Front Page Titles (by Subject) QUESTION XLVIII.: OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE. - Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2)
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QUESTION XLVIII.: OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 2 (Summa Theologica - Secunda Secundae Pt.2) 
Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).
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OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE.
Article I.—Are there three assignable parts of prudence?
R. A part is threefold—integral, as wall, roof, and foundation are parts of a house; subjective, as ox and lion are parts of animal; and potential, as nutritive and sensitive are parts of the soul. In three ways, therefore, may we assign parts to any virtue. In one way according to the likeness of integral parts, calling those things parts of any virtue that must needs concur to the perfect act of the said virtue. Again, by the subjective parts of a virtue we understand its different species. In this way the parts of prudence, strictly considered, are the prudence with which a man governs himself, and the prudence with which he governs a people. Lastly, by the potential parts of a virtue are understood the adjoining virtues that are directed to secondary acts or matters, and have not the full force of the primary virtue.