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Subject Area: Philosophy
Subject Area: Religion

QUESTION LI.: OF THE GENERATING CAUSE OF HABITS. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 1 (Summa Theologica - Prima Secundae, Secunda Secundae Pt.1) [1274]

Edition used:

Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).

Part of: Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, 2 vols.

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QUESTION LI.

OF THE GENERATING CAUSE OF HABITS.1

Article II.—Is any habit caused by acts?

R. Sometimes in an agent there is only the active principle of its act; and in such an agent there cannot be caused by its own action any habit. Hence it is that physical things, as it is said, “can neither grow accustomed nor unaccustomed.” But there is found an agent wherein there is an active and a passive principle of its act, as is manifest in human acts. For the act of the appetitive faculty proceeds from the appetitive power, inasmuch as that power is impressed by the apprehensive power representing the object; and further, the intellectual power, so far as it reasons about conclusions, has for active principle some self-evident proposition. Hence from such acts certain habits may be caused in the agents, not indeed as to the first active principle, but as to the principle of the act, which transmits an impression which it has itself first received. For everything that is acted on and impressed by another receives a disposition from the act of that which acts upon it. Hence by multiplication of acts there is generated a certain quality in the passive power that receives the impression, which quality is named a habit. Thus the habits of moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers, inasmuch as they are impressed by reason; and the habits of sciences are caused in the intellect, inasmuch as that is impressed by primary propositions.

[1 ]The substance of Article I., otherwise a very important article, will be found in q. 63. art. 1. (Trl.)