Econlib

The Library

Other Sites

Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow QUESTION CIX.: OF TRUTHFULNESS. - Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2)

Return to Title Page for Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2)

Search this Title:

Also in the Library:

Subject Area: Philosophy
Subject Area: Religion

QUESTION CIX.: OF TRUTHFULNESS. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2) [1274]

Edition used:

Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).

Part of: Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, 2 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


QUESTION CIX.

OF TRUTHFULNESS.

Article I.

§ 3. He who speaks the truth, utters certain signs conformable to things, the signs being either words or outward deeds or any outward things whatever. But such things are the matter of the moral virtues only: for to them belongs the use of the outward members under the control of the will. Hence truthfulness is a moral virtue. And it is in the golden mean between excess and defect in two ways,—on the part of the object and on the part of the act. On the part of the object, because truth essentially involves a certain equality: now equality is something intermediate between too much and too little: hence by the fact of a person’s saying what is true of himself, he holds an intermediate place between him who says too great things of himself and him who says too small things. On the part of the act it holds the golden mean, inasmuch as it speaks the truth when it ought and as it ought. Now excess is attributable to him who blurts out his own doings and feelings unseasonably; and defect to him who conceals them when he ought to declare them.

Article II.—Is truthfulness a special virtue?

R. The idea of human virtue is that it should render man’s work good. Hence wherever a special character of goodness is found in the act of man, man needs to be disposed thereto by a special virtue. But since goodness consists in order, a special character of goodness must accompany every definable order. But there is a certain special order whereby our outward behaviour whether in word or deed is ordained as a sign to something signified; and to this effect man is perfected by the virtue of truthfulness. Clearly then truthfulness is a special virtue.

Article III.—Is truthfulness a part of justice?

R. The qualification for a virtue to be annexed to justice as a secondary to a primary virtue, is that it should partly coincide with justice and partly fall short of the perfect character thereof. Now the virtue of truthfulness coincides with justice in two particulars. One particular is this, that it is exercised in relation to another person: for the declaration is made to another, the man declaring to that other the truth about himself. The other particular is touching the equality that justice establishes in things; and the virtue of truthfulness does likewise: for it equalizes and adapts signs to existent matters of fact about the speaker. But it falls short of the proper character of justice in respect of the nature of the thing due: for this virtue does not deal with what is legally due, as justice does, but rather with what is morally due, inasmuch as on grounds of moral seemliness one man owes to another a declaration of the truth. Hence truthfulness is a part of justice, being annexed to it as a secondary virtue to its primary.

§ 1. Because man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another that without which human society could not go on. But men could not live with one another, if they did not believe one another as declaring the truth to one another. And therefore the virtue of truthfulness in some way hinges upon the notion of a thing due.