Front Page Titles (by Subject) QUESTION XXVI.: OF LOVE. - Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 1 (Summa Theologica - Prima Secundae, Secunda Secundae Pt.1)
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QUESTION XXVI.: OF LOVE. - St. Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, vol. 1 (Summa Theologica - Prima Secundae, Secunda Secundae Pt.1) 
Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas. A Translation of the Principal Portions of the Second part of the Summa Theologica, with Notes by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (London: Burns and Oates, 1892).
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Article II.—Is love a passion?
R. The first impression made on appetite by its object is called love, which is nothing else than a complacency taken in an object of appetite; and from this complacency follows movement towards the said object, which movement is desire; and finally comes rest, which is joy. So then, since love consists in a certain impression made on appetite by its object, manifestly love is a passion, and that in the strict sense of the word, inasmuch as it is in the concupiscible faculty; and generally, and by extension of the name, inasmuch as it is in the will.
Article IV.—Is love fitly divided into love of friendship and love of desire?
R. As the Philosopher says, “to love is to wish good to another.” So therefore the movement of love tends to two objects, to the good which one wishes for a person, either oneself or another; and to the person for whom one wishes the good. Towards the good then which one wishes for some one the love of desire is entertained: but towards the person for whom one wishes that good, there is entertained the love of friendship. What is loved with a love of friendship is loved absolutely and by itself; but what is loved with a love of desire is not loved absolutely and by itself, but is loved for another. The love wherewith an object is loved that good may accrue to it, is love absolutely; but the love wherewith a thing is loved that it may be the good of another, is love in a restricted sense.
§ 1. Love is not divided into friendship and desire, but into love of friendship and of desire: for he is properly called a friend, to whom we wish any good; and that we are said to desire which we wish for ourselves.