Front Page Titles (by Subject) QUESTION CVII.: OF INGRATITUDE. - Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2)
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QUESTION CVII.: OF INGRATITUDE. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2) 
Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).
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Article II.—Is ingratitude a special sin?
R. Ingratitude means want of gratitude. Now every want or privation has its species according to the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Hence as gratitude is one special virtue, so ingratitude is one special sin. But it has different degrees, according to the order of things requisite for gratitude. There the first thing requisite is that the man should recognize the benefit he has received; the second is praise and rendering of thanks; the third is that he should give something in return according to place and time and his ability. But because what is last to be generated is the first to decay, therefore the first degree of ingratitude is not to return the kindness; the second is to dissemble the kindness, as being unwilling to show that you have received any; the third and most grievous is failing to recognize it as such, either by forgetting it or in any other way. And because in an affirmation there is understood the denial of the opposite statement,1 therefore it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude that a man should render evil for good; to the second, that he should disparage the benefit he has received; to the third, that he should account the benefit an ill turn done him.
Article IV.—Are kindnesses to be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
R. About the ungrateful person two things are to be considered: first, what it is that he deserves to have done to him; and putting the question that way, it is certain that he deserves withdrawal of kindness. In another way it is to be considered, what it befits the benefactor to do. In the first place, he ought not to be too ready to judge that there is ingratitude, for “frequently,” as Seneca says, “he who has made no return is grateful,” the reason being perhaps that he has not had the means or due opportunity of making any return. Secondly, he ought to aim at making the ungrateful person grateful; which if he cannot do with the first act of kindness, he will perhaps do with the second. But if after repeated kindnesses the other increases his ingratitude and becomes worse, the benefactor ought to desist from bestowing kindnesses.
§ 2. He who bestows a kindness on an ungrateful person, does not give him an occasion of sin, but rather of gratitude and love. If the recipient thence takes occasion of ingratitude, that is not to be imputed to the giver.
§ 3. He who bestows a kindness, ought not to pose as a punisher of ingratitude, but rather as a benevolent physician, seeking to cure ingratitude by reiterated acts of kindess.
[1 ]i.e., if you affirm, as below, that a man renders evil for good, you deny the opposite, that he returns good for good. (Trl.)