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• Preface.
• Aquinas Ethicus, Or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. a Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, With Notes.: First Division of the Second Part, Commonly Called Prima Secundæ.
• Question I.: Of the Last End of Man In General.
• Question II.: Of the Object In Which Man’s Happiness Consists.
• Question III.: What Is Happiness?
• Question IV.: Of Things Requisite For Happiness.
• Question V.: Of the Attainment of Happiness.
• Question VI.: Of the Voluntary and the Involuntary.
• Question VII.: Of the Circumstances of Human Acts.
• Question VIII.: Of the Will and Its Objects.
• Question XII.: Of Intention.
• Question XIII.: Of Election, Or Choice of Means.
• Question XVIII.: Of the Good Or Evil of Human Acts In General.
• Question XIX.: Of the Good and Evil of the Interior Act of the Will.
• Question XX.: Of the Good and Evil of Exterior Human Acts.
• Question XXI.: Of the Properties Consequent Upon Human Acts Considered As Good Or Evil.
• Question XXII.: Of the Subject of the Passions.
• Question XXIII.: Of the Difference of Passions One From Another.
• Question XXIV.: Of Good and Evil In Passions.
• Question XXVI.: Of Love.
• Question XXVII.: Of the Cause of Love.
• Question XXVIII.: Of the Effects of Love.
• Question XXIX.: Of Hatred.
• Question XXX.: Of Desire.
• Question XXXI.: Of Delight, Or Pleasure.
• Question XXXII.: Of the Cause of Pleasure.
• Question XXXIII.: Of the Effects of Pleasure.
• Question XXXIV.: Of Good and Evil In Pleasures.
• Question XXXV.: Of Pain and Sorrow In Themselves.
• Question XXXVI.: Of the Causes of Pain.
• Question XXXVIII.: Of Remedies For Sorrow Or Pain.
• Question XXXIX.: Of the Good and Evil of Sorrow Or Pain.
• Question Xl.: of Hope.
• Question Xli.: of Fear In Itself.
• Question Xlii.: of the Object of Fear.
• Question Xliv.: of the Effects of Fear.
• Question Xlv.: of Fiery Daring.
• Question Xlvi.: of Anger As It Is In Itself.
• Question Xlvii.: of the Efficient Cause of Anger.
• Question Xlviii.: of the Effects of Anger.
• Question Xlix.: of Habits In General.
• Question L.: of the Subject of Habits.
• Question Li.: of the Generating Cause of Habits.
• Question Lii.: of the Increase of Habits.
• Question Liii.: of the Destruction and Diminution of Habits.
• Question Lv.: of Virtues In Their Essence.
• Question Lvi.: of the Subject of Virtue.
• Question Lvii.: of the Various Intellectual Virtues.
• Question Lviii.: of the Distinction of Moral Virtues From Intellectual.
• Question Lix.: of Moral Virtues In Their Relation to the Passions.
• Question Lxi.: of the Cardinal Virtues.
• Question Lxii.: of the Theological Virtues.
• Question Lxiii.: of the Cause of Virtues.
• Question Lxiv.: of the Mean of Virtues.
• Question Lxv.: of the Connexion of Virtue With Virtue.
• Question Lxxi.: of Vices and Sins In Themselves.
• Question Lxxii.: of the Distinction Between Sin and Sin.
• Question Lxxiii.: of the Comparison of Sin With Sin.
• Question Lxxiv.: of the Subject of Sins.
• Question Lxxv.: of the Causes of Sin In General.
• Question Lxxvi.: of the Causes of Sin In Particular.
• Question Lxxvii.: of the Cause of Sin On the Part of the Sensitive Appetite.
• Question Lxxviii.: of Malice As a Cause of Sin.
• Question Lxxxiv.: of One Sin Being the Cause of Another Sin.
• Question Lxxxvi.: of the Stain of Sin.
• Question Lxxxvii.: of Liability to Punishment.
• Question Lxxxviii.: of Venial and Mortal Sin.
• Question XC.: Of Laws.
• Question XCI.: Of the Variety of Laws.
• Question XCII.: Of the Effects of Law.
• Question XCIII.: Of the Eternal Law.
• Question XCIV.: Of the Natural Law.
• Question XCV.: Of Human Law.
• Question XCVI.: Of the Authority of Human Law.
• Question XCVII.: Of Change of Laws.
• Question C.: Of the Moral Precepts of the Old Law.
• Second Division, Or Secunda Secundæ.
• Question I.: Of Faith.
• Question II.: Of the Act of Faith.
• Question III.: Of the Exterior Act of Faith.
• Question IV.: Of the Virtue of Faith.
• Question V.: Of Persons Having Faith.
• Question VI.: Of the Cause of Faith.
• Question X.: Of Unbelief In General.
• Question XI.: Of Heresy.
• Question XII.: Of Apostasy.
• Question XIII.: Of the Sin of Blasphemy.
• Question XVII.: Of Hope.
• Question XVIII.: Of the Subject of Hope.
• Question XIX.: Of the Gift of Fear.
• Question XX.: Of Despair.
• Question XXI.: Of Presumption.
• Question XXIII.: Of Charity In Itself.
• Question XXIV.: Of the Subject of Charity.
• Question XXV.: Of the Object of Charity.
• Question XXVI.: Of the Order to Be Observed In Charity.
• Question XXVII.: Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is Love.
• Question XXVIII.: Of Joy.
• Question XXIX.: Of Peace.
• Question XXXI.: Of Doing Good to Others.
• Question XXXII.: Of Almsgiving.
• Question XXXIII.: Of Fraternal Correction.
• Question XXXIV.: Of Hatred.
• Question XXXV.: Of Sloth.
• Question XXXVI.: Of Envy.
• Question XXXVII.: Of Discord.
• Question Xl.: of War.
• Question Xli.: of Assault and Battery.
• Question Xlii.: of Sedition.
• Question Xliii.: of Scandal.
• Question Xliv.: of the Precepts of Charity. [st. Matt. XXII. 36—40.]
• Question Xlvi.: of Stupidity.

QUESTION LXXV.

OF THE CAUSES OF SIN IN GENERAL.

Article I.—Has sin any cause?

R. The will, apart from the guidance of the rule of reason and of the divine law, bent upon some good that perishes, causes the act of sin in the way of ordinary causation, but the inordinateness of the act it causes incidentally and beside the intention of the agent; for the failure of order in the act arises from the failure of guidance in the will.

§ 1. Sin means not merely the privation of good, which is the inordinateness of the act, but further the act under that privation.

Article III.—Has sin any outward cause?

R. The inward cause of sin is at once the will as carrying through the act of sin, and the reason as working apart from the due rule, and the sensitive appetite as inclining to the sin. So then an extrinsic agency might possibly be the cause of sin in three ways, either as immediately moving the will, or as moving the reason, or as moving the sensitive appetite. Now as to the will, no one can inwardly move that except God, who cannot be the cause of sin. It remains then that no external agency can be the cause of sin otherwise than either by moving the reason, as a man or a devil persuading to sin, or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain sensible exterior things do. But neither does exterior persuasion necessarily move the reason in matters of conduct, nor do things outwardly set before it necessarily move the sensitive appetite, unless it happen to be somehow predisposed thereunto; and even then the sensitive appetite does not necessarily move the reason and the will. Hence an outward agency may be a cause moving to sin, but not with sufficient power of itself to induce to sin; but the sole cause sufficient to bring sin to full effect is the will alone.

Article IV.—Is sin the cause of sin?

R. One sin may be the cause of another, as one human act may be the cause of another; and that may be in four ways, according to the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, as well ordinary as incidental. Incidentally,1 by removing an obstacle, which is called moving incidentally; for when by one act of sin a man loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that went towards withdrawing him from sin, he falls thereby into another sin; and so the first sin is the cause of the second incidentally. Again, ordinarily,1 when by committing one sin a man is disposed more easily to commit another sin like the first; for of acts are caused dispositions and habits inclining to other similar acts. In the genus of material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing matter for it; as avarice prepares matter for litigation. In the genus of final cause, one sin is the cause of another, inasmuch as for the end and aim of one sin a person goes and commits another sin; as when one commits simony for some aim of ambition. And because in moral things it is the end in view that gives the form, it follows that the one sin is the formal cause of the other: for in an act of theft committed as a means to fornication as an end, theft is the material element, and fornication the formal.1

§ 3. Not every cause of sin is another sin: hence there is no running to infinity; but it is possible to arrive at a sin, the cause of which is not any other sin.

§ 4. Gregory says: “The sin that is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is at once a sin and a cause of sin.”

[1 ]Incidentally and ordinarily here stand respectively for per accidens and per se. On the rendering of these terms in English, see note on II-II. q. 37. art. 1 (Trl.)

[1 ]Incidentally and ordinarily here stand respectively for per accidens and per se. On the rendering of these terms in English, see note on II-II. q. 37. art. 1 (Trl.)

[1 ]A stock example, taken from Aristotle In the original, the means and end here change places. Elsewhere they figure as in this translation. (Trl.)