The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Preface.
• Aquinas Ethicus, Or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. a Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second Part of the Summa Theologica, With Notes.: First Division of the Second Part, Commonly Called Prima Secundæ.
• Question I.: Of the Last End of Man In General.
• Question II.: Of the Object In Which Man’s Happiness Consists.
• Question III.: What Is Happiness?
• Question IV.: Of Things Requisite For Happiness.
• Question V.: Of the Attainment of Happiness.
• Question VI.: Of the Voluntary and the Involuntary.
• Question VII.: Of the Circumstances of Human Acts.
• Question VIII.: Of the Will and Its Objects.
• Question XII.: Of Intention.
• Question XIII.: Of Election, Or Choice of Means.
• Question XVIII.: Of the Good Or Evil of Human Acts In General.
• Question XIX.: Of the Good and Evil of the Interior Act of the Will.
• Question XX.: Of the Good and Evil of Exterior Human Acts.
• Question XXI.: Of the Properties Consequent Upon Human Acts Considered As Good Or Evil.
• Question XXII.: Of the Subject of the Passions.
• Question XXIII.: Of the Difference of Passions One From Another.
• Question XXIV.: Of Good and Evil In Passions.
• Question XXVI.: Of Love.
• Question XXVII.: Of the Cause of Love.
• Question XXVIII.: Of the Effects of Love.
• Question XXIX.: Of Hatred.
• Question XXX.: Of Desire.
• Question XXXI.: Of Delight, Or Pleasure.
• Question XXXII.: Of the Cause of Pleasure.
• Question XXXIII.: Of the Effects of Pleasure.
• Question XXXIV.: Of Good and Evil In Pleasures.
• Question XXXV.: Of Pain and Sorrow In Themselves.
• Question XXXVI.: Of the Causes of Pain.
• Question XXXVIII.: Of Remedies For Sorrow Or Pain.
• Question XXXIX.: Of the Good and Evil of Sorrow Or Pain.
• Question Xl.: of Hope.
• Question Xli.: of Fear In Itself.
• Question Xlii.: of the Object of Fear.
• Question Xliv.: of the Effects of Fear.
• Question Xlv.: of Fiery Daring.
• Question Xlvi.: of Anger As It Is In Itself.
• Question Xlvii.: of the Efficient Cause of Anger.
• Question Xlviii.: of the Effects of Anger.
• Question Xlix.: of Habits In General.
• Question L.: of the Subject of Habits.
• Question Li.: of the Generating Cause of Habits.
• Question Lii.: of the Increase of Habits.
• Question Liii.: of the Destruction and Diminution of Habits.
• Question Lv.: of Virtues In Their Essence.
• Question Lvi.: of the Subject of Virtue.
• Question Lvii.: of the Various Intellectual Virtues.
• Question Lviii.: of the Distinction of Moral Virtues From Intellectual.
• Question Lix.: of Moral Virtues In Their Relation to the Passions.
• Question Lxi.: of the Cardinal Virtues.
• Question Lxii.: of the Theological Virtues.
• Question Lxiii.: of the Cause of Virtues.
• Question Lxiv.: of the Mean of Virtues.
• Question Lxv.: of the Connexion of Virtue With Virtue.
• Question Lxxi.: of Vices and Sins In Themselves.
• Question Lxxii.: of the Distinction Between Sin and Sin.
• Question Lxxiii.: of the Comparison of Sin With Sin.
• Question Lxxiv.: of the Subject of Sins.
• Question Lxxv.: of the Causes of Sin In General.
• Question Lxxvi.: of the Causes of Sin In Particular.
• Question Lxxvii.: of the Cause of Sin On the Part of the Sensitive Appetite.
• Question Lxxviii.: of Malice As a Cause of Sin.
• Question Lxxxiv.: of One Sin Being the Cause of Another Sin.
• Question Lxxxvi.: of the Stain of Sin.
• Question Lxxxvii.: of Liability to Punishment.
• Question Lxxxviii.: of Venial and Mortal Sin.
• Question XC.: Of Laws.
• Question XCI.: Of the Variety of Laws.
• Question XCII.: Of the Effects of Law.
• Question XCIII.: Of the Eternal Law.
• Question XCIV.: Of the Natural Law.
• Question XCV.: Of Human Law.
• Question XCVI.: Of the Authority of Human Law.
• Question XCVII.: Of Change of Laws.
• Question C.: Of the Moral Precepts of the Old Law.
• Second Division, Or Secunda Secundæ.
• Question I.: Of Faith.
• Question II.: Of the Act of Faith.
• Question III.: Of the Exterior Act of Faith.
• Question IV.: Of the Virtue of Faith.
• Question V.: Of Persons Having Faith.
• Question VI.: Of the Cause of Faith.
• Question X.: Of Unbelief In General.
• Question XI.: Of Heresy.
• Question XII.: Of Apostasy.
• Question XIII.: Of the Sin of Blasphemy.
• Question XVII.: Of Hope.
• Question XVIII.: Of the Subject of Hope.
• Question XIX.: Of the Gift of Fear.
• Question XX.: Of Despair.
• Question XXI.: Of Presumption.
• Question XXIII.: Of Charity In Itself.
• Question XXIV.: Of the Subject of Charity.
• Question XXV.: Of the Object of Charity.
• Question XXVI.: Of the Order to Be Observed In Charity.
• Question XXVII.: Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is Love.
• Question XXVIII.: Of Joy.
• Question XXIX.: Of Peace.
• Question XXXI.: Of Doing Good to Others.
• Question XXXII.: Of Almsgiving.
• Question XXXIII.: Of Fraternal Correction.
• Question XXXIV.: Of Hatred.
• Question XXXV.: Of Sloth.
• Question XXXVI.: Of Envy.
• Question XXXVII.: Of Discord.
• Question Xl.: of War.
• Question Xli.: of Assault and Battery.
• Question Xlii.: of Sedition.
• Question Xliii.: of Scandal.
• Question Xliv.: of the Precepts of Charity. [st. Matt. XXII. 36—40.]
• Question Xlvi.: of Stupidity.

QUESTION XXXII.

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE.

Article I.—Is activity the proper cause of pleasure?

R. For pleasure two things are requisite, the attainment of a fitting good, and the knowledge of that attainment. Both these requisites consist in a certain activity, for actual knowledge is an activity. In like manner we gain fitting good by some activity; also the very activity itself that is proper to the agent is a certain fitting good. Hence all pleasure must follow upon some activity.

§ 1. The objects on which our activities are exercised are not pleasurable to us except inasmuch as they are conjoined to us either by knowledge, as when we take pleasure in looking at things, or in some other way along with knowledge, as when a man takes pleasure in knowing that he has some good possession, as riches, or honour, or the like, which would not give him pleasure but for the fact of his apprehending it as his possession. But possession here means nothing else than the use of the thing, or the power to use it, and that is by a certain activity. Hence it is clear that every pleasure is reducible to activity as to its cause.

§ 2. Even in cases where not the activities, but the products of activity, are the ends in view, those products of activity are pleasant inasmuch as they are possessed: which possession has reference to some use or activity.

§ 3. Activities are pleasant inasmuch as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. But since human strength is limited, activity is proportionate to it according to a certain measure. Hence any activity exceeding that measure ceases to be proportionate or pleasant, and becomes rather laborious and wearisome. And in this way ease and play and other things that belong to rest, are pleasant, inasmuch as they take away the distress that is of labour.

§ 4. The Philosopher says: “Pleasure is a connatural activity, unimpeded.”

Article II.—Is change a cause of pleasure?

R. There are three requisites of pleasure: a pleasurable good, the conjunction of the pleasurable object with the subject, and the knowledge of this conjunction. And under these three heads change is made out to be pleasant. On the part of us who are the subjects of pleasure, change is rendered pleasant to us, because our nature is changeable, and therefore what is suitable to us now, afterwards will not be suitable: as warming oneself at the fire suits a man in winter, not in summer. On the part also of the pleasurable good that is brought into conjunction with us, change becomes pleasant, because the continued action of anything increases its effect, as the longer one keeps near a fire the more he is warmed and dried. But a natural frame of being consists in a certain fixed measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasurable object goes beyond the measure of one’s natural frame of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasurable. On the part of the knowledge itself—because man desires a perfect whole; when therefore things cannot be apprehended as a whole, change in them is pleasant, so that one part may pass, and another part succeed, and thus the whole be appreciated. If therefore there be any Being the nature of which is unchangeable, a Being the natural proportion of which cannot be outdone by the continuance of any delightful object, a Being which can behold the whole object of its delight at once,—to that Being change will not be agreeable. And the more any pleasures approach the condition of this pleasure, the more capable are they of continuance.

§ 3. What is customary becomes pleasant by becoming natural, for custom is a second nature. But the change that is pleasant is not that change which departs from custom, but rather the change that prevents the spoiling of a natural frame of being, that might ensue from holding on too long in some one activity. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness it is that custom is rendered pleasant and change delightful.

Article VI.—Is beneficence a cause of pleasure?

R. So far as we reckon the good of another to be as it were our own good, on account of the union of love, we take pleasure as in our own good in the good which accrues through us to others, especially to friends. In another way beneficence becomes pleasant, inasmuch as thereby a man gets an imagination of an overflowing source of good existing in himself, whence he is able also to impart to others, which is the reason why men take pleasure in their children and in their own works, as imparting to them their own good.

§ 3. To conquer, confute, and punish is not pleasant in that it makes for the evil of another, but in that it belongs to one’s own good, which a man loves more than he hates another’s evil. For it is naturally pleasant to conquer, inasmuch as thereby an idea is formed of one’s own excellence; and therefore all games into which rivalry enters, and where victory is possible, are especially pleasant; and generally all contests according as they hold out hope of victory. To confute and rebuke may be a cause of pleasure in two ways: in one way in that it gives a man an imagination of his own wisdom and excellence, for rebuke and correction is the function of wise men and elders; in another way in that by rebuke and reprehension one does good to another, which is pleasant. But to an angry man it is pleasant to punish, in that he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, coming of a previous offence; for when one is offended by another, he thinks himself slighted thereby, and therefore he desires to be rid of this slight by paying back the offence that he has sustained. And thus it is clear that beneficence can be of itself pleasant; but maleficence is not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to belong to one’s own good.