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• Scotch Reform; Considered With Reference to the Plan Proposed In the Late Parliament, For the Regulation of the Courts and the Administration of Justice In Scotland: With Illustrations From English Non-reform: In the Course of Which, Divers Imperfectio
• Advertisement.
• Letters to Lord Grenville, On the Proposed Reform In the Administration of Civil Justice In Scotland.
• Letter I.
• Letter II.: Proposed Division of the Court of Session.
• Letter III.: Proposed System of Pleading.
• Letter IV.: Proposed Trial By Jury.
• Letter V.: On the Bill Called Lord Eldon’s.
• Summary View of the Plan of a Judicatory, Under the Name of the Court of Lords’ Delegates, Proposed For the Exercise of Those Judicial Functions, the Adequate Discharge of Which By the Whole House Has, For These Six Or Seven Years, Been Rendered Confe
• The Elements of the Art of Packing, As Applied to Special Juries, Particularly In Cases of Libel Law.
• Advertisement to the First Edition.
• Part I.
• Chapter I.: Occasion of This Work.
• Chapter II.: Juries—their Use As a Check to Judges.
• Chapter III.: The Check How Done Away By Influence.
• Chapter IV.: Special Juries, a Special Engine of Corruption.
• Chapter V.: Jury Unanimity Increases the Corruption.
• Chapter VI.: Purposes to Which Influence On Juries May Be Made Subservient.
• Chapter VII.: Chief Purpose, Crushing the Liberty of the Press.
• Chapter VIII.: The Exchequer Packing Office Suffices.
• Chapter IX.: Instruments For Crushing the Liberty of the Press.
• Chapter X.: Want of Adequate Obsequiousness Morally Impossible.
• Chapter XI.: Such Juries Worse Than None.
• Part II.: State of the Packing System, Anno 1808.
• Chapter I.: Introduction—two Reforming Shrievalties.
• Chapter II.: The Sheriff to the Lord Chief Baron—notices.
• Chapter III.: Lord Chief Baron to Sheriff Sir Richard Phillips—avowries and Defences.
• Chapter IV.: Observations On the Lord Chief Baron’s Defences.
• Chapter V.: Special Jury Corruption—devices By Which It Was Protected.
• Chapter VI.: Learned Advice From the Temple.
• Chapter VII.: Advice From Lincoln’s-inn.
• Chapter VIII.: Maxims Concerning Reform, Deduced From the Above Letter.
• Chapter IX.: Transactions At the Remembrancer’s.
• Part III.: State of the Packing System, Anno 1809.
• Chapter I.: Commons’ Debate, 24 Th April 1809. Packing and Cutting.
• Chapter II.: Double-fee Abuse, Plain and Embroidered.
• Part IV.—: Remedies Proposed. *
• Chapter I.: Humble Proposal For Restoring the Constitution In Regard to Juries.
• Chapter II.: State of Jury Package In Scotland.
• Chapter III.: Humble Proposal For Restoring the Authority of Parliament.
• “swear Not At All:” Containing an Exposure of the Needlessness and Mischievousness, As Well As Anti-christianity of the Ceremony of an Oath: a View of the Parliamentary Recognition of Its Needlessness, Implied In the Practice of Both Houses; a
• Advertisement.
• Editor’s Note
• Swear Not At All. Mat. V. 34.
• Section 1.: Oath. Incongruity of the Assumption, On Which Its Supposed Beneficial Efficiency Is Grounded.
• Section 2.: Mischievousness of This Instrument Considered In a General Point of View.
• Section 3.: Its Inefficiency In the Character of a Security Against Deceptious Incorrectness and Incompleteness In Evidence.
• Section 4.: Recognition of Its Inutility By Lords and Commons.
• Section 5.: Mischiefs —1. Contributing to the Mendacity-licence Granted By Judges.
• Section 6.: Mischief 2— Weakening In Various Ways the Efficiency of the Laws.
• Section 7.: Mischief 3— Bewildering and Enslaving the Consciences of Jurymen.
• Section 8.: Mischief 4— Giving Aid and Force to the Enterprises of Malefactors.
• Section 9.: Mischief 5— Furnishing Pretence For Misrule By Abuse of Prerogative.
• Section 10.: Misrule, How to Perpetuate—coronation Oaths Amended.
• Section 11.: Mischief 6— Corrupting the National Morals and Understanding—oxford University Oaths.
• Section 12.: Mischief 6 Continued. —ii. Cambridge Oaths.
• Section 13.: Practice of Receiving Judicial Oaths, Its Repugnancy to the Precepts of Jesus.
• Section 14.: Succedanea—true Securities Substitutible to This False One.
• Section 15.: Cause and Origin of the Practice In Regard to Oaths.
• Appendix.
• Truth Versus Ashhurst; Or, Law As It Is, Contrasted With What It Is Said to Be.
• The King Against Edmonds and Others: Set Down For Trial, At Warwick, On the 29 Th of March 1820.
• The King Against Sir Charles Wolseley, Baronet, and Joseph Harrison, Schoolmaster, Set Down For Trial, At Chester, On the 4 Th of April 1820.
• Official Aptitude Maximized; Expense Minimized: As Shown In the Several Papers Comprised In This Volume.
• Paper I.—
• Paper II.—: Introductory View, &c.
• Paper III.—: Extract From the Proposed Constitutional Code; Entitled, Official Aptitude Maximized—expense Minimized. By Jeremy Bentham, Esq. Bencher of Lincoln’s Inn.
• Paper IV.—: Supplement to the Above Extract.
• Paper V.—: Defence of Economy Against the Right Honourable Edmund Burke.
• Paper VI.—: Defence of Economy Against the Right Honourable George Rose.
• Paper VII.: Observations On Mr. Secretary Peel’s House of Commons Speech, 21 St March 1825, Introducing His Police Magistrates’ Salary Raising Bill, ( Date of Order For Printing, 24 Th March 1825.)
• Paper VIII.: Indications Respecting Lord Eldon, Including History of the Pending Judges’-salary-raising Measure.
• Paper IX.—: On the Militia.
• Paper X.: On Public Account Keeping.
• Paper XI.: Constitutional Code—table of Contents As Shown By Titles of Chapter and Sections.
• Commentary On Mr. Humphreys’ Real Property Code, By Jeremy Bentham. From the Westminster Review, No. XII., For October 1826.
• *∗* the Following Note Was Prefixed to the Article By the Editor of the Westminster Review: —
• Commentary On Humphreys’ Real Property Code.
• I.: Deed of Sale.
• II.: Deed of Mortgage. 1
• III.: Marriage Settlement Deed.
• Outline of a Plan of a General Register of Real Property: Contained In a Communication to the Commissioners Appointed Under Letters Patent, of Date the 6 Th June 1828, to Inquire Into the Law of England Respecting Real Property, and First Printed I
• Justice and Codification Petitions: Being Forms Proposed For Signature By All Persons Whose Desire It Is to See Justice No Longer Sold, Delayed, Or Denied: and to Obtain a Possibility of That Knowledge of the Law, In Proportion to the Want of Which T
• Justice and Codification Petitions.
• Advertisement.
• Preliminary Explanations Necessary to Be First Read.
• Petition For Justice.
• Abridged Petition For Justice.
• More Abridged Petition For Justice.
• Supplement, Which May Be Added Or Not to Any One of the Three Or Any Other Proposed Petition.
• Petition For Codification.
• Lord Brougham Displayed: Including I. Boa Constrictor, Alias Helluo Curiarum; II. Observations On the Bankruptcy Court Bill, Now Ripened Into an Act; III. Extracts From Proposed Constitutional Code.

Section 13.

Practice of receiving Judicial Oaths, its Repugnancy to the Precepts of Jesus.

How palpably repugnant to the precepts of Jesus many of the observances are, to which men are compelled, under the notion of their being enjoined by the religion of Jesus, is what could not easily be conceived by any, who, on such occasions, are not in the habit of using their eyes, nor will be believed by many of those who are.

“Again,” (says the account in Matthew, v. 33, the only one of his four biographers by whom any account is given of this precept,) “Again, ye have heard that it hath been said of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: (33) But I say unto you, Swear not at all: neither by heaven, for . . . &c. (35) Nor by the earth, for . . . &c. neither by Jerusalem: for . . . &c. (36) Neither . . . by thy head, because . . . &c. (37) But let your communication be Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.”

As to what is to be understood to have been here meant by “old time,” the only passages of the Mosaic law, as reported in the Old Testament, that have any bearing upon the subject (at least as far as the marginal references can be depended upon) are those which are in Exodus (xx. 7,) Leviticus (xix. 12,) Deuteronomy (v. 11.)

In Exodus (xx. 7,) the words are these, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord in vain: for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.” These are the words, in the authentic translation of that portion of the Jewish statute law, which, in the Church-of-England liturgy and other offices, is distinguished by the name of the ten commandments, of which it stands third.

Next comes Leviticus (xix.) in which the words are these:—(11) “Ye shall not steal, neither deal falsely, neither lie one to another. (12) And ye shall not swear by my name falsely, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God: I am the Lord.”

Lastly comes Deuteronomy, (v. 11,) in which the words are exactly the same as in Exodus.

Will it be said, that by the words “but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths,” it appears that the sort of oath meant by Jesus to be forbidden was the promissory oath alone, and not the assertory oath?

But—1. In the promissory oath the assertory oath, it has been seen, is included.

2. And, in the above passage in Leviticus, the assertory, in which is included the testimonial oath, is specially mentioned. “Ye shall not lie one to another—Ye shall not swear by my name falsely, neither shalt thou profane the name of the Lord—Ye shall not swear by my name falsely”—says the law of Moses. What says the law of Jesus? Ye shall not swear falsely? No: but Swear not at all. “Ye shall not swear at all.” In this prohibition the words are general, all-comprehensive. If, in respect of judicial occasions or any other occasions, it had been his intention that any exception should be made, would not such intention have been expressed?—would not this have been the occasion for expressing it? If, of words thus plain and positive, the only obvious import is not to be trusted to, would it not be better that, instead of being in such multitudes distributed, all Testaments, old and new, should be burnt, and the Church-of-England Common Prayer-book, with its articles of faith, and other appendages, distributed instead of them?*

3. And accordingly comes the concluding passage of the words of Jesus, in which the word, employed in contradistinction to swearing, is “communication.” Under this word communication, is not assertion—statement—narrative,—whichsover be the name given to that application of the faculty of discourse which is most in use;—is it not still more obviously and necessarily included, than any such comparatively rare application as is made by what is called promise, engagement—deliberate and solemn engagement?

The words of James—will they be acknowledged as the words of Jesus, or as conformable to and explanatory of the meaning of the words of Jesus? “But above all things, my brethren,” says that apostle (v. 12,) “swear not: neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath: but let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay, lest ye fall into condemnation.”

On either of these occasions respectively, did Jesus—did James—explain, and say—“on a judicial occasion, or for a judicial purpose, swear as much as you will, for in such case swearing is not swearing?” On the day when this letter was written by James, had such been the meaning of his master, was it not high time for the disciple to have made known as much?

On this ground stands the system, by which, on pretence of Christianity, Christians in such multitudes, together with all such other persons, to whom it may happen to stand in need of their testimony, are thrust out of the protection of the law—of that branch of it, viz. the penal, on which alone men are altogether dependent for whatsoever protection is afforded to them against the most grievous of the injuries to which man’s nature is exposed.

All this while,—without any the smallest innovation upon Church-of-Englandism—upon that system, in comparison of which all perceptible happiness and unhappiness is as dust upon the balance—without any such horrible and impracticable temerity (will men believe as much when they see it with their own eyes?)—the practice of administering oaths might be abolished. No: not indeed, if so it were, that, by any one of the thirty-nine articles, the practice is enjoined: but on the contrary, so it is, that, by the only article which has any application to the subject, what is declared is—not the obligatoriness—but merely the lawfulness, of employing this instrument. The lawfulness? Yes. Lawful then let it be: at any rate, so as the practice of employing it be done away, the doctrine concerning its lawfulness, taking the word lawfulness in a religious sense, may without much mischief remain unquestioned and undisturbed.

If so it really were, that in all testimonial cases the employment of this supposed security were obligatory, what should be said of those, by whom, to so great an extent as has been seen, it has been left unemployed?

Obligatory or unobligatory, useful or unuseful, the practice at present maintained in relation to it will in either case be indefensible.

[* ]True it is, that, in the same chapter (v. 17,) “Think not,” says Jesus, “that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil . . . &c.” But from this passage, can the oath-and-perjury-compelling powers think to extract a warrant for the exaction or reception of the assertory—the judicial oath? Can any such notion be maintainable, as that—the assertory, the testimonial, the judicial oath, having been allowed by the Mosaic law—the prohibition of it by Jesus would pro tanto be a destruction of that law, and therefore, consistently with the explanation thus given by him, cannot be supposed to have been intended?

In the first place,—although true it is that, if the ordinance in question were of the positive cast, commanding the thing in question to be done, a posterior law, prohibiting that same thing from being done, would pro tanto be destructive of such prior law,—yet whereas, in the present case, that which by the posterior law in question is prohibited, was by the prior law not commanded but only left unprohibited,—what is not true is—that, without special words in the prior law to guard against such prohibition, any such destruction would, in common understanding, be understood to be effected.

In the next place, if, by the prohibition of the assertory oath or vow, the Mosaic law would have been destroyed, then so was it by the prohibition of the promissory oath or vow:—for, that this was in contemplation, and by Jesus meant, if anything was meant, to be included in the prohibition, is put out of doubt by the word “performance”—“but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths.” By these are plainly meant oaths capable of being performed, i. e. vows: promises—intelligible and serious promises—capable of being performed; not that species of nonsense, which, under the name of profane swearing, stands prohibited under 1s. and 5s. penalties by English statute law.