Front Page Titles (by Subject) QUESTION CXIV.: OF THE FRIENDLINESS THAT IS CALLED AFFABILITY. - Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2)
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QUESTION CXIV.: OF THE FRIENDLINESS THAT IS CALLED AFFABILITY. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2) 
Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).
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OF THE FRIENDLINESS THAT IS CALLED AFFABILITY.
Article I.—Is friendliness a special virtue?
R. Where there occurs a special character of goodness, there must be a special character of virtue. But goodness consists in order. And a man must be suitably ordered and adapted to his fellow-men in social intercourse as well in action as in word, that he may behave to each appropriately. And therefore there must be a special virtue that observes this suitable order; and it is called friendliness, or affability.
§ 1. The Philosopher mentions two varieties of friendship: one of which consists principally in the affection with which one man loves another; the other variety consists only in outward words or actions, and has not the perfect nature of friendship, but a certain likeness to it, inasmuch as one behaves becomingly to those with whom he converses.
§ 2. Every man is naturally every man’s friend with a certain general love, as it is said: “Every beast loveth its like.”1 This love is represented by the signs of friendliness that one exteriorly shows in word or action even to foreigners or strangers. Hence there is no simulation or pretence about the matter: for one does not show them perfect signs of friendship, not bearing oneself with the same familiarity towards strangers as towards special friends.
§ 3. “The heart of the wise” is said to be “where there is mourning,”1 not that his presence may bring grief to his neighbour, for the Apostle says: “If because of thy meat thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity,”2 but that he may carry consolation to them that are in grief, according to the text: “Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn.”3 But “the heart of fools is where there is mirth,”4 not that they may bring mirth to others, but that they may enjoy others’ mirth. It belongs therefore to the wise man to be good company to those with whom he converses, not in wantonness that virtue shuns, but with propriety, according to the text: “Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.”5 Sometimes however, for good to come of it, or for the avoidance of evil, the virtuous man will not shrink from making those sorrowful with whom he associates: hence the Apostle says, “Although I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent: now I am glad, not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance.”6
§ 1. As said above, because man is by nature a social animal, he owes by a certain moral fitness that declaration of truth to other men without which human society could not endure. But as man could not live in society without truth, so neither can he without pleasure, because, as the Philosopher says, “None can stay all day with a gloomy person, or with a person who is not pleasant.” And therefore a man is bound by a natural debt of propriety to be pleasant in his intercourse with other men, unless for some reason it be necessary at times to make others sorrowful to good purpose.1
[1 ]Ecclus. xiii. 19.
[1 ]Eccles. vii. 5.
[2 ]Romans xiv. 15.
[3 ]Ecclus. vii. 38.
[4 ]Eccles. vii. 5.
[5 ]Psalm cxxxii. 1.
[6 ]2 Cor. vii. 8.
[1 ]See further on this matter II-II. q. 168 arts. 2. 4 (Trl.)