Front Page Titles (by Subject) QUESTION XXIX.: OF PEACE. - Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 1 (Summa Theologica - Prima Secundae, Secunda Secundae Pt.1)
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QUESTION XXIX.: OF PEACE. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 1 (Summa Theologica - Prima Secundae, Secunda Secundae Pt.1) 
Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).
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Article III.—Is peace the proper effect of charity?
R. A double union is of the essence of peace. One union is by subordination of the individual’s own desires all to one object: the other is by union of one individual’s desire with that of another individual. Charity effects both these unions. It effects the first union by making us love God with all our hearts, so as to refer all we have to Him; and thus all our desires tend to one object. It effects the second union by making us love our neighbour as ourselves, with the result that a man wishes to fulfil his neighbour’s will as his own.
§ 2. To the objection, that a thing is not an effect of charity, when the contrary of it can stand with charity—but disagreement, the contrary of peace, can stand with charity, as we see that Jerome and Augustine disagreed in some matters of opinion, and Paul and Barnabas—it is to be said that harmony of opinions is not a point of friendship, but harmony in the practical interests of life, especially those of great importance; for disagreement over small matters counts for no disagreement at all. And therefore there is nothing to prevent persons, who have charity, from disagreeing in matters of opinion. Nor is this inconsistent with peace: because opinions belong to the intellect, which is prior to desire: now it is union of desires that makes peace. In like manner also, so long as there is concord in main interests, disagreement on some little matters is not against charity: for such disagreement arises from diversity of opinions, one party reckoning the matter that they disagree about to be a point of that interest upon which they are agreed, while the other considers that it is not. Accordingly, such disagreement about minutiæ and matters of opinion, though inconsistent with that perfect peace, in which truth will be fully known and every desire satisfied, still is not inconsistent with such imperfect peace as is possible on our way to that goal.