Front Page Titles (by Subject) QUESTION CLXVI.: OF STUDIOUSNESS. - Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2)
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QUESTION CLXVI.: OF STUDIOUSNESS. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2) 
Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).
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Article I.—Is knowledge properly the matter of studiousness?
R. Study properly implies a vigorous application of the mind to some object. Now the mind is not applied to an object otherwise than by knowing or trying to know it. Hence the mind is first applied to knowledge, and secondarily to those things whereunto man is led by knowledge. And therefore study primarily regards knowledge, and in the second place any actions besides, to the doing of which we are guided by knowledge. But the virtues have properly assigned to them that matter, with which they are first and primarily conversant, as fortitude is conversant with perils of death, and temperance with the pleasure of touch. And therefore studiousness is properly said to be about knowledge.
Article II.—Is studiousness a part of temperance?
R. To temperance it belongs to moderate the movement of appetite, that it run not to excess after natural desires. Now as man in his bodily nature desires naturally the pleasures of food and of sex, so in his soul he naturally desires knowledge: hence the Philosopher says that “all men naturally desire to know.” The moderation of this desire belongs to the virtue of studiousness. Consequently studiousness is a potential part of temperance, being attached to it as a secondary to a primary virtue.
§ 3. On the side of the soul man is inclined to desire knowledge; and being so, he must put a laudable restraint on the craving, so as not to push his investigation of things beyond the bounds of moderation. On the other hand, man is inclined on the side of his bodily nature to shun the labour of searching after knowledge. In the first respect then studiousness consists in applying the curb; and in this respect it is set down to be a part of temperance. But in the second respect, the merit of this virtue lies in vigorous application to the pursuit of knowledge: and hence it has its name.