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• Preface.
• Aquinas Ethicus, Or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. a Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, With Notes.: First Division of the Second Part, Commonly Called Prima Secundæ.
• Question I.: Of the Last End of Man In General.
• Question II.: Of the Object In Which Man’s Happiness Consists.
• Question III.: What Is Happiness?
• Question IV.: Of Things Requisite For Happiness.
• Question V.: Of the Attainment of Happiness.
• Question VI.: Of the Voluntary and the Involuntary.
• Question VII.: Of the Circumstances of Human Acts.
• Question VIII.: Of the Will and Its Objects.
• Question XII.: Of Intention.
• Question XIII.: Of Election, Or Choice of Means.
• Question XVIII.: Of the Good Or Evil of Human Acts In General.
• Question XIX.: Of the Good and Evil of the Interior Act of the Will.
• Question XX.: Of the Good and Evil of Exterior Human Acts.
• Question XXI.: Of the Properties Consequent Upon Human Acts Considered As Good Or Evil.
• Question XXII.: Of the Subject of the Passions.
• Question XXIII.: Of the Difference of Passions One From Another.
• Question XXIV.: Of Good and Evil In Passions.
• Question XXVI.: Of Love.
• Question XXVII.: Of the Cause of Love.
• Question XXVIII.: Of the Effects of Love.
• Question XXIX.: Of Hatred.
• Question XXX.: Of Desire.
• Question XXXI.: Of Delight, Or Pleasure.
• Question XXXII.: Of the Cause of Pleasure.
• Question XXXIII.: Of the Effects of Pleasure.
• Question XXXIV.: Of Good and Evil In Pleasures.
• Question XXXV.: Of Pain and Sorrow In Themselves.
• Question XXXVI.: Of the Causes of Pain.
• Question XXXVIII.: Of Remedies For Sorrow Or Pain.
• Question XXXIX.: Of the Good and Evil of Sorrow Or Pain.
• Question Xl.: of Hope.
• Question Xli.: of Fear In Itself.
• Question Xlii.: of the Object of Fear.
• Question Xliv.: of the Effects of Fear.
• Question Xlv.: of Fiery Daring.
• Question Xlvi.: of Anger As It Is In Itself.
• Question Xlvii.: of the Efficient Cause of Anger.
• Question Xlviii.: of the Effects of Anger.
• Question Xlix.: of Habits In General.
• Question L.: of the Subject of Habits.
• Question Li.: of the Generating Cause of Habits.
• Question Lii.: of the Increase of Habits.
• Question Liii.: of the Destruction and Diminution of Habits.
• Question Lv.: of Virtues In Their Essence.
• Question Lvi.: of the Subject of Virtue.
• Question Lvii.: of the Various Intellectual Virtues.
• Question Lviii.: of the Distinction of Moral Virtues From Intellectual.
• Question Lix.: of Moral Virtues In Their Relation to the Passions.
• Question Lxi.: of the Cardinal Virtues.
• Question Lxii.: of the Theological Virtues.
• Question Lxiii.: of the Cause of Virtues.
• Question Lxiv.: of the Mean of Virtues.
• Question Lxv.: of the Connexion of Virtue With Virtue.
• Question Lxxi.: of Vices and Sins In Themselves.
• Question Lxxii.: of the Distinction Between Sin and Sin.
• Question Lxxiii.: of the Comparison of Sin With Sin.
• Question Lxxiv.: of the Subject of Sins.
• Question Lxxv.: of the Causes of Sin In General.
• Question Lxxvi.: of the Causes of Sin In Particular.
• Question Lxxvii.: of the Cause of Sin On the Part of the Sensitive Appetite.
• Question Lxxviii.: of Malice As a Cause of Sin.
• Question Lxxxiv.: of One Sin Being the Cause of Another Sin.
• Question Lxxxvi.: of the Stain of Sin.
• Question Lxxxvii.: of Liability to Punishment.
• Question Lxxxviii.: of Venial and Mortal Sin.
• Question XC.: Of Laws.
• Question XCI.: Of the Variety of Laws.
• Question XCII.: Of the Effects of Law.
• Question XCIII.: Of the Eternal Law.
• Question XCIV.: Of the Natural Law.
• Question XCV.: Of Human Law.
• Question XCVI.: Of the Authority of Human Law.
• Question XCVII.: Of Change of Laws.
• Question C.: Of the Moral Precepts of the Old Law.
• Second Division, Or Secunda Secundæ.
• Question I.: Of Faith.
• Question II.: Of the Act of Faith.
• Question III.: Of the Exterior Act of Faith.
• Question IV.: Of the Virtue of Faith.
• Question V.: Of Persons Having Faith.
• Question VI.: Of the Cause of Faith.
• Question X.: Of Unbelief In General.
• Question XI.: Of Heresy.
• Question XII.: Of Apostasy.
• Question XIII.: Of the Sin of Blasphemy.
• Question XVII.: Of Hope.
• Question XVIII.: Of the Subject of Hope.
• Question XIX.: Of the Gift of Fear.
• Question XX.: Of Despair.
• Question XXI.: Of Presumption.
• Question XXIII.: Of Charity In Itself.
• Question XXIV.: Of the Subject of Charity.
• Question XXV.: Of the Object of Charity.
• Question XXVI.: Of the Order to Be Observed In Charity.
• Question XXVII.: Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is Love.
• Question XXVIII.: Of Joy.
• Question XXIX.: Of Peace.
• Question XXXI.: Of Doing Good to Others.
• Question XXXII.: Of Almsgiving.
• Question XXXIII.: Of Fraternal Correction.
• Question XXXIV.: Of Hatred.
• Question XXXV.: Of Sloth.
• Question XXXVI.: Of Envy.
• Question XXXVII.: Of Discord.
• Question Xl.: of War.
• Question Xli.: of Assault and Battery.
• Question Xlii.: of Sedition.
• Question Xliii.: of Scandal.
• Question Xliv.: of the Precepts of Charity. [st. Matt. XXII. 36—40.]
• Question Xlvi.: of Stupidity.

QUESTION XCVII.

OF CHANGE OF LAWS.

Article I.—Ought human law ever to be changed at all?

R. Human law is a dictate of reason for the direction of human acts. Thus two manner of causes may appear for a proper alteration of human law: one on the part of reason, another on the part of the people whose acts are regulated by the law. On the part of reason we have this cause, that it seems natural to human reason to travel by degrees from imperfection to perfection. Hence we see in speculative science that the imperfect teaching of early philosophers has given place to the more perfect teaching of a later age. So also in matters of practice: the first who applied their minds to discover something useful for the commonwealth, were not able to take everything into consideration; and accordingly their institutions were defective on many points, which points later ages have altered, and set up other institutions, which it is hoped may prove less defective in view of the public welfare.

On the part of the people whose acts are regulated by law, a law may be changed for the changed condition of the people, as their expediency varies with their condition. Augustine furnishes an example. “If the people,” he says, “are observant of moderation and of principle, and carefully watch over the common interest, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to appoint their own magistrates and carry on the government. If in course of time the same people become gradually corrupt, sell their votes, and place atrocious criminals in office, the power of conferring offices of State is rightly taken away from the people, and returns to the discretion of a few good men.”

Article II.—Ought human law always to be changed when anything better occurs?

R. The alteration of a human law is right exactly so far as the alteration is conducive to the public interest. But the mere change of itself is in some measure prejudicial to that interest, because custom goes a long way towards getting the laws observed, so much so that enactments running counter to common custom, though light in themselves, seem burdensome. Hence, when the law is changed, the binding power of the law is diminished, inasmuch as a custom is set aside. And therefore human law never ought to be changed, unless the gain to the public advantage on the other side be enough to balance the loss on this head.

§ 1. Rules of art have force by reason only; and therefore the old arrangement is to be altered for every improvement that occurs. But laws gather greatest weight by custom, and therefore they ought not lightly to be changed.1

Article III.—Can custom obtain the force of law?

R. Every law emanates from the reason and will of the lawgiver: divine and natural law from the reasonable will of God; human law from the will of man regulated by reason. Now the reason and will of man concerning things to be done may be manifested in deed no less than in word: for a man is always supposed to choose that as good which he carries into effect in act. But clearly the law may be both altered and expounded by the word of man, manifesting the inward motion and concept of human reason. Hence also by repeatedly multiplied acts, which make a custom, the law may be altered and expounded, and also something be established that shall have the force of law; inasmuch as the multiplication of exterior acts is a most effectual declaration of the inward motion of the will and concept of the reason; for when a thing is done many times over, it seems to come of the deliberate judgment of the reason. And in this way custom at once has the force of law, and abolishes law, and is the interpreter of the laws.

§ 2. Human laws break down in some cases. Hence it is possible to act against the law, in a case where the law breaks down, without the act being therefore evil. When cases like this multiply on account of some change in the circumstances of the people, then the law is declared by custom to be no longer useful, as it might be declared by the express promulgation of a law to the contrary. But if the same reason sitll remains for which the law was first useful, then it is not the custom that should prevail against the law, but the law against the custom; unless perchance the law should be adjudged useless on this mere ground, that it is not possible according to the custom of the country, which possibility was one of the conditions of the law. For it is difficult to set aside the custom of the multitude.

§ 3. The people amongst whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. If they are a free people that can make a law for themselves, the consent of the whole people goes for more in favour of the observance indicated by the custom than does the authority of the prince, who has no power of framing a law, except inasmuch as he personates the people. Hence, though individuals cannot make a law, the whole people can make one. But if the people have not the unrestricted power of making a law for themselves, or setting aside a law enacted by higher authority, still the custom prevailing in such a people has the force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by them to whom it belongs to impose a law upon the people: for this tolerance of theirs is taken as an approval of the practice which the custom has brought in.1

Article IV.—Can the rulers of the people dispense from human laws?

R. A dispensation properly means a measuring out to individuals of something held in common. Hence the ruler of a household is called a dispenser, inasmuch as he allots to every one in the household in due weight and measure both duties and the necessaries of life. So then in every community one is said to dispense, in that he ordains how some common precept is to be fulfilled by individuals. But it happens sometimes that a precept which is to be advantage of the community generally, is not adapted to a particular person or to a particular case, either because it would hinder some greater good, or would even bring on some evil. Now it would be dangerous to leave this issue to be settled by individual judgments, except perchance for an evident and sudden emergency. And therefore he who has the ruling of a community has the power of dispensing from the human law that rests on his authority, so that he can give leave for the precept of the law not to be observed by certain persons, or in certain cases, when the law fails in its application to them. But if without this reason he gives leave of his mere will and pleasure, he will be unfaithful in his dispensation, or even imprudent: unfaithful, if he has not an eye to the common good; imprudent, if he is ignorant of the principle on which dispensations should be granted. Wherefore our Lord says: “Who (thinkest thou) is the faithful and wise steward, whom his lord setteth over his family?”1

§ 1. When any one is dispensed from the observance of the general law, it ought not to be to the prejudice of the general good, but to the advancement of the same.

§ 2. It is not a respecting of persons if equal measure is not kept with persons who are unequal. Hence when the condition of any person reasonably requires that some special regard should be had for him, it is not a respecting of persons if a special favour is done him.

§ 3. So far as the natural law contains general precepts that never fail, it does not admit of dispensation. But in its other precepts, that follow as conclusions from the general precepts, a dispensation is sometimes given by man, as that a loan should not be paid back to a traitor, or something of that sort. But in the precepts of the divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man whom God may empower for that special purpose.2

[1 ]Another reason would be, that the value of a new improvement in art or manufactures is at once tested commercially: the value of a new law is not. (Trl.)

[1 ]Therefore, according to St. Thomas (cf. q. 90. art. 3.), sovereignty either may or may not rest with the people. He is opposed at once to intolerant monarchism, and to the “inalienable sovereignty of the people,” as taught by Rousseau. Cf. Ethics and Natural Law, pp. 330, 339, 340. (Trl.)

[1 ]St Luke xii 42

[2 ]The “divine law” is the Christian law (I-II. q 91. art. 4.), and so far as dispensation is possible, the positive part of that law. For the alleged dispensations in the natural law, see above, q 94 art. 5. note (Trl.)