material witness? Here you are most completely at your ease. There stand the cases, in two rows: on one hand, those in which the objection has been allowed—on the other, those in which it has been disallowed: length of the rows, as nearly equal as heart could desire. Exclude the witness, you bow to the name of Lord Kenyon, and with him pronounce the laws of evidence to be the perfection of wisdom: receive the witness, your bow points to Lord Hardwicke, and with him you confess your disposition to admit lights.
The advantage gained by the principle of nullification would be imperfect, but for the occasional dash of ill-applied reason, by which it is made up into the double-fountain principle.
By the double-fountain principle, more business is made than could possibly be made by the fountains of corruption if set running by themselves. Suppose a flaw started—exactly the same flaw that had already been made fatal: here, if thhe practice of drawing decisions occasionally from reason were unknown, certainty would thus far take place: the merits would in that instance have, and be seen to have, no chance: the benefit of the argument would be lost to the profession, as well as the sweets of arbitrary power to the judge.