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Front Page Titles (by Subject) QUESTION I.: OF FAITH. - Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 1 (Summa Theologica - Prima Secundae, Secunda Secundae Pt.1)
QUESTION I.: OF FAITH. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 1 (Summa Theologica - Prima Secundae, Secunda Secundae Pt.1) [1274]Edition used:Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).
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QUESTION I.
OF FAITH.
Article I.—Is the object of faith the Sovereign Truth?
R. The object of any cognitive habit has two elements; namely, that which is materially known, which we may call the material object; and that by which the knowledge comes, which is the formal reason of the knowledge of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are things materially known; but the demonstrations by which the conclusions are known, are the formal reason of the knowledge. Thus then in faith, if we consider the formal reason of the knowing of the object, it is nothing else than the Sovereign Truth; for the faith of which we speak does not assent to anything on any other ground than this, that it is revealed by God. Hence faith rests upon the mere truth of God as the means by which it is established and brought home to the mind. But if we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they are not only God Himself, but many other things also, which however do not fall under the assent of faith except so far as they bear some reference to God.
Article IV.—Can the object of faith be anything that is seen?
R. Faith imports the assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways: in one way because it is moved thereto by the object itself, which is either known by itself, as in the case of first principles, whereof there is intuition, or is known through something else, as in the case of conclusions, whereof there is science. In another way the intellect assents to a thing, not because it is sufficiently moved by its own proper object as intellect, but by a choice voluntarily inclining to one side rather than to another. If this be done with doubt and dread of the contrary, it will be opinion; but if it be done with full assurance, unaccompanied by any such dread, it will be faith. But those things are said to be seen, which by themselves move our intellect or sense to a knowledge of them. Hence it is manifest that neither faith nor opinion can be of things that are seen whether by sense or by intellect.
§ 1. On the words, “Because thou hast seen me, Thomas, thou hast believed,” it is to be said that Thomas saw one thing and believed another: he saw a Man, and believing he confessed Him to be God.
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