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II.: Deed of Mortgage. 1 - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 5 (Scotch Reform, Real Property, Codification Petitions) [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 5.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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II.

Deed of Mortgage.1

Author’s Draught.(No Topics given.)

Proposed Charge of a principal Sum with Interest.

“This deed made the 1st day of April 1927, Between Andrew Allen ofNA of the one, and Benedict Butler, ofNA of the other part, witnesseth, that, in consideration of five hundred pounds sterling by the said B. Butler to the said A. Allen, now lent and paid, the said A. Allen doth charge all that Messuage or dwelling-house, with the outhouses and gardens thereto belonging; also the three following parcels of land thereto adjoining and therewith occupied, namely, Blackacre, being meadow, containing ten acres; Greenacre, being pasture, containing four acres two roods; and Whitacre, being arable, containing eight acres; All which said premises are situate in the parish of Stoke, in the county of Hereford, and are now in the occupation of Giles Hall, with the appurtenances thereto belonging, with the payment to the said B. Butler, of the sum of five hundred pounds, with interest at four per cent. per annum, as follows, viz. half a year’s interest of the same sum to be paid on the 1st day of October, now next ensuing, and the said principal sum of five hundred pounds and another half year’s interest,2 for the same to be paid on the 1st day of April, which will be in the year 1928.”

[1 ]Mortgage.] Mortgage is the denomination, by which, for the present purpose, I designate this sort of deed: this being the most important and obvious species of the genus for the designation of which our learned author has employed the word charge. Preferable however to mortgage—preferable in every point of view, and to a most important effect—would be land-pledge. Mortgage is understood by nobody; land-pledge would be understood by everybody; by everybody, male and female, who has ever seen or heard what passes at a pawnbroker’s. So much for name.

Behold now how much may depend upon a right name: behold the instruction that may be afforded by it. Give validity and currency to either of these forms—the author’s or the reviewer’s,—and there will be no more need of equity suits, nor any more need of delay, where land is the pledge, than where a pair of ear-rings, worth the same money, or a table-spoon, is the pledge: and the present licensed depredation—in some circumstances, on the part of the lender, in others on the part of the borrower,—is at an end. What is it that should make the difference? Is not a sheet of paper as easily passed from hand to hand as a pair of ear-rings? As to difference, if any there be, it is all of it in favour of the immoveable pledge; for, the jewels may be run off with; the land can not. Secresy—in regard to rents—is that an object? for example, on the borrower’s account, lest the state of his finances should be made known. More effectually can that be provided for in the case of the land, than in the case of the diamonds: the receiver of the rents, whoever he is, being supposed an object of confidence on both sides, the transfer is made to him: made to him, in trust, in case of payment on the appointed day, to deliver the money, or the land to the one party; in case of non-payment, to the other. Here, too, as far as regards the principal, all danger vanishes: trustee can no more run away with the land, than borrower or lender could; and as to the interest, it is no more than what every man, who employs a steward, by so doing trusts him with.

Indulgence to debtors—is that an object? How much better could it not be afforded, how much likelier would it not be to be afforded—by a creditor who had no law-charges to apprehend, than by one who has law-charges to apprehend—especially such as those which hang over his head at present?

Behold now the extent of the benefit which this theory, simple as it is, may be made productive of, if carried into practice: benefit to landlords in general; benefit to tenants in general; benefit to everybody, but to those who are among everybody’s worst enemies, and who will be sufficiently known by that name. Where recovery of rents is the object, in so far as there is property enough of the tenant’s, or anybody else’s upon the premises,—landlords—nor yet altogether without good reason—are by themselves trusted with the power of being themselves judges in their own cause. Well then—where recovery of possession is the object—pledges on the spot being wanting or insufficient—with how much less danger might they not be trusted with the power of being, to the effect in question, judges in the cause of others—meaning of course by others, those with whom they have no connexion? On this plan, in case of appeal—and in that case only—might those judicatories have cognizance, which at present have it in the first instance. Of the essentially and incurably corrupt, and, in every respect, unapt judicatory in question, my opinion is the same as that of the Morning Chronicle: but, so long as the people continue oppressed with it, I see much less danger from this power in its hand, than from most of that which is at present exercised by it.

As to the species of conveyances to which this system would be applicable,—the same principles which would give simplicity to deeds of sale, mortgage and settlement, would give correspondent simplicity to leases.

Turn now to the gaming-table. On a visit to it,—why, in that case, should not a noble lord, or honourable gentleman, put into his pocket a few papers of sales, mortgages, or leases, as well as the correspondent number of rouleaus? This is not a mere jest: for, if ruined, why might he not be so,—for the benefit of a set of companions of his own choice, with whom he was living on convivial terms, and in regard to whom, in conjunction with the chance of being ruined by them, he possessed an equal chance of enriching himself by their ruin, and from whom he might receive more or less of indulgence, why not as well for their benefit alone, as partly for their benefit, partly for the benefit of a set of lawyers whom he knows nothing of,—from whom nothing is to be got,—and from whom, on his part, nothing but ruin, or a more or less near approach towards it, can be expected?

Lawyers, by whom, comparatively speaking, such facility has been left to transfer, in the case of moveables,—whence happens it that they have dealt on so opposite a footing by it in the case of immoveables? Answer, altogether simple. Society could not have held together, and the matter of legal plunderage would either never have come into existence, or, as fast as it had come, would have been swallowed up,—had they thus loaded it in the case of moveables; but, in the case of immoveables, the magnitude of the masses is such as renders it possible for them to bear the load. Sweet, accordingly, is the “savour of the realty,” to learned noses.

[2 ]Another half year’s interest.] But what, if that happens which most commonly does happen? What, if the loan is continued, as it sometimes is, for years by dozens, beyond the twelvemonth? For this case no provision is here made. [See notes on the Reviewer’s Draught.] In any case, on failure of payment, prompt is the remedy needed; and next to instantaneous is the remedy which, as above, the nature of the case affords; yes, and which would be afforded in fact, if those judicatories, which are law and equity courts in name, were not iniquity courts, if not in purpose, in effect.