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• Preface.
• Aquinas Ethicus, Or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. a Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, With Notes.: First Division of the Second Part, Commonly Called Prima Secundæ.
• Question I.: Of the Last End of Man In General.
• Question II.: Of the Object In Which Man’s Happiness Consists.
• Question III.: What Is Happiness?
• Question IV.: Of Things Requisite For Happiness.
• Question V.: Of the Attainment of Happiness.
• Question VI.: Of the Voluntary and the Involuntary.
• Question VII.: Of the Circumstances of Human Acts.
• Question VIII.: Of the Will and Its Objects.
• Question XII.: Of Intention.
• Question XIII.: Of Election, Or Choice of Means.
• Question XVIII.: Of the Good Or Evil of Human Acts In General.
• Question XIX.: Of the Good and Evil of the Interior Act of the Will.
• Question XX.: Of the Good and Evil of Exterior Human Acts.
• Question XXI.: Of the Properties Consequent Upon Human Acts Considered As Good Or Evil.
• Question XXII.: Of the Subject of the Passions.
• Question XXIII.: Of the Difference of Passions One From Another.
• Question XXIV.: Of Good and Evil In Passions.
• Question XXVI.: Of Love.
• Question XXVII.: Of the Cause of Love.
• Question XXVIII.: Of the Effects of Love.
• Question XXIX.: Of Hatred.
• Question XXX.: Of Desire.
• Question XXXI.: Of Delight, Or Pleasure.
• Question XXXII.: Of the Cause of Pleasure.
• Question XXXIII.: Of the Effects of Pleasure.
• Question XXXIV.: Of Good and Evil In Pleasures.
• Question XXXV.: Of Pain and Sorrow In Themselves.
• Question XXXVI.: Of the Causes of Pain.
• Question XXXVIII.: Of Remedies For Sorrow Or Pain.
• Question XXXIX.: Of the Good and Evil of Sorrow Or Pain.
• Question Xl.: of Hope.
• Question Xli.: of Fear In Itself.
• Question Xlii.: of the Object of Fear.
• Question Xliv.: of the Effects of Fear.
• Question Xlv.: of Fiery Daring.
• Question Xlvi.: of Anger As It Is In Itself.
• Question Xlvii.: of the Efficient Cause of Anger.
• Question Xlviii.: of the Effects of Anger.
• Question Xlix.: of Habits In General.
• Question L.: of the Subject of Habits.
• Question Li.: of the Generating Cause of Habits.
• Question Lii.: of the Increase of Habits.
• Question Liii.: of the Destruction and Diminution of Habits.
• Question Lv.: of Virtues In Their Essence.
• Question Lvi.: of the Subject of Virtue.
• Question Lvii.: of the Various Intellectual Virtues.
• Question Lviii.: of the Distinction of Moral Virtues From Intellectual.
• Question Lix.: of Moral Virtues In Their Relation to the Passions.
• Question Lxi.: of the Cardinal Virtues.
• Question Lxii.: of the Theological Virtues.
• Question Lxiii.: of the Cause of Virtues.
• Question Lxiv.: of the Mean of Virtues.
• Question Lxv.: of the Connexion of Virtue With Virtue.
• Question Lxxi.: of Vices and Sins In Themselves.
• Question Lxxii.: of the Distinction Between Sin and Sin.
• Question Lxxiii.: of the Comparison of Sin With Sin.
• Question Lxxiv.: of the Subject of Sins.
• Question Lxxv.: of the Causes of Sin In General.
• Question Lxxvi.: of the Causes of Sin In Particular.
• Question Lxxvii.: of the Cause of Sin On the Part of the Sensitive Appetite.
• Question Lxxviii.: of Malice As a Cause of Sin.
• Question Lxxxiv.: of One Sin Being the Cause of Another Sin.
• Question Lxxxvi.: of the Stain of Sin.
• Question Lxxxvii.: of Liability to Punishment.
• Question Lxxxviii.: of Venial and Mortal Sin.
• Question XC.: Of Laws.
• Question XCI.: Of the Variety of Laws.
• Question XCII.: Of the Effects of Law.
• Question XCIII.: Of the Eternal Law.
• Question XCIV.: Of the Natural Law.
• Question XCV.: Of Human Law.
• Question XCVI.: Of the Authority of Human Law.
• Question XCVII.: Of Change of Laws.
• Question C.: Of the Moral Precepts of the Old Law.
• Second Division, Or Secunda Secundæ.
• Question I.: Of Faith.
• Question II.: Of the Act of Faith.
• Question III.: Of the Exterior Act of Faith.
• Question IV.: Of the Virtue of Faith.
• Question V.: Of Persons Having Faith.
• Question VI.: Of the Cause of Faith.
• Question X.: Of Unbelief In General.
• Question XI.: Of Heresy.
• Question XII.: Of Apostasy.
• Question XIII.: Of the Sin of Blasphemy.
• Question XVII.: Of Hope.
• Question XVIII.: Of the Subject of Hope.
• Question XIX.: Of the Gift of Fear.
• Question XX.: Of Despair.
• Question XXI.: Of Presumption.
• Question XXIII.: Of Charity In Itself.
• Question XXIV.: Of the Subject of Charity.
• Question XXV.: Of the Object of Charity.
• Question XXVI.: Of the Order to Be Observed In Charity.
• Question XXVII.: Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is Love.
• Question XXVIII.: Of Joy.
• Question XXIX.: Of Peace.
• Question XXXI.: Of Doing Good to Others.
• Question XXXII.: Of Almsgiving.
• Question XXXIII.: Of Fraternal Correction.
• Question XXXIV.: Of Hatred.
• Question XXXV.: Of Sloth.
• Question XXXVI.: Of Envy.
• Question XXXVII.: Of Discord.
• Question Xl.: of War.
• Question Xli.: of Assault and Battery.
• Question Xlii.: of Sedition.
• Question Xliii.: of Scandal.
• Question Xliv.: of the Precepts of Charity. [st. Matt. XXII. 36—40.]
• Question Xlvi.: of Stupidity.

QUESTION LXIV.

OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUES.1

Article I.—Are moral virtues in a mean?

R. The proper function of moral virtue is to perfect the appetitive part of the soul with regard to some determinate matter. Now the measure and rule of the movement of the appetite towards its object is reason. But the goodness of everything that comes under measure and rule consists in its being conformed to its rule. Consequently, evil in these things lies in departure from rule or measure either by excess or defect. And therefore it is clear that the good of moral virtue consists in being up to the level of the measure of reason: which condition of being up to the level, or of conformity to rule, evidently lies in the mean between excess and defect.

§ 2. The mean and the extremes in actions and passions are determined according to circumstances; and circumstances differ. Hence there is nothing to hinder a virtue exhibiting what is an extreme according to one circumstance, and yet is a mean according to other circumstances by conformity to reason; and such is the case with munificence and magnanimity. For if we consider the absolute quantity of that unto which the munificent and magnanimous man tends, it will be called an extreme and a maximum: but if this same degree is considered in respect of other circumstances, at that rate it has the character of a mean, because the said virtues tend to this maximum according to the rule of reason, where they ought, and when they ought, and for the motive for which they ought: whereas excess would be to tend to this maximum when one ought not, or where one ought not, or for a motive for which one ought not; and defect would be not to tend to this maximum where one ought and when one ought.

§ 3. The same is the explanation of virginity and of evangelical poverty as of magnanimity. Virginity abstains from all sexual pleasure, and evangelical poverty from all riches, for the motive for which and according to the rule by which they ought, that is, according to the command of God and for life everlasting.1

Article II.—Is the mean of moral virtue the mean of the objective thing or the mean of reason?

R. The mean of reason may be understood in two ways: in one way as a mean existing in the act itself of reason, as though it were the act of reason itself that was reduced to a mean. In that sense the mean of moral virtue is not the mean of reason: because moral virtue does not perfect the act of reason, but the act of the appetitive faculty. In another way, by the mean of reason may be understood that mean which is fixed by reason in any matter. In that sense every mean of moral virtue is the mean of reason; because moral virtue is said to stand in a mean by conformity to right reason. But sometimes it happens that the mean of reason is also the mean of the objective thing; and then the mean of moral virtue must also be the mean of the objective thing, as in the case of justice. Sometimes, again, the mean of reason is not the mean of the objective thing, but is taken in reference to ourselves; and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The explanation of this is, that justice deals with acts that are about exterior things; and there the standard of right must be set up simply and objectively, as things are in themselves. And therefore the mean of reason in justice is the same as the mean of the objective thing, inasmuch as justice renders to every man his due, no more and no less. But the other moral virtues are concerned with interior passions, in which the right measure cannot be fixed in the same way, because different men stand differently towards the passions. And therefore the right measure of reason in the passions must be determined in reference to us who are moved by passion.1

Article IV.—Do the theological virtues observe the golden mean?

R. There are two measures of a theological virtue: one with regard to the virtue itself, and the other in our regard. The measure and rule of the theological virtue in itself, is God. For our faith is ruled by God’s truth, our charity by His goodness, and our hope is measured by the greatness of His omnipotence and loving kindness. But this is a measure exceeding all human ability; and therefore never can man love God so much as He ought to be loved; nor believe or hope in Him as much as is due. Much less can there be excess there; and therefore the goodness of such virtue does not consist in any observance of a golden mean, but the observance is all the better the more it is carried to a height.

The other rule or measure of a theological virtue is in regard of ourselves: because though we cannot go out to God as we ought, still we ought to go out to Him, believing in Him, hoping in Him, and loving Him, according to the measure of our condition. Hence a mean and extremes may be made out in a theological virtue incidentally, in regard of ourselves.

[1 ]Ethics and Natural Law, pp. 77—84. (Trl.)

[1 ]Ethics and Natural Law, p. 84, n. 8. (Trl.)

[1 ]The golden mean must be taken in relation to ourselves. (See Ethics and Natural Law, p. 80.) In justice alone there is question, not of ourselves, but of our neighbour’s right, and of any contract we have made with him. The mean then must be fixed, not by what suits us, but by the objective letter of the contract, so far as justice alone is concerned. (Trl.)