Home

Lectures On Jurisprudence, ed. R.. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein, vol. V of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982).

Part of: The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, 7 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

Copyright information:

The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith and the associated volumes are published in hardcover by Oxford University Press. The six titles of the Glasgow Edition, but not the associated volumes, are being published in softcover by Liberty Fund. The online edition is published by Liberty Fund under license from Oxford University Press.

©Oxford University Press 1976. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be stored transmitted retransmitted lent or reproduced in any form or medium without the permission of Oxford University Press.

Fair use statement:

This material is put online to further the educational goals of Liberty Fund, Inc. Unless otherwise stated in the Copyright Information section above, this material may be used freely for educational and academic purposes. It may not be used in any way for profit.

LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE

REPORT DATED 1766

Juris Prudence or Notes from the Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms delivered in the University of Glasgow

by Adam Smith Professor of Moral Philosophy.

mdcclxvi

| Juris Prudence

INTRODUCTION

Jurisprudence is that science which inquires into the general principles which ought to be the foundation of the laws of all nations. Grotius seems to have been the first who attempted to give the world any thing like a regular system of natural jurisprudence, and his treatise on the laws of war and peace, with all its imperfections, is perhaps at this day the most compleat work on this subject.1 It is a sort of casuistical book for sovereigns and states determining in what cases war may justly be made and how far it may be carried on. As states have no common sovereign and are with respect to one another in a state of nature, war is their only method of redressing injuries. He determines war to be lawfull in every case where the state receives an injury which would be redress’d | by an equitable civil magistrate.2 This naturaly led him to inquire into the constitution of states, and the principles of civil laws; into the rights of sovereigns and subjects; into the nature of crimes, contracts, property, and whatever else was the object of law, so that the two first books of his treatise, which are upon this subject, are a compleat system of jurisprudence.

The next writer of note after Grotius was Mr. Hobbes. He had conceived an utter abhorrence of the ecclesiastics; and the bigottry of his times gave him occasion to think that the subjection of the consciences of men to ecclesiastic authority was the cause of the dissensions and civil wars that happened in England during the times of Charles the 1st and of Cromwell. In opposition to them he endeavoured to establish a system of morals by which the consciences of men might be subjected to the civil power, and which represented the will of the magistrate as the only proper rule of conduct. Before the establishment of civil society mankind according to him were in a state of war; and in order to avoid the ills of a natural state, men enter’d into contract to obey one common sovereign who should determine all disputes. Obedience to his will according to him constituted civil government, | without which there could be no virtue, and consequently it too was the foundation and essence of virtue.

The divines thought themselves obliged to oppose this pernicious doctrine concerning virtue, and attacked it by endeavouring to shew that a state of nature was not a state of war but that society might subsist, tho’ not in so harmonious a manner, without civil institutions. They endeavoured to shew that man in this state has certain rights belonging to him, such as a right to his body, to the fruits of his labour, and the fullfilling of contracts. With this design Puffendorf wrote his large treatise.3 The sole intention of the first part of it is to confute Hobbes, tho’ it in reality serves no purpose to treat of the laws which would take place in a state of nature, or by what means succession to property was carried on, as there is no such state existing.

The next who wrote on this subject was the Baron de Cocceii, a Prussian. | There are five volumes in folio of his works published,4 many of which are very ingenious and distinct, especially those which treat of laws. In the last volume he gives an account of some German systems.

Besides these there are no systems of note upon this subject.

Remainder of 4 left blank in MS.

| Jurisprudence is the theory of the general principles of law and government.

The four great objects of law are Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms.

The object of Justice is the security from injury, and it is the foundation of civil government.

The objects of Police are the cheapness of commodities, public security, and cleanliness, if the two last were not too minute for a lecture of this kind. Under this head we will consider the opulence of a state.

It is likewise necessary that the magistrate who bestows his time and labour in the business of the state should be compensated for it. For this purpose and for defraying the expences of government some fund must be raised. Hence the origine of Revenue. The subject of consideration under this head will be the proper means of levying revenue, which must come from the people by taxes, duties, etca. In general whatever revenue can be raised most insensibly from the people ought to be preferr’d, and in the sequel it is proposed to be shewn how far the laws of Brittain and of other European | nations are calculated for this purpose.

As the best police cannot give security unless the government can defend themselves from forreign injuries and attacks, the fourth thing appointed by law is for this purpose, and under this head will be shewn the different species of Arms with their advantages and dissadvantages, the constitution of standing armies, militias, etca.

After these will be considered the laws of nations, under which are comprehended the demands which one independent society may have upon another, the priviledges of aliens, and proper grounds for making war.

Part 1st. Of Justice

The end of justice is to secure from injury. A man may be injured in several respects.

1st, as a man

2^dly, as a member of a family

3^dly, as a member of a state.

As a man, he may be injured in his body, reputation, or estate.

As a member of a family, he may be injured as a father, as a son, as a husband or wife, as a master or servant, as a guardian or pupil. | For the two last are to be considered in a family relation, till such time as the pupil can take care of himself.

As a member of a state, a magistrate may be injured by dissobedience or a subject by oppression, etca.

A man may be injured 1st, in his body by wounding, maiming, murthering, or by infringing his liberty.

2^dly, in his reputation, either by falsely representing him as a proper object of resentment or punishment as by calling him a thief or robber, or by depreciating his real worth, and endeavouring to degrade him below the level of his profession. A physician’s character is injured when we endeavour to perswade the world he kills his patients instead of curing them, for by such a report he loses his business. We do not however injure a man when we do not give him all the praise that is due to his merit. We do not injure Sir Isaac Newton or Mr. Pope, when we say that Sir Isaac was no better philosopher than Descartes or that Mr. Pope was no better poet than the ordinary ones of his own time. By these expressions we do not bestow on them all the praise that they deserve, yet we do them no injury, for we do not throw them below the ordinary rank of men in their own professions. | These rights which a man has to the preservation of his body and reputation from injury are called natural. Or as the civilians express them iura hominum naturalia.

3^dly, a man may be injured in his estate. His rights to his estate are called acquired or iura adventitia and are of two kinds, real and personal.

A real right is that whose object is a real thing and which can be claimed a quocumque possessore. Such are all possessions, houses, furniture.

Personal rights are such as can be claimed by a law–suit from a particular person, but not a quocumque possessore. Such are all debts and contracts, the payment or performance of which can be demanded only from one person. If I buy a horse and have him delivered to me, tho’ the former owner sell him to another, I can claim him a quocumque possessore; but if he was not delivered to me, I can only pursue the seller.

Real rights are of four kinds, Property, Servitudes, Pledges, and Exclusive Priviledges.

Property is our possessions of every kind which if any way lost, or taken from us by stealth or violence, may be redemanded a quocumque possessore.

| Servitudes are burthens upon the property of another. Thus I may have a liberty of passing thro’ a field belonging to another which lyes between me and the high way, or if my neighbour have plenty of water in his fields and I have none in mine for my cattle, I may have a right to drive them to his. Such burthens on the property of another are called servitudes. These rights were originally personal, but the trouble and expence of numerous lawsuits in order to get possession of them, when the adjacent property which was burthened with them passed thro’ a number of hands, induced legislators to make them real, and claimable a quocumque possessore. Afterwards the property was transferred with these servitudes upon it.

Pledges, which include all pawns and mortgages, are securities for something else to which we have a right. The laws of most civilized nations have considered them as real rights, and give a [a] liberty to claim them as such.

Exclusive priviledges are such as that of a book–seller to vend a book for a certain number of years, and to hinder any other person from doing it during that period. These rights are for the most part creatures of the civil law, tho’ some few of them are natural, | as in a state of hunters even before the origin of civil government if a man has started a hare and pursued her for sometime, he has an exclusive priviledge to hunt her, by which he can hinder any other to come in upon her with a fresh pack of hounds.

An heir has also an exclusive priviledge of hindering any person to take possession of the inheritance left him while he is deliberating whither or not it will be for his interest to take possession of it and pay off the debts with which it is burthened.

Personal rights are of three kinds as they arise from Contract, Quasi Contract, or Delinquencey.

The foundation of contract is the reasonable expectation which the person who promises raises in the person to whom he binds himself; of which the satisfaction may be extorted by force.

Quasi contract is the right which one has to a compensation for necessary trouble and expence about another man’s affairs. If a person finds a watch in the high–way he has a claim to a reward and to the defraying of his expences in finding out the owner. If a man lend me a sum of money5 he has a right not only to the sum, but to interest also.

| Delinquencey is founded upon damage done to any person, whither thro’ malice or culpable negligence. A person has a right to claim these only from a certain person.

The objects of these seven rights make up the whole of a man’s estate.

The origin of natural rights is quite evident. That a person has a right to have his body free from injury, and his liberty free from infringement unless there be a proper cause, no body doubts. But acquired rights such as property require more explanation. Property and civil government very much depend on one another. The preservation of property and the inequality of possession first formed it, and the state of property must always vary with the form of government. The civilians begin with considering government and then treat of property and other rights. Others6 who have written on this subject begin with the latter and then consider family and civil government. There are several advantages peculiar to each of these methods, tho’ that of the civil law seems upon the whole preferable.

| Of Public Jurisprudence

There are two principles which induce men to enter into a civil society, which we shall call the principles of authority and utility. At the head of every small society or association of men we find a person of superiour abilities; in a warlike society he is a man of superiour strength, and in a polished one of superior mental capacity. Age and a long possession of power have also a tendencey to strengthen authority. Age is naturaly in our imagination connected with wisdom and experience; and a continuance in power bestows a kind of right to the exercise of it. But superior wealth still more than any of these qualities contributes to conferr authority. This proceeds not from any dependance that the poor have upon the rich, for in general the poor are independent, and support themselves by their labour, yet tho’ they expect no benefit from them they have a strong propensity to pay them respect. This principle is fully explained in the Theory of moral Sentiments, where it is shewn that it arises from our sympathy with our superiours being greater | than that with our equals or inferiors: we admire their happy situation, enter into it with pleasure, and endeavour to promote it.

Among the great, as superior abilities of body and mind are not so easily judged of by others, it is more convenient, as it is more common, to give the preference to riches. It is evident that an old family, that is, one which has been long distinguished, by it’s wealth has more authority than any other. An upstart is always dissagreable; we envy his superiority over us7 and think ourselves <as> well entitled to wealth as he. If I am told that a man’s grandfather was very poor and dependent on my family, I will grudge very much to see his grandson in a station above me and will not be much disposed to submit to his authority. Superiour age, superior abilities of body and of mind, ancient family, and superiour wealth seem to be the four things that give one man authority over another.

The second principle which induces men to obey the civil magistrate is utility. Every one is sensible of the necessity of this principle to preserve justice and peace in the society. | By civil institutions, the poorest may get redress of injuries from the wealthiest and most powerfull, and tho’ there may be some irregularities in particular cases, as undoubtedly there are, yet we submit to them to avoid greater evils. It is the sense of public utility, more than of private, which influences men to obedience. It may sometimes be for my interest to dissobey, and to wish government overturned. But I am sensible that other men are of a different opinion from me and would not assist me in the enterprize. I therefore submit to it’s decision for the good of the whole.

If government has been of a long standing in a country and if it be supported by proper revenues, and be at the same time in the hands of a man of great abilities, authority is then in perfection.

In all governments both these principles take place in some degree, but in a monarchy the principle of authority prevails, and in a democracey that of utility. In Brittain, which is a mixed government, the faction’s formed sometime ago under the names of Whig and Tory were influenced by these principles; the former submitted to government on account of it’s utility and the advantages which they | derived from it, while the latter pretended that it was of divine institution, and to offend against it was equally criminal as for a child to rebell against it’s parent. Men in general follow these principles according to their natural dispositions. In a man of a bold, daring, and bustling turn the principle of utility is predominant, and a peaceable, easy turn of mind usually is pleased with a tame submission to superiority.

It has been a common doctrine in this country that contract is the foundation of allegeance to the civil magistrate. But that this is not the case will appear from the following reasons.

In the first place, the doctrine of an original contract is peculiar to Great Brittain, yet government takes place where it was never thought of, which is even the case with the greater part of people in this country. Ask a common porter or day–labourer why he obeys the civil magistrate, he will tell you that it is right to do so, that he sees others do it, that he would be punished if he refused to do it, or perhaps that it is a sin against God not to do it. But you will never hear him mention a contract as the foundation of his obedience.

2^dly, when certain powers of government were | at first entrusted to certain persons upon certain conditions, it is true that the obedience of these who entrusted it might be founded on a contract, but their posterity have nothing to do with it, they are not conscious of it, and therefore cannot be bound by it. It may indeed be said that by remaining in the country you tacitly consent to the contract and are bound by it. But how can you avoid staying in it? You were not consulted whether you should be born in it or not. And how can you get out of it? Most people know no other language nor country, are poor, and obliged to stay not far from the place where they were born to labour for a subsistance. They cannot therefore be said to give any consent to a contract, tho’ they may have the strongest sense of obedience. To say that by staying in a country a man agrees to a contract of obedience to government, is just the same with carrying a man into a ship and after he is at a distance from land to tell him that by being in the shop8 he has contracted to obey the master. The foundation of a duty cannot be a principle with which mankind is entirely unacquainted. They must have some idea however confused of the principle upon which they act.

| But again, upon the supposition of an original contract, by leaving the state you expressly declare that you will no longer continue a subject of it and are freed from the obligation which you owed it, yet every state claims it’s own subjects and punishes them for such practices, which would be the highest injustice if their living in the country implies a consent to a former agreement. Again, if there be such a thing as an original contract, aliens who come into a country preferring it to others give the most express consent to it, yet a state always suspects aliens as retaining a prejudice in favour of their mother country, and they are never so much depended upon as freeborn subjects. So much is the English law influenced by this principle, that no alien can hold a place under the government, even tho’ he should be naturalized by Act of Parliament.9 Besides if such a contract were supposed, why should the state require an oath of allegiance whenever a man enters on any office, for if they supposed a previous contract, what occasion is there for renewing it. Breach of allegiance or high treason is a much greater crime and more severely punished in all nations than breach of contract, in which no more but fullfillment is required. They must therefore be on a different footing. | The less can by no means involve in it the greater contract. Contract is not therefore the principle of obedience to civil government, but the principles of authority and utility formerly explained.

We shall now endeavour to explain the nature of government, it’s different forms, what circumstances gave occasion for it, and by what it is maintained.

The forms of government however various may not improperly be reduced to these three, Monarchical, Aristocratical, and Democratical. These may be blended in a great number of ways, and we usually denominate the government from that one which prevails.

Monarchical government is where the supreme power and authority is vested in one, who can do what he pleases, make peace and war, impose taxes, and the like.

Aristocratical government is where a certain order of people in the state, either of the richest, or of certain families, have it in their power to choose magistrates, who are to have the management of the state.

Democratical government is where the management of affaires belongs to the whole body of the people together.

| These two last forms may be called republican, and then the division of government is into monarchical and republican.

To acquire proper notions of government it is necessary to consider the first form of it, and observe how the other forms arose out of it.

In a nation of hunters there is properly no government at all. The society consists of a few independent families, who live in the same village and speak the same language, and have agreed among themselves to keep together for their mutual safety. But they have no authority one over another. The whole society interests itself in any offence. If possible they make it up between the parties, if not they banish from their society, kill, or deliver up to the resentment of the injured, him who has committed the crime. But this is no regular government. For tho’ there may be some among them who are much respected, and have great influence in their determinations, yet he never can do any thing without the consent of the whole.

Thus among hunters there is no regular government; they live according to the laws of nature.

| The appropriation of herds and flocks, which introduced an inequality of fortune, was that which first gave rise to regular government. Till there be property there can be no government, the very end of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from the poor. In this age of shepherds if one man possessed 500 oxen, and another had none at all, unless there were some government to secure them to him, he would not be allowed to possess them. This inequality of fortune, making a distinction between the rich and the poor, gave the former much influence over the latter, for they who had no flocks or herds must have depended on those who had them, because they could not now gain a subsistence from hunting as the rich had made the game, now become tame, their own property. They therefore who had appropriated a number of flocks and herds, necessarily came to have great influence over the rest; and accordingly we find in the Old Testament that Abraham, Lot, and the other patriarchs were like little petty princes. It is to <be> observed that this inequality of fortune in a nation of shepherds occasioned greater influence than in any period after that. Even at present, a man may spend a great estate | and yet acquire no dependents. Arts and manufactures are increased by it, but it may make very few persons dependent. In a nation of shepherds it is quite otherways. They have no possible means of spending their property, having no domestic luxury, but by giving it in presants to the poor, and by this means they attain such influence over them as to make them in a manner their slaves.

We come now to explain how one man came to have more authority than the rest and how chieftans were introduced. A nation consists of many families who have met together and agreed to live with one another. At their public meetings there will always be one of superiour influence to the rest, who will in a great measure direct and govern their resolutions, which is all the authority of a chieftan in a barbarous country. As the chieftan is the leader of the nation, his son naturaly becomes the chief of the young people, and on the death of his father succeeds to his authority. Thus chieftanship becomes hereditary. This power of chieftanship comes in the progress of society to be increased by a variety of circumstances. The number of presants which he receives encrease his fortune | and consequently his authority. For amongst barbarous nations no body goes to the chieftan, or makes any application for his interest, without something in his hand. In a civilized nation the man who gives the presant is superior to the person who receives it. But in a barbarous nation the case is directly opposite.

We shall now consider the different powers which naturaly belong to government, how they are distributed, and what is their progress in the first periods of society.

The powers of government are three, to wit, the Legislative, which makes laws for the public good. The Judicial, or that which obliges private persons to obey these laws, and punishes those who dissobey. The Executive, or as some call it, the Federal power, to which belongs the making war and peace.

All these powers in the original form of government belonged to the whole body of the people. It was indeed long before the legislative power was introduced, as it is the highest exertion of government to make laws and lay down rules | to bind not only ourselves, but also our posterity, and those who never gave any consent to the making them. As for the judicial power, when two persons quarrell’d between themselves the whole society naturaly interposed, and when they could not make up matters turned them out of the society. During this early age crimes were few, and it was long before the punishment was made equal to the crime.

Cowardice and treason were the first crimes punished. For cowardice among hunters is considered as treason, because when they went out in small numbers, if their enemy attacked them, and some of their party deserted them, the rest might suffer by it, and therefore they who deserted were punished for treason.

The priest generally inflicted the punishment as it were by the command of the gods, so weak at that time was government. The power of making peace and war in like manner belonged to the people, and all the heads of families were consulted about it.

Tho’ the judicial power which concerns individuals was long precarious, the society first interposing as friends, and then as arbitrators, | the executive power came very soon to be exerted absolutely. When any private quarrell happens concerning the property of this cow, or of that ox, society is not immediately concerned. But it is deeply interested in making peace and war. In the age of shepherds this power is absolutely exerted. In Great Brittain we can observe vestiges of the precariousness of the judicial power, but none of the executive. When a criminal was brought to trial, he was asked how he would chuse that his cause should be decided, whither by combat, the ordeal trial, or the laws of his country. The society only obliged him not to disturb them in the decision. In England the question still remains, tho’ the answer is not now arbitrary. It was very common in the ruder ages to demand a trial by dipping their hand in boiling water, by means of which almost every one was found innocent, tho’ now scarce any one would escape by this means. When people were constantly exposed to the weather boiling water could have little effect upon them, tho’ now, when we are quite covered, it must have a contrary effect. | This choice of trial shews the weakness of the judicial laws. We find that the judicial combat continued in England as late as the days of Q. Elizabeth. It has now worn out gradually and insensibly, without so much as a law or a rule of court made against it.

In the periods of hunters and fishers and in that of shepherds, as was before observed, crimes are few; small crimes passed without any notice. In these ages no contraversies arose from interpretations of testaments, settlements, contracts, which render our law–suits so numerous. For these were unknown among them. When these took place and difficult10 trades began to be practised contraversies became more frequent. But as men were generally employed in some branch of trade or another, without great detriment to themselves they could not spare time to wait upon them. All causes must be left undecided, which would be productive of every inconvenience, or they must fall upon some other method more suitable to the several members of society. The natural means they would fall upon | would be to chuse some of their number to whom all causes should be referred. The chieftan who was before this distinguishd by his superior influence, when this comes to be the case would preserve his wonted precedence and would naturaly be one of those who were chosen for this purpose. A certain number would be chosen to sit along with him, and in the first ages of society this number was always considerable. They would be afraid to trust matters of importance to a few, and accordingly we find that at Athens there were 500 judges at the same time. By this means the chieftan would still further encrease his authority, and the government would appear in some degree monarchical. But this is only in appearance, for the final decision is still in the whole body of the people, and the government is realy democratical.

The power of making peace and war, as was before observed, was at first lodged in the whole body of the people. But when society advanced, towns were fortified, magazines prepared, stocks of money got together, | generals and officers appointed, the whole body of the people could not attend to deliberations of this kind. This province would either fall to the court of justice, or there would be another sett of people appointed for this purpose, tho’ it would naturally at first fall to the court of justice. This is properly called the senatorial power, which at Rome took care of the public revenue, public buildings, and the like. But afterwards at Rome the court of justice and the senatorial one became quite distinct. The same may be said of the areopagite court at Athens.

We shall now make some observations on nations in the two first periods of society. These viz. of hunters and shepherds.

In a nation of hunters and fishers few people can live together, for in a short time any considerable number would destroy all the game in the country, and consequently would want a means of subsistance. Twenty or thirty families are the most that can live together, and these make up a village, but as they live together for their mutual defence and to assist one another, their villages are not far distant from each other. | When any controversie happens between persons of different villages, it is decided by a general assembly of both villages. As each particular village has it’s own leader, so there is one who is the leader of the whole nation. The nation consists of an alliance of the different villages, and the chieftans have great influence on their resolutions, especially among shepherds. In no age is antiquity of family more respected than in this. The principle of authority operates very strongly, and they have the liveliest sense of utility in the maintenance of law and government.

The difference of the conduct of these nations in peace and war is worth our observation.

The exploits of hunters, tho’ brave and gallant, are never very considerable. As few of them can march together, so their number seldom exceeds 200 men, and even these cannot be supported above 14 days. There is therefore very little danger from a nation of hunters. Our colonies are much affraid of them without any just grounds. | They may indeed give them some trouble by their inroads and excursions, but can never be very formidable. On the other hand a much greater number of shepherds can live together. There may be a thousand families in the same village. The Arabs and Tartars who have always been shepherds have on many occasions made the most dreadfull havoc. A Tartar chief is extremely formidable, and when one of them gets the better of another, there always happens the most dreadfull and violent revolutions. They take their whole flocks and herds into the field along with them, and whoever is overcome loses both his people and wealth. The victorious nation follows it’s flocks, and pursues it’s conquest, and if it comes into a cultivated country with such numbers of men, it is quite irresistable. It was in this manner that Mahomet ravaged all Asia.11

There is a very great difference betwixt barbarous nations and those that are a little civilized. Where the land is not divided, and the people live in hutts which they carry about with them, they can have no attachment to the soil, | as all their property consists in living goods which they can easily carry about with them. On this account barbarous nations are always disposed to quit their country. Thus we find such migrations among the Helvetii, Tuetones, and Cimbrians. The Huns, who dwelt for a long time on the north side of the Chinese Wall, drove out the Astrogoths on the other side of the Palus Maeotis, they again the Wisigoths, etca.

Having considered the original principles of government, and it’s progress in the first ages of society, having found it in general to be democratical, we come now to consider how republic<an> governments were introduced. It is to be observed in general, that the situation of a country, and the degree of improvement of which it is susceptible, not only in the cultivation of the land but in other branches of trade, is favourable to the introduction of a republican government.

There is little probability that any such government will ever be introduced into Tartary or Arabia, because the situation of their country is such that it cannot be improved. | The most part of these is hills and deserts which cannot be cultivated, and is only fit for pasturage. Besides they are generaly dry, and have not any considerable rivers. The contrary of this is the case in these countries where republican governments have been established, and particularly in Greece. Two thirds of Attica are surrounded by sea, and the other side by a ridge of high mountains. By this means they have a communication with their neighbouring countries by sea and at the same <time> are secured from the inroads of their neighbours. Most of the European countries have most part of the same advantages. They are divided by rivers and branches of the sea, and are naturaly fit for the cultivation of the soil and other arts. We shall now see how favourable this is to the reception of a republican government. We may suppose the progress of government in Attica in the infancey of the society to have been much the same with that in Tartary and the other countries we have mentioned, and we find in reality that at the time of the Trojan war it was much in the same situation, | for then there was little or no cultivation of the ground, and cattle was the principle part of their property. All the contests about property in Homer regard cattle. Here as in every other country in the same period the influence of the chieftan over his own vassals was very considerable. A people inhabiting such a country, when the division of land came to take place and the cultivation of it to be generally practised, would naturaly dispose of the surplus of their product among their neighbours, and this would be a spur to their industry. But at the same time it would be a temptation to their neighbours to make inroads upon them. They must therefore fall upon some method to secure themselves from danger, and to preserve what it formerly cost them so much trouble to procure. It would be more easy to fortify a town in a convenient place than to fortify the frontiers of the whole country, and accordingly this was the method they fell upon. They built fortified towns in the most convenient places, and whenever they were invaded took shelter in them with their flocks and moveable goods, and here they cultivated the arts and sciences. | Agreable to this we find that Theseus fortified Athens and made the people of Attica carry into it all their goods, which not only increased his power over them, but also the authority of that state above others. When people agreed in this manner to live in towns, the chieftans of the several clans would soon lose their authority, and the government would turn republican, because their revenue was small and could not make them so conspicuous and distinguished above others as to retain them in dependance. The citizens gradually increase in riches, and coming nearer the level of the chieftan, become [his] jealous of his authority. Accordingly we find that Theseus himself was turned out; after this nine regents were sett up who were at first to have authority for life but were afterwards continued only for ten years; thus Athens, and in like manner all the Greek states, came from a chieftanship to something like monarchy and from thence to aristocracey. In general, as was before observed, the revenue becomes insufficient to support the authority of a number of chieftans, but a few getting into their hands superiour wealth form an aristocracey.

| It is to be observed that there is a considerable difference between the ancient and modern aristocracies. In the modern republics of Venice, Milan, etca the government of the state is entirely in the hands of the hereditary nobility, who are possessed of all the three powers of government. Both in modern and ancient aristocracies the people had the choice of those in authority, but the difference is this, that only the nobility could be elected in modern times. The institution of slavery is the cause of this difference. When the freemen had all their work done by slaves, they had it in their power to attend on publick deliberations. But when the ground came to be cultivated by freemen, the lower sort could not have it in their power to attend, but consulting their interest they would endeavour to avoid it. Agreable to this we find that at Venice the populace desired to be free of it. In the same manner the towns in Holland voluntarily gave it up to the town council, which was in consequence of this vested with the whole power. | Nothing like this happened in the republics of Greece and Rome. In the early ages of these states, tho’ the populace had the whole power, they were called aristocracies, because they always chose their magistrates from among the nobility. They were not indeed hindered by any express law to do otherwise, but it was customary to do so, because the lower classes were maintained by the fortunes of the rich, and thereby became dependent on them, and gave their vote for him whose bounty they shared. The nobility might differ among themselves about elections, but would never propose the election of plebeians. Thus the influence of the nobility was the law, and not any express prohibition.

At Athens, Solon enacted that none of the lower of the four classes into which the people were divided should be elected. But afterwards magistrates were elected out of all classes, and the government became democratical.

At Rome, it was long before the power of being elected extended to the whole body of the people. After | decemvirs were appointed the power of the people began to encroach more and more upon the nobles, and still more when they got military tribunes elected. The cause of this was the improvement of arts and manufactures. When a man becomes capable of spending on domestic luxury what formerly supported an hundered retainers, his power and influence naturaly decrease. Besides, the great usually had every trade exercised by their own slaves, and therefore the taylors and shoemakers being no longer dependant on them would not give them their votes. The popular leaders then endeavoured to get laws passed by which they might be allowed to be elected magistrates. It was long before the generality even of the plebeians would consent to this, because they thought it dissagreable to have their equals so far above them. In process of time, however, they got it enacted that there should be in authority an equal number of patricians and plebeians. Viz. a consul chosen out of each.

We have shewn how republics arose, | and how they again became democratical; we are next to shew how this liberty was lost, and monarchy or something like it was introduced.

Considering these states in the situation above described, as possessed of their towns and a small territory in the adjacent country, they must either confine themselves within their ancient boundaries, or enlarge their territory by conquest: they must either be what may not improperly be called a defensive republic or a conquering one. The Grecian states are a good example of the former and Rome and Carthage of the latter. We are to shew how each of these lost their liberty, and first how the defensive states lost theirs.

When a country arrives at a certain degree of refinement it becomes less fit for war. When the arts arrive at a certain degree of improvement, the number of the people encreases, yet that of fighting men becomes less. In a state of shepherds the whole nation can go out to war, and even when it becomes more refined, and the division of labour takes place, and every one is possessed of a small farm, they can send out a great number. | In such an age their champaigns are always in summer, and from seedtime till harvest their young men have nothing ado but to serve in them. The whole business at home can be performed by the old men and woemen, and even these have sometimes beat the enemy in the absence of their soldiers. In a state where arts are carried on, and which consists chiefly of manufacturers, there cannot be sent out such numbers, because if a weaver or taylor be called away nothing is done in his absence. Scarce one in an hundered can be spared from Brittain and Holland. Of an hundered inhabitants fifty are woemen, and of fifty men, twenty five are unfit for war. In the last war Brittain could not spare so many, as any one almost may be convinced, if he reflect whether among his acquaintances he missed one out of twenty five. According to this principle, Athens tho’ a small state could once send out 30000 fighting men, which made a very considerable figure. But after the improvement of arts they could not send out more than 10000, which was quite inconsiderable. Brittain, notwithstanding the politeness and refinement at which it has arrived, on account of the largeness of it’s territories | can still send out a very formidable army. But a small state necessarily declines. However there is one advantage attending slavery in a small republic, which seems to be it’s only advantage, that it retards their declension. At Rome and Athens the arts were carried on by slaves, and the Lacedemonians went so far as not to allow any freeman to be brought up to mechanic employments, because they imagined that they hurt the body. Accordingly we find that at the battle of Chaeronea, when the Athenians were come to a considerable degree of politeness, they were able to send out great numbers of men, purely on this account that all trades were carried on by slaves. We may observe that in the Italian republics, where slavery did not take place, they soon lost their liberty. When in consequence of the improvement of arts a state has become opulent, it must be reckoned a great hardship to go out to war, whereas among our ancestors it was thought no inconvenience to take the field. A knight {eques} was no more than a horseman, and a footsoldier was a gentleman. They were inured to hardships at home, and therefore a champaign appeared no way dreadfull. But when opulence and luxury encreased | the rich would not take the field but on the most urgent account, and therefore it became necessary to employ mercenaries and the dregs of the people to serve in war. Such persons could never be trusted in war unless reduced to the form of a standing army, and subjected to rigid discipline, because their private interest was but little concerned and therefore without such treatment they could not be expected to be very resolute in their undertakings. Gentlemen may carry on a war without much discipline. But this a mob can never do. As the citizens in Greece thought it below them to bear arms, and entrusted the republic to mercenaries, their military force was diminished and consequently a means was provided for the fall of the government. Another cause of their declension was the improvement of the art of war, which rendered every thing precarious. In early ages it was very difficult to take a city, as it could only be done by a long blocade. The siege of Troy lasted ten years, and Athens once could withstand for two years a siege both by land and sea. In modern times the beseigers have an advantage over the beseiged and a good engineer can force almost any town to surrender in six weeks. | But it was not so once. Phillip of Macedon made great improvements in this art, which at last occasioned the dissolution of all the Greek governments and their subjection to forreign powers. Rome stood out much longer than Greece, because the number of it’s citizens was daily increasing. At Rome any person might be made a citizen, as this was of little advantage. But at Athens the right of citizenship was given to very few, as it was itself a little estate. However Rome itself, after opulence and luxury encreased, shared the fate of other republics, tho’ the event was brought about in a different manner. Till the time of Marius, the better sort of freemen went out to the field. Marius was the first that recruited <?>.12 He gathered the freed slaves into his army, and established a rigid military discipline. That army which before had consisted of gentlemen was now made up of runaway slaves and the lowest of the people. With such an army Marius conquered and kept in awe the provinces. He had the disposal of all offices and posts in this army. Every one among them owed his rise to him and was consequently dependant upon him. | Whenever such a general was affronted he would naturaly apply to his army for relief, who would easily be induced to side with their general against their own nation. This was the very expedient that Marius fell upon. By the influence of Sylla he was, in his absence, banished from Rome, and a price sett upon him. Marius applied to his army, who were determined at all events to follow him, marched to Rome when Sylla was abroad on an expedition against Mithridates, took possession of the government, and vanquished Sylla’s party. Marius died soon after, and Sylla having conquered Mithridates returned to Rome, and in his turn beat the Marian party, changed the government into a monarchy, and made himself perpetual Dictator, tho’ he afterwards had the generosity and magnanimity to resign it. About thirty or forty years afterwards the same thing happened between Caesar and Pompey. Caesar as well as Sylla got himself made perpetual Dictator, but had not enough of public spirit to resign it. His veteran troops which were settled in Italy, mindfull of the favours which he conferred upon them, after his death | gathered about Octavius his adopted son and invested him with the supreme authority. Much the same thing happened in our own country with respect to Oliver Cromwell. When the Parliament became jealous of this man, and disbanded the army, he applied to them, in a manner indeed more canting than that of the Roman generals, and got the Parliament turned out and a new one appointed more suitable to his mind, with the whole authority vested in himself.

Thus we have seen how small republics, whether conquering or defensive, came at length to a dissolution, from the improvements in mechanic arts, commerce, and the arts of war. We are next to consider what form of government succeeded the republican.

When small republics were conquered by another state, monarchy, or whatever other government pleased the conquerors, was established, tho’ they generally followed the model of their own country. The Athenians always established democracey, and the Spartans aristocracey. The Romans indeed more prudently divided their conquests into provinces which were governed pretty absolutely | by persons appointed by <the> Senate for that purpose. The case is somewhat different when a state is conquered by it’s own subjects. Both the nature of the action and the instruments by which it is performed require a military monarchy, or a monarchy supported by military force, because it is as necessary to keep them in awe as to conquer them. This was the form of government that was established in Rome during the time of the emperors; these emperors took the whole executive power into their own hands, they made peace and war as they thought proper, and even named the magistrates, either immediately themselves, or by means of a Senate of their own appointment. They did not however alter any institutions of the civil law. Right and wrong were decided as formerly. Cromwell did the same in our own country: he kept the state in awe by an insignificant army, but he allowed the judge to determine right and wrong as formerly. Nay, he made such improvements in the civil law, by taking away wardships, etca, that the first thing the Parliament of Charles II^d did was to confirm many of Cromwell’s laws. | The Roman authors tell us that justice was never better administered than under the worst of the emperors, Domitian and Nero. It is the interest of all new administrators to make few alterations in what the generality of people are much concerned and have been long accustomed to. They will more easily go into any thing else, when they are indulged in this. It was particularly the interest of the emperors to keep up the ancient system of laws, and accordingly we find that all consuls who misbehaved in their respective provinces were severely punished. It was not so under the Republic; the most scandalous crimes were committed by governours, as we learn from Cicero’s Orations.13

A military government allows the strictest administration of justice. No body indeed can have a fair trial where the emperor is immediately concerned, then he will do as he pleases. But where he is in no way interested, it is his interest to adhere to the ancient laws.

It is to be observed that there was a very great difference between the military government established at Rome and these that were established in Asia. At Rome the conquerors and conquered were the same people. The conquerors themselves | were sensible of the good effects of these laws, and were so far from being willing to abrogate them that they made improvements upon them. It is not so with the Asiatic governments, tho’ they are purely military. Turky, Persia, and the other countries were conquered by Tartars, Arabians, and other barbarous nations, who had no regular system of laws and were entirely ignorant of their good effects. They established in all public offices their own people who were entirely ignorant of all the duties of them. A Turkish bashaw or other inferior officer is decisive judge of every thing, and is as absolute in his own jurisdiction as the signior. Life and fortune are altogether precarious, when they thus depend on the caprice of the lowest magistrate. A more miserable and oppressive government cannot be imagined.

We have considered how the dissolution of small states was brought about, and what form of government succeeded them, by what means an imperial government was introduced into conquering republics, and what kind of administration this was. We come now to shew how this military monarchy came to share that fated dissolution that awaits every state and constitution whatever.

In the time of the imperial governments at Rome | they had arrived at a considerable degree of improvement both in arts and commerce. In proportion as people become acquainted with these, and their consequence domestic luxury, they become less fond of going out to war, and besides the government finds that it would hurt it’s revenue <?to send out> those employed in manufactures. If barbarous nations be in the neighbourhood, they can employ them as soldiers at an easier rate, and at the same time not hurt their own industry. Sensible of these things, the Romans recruited their armies in Germany, Brittain, and the northern barbarous countries which bordered on the Roman Empire. They had the liberty of recruiting in these countries, in the same manner that the Dutch did in Scotland before the beginning of the last war. After they had gone on for sometime in this practice, they would find for several reasons that it would be much easier to make a bargain with the chieftans of these barbarous nations whom they employed, and give him so much money to lead out a number of men to this or that expedition. Supposing then an institution of this kind. The barbarous chieftan, at the head of his own men, possessed the whole military authority of the people for whom he fought, and whenever the government in the least offended him, he could turn his arms against those who employed him, and make himself master of their country. | We find that all the western provinces were taken possession of much in this manner. After they had by their practice given such invitations to the inroads of barbarians, we find that most of the Roman provinces were infested by them. In this country the Romans built a wall and kept garrisons to secure their province from the pillagers of the north. The garrisons which secured this station were called away to the defence of Gaul which at that time was also infested. The historians tell us that the Brittains then got leave to shake off the Roman yoke, but it could be no advantage to the Romans to give any country in Brittain it’s liberty, and it was no favour done it to have no protection from Rome, which the province in reality wanted to have continued. The Romans undoubtedly meant that they should take the trouble of defending themselves, as they were for sometime to be otherwise employed. The Brittains, however, did not like the proposal but resolved to invite over a body of Saxons to their relief. Accordingly Hengist and Hursa came over with a considerable army, which was frequently recruited, entirely drove out the Romans,14 and finding themselves masters of the whole country took possession of it, and founded the Saxon Heptarchy. In this manner fell the western Empire of Europe | and military monarchy came to ruin. We find in the last hundered and fifty years of the Roman Empire this custom of recruiting in barbarous nations carried on, and many of their chieftans had greatly raised themselves. Patricius Aelias15 under Honorious and many others acquired great power. In the same manner all the Asiatic governments were dissolved. Their soldiers were hired from Tartary. Arts and manufactures were carried on; the people made more by their trades than by going to war. The East India trade which Italy and some other nations carried on by the Red Sea had rendered them very opulent. Every nation as well as Rome was willing to make a bargain with the neighbouring barbarous princes to defend them, and this proved the ruin of the government.

Having now considered all the ancient forms of government of which we have any distinct accounts, we shew next what form succeeded the fall of the Roman Empire, and give an account of the origin of the modern governments of Europe.

The government which succeeded this period was not altogether unlike the Tartar constitution formerly mentioned, tho’ the Germans and others, who upon the fall of the Roman Empire took possession of the western countries, had better notions of property | and were a little more accustomed to the division of lands. The king and the other chieftans after they had become conquerors of the country would naturaly for their own purposes take possession of a great part of it. They would distribute it among their vassalls and dependants as they thought proper, and would leave but a very inconsiderable share to the ancient inhabitants. They did not however extirpate them entirely, but still paid them some little regard. Among the Franks who took possession of Gaul, the person who killed a Frank paid only five times the fine which was payable for killing one of the old inhabitants. As these nations were almost lawless, and under no authority, depredations were continually committed up and down the country and all kinds of commerce stopped.

In consequence of this arose the allodial government, which introduced an inequality of fortune. All these chieftans held their lands allodialy without any burthen of cess, wardship, etca. One of these great lords was possessed of almost a county,^a | but as he was unable himself to reap any advantage from so much of it he found it necessary to parcell it out among vassals, who either paid a certain annuity, attended him in war, or performed some service of this nature. By this means his incomes became so great that, as there was then no domestick luxury, he could not consume them in any way but by maintaining a great number of retainers about his house. These were another species of dependants, who increased his authority and secured domestic peace. For they kept the tenants in awe, and were kept in awe by the tenants. So great was the authority of these lords, that if any one claimed a debt from any of their vassals, the king had no power to send a messenger into the lords dominions to force payment. He could only apply to the lord, and desire him to do justice. To them also lay the last result16 in judging of all manner of property under their own jurisdiction, the power of life and death, of coining money, and of making bye laws and regulations in their own territories. But besides this power of government which in a great measure was betwixt the king and the great lords, if there had been no other | the balance would not have been properly kept. But besides the allodial lords there was a great number of free people, who were allowed to consult about justice in their own spheres. Every county was divided into hundereds, and subdivided into tens. Each of these had their respective court, vizt the decemary17 court, the hundered court. Over those was placed the Wittenagemot or assembly of the whole people. Appeals were brought from the ten to the hundered, and from it to <the> county court. An appeal could be brought to the kings court in case the inferiour court denied justice by refusing to hear a cause, or if it was protracted by unreasonable delays. Appeals were also sometimes carried to the Wittenagemott, which was made up of the king, allodial lords, aldermen or earls, bishops, abbots, etca. This was the first form of government in the west of Europe, after the downfall of the Roman Empire.

We are next to shew how the allodial government was overturned, and the feudal system introduced.

As these great lords were continually making war upon one another, | in order to secure the attendance of their tenants they gave them leases of the lands which they possessed from year to year, which afterwards for the same reasons came to be held for life. When they were about to engage in any very hazardous enterprize, that, in case of the worst consequences, the families of their vassals who went along with them might not be left destitute and that they might still be more encouraged to follow them, they extended this right to the life of the son and grandson; as it was thought cruel to turn out an old possessor, the right became at last hereditary, and was called feuda. The feudal tenant was bound to certain offices, but service in war was the chief thing required, and if the heir was not able to perform it he was obliged to appoint one in his place. It was in this manner that wardships were introduced. When the heir female succeeded, the feudal baron had a right to marry her to whomever he pleased, because it was thought reasonable that he should have a vassal of his own chusing. The prima seizin was another emolument of the master. When the father died the son had no right to the estate till he publickly declared his willingness to accept of it. | And on this account the lord sometimes had the estate in his own hand and enjoyed the profits of it for sometime. The heir paid a sum to get it back, which was called relief. There was still another emolument belonging to the lord, called escheat, that is, after the estate became hereditary, if there was no heir of the family to succeed, it returned to the lord. The same thing happened if the heir fail’d of performing the services for which he had the tenure. There were besides these some small sums due to the superior on redeeming his son when taken prisoner, or on knighting him,18 and on the marriage of his daughter and some such occasions. The same causes that made allodial lords give away their lands to their vassals on leases which afterwards became hereditary, made the king give away the greater part of his lands to be held feudaly, and what a tenant possessed in feu was much the same with real property. They were indeed subject to the above mentioned emoluments, but they possessed their lands for themselves and posterity. Feudal property may in some respects be inferiour to allodial, but the difference is so inconsiderable that allodial lops^b soon became to be held feudaly. | About the tenth century all estates came to be held feudaly, and the allodial lords, that they might enjoy the kings protection, exchanged their rights for a feudal tenure.

It is to be observed that these historians who give an account of the origin of feudal laws from the usurpation of the nobility are quite mistaken. They say that the nobility wanted to have these lands which they held at pleasure of the king to be hereditary, that it might not be in his power to turn them out, and that the feudal law was introduced on account of the diminution of the kings power. But it was actualy the contrary; it was on account of the encrease of his power, and it required great influence in the king to make the lords hold their lands feudaly. The best proof of this is that William the Conqueror changed all the allodial lordships in England into feudal tenures and Malcolm Kenmure did the same in Scotland.

The introduction of the feudal system into all Europe took away every thing like popular government. | The popular courts were all removed. Neither decemary, hundered, nor county courts were allowed. All public affairs were managed by the king and the great feudal lords. No commoners, none but hereditary lords had a right to sit in Parliament. These great lords who held immediately of the king were considered as his companions, pares convivii comites. They advised concerning public affairs and nothing of importance could be done without them. The consent of the majority was to be obtained before any law could be passed, and it was necessary to have them called together. The barons or inferior lords observed the same method in their jurisdictions, and they who held [them] of them were called pares curiae baronis. It was likewise necessary that they should be consulted, as they too were in arms. The baron could neither go to war nor make a law without the consent of the majority. Nothing could be done in the kingdom without almost universal consent, and thus they fell into a kind of aristocracey with the king at the head of it.

Besides these orders of men of which we have taken notice, there were two others | which in that period were held in the utmost contempt. The first was that of the villains {villani} who plowed the ground and were adscripti glebae. The second order was the inhabitants of borroughs who were much in the same state of villainage with the former or but a little beyond it. As the boroughs were much under the influence of the lord who gave them protection, it was the kings interest to weaken as much as possible this interest and to favour their liberty. Henry II^d carried this so far that if a slave escaped to a borrough and lived there peaceably a year and day, he became free. He gave them many other priviledges, but what secured them most was the power of forming themselves into corporations upon paying a certain sum to the king. They held of him in capite, and at first every man paid his proportion to the king, but afterwards the borrough paid the sum and levied it as it seem’d proper to itself. By this means as the number of inhabitants encreased the burthen became lighter, and the borroughs became opulent and very considerable. In the reign of King John a law was made that if a lord married his ward to a burgher he only forfeited his wardship.19

| Thus we have considered the several orders of men of which the whole kingdom then consisted. We shall next show how each of them got a share in the government and what share of it was allotted to each of them. Every person who had an estate, great or small, had a right to sit in the kings court and to consult and advise with him about public matters. In the reign of William Rufus 700 sat in Parliament; in Henry III^ds time it was enacted that the smaller barons, who could not afford to attend in Parliament, should send a representative. These representatives were considered as lords and sat in the same house with them. In the same manner borroughs came to have representatives in Parliament, because they themselves were become opulent and powerfull and the king found it his interest to give them some weight so as to lessen the authority of the peers.

It became necessary to have their consent as well as that of the barons before any law was passed. These representatives of the borroughs sat in a house by themselves, and the smaller barons, being far from the level of the great lords with whom they sat and not much superior to the Commons, soon joined them. The kings revenues were then on many occasions insufficient for his demands; they consisted chieffly | 1st, of the royal demesnes, 2^dly, knights services, III^dly, feudal emoluments such as wardships, 4^thly, fines, amercements, compositions, for crimes, etc, 5^thly, all waff goods, res nullius, etc. These were the principal sources of the kings revenue. But these were by no means sufficient to supply the encreasing expences of government. The two bodies of the commoners when joined made a very considerable figure, and the greater part of the subsidies came from them. The king excused the smaller barons from a constant attendance and called them or not as he pleased. When he did call them he issued a writ summoning them, and from this was the origin of creating peers by writ or patent, which is the only way of doing it at present.

Having shewn how the House of Commons became considerable, we shall next shew how the nobilitys power decreased and the government turned arbitrary. In all the courts of Europe the power of the nobility declined from the common causes, the improvements in arts and commerce. When a man could spend his fortune in domestic luxury he was obliged to dismiss his retainers. By their antient rustic hospitality they could more easily maintain 1000 retainers than at present lodge one lord for a night. Richard Earl of Warwick, who was stiled Make–King, maintained every day forty thousand people besides tenants, but when luxury took place he was unable to do this. Thus the power of the nobility was diminished, and that too before the House of Commons had established it’s authority. | And thus the king became arbitrary. Under the House of Tudor the government was quite arbitrary, the nobility were ruined, and the borroughs lost their power.

It might be expected that the sovereign also should have lost his authority by the improvement of arts and commerce, but a little attention will convince us that the case must have been quite opposite. A man possessed of forty thousand pounds a year, while no other body can spend above a hundered, cannot be affected by the encrease of luxury. This is precisely the case of the king. He is possessed of a million while none of his subjects can spend above 30 or 40 thousand pounds, and therefore he can spend it in no other way but by maintaining a great number of people. Luxury must therefore sink the authority of the nobility whose estates are small in proportion to that of the king, and as his continues unaffected his power must become absolute. Tho’ this was the case in most nations of Europe, yet in Germany it was quite otherways. The monarchy there was elective and consequently never could have so much authority. The country is much larger than any other in Europe, and at the dissolution of the feudal government the nobility, who were possessed of considerable fortunes already, got more in proportion than the rest; thus their estates rose so high above those that were immediately below them, that it was impossible for them to spend them in luxury, | and therefore they were able to keep a considerable number of retainers. Thus in Germany the power of the nobility was preserved, while in England it was utterly destroyed and the king rendered absolute.

We have now shewn how the government of England turned absolute; we shall next consider how liberty was restored, and what security the British have for the possession of it. The Act20 of Henry VII^th allowing the nobility to dispose of their estates had already placed them entirely on a level with the Commons. Elizabeth, who always affected popularity, was continually unwilling to impose taxes on her subjects. In order to supply her exigences she sold the royal demesnes, as she knew that none of her offspring was to succeed her. Her successors therefore standing in need of frequent supplies were obliged to make application to Parliaments. The Commons were now become very considerable, as they represented the whole body of the people, and as they knew the king could not want, they never granted him any thing without in some degree infringing his priviledges. At one time they obtained freedom of speech, at another they got it enacted that their concurrence should be necessary to every law. The king on account of his urgent necessities was forced to grant whatever they asked | and thus the authority of the Parliament established itself. A peculiar advantage which Brittain enjoyed after the accession of James Ist was that as the dominions of Brittain were every way bounded by the sea, there was no need for a standing army and consequently the king had no power by which he could overawe either people or Parliament. The 12000021 P^ds a year which was settled upon the king at that time22 might have secured his independencey, had not the bad oeconomy of Charles II^d rendered him as indigent as any of his predecessors. His successor was still more dependant and was forced to quit the throne and the kingdom altogether. This brought in a new family which as the royal demesnes were entirely alienated depended wholly upon taxes, and were obliged to court the people for them. Ever since, the kings revenue tho’ much greater than it was then depends so much on the concurrence of the Parliament that it never can endanger the liberty of the nation. The revenue at present consists chiefly of three branches, to wit. 1st, the Civil List, which is entirely consumed in the maintenance of the royal family and can give the king no influence, nor hurt the liberty of the subject. II^dly, the annual land and malt taxes, which depend entirely on the Parliament. III^dly, the funds mortgaged for paying of the public debts, such as the taxes on salt, beer, malt, etc, levied by the officers of custom and excise. | These the king can by no means touch; they are paid to the Court of Exchequer, which is generally managed by people of interest and integrity who possess their offices for life and are quite independent of the king. Even they can pay nothing but to those appointed by Parliament, and must have the discharge of the public creditor. The surplus of the mortgages23 goes into what is called the sinking fund for paying the public debt <?which> secures the government in the present family, because if a revolution were to happen the public creditors, who are men of interest, would lose both principal and interest. Thus the nation is quite secure in the management of the public revenue, and in this manner a rational system of liberty has been introduced into Brittain. The Parliament consists of about 200 peers and 500 commoners. The Commons in a great measure manage all public affairs, as no money bill can take its rise except in that House. Here is a happy mixture of all the different forms of government properly restrained and a perfect security to liberty and property.

There are still some other securities to liberty. The judges appointed for the administration of justice are fixed for life, and quite independent of the king. Again, the king’s ministers are liable to impeachment by the House of Commons for maladministration and the king cannot pardon24 them. | The Habeas Corpus Act, by which the arbitrary measures of the king to detain a person in prison as long as he pleased is restrained, and by which the judge who refuses to bring a prisoner to his trial if desired within forty days is rendered incapable of any office, is another security to the liberty of the subject. The method of election, and placing the power of judging concerning all elections in the hands of the Commons, are also securities to liberty. All these established customs render it impossible for the king to attempt any thing absolute.

Besides all these, the establishment of the courts of justice is another security to liberty. We shall therefore consider the origin of these courts, the history of them, and their present state.

In England, and indeed in all Europe, after the feudal law was introduced, the kingdom was governed and justice administered in the same manner as by a baron in his jurisdiction. As a steward managed all affairs in the county belonging to the lord, so the Grand Justiciary had the management of all in the kingdom. He appointed sherriffs and other inferior officers. He was himself a great lord, and by the authority of his office, in every country but England he became as powerfull as the king. | But Edward the first saw the danger and got it prevented. All kinds of law, criminal or civil, were determined by the Justiciary or King’s Court which always attended the king; these delays and adjournments in civil suits, to which this court always attending the king must have been liable, gave occasion for separating common causes from the Kings Court, and fixing for them at Westminster a Court of Common Pleas. Criminal causes have always a more speedy determination. One would indeed think that when a person’s life is at stake, the debate should be longer than in any other case. But resentment is roused in these cases and precipitates to punish. It is a matter of no moment to the spectator how a triffling matter of cash be determined, but it is by no means so in criminal cases. When common pleas were taken away, the criminal and fiscal powers were connected and the power and authority of the Great Justiciary little diminished. Afterwards Edward Ist divided the business of the Justiciary into three different courts vizt

The Court of King’s Bench
The Court of Exchequer
The Court of Common Pleas

In the last all civil suits were tried. In the first all criminal ones, and to it lay the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas; it was called King’s Bench | because the king then frequently sat upon it, tho’ this cannot now be done, as it is improper that the king should judge of breaches of the kings peace. The Court of Exchequer judged in all affairs between the king and his subjects, the debts due by either of them to the other, and whatever regarded the revenue. The Court of Chancery was originally no court at all. The Chancellor was no more than a keeper of breives or writs according to which justice was done. What gave occasion to the keeping of these breives shall now be considered.

Edward Ist abolished the power of the Grand Justiciary. He employed mean persons to be judges, generally clergyman. As the decision depended on such persons their jurisdictions would be exercised very precariously, and accordingly we find that in both [in] criminal and civil cases they interposed with hesitation, in the former as mediators and in the latter as arbitrators, and accordingly they would be unwilling to give justice in these cases where they had no precedent from the Court of Justiciary. On this account all the breives by which the Court of Justiciary determined were kept. To keep these seems to have been originaly the office of Chancellor. If a person had a law–suit, he went to the clerk of the Court of Chancery who examined the breives | and if he found one that comprehended your case justice was done accordingly, but if one could not be found you could not have justice. Thus we find that the Chancellor was not a judge originaly. In Scotland the office of the English Chancellor is lodged in the Court of Session. In England a brief was sent from the Chancellor to the sherriff by which he was obliged to appear before the kings judges. Judges then, from the irregularity and inaccuracey of their proceedings, gave great jealousie to the king, and on this account many severe sentences went out against them. £1000025 has at one time been levied from the judges on account of corruption. They were therefore tied down strictly to the Chancery breives, and always bound by their records in such a manner that they could not be in the least amended, not so much as a word wrong spell’d rectified. This precision still remains in some cases, where not taken away by the statutes of amendment. A meer orthographical blunder, tho’ evidently so, has in many cases made the whole of no effect. The judges were therefore tied down to the precise words of the brief, or if there was a statute to the words of it. This was the origin and jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.

During the improvement of the law of England there arose rivalships among the several courts. | We shall therefore shew how each of them began to extend it’s power and encroach <?on> the priviledges of another, and how the Court of Chancery encreased it’s influence. The Court of King’s Bench, which judged criminal causes and every breach of the king’s peace, was the first that assumed immediately, and previously to an appeal, to judge in civil causes, and to encroach on the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas, by what is called a writ of error, that is, they supposed the person to be guilty of a trespass. For example, when a man owed 10£ and did not come to pay it at the time appointed, an order went out from the Kings Bench to examine and find him out, supposing that he intended to conceal himself, and they punished him for this trespass.26 At present an action on contract can come immediately before the Kings Bench. In this manner it was that this court extended it’s power, and being supreme over all, none could encroach upon it.

The Court of Exchequer brought in civil causes to be tried immediately by them, in the following manner: suppose a man owed a sum of money to the king, which it is the business of the court to take care of, and the man cannot pay unless his debtors first pay him. The court took upon them | to sue this other man by what is called the quo minus, that is, by what he is rendered less able to pay the king. As the debts of the king were many, and as the profits of the judges arose from sentence money, which was more or less according to the business of the court, they eagerly grasped at this extension of their power. All the courts endeavoured, by the speediness of their determinations and accuracey of their proceedings, to encourage prosecutors to come before them.

In what manner the Chancellor came to attain his equitable jurisdiction shall be taken notice of in the next place. After the improvement of arts and commerce, which gave occasion to many law suits unheard of before, people suffered a great deal by the imperfections of law. Edward III^d27 found that there were a great many injuries to which no brief nor court statute extended, and therefore the Parliament allowed that if a person applied to the clerk of Chancery and found there was no brief that could give him any remedy, the clerk should look for some breives of a similar nature and out of them compose a new one by which the complainer might have redress. In this manner the Chancery prescribed rules to the other courts. But as they appointed the brieffs and manner of proceeding this was putting an end to the affair, | for there was no occasion to go to any other court, and the Chancery got these affairs into its own hands. There could be no appeal brought from the Courts of Kings Bench or of Common Pleas to that of Chancery, but they applied to it for what the common law could not redress. The Chancellor in this manner obtained the power of judging in all cases of equity, and is applied to in the greater part of civil cases. The chief of which are 1st, the specific performance of contracts. By the common law if a person was bound by contract to deliver a piece of ground, and afterwards refused to do it, he was only obliged to pay damages, but not to perform it specifically. The Chancery, which was not considered as a court of conscience, enjoined the specific performance of it. 2^dly, the Chancery gave redress for all incests,28 and frauds in trust when the common law could not. As the leaving lands to the church deprived the king of the emoluments arising from them, an Act was passed against it. The clergy ordered that they should be left to certain persons who would dispose of them for the benefit of the church, and if they did not perform it, then as it was a fraud in trust | the Chancellor allowed the bishop to see it done. In like manner, when persons in the state of affairs at that time were obliged to alienate their estates to persons that had no concern in them, the Chancellor caused them to be restored. Wills, legacies, and things of this sort also fell under the equitable decision of the Chancellor.

It will be proper when we are treating of courts to enquire into the origin of juries. In the beginning of the allodial government, when the several courts had arrived at a very small degree of improvement and before they had experience to examine thoroughly into matters, when any person was brought before them on an action depending on his oath he was obliged to bring twelve compurgators to swear that the oath was just. There are remains of this at present in actions of debt, where if the person can bring in a certain number of persons to swear that his oath is just he gains the suit. It is to be observed that the imperfection of this way of trying was one of the great causes that gave origin to the judicial combat. A nobleman, or indeed any man of spirit, who was eluded of his right by a sett of perjured fellows, would rather choose to combat it in the field | and appeal to the judgement of God than leave his cause to them. Henry II^d first instituted that the sherriff and a certain number of persons who had opportunity to be best acquainted with the crime should have the whole affair laid before them, and that the person should be judged by their sentence. The law of England, always the friend of liberty, deserves praise in no instance more than in the carefull provision of impartial juries. They who are chosen must be near the place where the crime was committed, that they may have an opportunity of being acquainted with it. A great part of the jury may be laid aside by the pannel. He can lay aside 30 of their number, and he can challenge them either per capita, that is, any single juryman, or any number of them, if he suspect the sherriff of partiality. There may be many small causes for suspicion of partiality, and of the relevancey of these the court is judge. Nothing can be a greater security for life, liberty, and property than this institution. The judges are men of integrity, quite independent, holding their offices for life, but are tied down by the law. | The jurymen are your neighbours who are to judge of a fact upon which your life depends. They too can be laid aside for several reasons. The laws of England with regard to juries are only defective in one point, in which they differ from the laws of Scotland. In England the whole jury must be unanimous, which renders the office of a juryman a very dissagreable service. A case may appear to you more clear than it does to me, and may realy be different from what it appears to either of us, and yet there is a necessity for our agreement, and of consequence a necessity that one of us should swear contrary to our conscience. In criminal causes there is little danger; people are generally disposed to favour innocence and to preserve life. But in civil cases people are not so much troubled; they are not so much disposed to favour, and many of them are exceedingly doubtfull. People of fashion are not fond of meddling in a jury attended with such inconveniences, and therefore only the meaner sort of people attend the judge. A great man would not choose to be so often called and returned, and perhaps treated in such a manner as no gentleman would choose to be. | In this case the law providing for security has done too much. In this country, where unanimity is not required, the service is not so dissagreable. Tho’ a person differ from the majority, he may stand by his opinion and is not forced to comply, and the people of the highest rank are willing to be jurors. In the actions which come before the Court of Chancery no jury is required, and the Court of Session in Scotland has taken them away in civil causes.

Besides the courts that have been mentioned, there were several others erected by the kings patent. Henry VIII^th erected three, the Court of High Commission which sat upon ecclesiastics, the Court of Star Chamber which takes in any thing less than death, and the Court of Wardship which took care of the king’s interest in these emoluments. This last was taken away by Charles II^d, who accepted a sum for the whole. It is now understood that the king cannot erect a court without consent of Parliament. In no other country of Europe is the law so accurrate as in England because it has not been of so long standing. The Parliament of Paris was only erected about the time of Henry VIII^th of England. | The British Parliament consists of a great number of men, and these of great dignity. All new courts disdain to follow the rules that were formerly established. All new courts are a great evil, because their power at first is not precisely determined and therefore their decisions must be loose and inacurrate.

Thus we have considered the origin of government

1. Among a nation of savages
2. Among a nation of shepherds
3. The government of small clans with chieftans. The manner in which aristocracies arose, the fall of little republics, conquering or defensive, and lastly the different forms of government that arose in Europe after the dissolution of arbitrary government.

Last line of 75 and whole of 76 left blank in MS.

|^c We shall next consider the origin of the little republics in Europe, and consider the rights of sovereign^d and subject.

First, of the origin of these republics. In some countries the provinces which were far from the seat of government sometimes became independant, as was the case in a good part of Germany and France during the time of Charlemagne. Hugh Capet who was Chief Justiciary got the government into his hands, but took only the tittle of King o’ France. The Pope, by raising disturbances in Germany, for a long time hindered the Emperor Otho from taking possession of Italy. But when he got possession of it, on account of it’s distance he could not retain it. Every little town formed itself into a republic, with a council of it’s own chusing at it’s head. Some towns in Germany being well fortified, such as Hamburgh, assumed the same priviledges, and still in some measure retains them. The Italian towns are governed by a hereditary nobility, tho’ the ancient republics were perfectly democratical. In Venice the people freely gave up the government, as they also did in Holland, because they could not support the trouble which it gave them. The Dutch and | Swiss republics are formed into a respublica foederata, and on this depends their strength.

We shall make some remarks on the manner of voting in these republics. When there are 100 votes and three candidates, it is possible that the person who is most odious may be elected. If A, B, and C be candidates there may be 34 votes for A, and 33 for B, and as many for C. Thus tho’ there are 66 votes against A he carries it. This must be still more the case when a criminal is brought before this assembly. For 34 may think him guilty of murther, 33 of man slaughter, and 33 of chance medley, yet he must suffer for murther. To prevent this, in some of these republics they always bring the question to a simple state, is he guilty of murther or not? If there be 3 candidates, they put a previous vote, by which they exclude one of the candidates. In their Senates the president never has a deliberative vote, but only a decisive one, because they will allow no member to have two votes. When there is an equality on both sides, nothing can be done, and therefore the business is not rejected but referred to another meeting.

We shall now consider what duty is owing to the sovereign, and what is the proper punishment of dissobedience. Every attempt to overturn this power | is in every nation considered as the greatest crime and is called high treason. It is to be observed that there is a great difference between treason in monarchies and treason in republics. In the one it is an attempt on the king’s person and in the other on the liberties of the people, from whence we may see how the maxim of assassination came to be established in republics, and not in monarchies. It is the interest of monarchies that the person in authority be defended whatever his tittle or conduct be, and that no person be allowed to enquire into them. The laws of monarchy are therefore unfavourable to the assassination of tyrants. In a republic the definition of a tyrant is quite clear. He is one who deprives the people of their liberty, levies armies and taxes, and puts the citizens to death as he pleases. This man cannot be brought to a court of justice and therefore assassination is reckoned just and equitable. The present republican governments in Europe, indeed, do not encourage this maxim, because monarchies now sett the fashion, and <?other> government<s> copy their pattern. According to our present notions Oliver Cromwell’s assassination is most opprobrious, but it would have appeared otherwise when the republics of Greece and Rome sett the fashion.

Having thus taken notice of this difference between monarchical and republican governments, we shall next consider the crimes reckoned treason.

| There are three kinds of treason, or attacks upon the essence of government. 1st, perduellio, or an attempt to subvert the established government by force or rebellion. 2^dly, proditio, or the joining the enemy, delivering up to him forts, hostages, etc., or the refusing to deliver up garrisons, etc. to the government when they demand them. This is called high treason. 3^dly, laesa majestas, or an insult on the authority of the magistrate, which is not so heinous a crime as the two former. These were the kinds of treason among the Romans. Under the emperors these were blended, and a breach of the smallest, even in so triffling a manner as throwing a stone at the emperor’s statue, was punished with death. Under Honorious, a conspiracey against any of the emperors ministers was high treason.29

The crimes accounted treason by the English law are the following. 1st, killing the king, wishing^e his death, or providing arms against him with every attempt of this kind are punished capitally. The gun powder plot was never executed, yet the conspirators were put to death. Had they intended only the death of some other person they would not have been executed. 2^dly, corrupting the king’s wife or oldest daughter, because these are affronts to the king, | and may introduce a spurious offspring to the crown. If it be a younger daughter the crime is not so great. 3^dly, levying a force against the king, aiding his enemies, etc. 4^thly, attempting the life of the Chancellor or judge of^f assize when sitting in court; at another time it is only felony. Edward Ist, however, made the meer wounding of them not [not] treason.30 5^thly, counterfeiting the king’s great or privy seal, which is accounted an usurpation of the government, because by them the acts of government are carried on. 6^thly, counterfeiting of the king’s coin, tho’ this should not properly be treason, because it is no attempt on the essence of government. This crime is no more than forgery and is usually punished as such. These were the branches of treason before the Reformation. At this period Henry VIII^th declared himself head of the church, assumed the sovereignty in ecclesiastical affairs as a part of his prerogative, and established for this purpose the Court of High Commission to judge of ecclesiastics, which was abolished by Mary and restored by Elizabeth. As there was some danger then from the popish party the Catholic religion was considered as influenceing the being of government, and therefore it was declared | ^g high treason to bring in any bull of the Pope, Agnus Dei, or whatever might support his authority, to support popish seminaries, or conceal popish priests. This law, however proper then, should now be repealed, as there is no more occasion for it; no notice would now be taken of entertaining a popish priest.

During the Civil War and usurpation of Cromwell it became a question how far it is lawfull to resist the power of government. The court party believed the king to be absolute, and the popular doctrine was that the king is only a steward and may be turned out at the pleasure of the people. After the Restoration the court party got the better, and the other party become odious. At the Revolution the Stewart family were set aside, for excellent reasons, and the succession established in the present family. By this the court party was turned out, and began to influence the dispositions of the people. It was therefore enacted that whoever should speak against the present succession should be guilty of treason.31 This is now altogether unecessary, because the government is now so well established that there is no reason to take notice of those who write or speak against it.

In Scotland the laws were very confused with regard to treason; prejudiceing the people against the king or the king against the people | were made high treason. But by the Union they are made the same with those of England. These are the laws of Brittain with respect to treason, and they subject the person who breaks them to the highest penalties. He is half hanged and then his entrails are taken out, he forfeits his estate, his wife’s dowry,32 etc., and corrupts his blood so that his children cannot succeed.

Besides these there are other offences against the crown which do not subject to the pains of high treason, but to those of felony. 1st, the making of coin below the standard and the exportation of coin. From the notion that opulence consists in money, the Parliament resolved that every one might have bullion coined without any expence of mintage. Thus coined money was never below the value of bullion, and therefore there was a temptation to melt it down. This occasioned the Act declaring this practice felony. 2^dly, any attempt to encrease the coin, as by the philosophers stone, was made felony. 3^dly, destroying the kings armour is also felony.33 4^thly, any attempt against the king’s officers is also felony, and in general whatever is felony against another person is felony against the king. If his pocket were picked it would be felony against him, as it is against any private gentleman, | but the former offences are committed against him as king.

There are some other small offences which may be done to the king which do not amount to felony but incurr what is called a premunire. This is necessary to explain. In the reigns of King John and Henry III^d England was entirely under the dominion of the Pope; his legate brought over bulls, and raised contributions as he pleased, and long before the Reformation it was necessary to defend the king’s liberty against the Pope. The king sometimes appointed one to a benefice, and the Pope another, and the Pope’s candidate was often preferr’d. A law was therefore made forbidding any bull to be brought from Rome, or any appeal to be carried thither, and subjecting every person who refused to ordain the king’s presentee to the penalties of premunire–regem, i e to fortify the king against the Pope. The penalty was forfeiture of goods and outlawry. After Henry VIII^th was declared head of the church by the Pope, it was made a premunire to attack the king’s prerogative with regard to ecclesiastical matters.34

Beside these there are other offences called misprisions of treason and <?these> are either positive or negative. | Positive misprision35 of treason is the not revealing an attempt against the king’s person, his oldest daughter, or the heir of the kingdom. In like manner it is felony if you do not reveal any notice you receive of conspiracies and rebellions. Negative misprision36 is the counterfeiting of forreign coin current in the kingdom, such as Portuguese gold, but it is not felony to counterfeit French or Dutch money because they are not current here.37

In the last place, there are offences against the king called contempts, which are fourfold. 1st, contempt of the kings court or palaces; a riot committed in any of these is a great indignity offered to the sovereign. Riots in courts of justice are also severly punished, because there persons are often provoked, and if the law were not strict they wou’d disturb the court. 2^dly, contempt of the king’s prerogative, such as dissobeying the king when lawfully called, going out of the kingdom when in office without his leave, refusing to come after a summons under the privy seal, accepting a pension from a forreign prince without the king’s permission, even in a man of letters. 3^dly, contempt of the kings person and government (of which many are guilty), as by saying he is indolent or cowardly, | that he has broken the coronation oath, or to speak disrepectfully of his ministers. These are never regarded at present, because the government is so well established that writing and speaking cannot affect it. 4^thly, contempt of the kings tittle, by denying it, or preferring the Pretenders to it, by drinking the Pretenders health, or refuseing to take the oaths of alledgiance and abjuration. All these subject to imprisonment or fining but not to the penalties of treason, felony, premunire, nor outlawry.

Having considered the offences of the subject against the sovereign, we shall next treat of the crimes which the sovereign may commit against the subject. But first it is proper to consider who are subjects of a state.

The laws of different countries vary much with regard to those to whom the right of citizenship belongs. In most of the Swiss republics nothing gives the right of citizenship^h but to be born of a citizen. In Rome a family might be peregrina for four or five generations. At Athens no man was a citizen unless both father and mother were Athenians. It is to be observed that the Athenians were particularly sparing in giving the right of citizenship because it entitled them to very great priviledges. Even kings were denied that honour. All they did when they wanted to bestow a favour on a neighbouring king was to free him | ⁱ from taxes on imports. This they did to Amyntas, father of Phillip, King of Macedon. As aliens paid higher duties than natives, it was no small priviledge to have these removed. After the defeat of the Persians their forces amounted to 25000 men, there country was well cultivated, many cities in Asia paid them tribute. In consequence of this, the people were entitled to attendance on the court of justice, to have their children educated at the publick expence, to have certain distributions of money among them, with many other emoluments. If the number of citizens encreased these priviledges would not be so valuable, and therefore they were very jealous of it. As whoever comes into a parish in England must give a bond not to be burthensome to it, so <?in> all little republics where the number of freemen are small and election in the hands of a few, citizenship is of great importance. But in a large city such as Rome it was a very small compliment, and accordingly they made whole provinces citizens at once. In Brittain, one born within the kingdom is under the protection of the laws, can purchase lands, and if of the established religion can be elected to any office. In great estates38 the place of birth makes a citizen, and in small ones the being born of parents who are citizens.

| ^j In like manner the incapacity of being a citizen is different in different countries. By the old laws of Rome, and of every barbarous nation, the goods of every person who came within their territories were confiscated, and he himself became a slave to the first person who happened upon him. By a law of Pomponius, if he came from a nation at peace with Rome he was treated as the law prescribed. In barbarous countries they have but one word to signify a stranger and an enemy. At Rome every stranger was hostis, as they considered all nations as their enemies, and the person who came from them as a spy. The Leitchfield man o’ war was shipwreck’d on the Emperor of Morocco’s dominions, and because we had no league with him the whole crew were made slaves. Our sovereign so far complied with the custom of the place as to ransom them. When they found the advantages of exporting their own goods, and importing those of others, they would naturally allow those who traffick’d with them to be in a state of safety, both with respect to his person and goods, and would allow him an action if injured in either. This is the state of aliens in most of the countries of Europe at present. In Brittain an alien cannot purchase nor inherit land property, nor maintain a real action. | He cannot make a will because it is the greatest extension of property and is founded on piety and affection to the dead, which an alien can have but few opportunities of deserving. By a particular statute an alien merchant, but not a tradesman, may have a lease of a house. This arises from a whimsical principle that it would discourage our own tradesmen to allow forreigners to settle among them. This is the state of aliens in most countries.

In Brittain the manner of obtaining citizenship is twofold. 1st, by letters of denization, which is a part of the kings prerogative. 2^dly, by a bill of naturalization, which is an Act of Parliament. By the former an alien is capacitated to purchase lands and to transmit them to posterity if subjects of Great Brittain, but he cannot inherit, because as the king is heir of aliens he may transferr his own right but cannot take away the right of the person who ought to succeed. A denizen alien may inherit an estate bequeathed to him, but to be capable of inheriting in all respects an Act of naturalization is necessary, by which he has a right to all the priviledges of a freeborn born subject. When King William came to the throne naturalized aliens were made peers. | As many Dutch families came over with him it was natural to suppose that he would favour them with every priviledge. The English, offended at this partiality, made an Act declaring that there should be no Act of Parliament for the future by which they should be allowed such emoluments. As in most countries they are <not> allowed the right of transmitting lands, it was <?not> necessary that they should have an action for it. Neither in England nor in Germany are aliens allowed to make a will.39 In Saxony there was made a very equitable law that aliens from countries where they were allowed no priviledges should be allowed none among them. In Rome it was the right of citizens only to make a will.

It is to be observed with respect to aliens, that they are aliens amis, or aliens ennemie. If a number of the latter should make war upon the king or injure him, they cannot be prosecuted for high treason, because he is not their lawfull sovereign and they owe no alledgiance to him. If the laws of nations do not protect them they must be dealt with by martial law. Aliens however who live in the country are protected by the laws, and as they thus own alledgiance to the king they may be prosecuted for treason, and punished accordingly. Whatever makes a freeborn subject guilty of treason | makes an alien ami guilty of it. An alien ennemie, that is, one who comes from a country at war with us, if he give information to his natural sovereign is also guilty of treason.

Having thus considered who are properly the subjects of a state, we come now to treat of the crimes of the sovereign against the subject, or the limitations of his power.

On this branch of public law it is impossible to speak with any degree of precision. The duties of one subject to another are sufficiently ascertained by the laws of every country and the courts of justice, but there are no judges to determine when sovereigns do wrong. To suppose a sovereign subject to judgement, supposes another sovereign. In England it can be exactly ascertained when the king encroaches on the priviledges of the people, or they on that of the king, but none can say how far the supreme power of king and Parliament may go. In like manner where the absolute power of sovereignty is lodged in a single person, none can tell what he may not do, with accuracey. God is the only judge of sovereigns, and we cannot say how he will determine. All decisions on this subject have been made by the prevailing party, and never cooly by a court of justice, and can give us no light into the subject. Our best notions of it will arise from considering the several powers of government and their progress.

| In the beginning of society all the powers of government are exercised precariously. The majority may make war but cannot force the minority to it. Tho’ this power was the first that was exerted absolutely. The judicial power was much longer executed precariously than the foederative. In every country the judges once only interposed as mediators, and sometimes the pannel had his choice to referr his cause to the judge or to God, by combat, hot water, and nay, if the sentence of the judge did not please the pannel, he might challenge the judge to fight him in the court. In time however it became absolute. The legislative power was absolute whenever it was introduced, but it did not exist in the beginnings of society. It arose from the growth of judicial power. When the judicial power became absolute, the very sight of a judge was terrible as life, liberty, and property depended on him. Tacitus tells us that Quintillius Varus, having conquered a part of the Germans, wanted to civilize them by erecting courts of justice, but this so irritated them that they massacred him and his whole army. To a rude people a judge is the most terrible sight in the world. When property was extended it therefore became necessary to restrain their arbitrary decisions by appointing strict rules which they must follow. | ^k Thus the legislative power was introduced as a restraint upon the judicial. In Brittain the king has the absolute executive and judicial power. However the Commons may impeach his ministers, and the judges whom he appoints are afterwards independent of him. The legislative power is absolute in the king and Parliament. There are however certain abuses which no doubt make resistance in some cases lawful on whatever principle government be founded.

Suppose that government is founded on contract and that these powers are entrusted to persons who grossly abuse them, it is evident that resistance is lawfull, because the original contract is now broken. But we shewed before40 that government was founded on the principles of utility and authority. We also shewed that the principle of authority is more prevalent in a monarchy, and that of utility in a democracey, from their frequent attendance on public meetings and courts of justice. In such a government as this last, as the principle of authority is as it were prescribed,41 popular leaders are prevented from acquiring too great power, because they are not allowed to continue in office till they acquire any great ascendancey. But still there is a respect paid to certain offices, whoever be the person that exercises them. In Brittain both principles take place.

| Whatever be the principle of alledgiance, a right of resistance must undoubtedly be lawfull, because no authority is altogether unlimited. Absurdity of conduct may deprive an assembly of it’s influence, as well as a private person. An imprudent conduct will take away all sense of authority. The folly and cruelty of the Roman emperors make the impartial reader go along with the conspiracies formed against them.

It is to be observed that the right of resistance is more frequently exerted in absolute monarchies than in any other, because one man is more apt to fall into imprudent measures than a number. In Turky eight or ten years seldom pass without a change of government. The same degree of ill usage will justify resistance to a Senate or body of men. It must be allowed that resistance is in some cases lawfull, but its excessively difficult to say what an absolute sovereign may do or may not do, and there are different opinions concerning it. Mr. Locke says that when a sovereign raises taxes against the will of the people resistance is lawfull, but there is no country besides England where the people have any vote in the matter. In France the kings edict is all that is necessary, and even in Brittain it is but a very figurative consent that we have, for the number of voters is nothing to that of the people. | Exorbitant taxes no doubt justify resistance, for no people will allow the half of their property to be taken from them; but tho’ the highest propriety be not observed, if they have any degree of moderation people will not complain. No government is quite perfect, but it is better to submitt to some inconveniences than make attempts against it. Some other writers alledge that the king cannot alienate any part of his dominions. This notion is founded on the principle of the original contract, by which indeed, tho’ a people were willing to submitt to one government, they will not have one of anothers choosing. This doctrine is however groundless. In France and Spain great part of the dominions have been given to the kings children as a portion without any complaint. When Florida was put into our hands,42 they never made any opposition. The King of Spain and Czaar of Moscovy can even alter the succession as they please. This was in general the case in all feudal jurisdictions; they were divisible at the pleasure of the lord. It was but lately that the right of primogeniture took place in the principalities of Germany.

It is alledged that the King of France cannot alter the Salic law by which daughters cannot succeed to the crown. This law was owing to the power of the princes of the blood, who would not allow the succession to go past themselves. | But if France had been as destitute of nobility as Brittain was at the accession of the present family, the Salic law might have been altered as easily as any other law. It is hard to determine what a monarch may or may not do.

But when the summa potestas is divided as it is in Brittain, if the king do any thing, which ought to be consented to by the Parliament, without their permission, they have a right to oppose him.

The nature of a parliamentary right supposes that it may be defended by force, else it is no right at all. If the king impose taxes or continue them after the time is expired, he is guilty of breach of priviledge.

James II^d attempted some impositions of this sort upon importation. In the Petition of Right, it is expressly appointed that the taxes shall not continue a moment after the time determined by Act of Parliament. When the Parliament saw the crown going to James II who was a Roman Catholick they appointed two tests, to witt, an abjuration of the Pope, and the oath of supremacey, and that every person within 3 months after his acceptance of any office should take the sacrament after the form prescribed by the Church of England. K. James employed Roman Catholics both in the army and Privy Council, and besides appointed persons entirely unqualified | to the Treasury and broke in upon the priviledges of the universities. He also assumed a power of dispensing with the laws in cases where he himself was no way concerned. Some of the bishops, merely for doing what every British subject has a right to do, to witt, remonstrating against such proceedings, were sent to the Tower. Nothing could more alarm the nation than this attack upon the bishops. One Sharp preached against popery, the religion of the king, upon which the Bishop of London was ordered to suspend him. But he only cautioned him against such practices. The king, not pleased with this, created a Court of High Commission, which had been long abrogated and discharged ever after to be erected, and summoned both the Bishop and Sharp to appear before it. The king, perceiving the disgust of the people and thinking it proceeded from the fear of those possessed of abbay lands, lest they should be taken from them, and from a fear of a change in the religion of the country, he declared that he would grant liberty of conscience to all and retain every one in the possession of the church lands. This plainly shewed his intention to change | the religion of the country, which is the most difficult thing in the world. It is necessary before a religion be changed that the opinions of the people be changed, as was done by Luther, Calvin, John Knox, and others before the Reformation. K. James then applied to the army, but found they by no means sympathized with him. He in return told them that he would never any more bring down his sentiments to theirs, nor consult them on any occasion. It was no wonder that by such practices the Revolution was brought about, and the family sett aside, for the whole nation was disposed to favour the Prince of Orange. They might justly have passed by the whole family, but they generously dispensed with the rigorous law which corrupts the blood with the forfeiture of the estate, and bestowed the crown on his two Protestant daughters. Their brother, on account of the suspicions of his being a papist, as he had been educated in that religion, was rejected. The present family being the nearest Protestant heirs was by Act of Parliament settled in the government, and it was enacted that no prince unless a Protestant shall sit on the throne of Brittain. Thus K. James, on account of his encroachments on the body politic, was with all justice and equity in the world | opposed and rejected.

Thus we have considered man as a member of a state.

As ecclesiastics and laymen are two grand divisions of men in a state, under this head too might be considered ecclesiastic law, and the respective rights of these two [two] bodies of men. Here too we might consider military law, which arises from considering the state as divided into two bodies, civil and military. But these are forreign to our purpose.

Remainder of 99 and whole of 100 left blank in MS.

| Domestic Law.

We come now to consider man as a member of a family, and in doing this we must consider the threefold relation which subsists in a family. These, to witt, between Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, Master and Servant. 1st of these we shall consider husband and wife.

In every species of animals the connection between the sexes is just as much as is necessary for the propagation and support of the species. Quadrupeds whenever the female impregnates have no farther desire for each other. The support of the young is no burthen to the female, and there is no occasion for the assistance of the male. Among birds some such thing as marriage seems to take place. They continue the objects of desire to each other, their connection remains for a considerable time, and they jointly support the young. But whenever the young can shift for themselves all further inclination ceases.

In the human species | woemen by their milk are not capable of providing long for their children. The assistance of the husband is therefore necessary for their sustenance, and this ought to make marriage perpetual. In countries however where Christianity is not established, the husband possesses an unlimited power of divorce, and is not accountable for his conduct. In ancient Rome, tho’ they had the power of doing it, yet it was thought contrary to good manners.43

We may observe an utility in this constitution of our nature, that children have so long a dependance upon their parents, to bring down their passions to theirs, and thus be trained up at length to become usefull members of society. Every child gets this piece of education, even under the most worthless parent.

On this subject it is proposed to consider the duties of each of the two parties during their union, how this union should be^l begun and ended, and what are the particular rights and priviledges of each.

The first duty is fidelity of the wife to the husband; breach of chastity is the greatest of offences. Spurious children may be introduced into the family and come to the succession instead of lawfull ones. | This real utility however is not the proper foundation of the crime. The indignation of the public against the wife arises from their sympathy with the jealousy of the husband, and accordingly they are disposed to resent and punish it. The sentiment of jealousy is not chiefly founded, or rather not at all, upon the idea of a spurious offspring. It is not from the particular act that the jealousy arises, but he considers her infedility as an entire alienation of that preference to all other persons which she owes him. This is the real idea he has of it, as may appear from the following consideration. The idea we have of a father does not arise from the voluptuous act which gave occasion to our existence, for this idea is partly loathsome, partly ridiculous. The real idea that a son has of a father is the director of his infancey, the supporter of his helplessness, his guardian, pattern, and protector; these are the proper filial sentiments. The fathers idea of a son is of one that depends upon him, and was bred up in his house, or at his expence, by which connection there should grow up an affection towards him. But a spurious offspring is dissagreable from the resentment that arises against the mother’s infidelity.

| In these countries where the manners of the people are rude and uncultivated there is no such thing as jealousy. Every child that is born is considered as their own. The foundation of jealousy is that delicacey which attends the sentiment of love, and it is more or less in different countries in proportion to the rudeness of their manners. In general, wherever there is little regard paid to the sex infidelity is little regarded, and there will be the greatest looseness of manners. Agreable to this we find that Menelaus expressed his resentment against Paris, not against Helen, and this not for debauching her but for carrying her away. In the Odyssey44 she talks before her husband of that action without reserve. In Sparta it was common for them to borrow and lend their wives. When manners became more refined, jealousy began and rose at length to such a height that wives were shut up, as they are among the Turks at this day. As mankind became more refined, the same fondness which made them shut up woemen made them allow them liberties. In the latter ages of Greece woemen were allowed to go any where. This same fondness carried to a high degree gives as great a licence as when infidelity was disregarded. In no barbarous country is there more licentiousness than in France. Thus we may observe the prejudice of manners, with respect to woemen, in the different periods of society. | Tho’ there was little or no regard paid to woemen in the first state of society as objects of pleasure, yet there never was more regard paid them as rational creatures. In North America, the woemen are consulted concerning the carrying on of war, and in every important undertaking.45 The respect paid to woemen in modern times is very small. They are only put to no trouble for spoiling of their beauty. A man will not exempt his friend from a laborious piece of business, but he will spare his mistress. When the infedility of the wife is considered as an injury to the husband, it is necessary that unmarried woemen should be laid under restraints, that when married they may be accustomed to them. Hence the origin of punishment for fornication.

We come now to consider how this union is begun. As the duty after marriage is quite different from what it was before, it is necessary that there should be some ceremony at the commencement of it. This differs in different countries, but in general is connected with religion, as it is supposed to make the greatest impression. In the infancey of society, though marriage seemed intended to be perpetual, yet the husband had an unlimited power of divorce, tho’ it was reckoned indecent to exercise it, unless for an enormous crime. | The reason was that the government durst intermeddle little with private affairs, and far less with matters in private families. For the security of government they endeavoured by all means to strengthen the power of the husband and make him as absolute as possible. In ancient Rome, the husband was sovereign lord of life and death in all matters belonging to his own family.

In Rome three kinds of marriages took place.46 1st, by Conferriation,47 a religious ceremony.

2^dly, by Exemption,^m when the husband bought his wife.

3^dly, by Use. If he had lived with her a year and day, she was his by prescription, and he could divorce her.

The power of divorce extended to the wife after female succession took place; a woman possessed of a great fortune, who lived happily before marriage and had so much in her own power, would not encline to give it all to her husband. | The lawyers therefore invented a new kind of marriage in favour of heiresses, which was called the deductio domi48 or marriage by contract. Certain terms were agreed on between the parties, and then the husband came and carried her home. To prevent prescription taking place, she went away three or four days every year, which according to the form of the contract secured her fortune. Thus the wife became equally independent with the husband, and had equally the power of divorce. As the marriage was founded upon the consent of both parties, it was reasonable that the dissent of either party should dissolve it.

This form of marriage is pretty similar to the present, with this material difference, however, that it did not legitimate the children, nor preserve the honour of the woemen.49 The Roman form caused great disorders. When the parties seperated, which was often the case, they married others, and very often the woemen went thro’ five or six husbands. This so corrupted their morals that about the end of the monarchy there was scarce a great man that was not cuckolded. | The disorder came to such a height that after the establishment of Christianity, the power of divorce was restrained unless for certain causes. Among the Scythian nations which settled in the west of Europe, divorce was taken away altogether. In Burgundy, however, the power of the husband was very great. By a law there, if a man abused his wife he was liable to a fine, but if the wife misbehaved she was put to death.

As in general only flagrant crimes were taken notice of by the civil court, small ones went into the hands of the ecclesiastics, and that first gave occasion to their great power. When the civil court gave no redress for breach of contract, the ecclesiastics punished the offender for perjury, and when any difference happened betwixt man and wife they made them suffer penance for it. Afterwards the power of divorce was taken away unless for adultery, and when the one was afraid of bodily harm from the other. Even this last was not a perfect divorce, for neither of the parties was allowed to marry again, but only a seperation a mensa et toro. | The causes of a perfect divorce, after which they were allowed to marry again, were these three. 1st, if they were within the degrees of consanguinity,50 the marriage was made null, unless they had a dispensation from the Pope; 2^d, precontract with any other woman; 3^d, frigidity in a man, and incapacity in a woman.

The ecclesiastics brought in other alterations besides these with regard to marriage. It is to be observed that the laws made by men are not altogether favourable to woemen. They considered the infidelity in the husband and wife were equally punished. He had no more power to divorce than she. Adultery, saevitia, and metus were considered as causes of seperation but not of divorce.51

The cannon law when it took place was dictated by ecclesiastics, who on most occasions copied the Roman law, as they were the only persons that understood Latin, and among whom the remains of literature were preserved. At first even the ecclesiastic law required no ceremonies at marriage. As the ceremonies of conferriation52 and exemption53 had gone into desuetude in the latter times of the Roman law, when the only thing that | was required was the deductio domi, so by the ecclesiastic law for a long time a contract of any kind made a marriage, whether a contract in praesenti or in futuro. Contract in praesenti is when I say, I take you for a wife, or, I take you for a husband. Contract in futuro is when they say, I will do it. Either of these contracts might be proved either by evidence or by oath, if they declared themselves married persons, or that they were to be so. Pope Innocent III^d enacted that all marriages should be performed in facie ecclesiae, but tho’ this was considered as the only decent marriage, yet others were often in use and in some cases were valid. If a person was married in futuro, and afterwards in facie ecclesiae, and the first wife made no opposition till after the banns were out, the first marriage was null. If it was contractu presenti54 the second was null. This was the case in England till the late Marriage Act.

If a contract in futuro can be proved, or if the man refuse his oath, the marriage is in some countries considered as valid. The contract in presenti is every where valid especially if they cohabit afterwards. | All these institutions are derived from the canon law, which made the breach of them liable to church censures as ours does.

An Act of Parliament only makes a divorce in England, the infidelity of the wife will not do it. In Scotland it is much more easily done.

Protestants never carried matters so far as the canon law, for the clergy married themselves. Besides, love which was formerly a ridiculous passion became more grave and respectable. As a proof of this it is worth our observation that no ancient tragedy turned on love, whereas now it is more respectable and influences all the public entertainments. This can be accounted for only by the changes of mankind.

The species of marriage of which we have been treating took place only in Rome and in the Christian countries, with a few others, for in many countries they took as many wives as they were able to maintain. This naturaly leads us to consider the origin of polygamy.

It is to <be> observed that tho’ voluntary divorce be attended with inconveniences, yet it is not altogether contrary to the principle of justice that a man should | put away his wife and take another for less reasons than adultery, because they make them quite unhappy together, tho’ either of them might live very well elswhere. The same is the case with polygamy. If a woman consents to be one of five or twenty or more wives, and the laws allows it, there is no injury done her, she meets with the treatment which she might naturaly expect. The ancient Jewish and Oriental laws tolerated polygamy, but tho’ it and voluntary divorce be not altogether contrary to justice, it must always be a very bad policy where they are established or allowed.

Polygamy excites the most violent jealousy, by which domestic peace is destroyed. The wives are all rivals and enemies. Besides, the children are ill taken care of, and the wife complains that her children are not used as they ought, because she measures the affection of the father by her own, between which there is no proportion, as he55 is divided among 40 or 50 children and hers only among 4 or 5. Where polygamy takes place, there must both be a jealousy of love and a jealousy of interest, and consequently a want of tranquillity. It may be said that in the seraglios of the eastern monarchs there is the greatest peace, but this is owing to the most imperious discipline. | When rebells are subdued their humility is remarkable. In Africa we find the most horrid disorders, their discipline not being severe enough. It is the greatest misery to the woemen that they are entirely shut up and can enjoy no company but that of the eunuchs, which they detest. The man too who has the seraglio is by no means happy, tho’ apparently so. He too must be jealous, and on account of the inequality betwixt him and them he can have no entertainment at his own house, no opportunity of social improvements. You must never mention his wife to a Turk, she can never be seen by men, not even by her physician, as Tournefort tells us. This gravity and reserve of the husband must have a bad effect upon the manners of the country; as the men have no trust nor dependance upon each other, they cannot form into parties, and therefore the government must always be arbitrary, of which they have a model in their own houses, where there is little parental and less conjugal affection. Besides all this, it tends to depopulate the species; the greater part of men can get no wives, and many of them are castrated to take care of the seraglio. It is indeed alledged that there are more woemen born than men. Montesquieu says that at Bantam in the East Indies there are 10 woemen born for 1 man. | Dutch authors say that on the coast of Guinea there are 50 to one. The account from Japan is better attested, where it is said there are 11 woemen to 9 men. Where this is the case, if the fact be true, it would be an inconvenience if polygamy did not take place.

By strict examination, we find that in Europe there is little difference. The general computation is that there are 13 men to 12 woemen, or 17 to 16, which as men are more exposed to dangers than woemen makes the number about equal. Now if there be no difference in Europe, we have reason to conclude that there is not any difference in any other place. The laws of nature are the same every where, the laws of gravity and attraction the same, and why not the laws of generation. In some of the forementioned places there may indeed be more woemen than men. In places where the seat of religion is and where the court sits, and consequently the opulent live, there must be more woemen, because the rich only have seraglio’s and they purchase the woemen from other places, so that there is a constant import of woemen from these countries in which polygamy does not take place. Polygamy takes place under despotic governments. When a country is conquered by savages they indulge themselves in all manner of brutality, and this among the rest | as there is no established law to the contrary. It never took place in ancient Carthage or Rome, tho’ it takes place in Turky. In every country freedom puts out polygamy. There is nothing that free men will less submitt to than a monopoly of this kind. But despotism is always favourable to polygamy. Montesquieu observes still further in favour of polygamy, that in some countries woemen are marriageable at 8 or 9, and are old and withered at 30.56 When they have their beauty they cannot have much understanding, and when it encreases their beauty is gone, and consequently they cannot long be agreable companions, and therefore a husband had need of more than one. It may be their custom, indeed, to deflower infants, but the fact is not well attested. Cleopatra was 36 when taken by Augustus, yet she was with child; Constantia bore a child at 54. But tho’ [But tho’] the fact57 were true, it is not reasonable that polygamy should take place, but only voluntary divorce. If woemen were only usefull 10 or 12 years it might be reasonable to take another, but not a number at the same time.

Wherever polygamy takes place there can be no hereditary nobility. It is difficult to make the right of primogeniture take place where | there are so many wives, several of whom bring forth nearly at the same time. Where there are so many children they cannot all have the affection of the parent, and it is only by this means that any of them can establish themselves. Where the children are numerous affection diminishes. I may regard 4 or 5 children who are connected with my friend, but if there are 100 in the same relation they are little regarded.58 Now hereditary nobility is the great security of the people’s liberty. Being in every corner of the country, whenever the subjects are oppressed they fly to him as their head. In eastern countries there is no such thing. Every man is almost an upstart, and the royal family alone is regarded. The families of the bashaws after their death mix with the vulgar.

Wherever there is a hereditary nobility the country cannot easily be conquered, or rather not at all. They may be beat once or twice, but they still recover under their natural heads. Eastern countries, for this very reason that they want these, make feeble resistance against forreign invaders.

| Polygamy is exceedingly hurtfull to the populousness of a nation. An hundered woemen married to an hundered men will have more children than the same number married to two or three. It may indeed be said that in China, about the mouth of the Ganges, and in Egypt they are populous notwithstanding polygamy. In these countries there are regulations regarding populousness, and some other circumstances contribute to it such as the remarkable fertility of the soil.

Thus we see marriage is of two kinds, vizt polygamy or monogamy, of which the latter is of three kinds: 1st, when the husband can divorce the wife at pleasure, 2^dly, when the power of divorce is equally in their power, and 3^dly, when it is in the power of the civil magistrate entirely.

Where polygamy is allowed, the wife is entirely in the power of the husband; he may divorce her, or dispose of her as he pleases.

The laws concerning monogamy differ according to the species of it. That kind where the contract or agreement is indissoluble but by the civil magistrate is the most convenient. By this indeed nothing but what is very dissagreable to society is the occasion of divorce. | But it is always better that the marriage tye should be too strait, than that it should be too loose. The unlimited power of divorce in the latter ages of the Republic59 was productive of the most disorderly consequences, the prevention of which sufficiently attones for any hardships it may occasion. When both parties have the power of divorce they can have no mutual trust nor dependance upon each other, but their interests are quite seperate.

We come now to consider what interest the husband has in the property of the wife, or the wife in that of the husband, according to the different species of marriage.

Where polygamy takes place the wife, being in absolute slavery, has no interest at all in the husbands property and is only entitled to an aliment after his death. When the husband only has the power of divorce the property of the wife becomes his, as much as his own. When they have the power of divorce in the hands of both, whatever portion the wife brings is secured, and the husband can have no more ado with it but to manage it. | When he dies the wife has no more share of the husband’s property than was agreed upon by the contract. In the species of monogamy when divorce is in the hand of the magistrate, the right of the husband extends not so far as formerly, but that of the wife extends further, as she is more independent of him than in any other species. If a wife has a land estate, the husband receives the rents which are at his absolute disposal. If the wife die and leave a son, the husband is the natural guardian of it, and is entitled to a courtesie of the life rent of his wife’s estate.

In England the husband can dispose of all chattels real in his lifetime, but if he do not dispose of them in his lifetime they go to the wife, not to the heir, at his death.

All chattels personal he can dispose of as he pleases. Debts on bonds are the same with chattels real; if the husband demands payment of the debt he can dispose of the money as he pleases, but if he do not claim it in his lifetime it goes to his wife after his death. If the wife die first all chattels real and debts on bond go to her relations, if the husband have not already disposed of them. If the husband die first the wife has a third part of his land estate,60 | whether there be children or not. This is considered as her dowry.61 In England she has a compleat third of all,62 but in Scotland she has only a third of all bills, money, moveables, and bygone rents. Bonds bearing interest go to the children.

In Scotland the husband can sell his wife’s land with her own consent, but she must first be examined before a court and declare that it was with her own consent, and then her executorsⁿ cannot claim it. Both in Scotland and in England, no bond granted by the wife is binding upon the husband unless it be granted for the necessaries of life. In this respect she is considered as a servant, for if a servant buys provision in his name he is obliged to pay them. In Scotland the husband may have a writ of inhibition to prevent the wife from contracting debts in his name. In England any verbal notice that he will not be accountable for them is sufficient. If they be seperated, he is not even obliged to pay what she purchases for her aliment.

We come now to consider what persons are capable of contracting marriage. | Betwixt ascendants and descendants marriage is prohibited in infinitum. Nothing can be more shocking to nature than for a mother to marry her son. By this the mother becomes inferiour to her son, and on account of the inequality of their ages the ends of marriage are seldom accomplished. Therefore it is never tolerated unless where superstition takes place. In like manner a marriage between a father and a daughter is incestuous. It is however to be observed that this is not so contrary to nature as the former, because the father still is superiour when he is husband, and accordingly we find that many barbarous nations tolerated this. But still it is unatural that the father, the guardian and instructor of the daughter, should turn her lover and marry her. Besides, a mother can never look agreably on a daughter who will probably supply her place. Nothing can be more destructive of domestic happiness.

For the same reasons, the uncle and niece or the aunt and nephew never marry. At Rome and Carthage, indeed, they used sometimes to give a dispensation to the uncle and niece, but never to the aunt and nephew.

The marriage of collaterals, such as brother and sister, | seems to have been prohibited chiefly from political views, because they are bred up together, and would be in danger of mutual corruption unless properly restrained. The same reason lay against a marriage between cousins in these ages when they were brought up in the same house.

At Athens a man might marry his sister consanguinea but not his sister uteral.^o Many eminent men married in this manner, thus Cimon married his father’s daughter Elpinice.63

By the law of England, the wife of the deceased grand–uncle can marry her husbands grand nephew, it being above four degrees.

Affinity by the Christian law is considered as the same with consanguinity. The wife’s sister is considered as the husband’s sister and the wife’s aunt as the husband’s aunt. It is to be observed that the rules of affinity are rather rules of police than of nature, for it is not contrary to nature that a man should marry his wife’s sister. In many countries of the East Indies this kind of marriage takes place, because they think that the wife’s sister will probably make the best mother in law to her sisters children. But it may be answered to this, that it entirely hinders all intercourse between the sister and her brother in laws family, and that it might be expected that she would answer this purpose by living in his house unmarried with no children of her own. | The cannon and civil law reckoned affinity64 differently. The civil law counted brothers and sisters as one degree removed from the common stock, and cousins german two. The canon law counted how far the persons were asunder. Brothers were two degrees, the father being one and either of the brothers another. In the same manner cousins german were four degrees. The canon counted both sides from the stock and the civil law only one. When the one says the second degree was prohibited from marriage, and the other the fourth, they both mean cousins german. The Pope often dispensed with these laws, and by that means extended his authority and promoted his interest.

Having now considered all the different species of marriage, we come to consider the effects of the want of it. The effect of marriage is to legitimate the children. We must therefore consider the difference of legitimate and illegitimate. Legitimation gives the children inheritable blood, so that they can succeed to their father and his relations. An illegitimate child has no inheritable blood, and therefore cannot succeed to his father intestato, because it is unknown who is his father, nor to his mother, because no child succeeds that is not lawfully begotten. As a bastard can succeed to no body, so no body can succeed to him, as he is not related to any human creature. | If he die intestate without children, his wife has one half of his moveables and one third of his land estate, and the rest goes to the king, but if he has children, the wife has a third of all. The king is still considered as ultimus haeres.

In Scotland there is a further inconvenience attending it. As the king is the heir of bastards, a bastard is incapable of making a testament. Because it would cut the king out of his right. The king can, however, grant him letters of legitimation which make him capable of testating, because as the right of succession belongs to the king he may dispose of it as he pleases. However, this or any thing less than an Act of Parliament cannot give him inheritable blood, but an Act of the whole legislature can do any thing.

The canon and civil law restore to blood a person born out of wedlock in the following ways:

1st, per subsequens matrimonium, or marrying the woman that had the children. As concubines were numerous, it was enacted that whoever married his concubine legitimated her children. This Justinian afterwards made perpetual.

2^dly, per oblationem curiae. When the children were willing to execute certain parish offices, as deacons,65 etc, tho’ this entitled them only to succeed to the father and not to his relations.

| 3^dly, per adrogationem. As for example one Roman could adopt the son of another, and the son accept of him as a father. They had it in their power to adrogate any freeman; bastards were considered as freemen and if they were willing to accept might be adrogated as such.

4^thly, per <re>scriptum principis, which was much the same with letters of legitimation.

5^thly, per testamentum, by which they probably succeeded only to their fathers estate.

The canon law introduced the subsequens matrimonium into all countries but England. The English clergy were then unpopular by joining with the king against the barons, and therefore in England the subsequens matrimonium never could legitimate.

That subsequens matrimonium might legitimate, the canon law made some restrictions which did not take place at Rome. Bastards of adulterous persons could not succeed, those, to wit, of a woman who has a husband alive, or of a concubine to a man whose wife is alive, tho’ they should marry afterwards. Incestuous children also could not succeed, unless legitimated by a dispensation from the Pope. Thus we have seen the dissabilities and incapacities of illegitimate children, which can only have an effect where monogamy prevails, and indeed these alone | hinder polygamy from gaining ground in any country, because if bastards were allowed to succeed men would hardly subject themselves to the inconveniences of lawfull marriage. To have a wife entirely in their power and to take others when they please would be more convenient.

Three lines left blank in MS.

We come now to consider the history of parentage, being the second relation in which we were to consider man as a member of a family.

The authority of the father over his children, both with respect to liberty and property, was at first absolute. He was at liberty to choose whether he would bring up his children or not. And it was accounted no injustice to refuse to do it. The law hinders the doing injuries to others, but there can be no fixed laws for acts of benevolence.66 All that the law prohibited was immediately putting them to death, but he might expose them if he pleased. Even with us a father is not obliged to ransom a son who is taken captive, but may do it or not as he pleases. In the same manner anciently a father might choose whether he would ransom his son | from starving, from wild beasts, and the like. Tho’ some regulations were made in Rome concerning this, they were never well kept, and the practice was not abolished till the establishment of Christianity. In China, at present, where polygamy takes place, they are often obliged to expose them and generally drown them. As the father had it entirely in his power to bring up his son or not, he had an absolute jurisdiction over him if he did bring him up. At Rome the father had the ius vitae et necis, et vendendi. Besides, whatever the son acquired belonged to the father, and if he married his children were considered as members of the grand father’s family. This power of the father over his son was very soon lessened. The son was connected with the mother’s relations, and the uncle, whom on some occasions he was to succeed, would naturaly look after the person who was to be his heir. By a law of Numa–Pompilius, if a son was married it was no longer in the father’s power to sell him. The Twelve Tables indeed mention this priviledge of the father, but it is probable it was only those who married without their father’s consent. In like manner the ius vitae et necis went out. | The father only put in execution the laws of his country for capital crimes. He could take the power out of the hands of the magistrate and condemn his son to punishment himself, but he could not free his son if he was accused by the laws of his country. This shews that the patria potestas was not altogether absolute. This power of the father weaken’d by degrees, and at last went out altogether. The father only pronounced the sentence as it was dictated to him by the civil magistrate, as he himself might have gone wrong in some forms, and by that means rendered the whole null. It is much the same with the gentlemen in this country, who have it in their power to seize the goods of their tenants when in debt, without any form of law. As they are ignorant how it ought to be done, they are obliged as well as others to apply for authority to the civil court, tho’ they are vested with the power of doing it themselves.

The power of the father with respect to the property of the son soon went out likewise. We find that very early, by a law of Marcianus, the fathers were obliged to provide proper wives for their sons, and to bestow proper portions upon <them>, and if they refused the government was to see it done. | This shews that the property after marriage must have been their own. The law seems and has67 been made because the wife brought a fortune along with her, and therefore it was but reasonable that the husband should also have some property independent of his father. It must therefore only have been the property of unmarried children over which the parent had any power, and this is not unreasonable. The authority of the father was not arbitrary at Rome, for we often find men accused there for not taking proper care of their children, which could hardly have been the case if they could have put them to death.

Julius Caesar, and after him Augustus, were the first that gave to sons property independent of their fathers. At first they kept as their own whatever they took in war, or the peculium castrense, afterwards whatever they acquired by the liberal and mechanic arts. This was extended by Adrian, and afterwards by Justinian, to every thing, unless what they got from their fathers. All donations and legacies were entirely at their own disposal.

We also find the power of the father in dissinheriting them limited. There were only certain cases in which it was in his power.

| After the fall of the Roman Empire, the power of the father over the son, as well as over the wife, was softened. The father came to have over the son, while he continued in the family with him, an authority much the same with that a father has among us, that, to witt, of taking care of his morals. But when out of the family he was not so immediately concerned about him. The father has this particular priviledge with respect to his son, that he can become tutor to him without surety, and is not accountable, as every other tutor is, for negligence and omission. This is the natural authority the father has over the son. The father is obliged to bring up his children, and the children in case of old age or infirmity to maintain the father.

We now come to consider the history of law with regard to masters and servants, which was the third relation in which we proposed to consider <?man as a member of a> family.

We have found that the same principle which gave the husband authority over the wife also gave the father authority over the son. As the power of the husband was softened by means of his wife’s friends | with whom she was connected and to whom she could complain, so that of the father was softened by the same means. But it was not so with the servants; they had no body to whom they could complain, they had no connection with any person, and having none to take their part they necessarily fell into a state of slavery. Accordingly we find that the master had the power of life and death over them, quite different from the ius vitae et necis over the wife and children, which was restricted to criminal cases; the power over the servants was perfectly arbitrary. Besides, as the master had the disposal of his liberty, a slave could have no property. Whatever he has or can acquire belongs to his master. No contract of the slave could bind the master, however, unless the laws found a tacit consent of the master implied. A slave can only acquire for his master. If I promised a slave 10£ I am obliged to pay it to the master. But besides these dissadvantages there are many others to which the ancient Greek and Roman slaves, as well as our Negroes, were liable, tho’ less attended to.

| 1st. They were hindered from marriage. They may cohabit with a woman but cannot marry, because the union between two slaves subsists no longer than the master pleases. If the female slave does not breed he may give her to another or sell her. Among our slaves in the West Indies there is no such thing as a lasting union. The female slaves are all prostitutes, and suffer no degradation by it.

2^d. But slavery is attended with still greater evils than these, for a slave who is a polytheist is properly under the protection of no religion. He has no god any more than liberty and property. The polytheistic religion consists of a great number of local deities. Every place has it’s own divinity. The slaves belong not to the country, and therefore it’s gods are no way concerned about them. Besides, a heathen can never approach a deity empty handed. The slaves had nothing to offer and therefore could expect no favour from them. These slaves who were employed about the temples were the only ones who could have any tittle to the protection of the gods. The master prayed for them | but it was in the same manner that he prayed for his cattle. Every person is superstitious in proportion to the precariousness of his life, liberty, or property, and to their ignorance. Gamesters and savages are remarkably so. It is then a very great hardship that a slave, who is addicted to superstition from both these causes, should be deprived of that which is so well fitted to sooth the natural feelings of the human breast. The religion, therefore, which discovered one God who governed all things would naturaly be very acceptable to slaves. Accordingly we find that the Jewish religion, which, tho’ well fitted for defending itself, is of all others the worst adapted to the making of converts, because they could never be of the stock of Abraham from whom the Messiah was to come, could not be on a level with the Jews but only proselytes of the gate, and were obliged to abstain from many kinds of food, with all these dissadvantages made great progress among the Roman slaves. When Christianity was introduced, which was attended with none of these dissadvantages, it made the most rapid progress among the slaves.

| We are apt to imagine that slavery is quite extirpated because we know nothing of it in this part of the world, but even at present it is almost universal. A small part of the west of Europe is the only portion of the globe that is free from it, and is nothing in comparison with the vast continents where it still prevails. We shall endeavour to shew how it was abolished in this quarter and for what reasons it has continued in other parts and probably will continue.

It is to be observed that slavery takes place in all societies at their begining, and proceeds from that tyranic disposition which may almost be said to be natural to mankind. Whatever form of government was established, it was a part of its constitution that slavery should be continued. In a free government the members would never make a law so hurtfull to their interest, as they might think the abolishing of slavery would be. In <a> monarchy there is a better chance for it’s being abolished, because one single person is lawgiver | and the law will not extend to him nor diminish his power, tho’ it may diminish that of his vassals. In a despotic government slaves may be better treated than in a free government, where every law is made by their masters, who will never pass any thing prejudicial to themselves. A monarch is more ready to be influenced to do something humanely for them; when Augustus was visiting Vidius Pollio, one of the slaves who had accidentaly broken a platter threw himself down before Augustus imploring his protection, that he might not be cut in pieces and thrown into the fish pond. Augustus was so shocked with this that he immediately manumitted all Pollio’s slaves, tho’ Pollio no doubt relished not the behaviour of his guest. In the reigns of Adrian and Antoninus, when monarchy had taken place, there were several laws made in favour of slaves, but never one in the times of the Republic. Slavery, then, may be gradualy softened under a monarch, but not entirely abolished, because | no one person whatever can have so much authority as to take away at once the most considerable part of the nation’s property, because this would occasion a general insurrection.

In an opulent country the slaves are always ill treated, because the number of slaves exceeds the number of freemen and it requires the most rigid discipline to keep them in order. If a freeman was killed in a house68 all the slaves were put to death. Several authors tell us that in the nighttime at Rome, nothing was to be heard but the cries of slaves whom their masters were punishing. Ovid tells us that the slave who kept the gate was chained to it, and the slaves who manured the ground were chained together lest they should run away, and what was more cruel, when an old slave was incapable for work he was turned out to die on an island near the city kept for that purpose.

| Slavery is more tolerable in a barbarous than in a civilized society. In an uncultivated country the poverty of the people makes the number of the slaves any one can keep quite inconsiderable, and therefore their discipline will not be so rigid as where they are numerous. Besides, in a barbarous country the master labours himself as well as the slave and therefore they are more nearly on a levell. In the early periods of Rome the slave worked with his master and ate with him, and the only punishment in case of misbehaviour was the carrying a cross stick thro’ the town or village.

In Jamaica and Barbadoes, where slaves are numerous and objects of jealousy, punishments even for slight offences are very shocking. But in North America they are treated with the greatest mildness and humanity.

Thus we have shewn that slavery is more severe in proportion to the culture of society. Freedom and opulence contribute to the misery of the slaves. The perfection of freedom is their greatest bondage. And as they are the most numerous part of mankind, no human person will wish for liberty | in a country where this institution is established.

It is almost needless to prove that slavery is a bad institution even for freemen. A freemen who works for days wages will work far more in proportion than a slave in proportion to the expence that is necessary for maintaining and bringing him up. In ancient Italy an estate managed by slaves, in the most fertile country, yielded to the master only one sixth of the produce, whereas a landlord even in our barren country receives a third and the tenants live much better. Slaves cultivate only for themselves, the surplus goes to the master, and therefore they are careless about cultivating the ground to the best advantage. A freeman keeps as his own whatever is above his rent and therefore has a motive to industry. Our colonies would be much better cultivated by freemen.

That slavery is a dissadvantage appears from the state of colliers and salters in our own country. They have indeed priviledges which slaves have not. Their property after maintenance is their own, they cannot be sold but along with the work, they enjoy marriage | and religion, but they have not their liberty altogether, and it would certainly be an advantage to the master that they were free. The common wages of a day labourer is between six and eight pence. That of a collier is half a crown. If they were free their prices would fall. At Newcastle the wages exceed not 10^d or a shilling, yet colliers often leave our coalworks where they have half a crown a day, and run there tho’ they have less wages, where they have liberty.

There is still one inconvenience more that attends slavery, that it diminishes the number of freemen even to a degree beyond imagination, for every slave takes up the room of a freeman. The inequality of fortune seemed at first a misfortune and laws were made against it. £10 per ann. is reckoned the necessary expence of one man. A landed gentlemen who has £10,000 per ann. spends what would maintain a 1000 men. At first sight we are apt to conceive him a monster who eats up the food of so many, but if we attend to it he is realy usefull, and he eats or wears no more than the rest; £10 serves him too, and his £10,000 maintains a thousand people who are employed in refining his £10 by an infinity of ways so as to make it worth the whole. | This gives room for all kinds of manufactures. When slaves are employed to sift as it were this 10£ out of the 10,000£, one must be a taylor, another a weaver, a third a smith, and thus each takes up a freeman’s place.

We come now to account for the abolition of slavery in this part of the world. The slaves in this and the neighbouring countries were those who cultivated the ground and were what was called adscripti glebae, and could only be sold along with the land. As they had nothing but their maintenance for their labour, the ground was but badly cultivated. To remedy this dissadvantage tenants by stillbow69 were introduced; they had no stock themselves, and therefore the landlord gave them cattle and the implements for plowing, which they resigned at the end of the lease. At harvest the crop was equally divided between the landlord and tenant. This was the first species of free tenants, who were plainly emancipated villains. After this custom had continued for a long time the tenants picked up so much as enabled them to make a bargain with the landlord to give him a certain sum | for a lease of so many years; and whatever the ground should produce, they would take their venture. This is plainly an advantage to the landlord: the ground every year is better cultivated, he is at no expence, and the half of the product70 was better to the tenants than any sum they would give. By the feudal law, the lord had an absolute sway over his vassals. In peace he was the administrator of justice, and they were obliged to follow him in war. When government became a little better established, the sovereign did all he could to lessen this influence, which on some occasions was dangerous to himself and hindered people from applying to him for justice. As therefore the ancient villains were tenants at will, were obliged to perform certain duties to their master, and were entirely at his disposal, a law was made taking away all their burthens but that of being tenants at will, and at last their priviledge was extended and they became copyholders.

Another cause of the abolition of slavery was the influence of the clergy, but by no means the spirit of christianity, for our planters are all Christians. Whatever diminished the power of the nobles over their inferiours | encreased the power of the ecclesiastics. As the clergy are generaly more in favour with the common people than the nobility, they would do all they could to have their priviledges extended, especially as they might have expectations of reaping benefit by it. Accordingly we find that Pope Innocent the III^d encouraged all landlords to emancipate their slaves. Thus the influence of the clergy combining with that of the king hastened the abolition of slavery in the west of Europe. Agreable to this we find that in countries where neither the king nor the church were very powerfull slavery still prevails. In Bohemia, Hungary, and these countries where the sovereign is elective and consequently never could have great authority, and besides, where the church never had any great influence, servitude still remains, because the court is by no means powerfull enough to emancipate the slaves of the nobility.

To shew by what means slaves are acquired, to consider the state of domestic servants in our own country, together with mentioning a certain particular state of families, | will be all that is to be said on this head respecting man as a member of a family.

Slaves may be acquired five different ways. 1st, captives in war in almost every country are slaves; if the conqueror does not kill them, he has a right to make them slaves. 2^dly, as captives become slaves, having no body to deliver them, so their children become slaves also. 3^dly, persons guilty of certain crimes were made slaves, sometimes to the person injured, sometimes to the public. 4^thly, debtors in the ancient state of the Roman Republic were made slaves. If they could not pay their debt it was thought reasonable they should work for it. This still takes place in all countries where slavery is established. 5^thly, there is a sort of voluntary slavery when an indigent citizen sells himself to be the slave of another person. When a person sells himself to another for any sum, by the laws of slavery this very sum becomes the property of the person who bought him. But when a person was in debt and obliged to become a slave for it, he would not perhaps choose to be his creditor’s slave | for fear of ill usage, and would therefore sell himself to another person, on condition that he would pay his debt. The citizens of Rome were often in debt, and by that means became entirely dependent upon their superiours. Many of them had no means of subsistance but what they received from candidates for their votes, and as this was by no means sufficient for that purpose, they often borrowed from them to whom they gave their votes, who were ready enough to lend that they might secure them entirely to their interest. By this means they could not give their vote to any other person, unless he paid what they owed to their creditors, which few would be willing to do, as for the most part they owed more than the value of their votes.

In the middle age of the Republic, these two last methods of acquiring slaves were prohibited by express laws, the first by what was called cessio bonorum, and the latter by a law prohibiting any freeman to sell himself.

The slavery in the West Indies took place contrary to law. When that country was conquered by Spain, Isabella and Ferdinand were at the greatest pains to prevent the Indians from falling into a state of servitude, | their intention being to make settlements, to trade with them and to instruct them. But Columbus and Cortez were far from the law, and obeyed not their orders but reduced them to slavery, which in a manner instituted itself among them.

We come now to consider the state of servants. A Negroe in this country is a <?free> man.71 If you have a Negroe servant stolen from you, you can have no action for the price, but only for damages sustained by the loss of your servant. In like manner if a Negroe is killed, the person who does it is guilty of murder. But tho a Negroe servant is intitled to the priviledges of a freeman while here, you can oblige him to return to America and keep him as formerly.72 It is not from Christianity but from the laws of this country that he enjoys freedom, because there is no such thing as slavery among us.

The greatest dependants among us are menial servants {inter menia73 } who are bound from one term to another. They have almost the same priviledges with their master, liberty, wages, etca. The master has a right to correct his servant moderately, and if he should die under his correction it is not murther, unless it was done with an offensive weapon | or with forethought and without provocation.74 A servant can acquire property for his master either when he acts by his express authority, or when a tacit consent is implied. If a servant buys or sells goods in his master’s name, his master has room for an action in case of none payment or of non delivery. As there is a peculiar connection between master and servant, they can be vindicated in many cases where any other person would be found guilty. If either master or servant kill any other person in defence of each other, it is justifiable homicide.75 If a master dies before the term, the executors are obliged to pay up the whole of the servant’s wages, and to maintain him besides.

Apprentices are much in the same way with servants, only with this difference that the master receives a fee with the apprentice and is obliged to teach him a trade, and if he refuse to do it he may be pursued for damages and loss of time.

We come now to consider the particular state of families.

When a father dies leaving his children young, it is necessary that they should be taken care off. Even in the times of exposition, when an infant was sometime kept it was thought cruel to put him to death. | The child was destitute, there were then no hospitals or places of charity, it must therefore be put into the custody of some person. The nearest relation by the father’s side was he whom the law fixed upon. In an early age the maintenance of the child was all that was to be taken care of, for there were no estates to manage, and the mother went back to her father’s family. This guardianship terminated when the child was about 13 or 14 years of age, at which time it was capable in that age to shift for it self.76

But when men came to be possessed of estates, tho’ he might be supposed capable of shifting for himself about that age, yet he could not be capable of managing an estate. Now it became necessary to retain him in pupillarity more than 14 years. By praetorian law, at that age he was allowed to choose his guardians or curators. A curator can do nothing without the consent of the pupil; a guardian can act without his consent, but is accountable to his pupil for whatever he does during his minority. At first lunatics and ideots were almost the only persons who had guardians, and on account of it’s being disgracefull to have one, it was generaly declined. Afterwards the law made invalid all acts of the pupil till he was 21, without the consent of his curators. As the nearest relation by the father’s son77 | is often next heir, it was reckoned improper to trust the person of the son with him. The English law carried this so far that if an estate was left to the son in <?the> father’s lifetime he was not trusted with him. By our law the care of the estate is entrusted to the next heir, as he will probably take best care of it, and the heir to a more remote relation, who will take best care of him, as he cannot be benefited by his death.

We will now mention some offences in families with their peculiar punishments.

Infidelity of the wife to the husband is punished with the greatest ignominy. In the husband, it never was punished with death, nor in the woman unless where the greatest jealousy prevails. It would be thought ridiculous in our country to bring a woman to the scaffold for adultery.

Forcible marriages and rapes are generally punished with death.78

Bigamy as it dishonours the former wife is punished capitally.79 As there is the closest connection betwixt persons in a family, if the wife kills^p the husband it is considered as a sort of petty treason, and the punishment by the English law is burning alive.80

The same is the punishment if a servant kills his81 master, or makes an attempt upon him.

Thus we have finished all that is to be said with regard to man considered as a member of a family.

| Private Law.

We formerly explained the nature of rights and divided them into natural and acquired. The former need no explanation; the latter are divided into real and personal. Real rights are property, servitude, pledge, and exclusive priviledge. We are first to treat of property.

Property is acquired five ways. 1st, by occupation, or the taking possession of what formerly belonged to no body. 2^d, by accession, when a man has a right to one thing in consequence of another, as of a horse’s shoes along with the horse. 3^d, by prescription, which is a right to a thing belonging to another arising from long and uninterrupted possession. 4, by succession to our ancestors or any other person, whither by a will or without one. 5^th, by voluntary transferrence, when one man delivers over his right to another.

We shall first treat of occupation, the laws of which vary according to the periods of human society. The four stages of society are hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce. If a number of persons were shipwrecked on a desart island their first sustenance would be from the fruits which the soil naturaly produced, and the wild beasts which they could kill. As these could not at all times be sufficient, they come at last to tame some of the wild–beasts that they might always have them at hand. In process of time even these would not be sufficient, and as they saw the earth naturally produce considerable quantities of vegetables of it’s own accord they would think of cultivating it so that it might produce more of them. | Hence agriculture, which requires a good deal of refinement before it could become the prevailing employment of a country. There is only one exception to this order, to witt, some North American nations cultivate a little piece of ground, tho’ they have no notion of keeping flocks. The age of commerce naturaly succeeds that of agriculture. As men could now confine themselves to one species of labour, they would naturaly exchange the surplus of their own commodity for that of another of which they stood in need. According to these stages occupation must vary.

Occupation seems to be well founded when the spectator can go along with my possession of the object, and approve me when I defend my possession by force. If I have gathered some wild fruit it will appear reasonable to the spectator that I should dispose of it as I please.

The first thing that requires notice in occupation among hunters is what constitutes it and when it begins, whether it be on the discovery of the wild beast or after it is actualy in possession. Lawyers have varied on this head; some give a part to the person who has formerly wounded a wild beast, tho’ <he> have given up the chace, and others do not. All agree that it is a breach of property to break in on the chace of a wild beast which another has started, tho’ some are of opinion that if another should wound the beast in it’s flight he is entitled to a share, as he rendered the taking it more easy upon the whole. Among savages property begins and ends with possession, and they seem scarce to have any idea of any thing as their own which is not about their own bodies.

Among shepherds the idea of property is further extended. Not only what they carry about with them | but also what they have deposited in their hovels is their own. They consider their cattle as their own while they have a habit of returning to them. When the generality of beasts are occupied, they consider them as their own even after they have lost the habit of returning home, and they may be claimed for a certain time after they have strayed. But property receives its greatest extension from agriculture. When it first became necessary to cultivate the earth, no person had any property in it, and the little plot which was dressed near their hovels would be common to the whole village, and the fruits would be equally divided among the individuals. There are the remains of a common land property in our own country at this day. In many places there is a piece of ground belonging equally to several persons, and after harvest cattle are in many places allowed to feed where they please. Private property in land never begins till a division be made from common agreement, which is generally when cities begin to be built, as every one would choose that his house, which is a permanent object, should be entirely his own. Moveable property may be occupied in the very first beginings of society, but lands cannot be occupied without an actual division. An Arab or a Tartar will drive his flocks over an immense country without supposing a single grain of sand in it his own.

By the laws of many countries there are some things, however, that cannot be occupied by any private person. | Treasure and derelict goods by the laws of Brittain belong to the king. This arises from that natural influence of superiours which draws every thing to itself that it can without a violation of the most manifest rules of justice. In like manner seas and rivers cannot be occupied by any private person; unless particularly specified in your charter, you cannot take large fishes in a river running thro’ your own estate. A sea surrounded by several nations cannot be occupied by any one, but all must have a part of the jurisdiction, but any nation may hinder another from fishing in it’s bays or approaching it’s coasts with vessells of war.

The right of accession is not so much founded in it’s utility as in the impropriety of not joining it to that object on which it has a dependance. The milk of a cow I have purchased may not be of great value, but it is very improper that another person should have a right to bring up his calf upon it. The most important accessions are in land property. Land property is founded on division or an assignation by the society to a particular person of a right to sow and plant a certain piece of ground. In consequence of this right he must also have a right to whatever it produces, trees, fruit, minerals, etca. Alluvians made by any river naturaly | belong to the proprietor of the adjacent territory, but when the additions are very large, as is often the case in low countries, the government claims them, and the proprietor of the adjacent estate must purchase it before he possess it.

The principal dispute concerning accession is, when does the principal belong to me and the accession to another, or if they be mixed to whom does the whole belong? It is a maxim in law that no person be a gainer by anothers loss. If a man build a house by mistake upon my ground, tho’ the materials be his, it is but reasonable that I should have the house or be indemnified for my loss. In generall the accession follows the principal, tho’ in some cases, as where the workmanship is of more value than the materials, substantia cedet formae. The lawyers were however unwilling directly to contradict their general and established maxim, and therefore evaded it by giving the principal to the proprietor of the accession when it became a new species, that is, when it received a new form and a new name. This however was liable to exceptions. A picture and the board on which it was painted were in Latin of the same species; each was a tabula, and therefore the picture by this amendment still belonged to the proprietor of an insignificant board. The most general rule with regard to accessions is this. When the thing can be reduced to it’s primitive form without lessening it’s value or without any great loss to the proprietor of the accession, | the proprietor of the principal may justly claim it, but when this cannot be done the law justly favours the proprietor of the accession, and obliges him only to content the original proprietor for his property.

Prescription is founded on the supposed attachment of the possessor to what he has long been possessed of, and the supposed detachment of affection in the old possessor to what has been long out of his possession. There are four things requisite to form a right by prescription. 1st, bona fides, for if a person be sensible that his right to a thing is bad it is no injury to deprive him of it, and the indifferent spectator can easily go along with the depriving him of the possession. 2^d, iustus titulus, by which is not meant a tittle just in all respects, for this is of itself sufficient without any thing else, but a iustus titulus signifies some reasonable foundation that the person has to think a thing his own, such as <a> charter of some kind. If he claims a right without any such tittle no impartial spectator can enter into his sentiments. 3^d, uninterrupted possession is also necessary to prescription, for if the property have often been claimed of him the former possessor has not derelinquished his right. 4^th, the time is only to be reckoned when there was a person to claim the property, and therefore the longest uninterrupted | possession when the proprietor was a minor, a lunatic, or in banishment can give no right.

A iustus titulus is a proof of bona fides, and bona fides is requisite to a iustus titulus. By the Roman law bona fides was only required at the first taking possession, and tho’ afterwards you found a fault in your title prescription took place. Nature has fixed no period for prescription, and accordingly it varies according to the stability of property in a country. At Rome, <im>moveables once prescribed in two years, but afterwards more was required. In our country a feudal lord who continualy had claims upon his neighbour could scarce be brought to admit any law of this nature. He was willing to revive a claim tho’ as old as the days of Noah. And when at last they fixed on a period they made it as long as possible, to witt, forty years. Among the Romans it is to <be> observed that if any ones possession was interrupted during the time required for prescription by an enemy coming into the country, he had to begin a new again. By the English law nothing can interrupt prescription but a claim of the old possessor. Kings seldom ever allow their claims to prescribe, at least they account no length of uninterrupted possession sufficient to do it. However, immemorial possession will ever carry this along with it.

Succession is either legal or testamentary. By legal succession is meant that the law should distribute the goods of the deceased to those whom it is to be presumed the person himself would have chosen that they should be given, | according to some lawyers. But this supposes that testamentary succession, or a distribution of the goods according to the will of the deceased, was previous to legal succession, which is contrary to experience. In a rude period a man had scarce the full property of his goods during his lifetime, and therefore it cannot be supposed that then he should have had a power to dispose of them after his death. In all nations the relations of the dead person succeeded long before there was any such thing as a testament. The Twelve Tables at Rome, and the laws of Solon at Athens, seem first to have introduced testamentary succession, but long before this there was legal succession in both countries. The claim of the heir of blood is always thought the preferable one, but this claim is never founded on the presumed will of the deceased. If we consider succession in the earlyest times we shall find that it is more founded on the connection of goods than of persons. As the father and sons lived together and were joint acquirers of any property they had, when the father died the children had a joint right to the goods not so much on account of their relation to the father as on account of the labour they had bestowed on acquiring them. The mother and the children would therefore continue in possession. Among the Romans the wife was considered as a daughter and had her share accordingly. If any of the children were settled out of the family or were emancipated, they had no share in the succession, because they ceased to co–operate with the rest in acquiring the goods. | It may be observed that when families in this manner lived together it was necessary to prohibit marriages of cousins. When wives, sons, and grandsons lived in the same house, if all succeeded equally it was called succession secundum capita, but if the grandsons succeeded only to his father’s part it was secundum stirpes. If a man had three sons who were all dead, but the oldest had left behind him one son, the second two, and <the> third three, by the former rule on the death of their grandfather each would have a sixth, but by the latter the son of the oldest would have a third alone, the two sons of the second a third between them, and the three sons of the third a third among them. The grandsons were as it were the representatives of their father. The right of representation is the same with the successio secundum stirpes. Among the Romans the right of representation was introduced in favour of the strong and in prejudice of the weak, but in Brittain is the contrary.82 Among the Romans a son could not succeed to the mother when she died, because as she was considered as a daughter of the family every thing she had belonged to the husband; if the husband died first, the wife shared with her children and then went home to her father’s house and succeeded anew to her father. But in times of more refinement under the emperors, the mother could succeed to the son and the son to the mother. Anciently when a son died no person succeeded to him because he and every thing he had belonged to his father. Caesar first made a law that a son might possess as his own | whatever he got in war, or acquired by the liberal arts.

Three classes of men may succeed, ascendants, descendants, and collaterals, as these in an upper line may succeed to those in a lower, these in a lower to those in an upper line, or those of the same line to one another. Collateral succession at first extended only to the nearest in blood, and if he refused it the goods belonged to the public,83 but afterwards the praetor extended it to the seventh in blood.84 When a brother died and another succeeded, it was in consequence of their connection with the father, who is the common stock, and therefore succession of ascendants must have been prior to that of collaterals. But the right of descendants is stronger than either of these, because the son’s claim on the father is evidently more strong than that of the father on the son. The principles of succession then in moveables are founded on the community of goods which took place anciently in families.

The different state of families in our country makes a considerable difference betwixt our law and that of the Romans. The wife is among us a much more considerable person than a daughter and accordingly succeeds to more. When the husband dies, the goods are supposed to be divided into three equal parts, one of which is supposed to belong to the deceased husband, one to the wife and one to the children; there is however this difference, that the husband can dispose of his part by testament which the wife cannot. A forisfamiliated son is not in the same condition with an emancipated son among the Romans. He can succeed with his brothers. Only if he has got | a portion, he must bring it into the common stock at his father’s death. Grand children do not succeed in place of their deceased father as among the Romans. The English law however admits of representation, and it preferrs ascendants if males to collaterals.

We come now to treat of indivisable inheritance, which was introduced by the feudal law. When the nations that conquered the Roman Empire settled in the west of Europe an inequality of fortune necessarily ensued. As the great had no way of spending their fortunes but by hospitality, they necessarily acquired prodigious influence over their vassals. They gave out their lands merely as a maintenance to their dependants, and it is observable that the Saxon–word farm signifies victuals. The chieftans from their influence were the sole administrators of justice in their own territories. It was the interest of government to authorize this jurisdiction as it was the only method of preserving peace, and as the superiour was the leader both in peace and war. So lately as in the year 1745 this power remained in the Highlands of Scotland, and some gentlemen could bring several hundereds of men into the field. As these lords had no other way to dispose of their lands, they gave some of them as munera, which were revocable at their pleasure, and others they gave as beneficia, which continued during life and returned to the lord after their decease.

The benefices of the clergy seem to have been | on this foundation and have retained the name. By this means the lords secured the fidelity of their vassals. As benefices were for life the property of them naturaly came to be extended to the son of the deceased tenant, and by degrees the tenures became hereditary and were called feudal. Thus the tenant became more independant. When any chieftan died and left his son a minor, the king appointed a leader to the vassals during the minority, and appropriated the profits and emoluments arising from the lands to his own use. When a female succeeded, the lord had the power of disposing of her in marriage, as it was reasonable that he should name the husband who was to be his own vassal. As the lord was guardian of the heir male, it was also thought unreasonable that he should marry without his consent. As the feudal lord possessed the lands during a minority, before the minor could recover his estate he was obliged to pay what is called a relief. This was introduced by the court of the king or lord, before which the minor was obliged to swear fealty before he could recover his estate. He was also obliged to promise homage to his superiour before he could enter on possession. Thus they held their lands of the superiour for military service, homage, fealty, wardship, marriage, relief, etca. Allodial estates were free from all such services, but as it was for security of property to hold of some great man | who could protect the proprietor from violence, the generality of estates became feudal. For the same reason men possessed of great estates paid feu and swore fealty to the sovereign.

It appears from this that it must have been a very difficult matter to secure property, especially if it was small, in those early times, and therefore nothing could have a worse consequence than the division of estates. The consequences of dividing the kingdom of France were sufficiently experienced, and the case would have been still worse in private estates. However, on account of the opposition from the rest of the sons it was long before the right of primogeniture or the indivisibility of estates could be introduced, and in Germany it did not fully take place before the last century. But as the circumstances necessarily required it, estates were at last made indivisible, and since a single person was to be preferred the oldest son would naturaly be the person. This legal preference must be given for some quality that is altogether indisputable. If it were to be given to wisdom or valour there might be great disputes, but among brothers there can be no^q contest who is the oldest. In the beginings of society age itself is very much respected, and to this day among the Tartars the king is not succeeded by his son, but by that one of the royal family who is oldest.

| Primogeniture when introduced would naturaly occasion succession by representation, for the following reason. The younger brothers at first would think it hard that their older brother should be preferr’d to them, and if he died they would still think it harder that his son, an infant, should come in before them. Accordingly in many places this has been disputed in single combat. Bruce and Baliol disputed on this account. According to our notions Baliol had the best right for he was descended from the oldest daughter, tho’ Bruce was a step nearer the common stock. The difficulty of introducing this at first gave rise to a new species of succession, by which when a father died his estate went to his eldest son, but if he died while his children were minors, or if he died while his father was alive, his brother, not his son’s, succeeded. This was attended with one inconvenience, that on the death of the youngest his sons were preferred to those of the other brothers. By the Roman law a grandson succeeded only to his father’s part; he might succeed as a son but not as an oldest son. The brothers naturaly thought that they were nearer the father than any grandson he could have, but as this was a hardship to the brother’s claim so it was also a hardship to cut of^r the reasonable expectation which the grandson had if his father had lived. This last circumstance after gave occasion to lineal succession. | When this difficulty is got over there is little dispute about collateral succession. In feudal lordships a woman could not succeed, as she was incapable of performing military services, but they could succeed to lands where there was required any other kind of service.

Of fiefs there are two kinds, masculine and feminine. France, to the crown of which no woman can succeed, is an instance of the former, and England of the latter.

There are some niceties whimsical enough in the Scotch law with regard to succession of collatorals.85 If the second brother has an estate and dies it goes to the third and not to the oldest, who is supposed to have been sufficiently provided for. Conquest on the contrary ascends, but it does not go to the oldest but to the immediately older brother. By the English law the old brother excludes the whole blood from one half of the estate by conquest, in other countries the preference is not so great.

We must observe that the right of primogeniture hinders agriculture. If the whole estate were divided among the sons, each one would improve his own part better than one can improve the whole. Besides, tenants never cultivate a farm so well as if it were their own property. Primogeniture is also hurtfull to the family, for while it provides for one | it suffers all the rest in a few generations to be reduced to beggary. In succession to a monarchy, however, it has one evident advantage, that it prevents all dangerous rivalships among the brothers.

There are some other kinds of succession that take place, or have taken place in several countries. Thus in some countries the youngest son succeeds to the father. There is something like this among our tenants to this day; the older sons as they grow up are provided for, and the youngest remaining with the father succeeds to him.

So much for legal succession. We come next to testamentary. It is to be observed that there is no extension of property so great as this, and therefore it was long before it could be introduced; it was very natural to give a man a right to dispose of his property while he lived, but a testament supposes him to dispose of a right when properly speaking he can have none himself. He cannot be said to transferr his right, for the heir has no right in consequence of the testament till after the testator himself have none. Puffendorf whimsicaly accounts for this from the immortality of the soul. At Rome the right of making testaments was introduced gradually. At first it was only allowed, and that too after the consent of the fellow citizens was asked and obtained, to childless people. This was much the same with adopting children. | When a person died and wanted to leave his estate to a son in exile, he would naturaly request his neighbours not to take it from him after his own death. This request would be regarded, not so much on account of its being his will as from a kind of piety for the dead. We naturaly find a pleasure in remembring the last words of a friend and in executing his last injunctions. The solemnity of the occasion deeply impresses the mind. Besides, we enter as it were into his dead body, and conceive what our living souls would feel if they were joined with his body,86 and how much we would be distressed to see our last injunctions not performed. Such sentiments naturaly enclined men to extend property a little farther than a man’s lifetime.

This seems to have been the foundation of testamentary succession. It was a sort of impiety not to comply with the father’s desire, tho’ it was no injury to deprive the heir of the estate as there was no law established in his favour, and as his being in exile cut off all reasonable expectation of succeeding. The injury is conceived to be done to the dead person, as we enter into what would be his sentiments were he to live again.

It is to be observed that this practice is a considerable refinement in humanity, and never was practised in a rude nation. | Before the Twelve Tables no Roman had a right to make a will. Our Saxon ancestors had no right to dispose of their lands by testament, and in the history of the Old Testament we hear of no such practice. Piety for the dead could take place only with regard to the immediate successor, and therefore at first the right of making testaments extended no further, unless in case the person in whose favour it was made should refuse to succeed, in which case another might be appointed. This was a further extent of the right. Again, if a man died and left his sisters son heir to him, that the estate might not go to forreign relations the testator was allowed to say that if the pupil die at a certain age the estate shall go to such another person. This was called popular succession.87 Thus property was still further extended.

The greatest of all extensions of property is that by entails. To give a man power over his property after his death is very considerable, but it is nothing to an extension of this power to the end of the world. In the beginings of society the state of families is very different from what it is at present. As the wife was subject to the husband, and at the best only on the footing of a daughter, she seldom made any addition to the husband’s estate unless by her own industry. But when female succession took place, and woemen came to be possessed of fortunes, | they would not marry without a previous capitulation by which they insured themselves of good usage, and stipulated that some part of their fortune should go to their relations after their death. By this arose a new species of marriage from agreement which rendered the parties equally independant. This great alteration in domestic affairs would naturally at first be complained off, and as the ultimate cause of it was the succession of females they would endeavour to prevent their opulence. On this account a law was made at Rome bringing matters to their ancient footing, called the Vaccinian^s law. To elude this law a fide<i> com<m>issum was invented, by which, when a man had a mind to leave his estate to a person whom the law would not allow, <?he left it to another person> and took his solemn promise that he would transferr it to the person for whom he intended it. Augustus made a law obliging the trustee always to restore it, and appointed a fide<i> commissary^t praetor for that purpose. The person for88 whom the estate was left was called haeres fiduciarius, and the person to whom it was to be restored was called fide<i> commissarius. Thus property was extended beyond the first successor, and when this step was gained they easily advanced further and introduced entails.

Entails were first introduced into the modern law by the ecclesiastics, whose education made them acquainted with the Roman customs. As they were the preachers of this doctrine they naturaly became the explainers and executors of wills, till Theodosius Valentinus89 took it from them. | In England William the Conqueror restored it to the ecclesiastics.

By the customs of our country a man if he leave a wife and children can dispose only of a third by testament, and if he leave a wife without children only a half. Lands after the introduction of the feudal system could only be disposed <of> by testament in the same way with military services, by the consent of the superiour. Originally in England there were no entails by will but by tenure. A man held an estate for himself and his heirs, but if he had no heirs he could not alienate it, it returned to the superiour. But if he had heirs he could alienate it, and thus the lord was deprived of his right of reversion. A law was afterwards made to secure this.

Upon the whole nothing can be more absurd than perpetual entails. In them the principals of testamentary succession can by no means take place. Piety to the dead can only take place when their memory is fresh in the minds of men. A power to dispose of estates for ever is manifestly absurd. The earth and the fulness of it belongs to every generation, and the preceeding one can have no right to bind it up from posterity. Such extension of property is quite unnatural. The insensible progress of entails was owing to their not knowing | how far the right of the dead might extend, if they had any at all. The utmost extent of entails should be to those who are alive at the person’s death, for he can have no affection to those who are unborn.

Entails are dissadvantageous to the improvement of the country, and these lands where they have never taken place are always best cultivated. Heirs of entailed estates have it not in their view to cultivate lands and often they are not able to do it. A man who buys land has this entirely in view and in general the new purchase<r>s are the best cultivaters.

In voluntary transferrance two things are required:

1st, a declaration of the intention both of the person who transferrs and of him to whom it is transferr’d.

2^d, the actual delivery of the thing.

In most cases the first of these is not binding without the latter because there is no right without possession. If a man indeed have borrowed a thing and afterwards purchase it there is no need of delivery, for it is already in his possession. Before possession you can have no right to the thing, tho’ you may have a right to make the man keep his promise or contract. If I buy a horse from a man and before delivery he sell him to a third person, I cannot demand the horse from the possessor but only from the person who sold him. | But if he has been delivered I can claim him from any person. Property therefore cannot be transferred without tradition or delivery. Grotius indeed justly observes that in the transferrance of a pledge there is no need of delivery, because in this case the thing is already in the man’s possession. In France, if a man declare his purpose to make a donation, and die before delivery, the donation goes to the heir. This was also a custom among the Wisigoths.

In transferring the property of lands and other large objects, what gives possession is not so easy to determine. As there cannot be an actual delivery, in our country a symbolical delivery is used. An ear or sheaf of corn signifies the whole field, a stone and turf the estate to the center of the earth, and the keys of the door, the house. By the Scotch law if there be a transferrance of several estates the purchaser must be infeft in each; by the English law infeftment in one serves for all when done in presence of the county court. In Scotland it must be done on the land; it is enough in England if it be done in view of it. Besides delivery, a charter or writing shewing on what terms the transferrence was made is also requisite for security. Till the custom was abolished by a late statute, no vassal or possessor had a right of alienating his estate without the consent | of the superiour, as he held it for military service. It was requisite that the estate should be resigned to the superiour, who resigned it to the purchaser, as it was proper that his vassal should be of his own chusing. Afterwards however it became necessary to accept of creditors, and this was often used as a handle to elude the law. The seller gave a bond for a sum of borrowed money without any mention that it was a sale, by which means the lands were adjudged to the creditor, and the lord was obliged to accept of him as his vassal. In like manner, as the tenant was liable to oppression from a new superiour the lord could not dispose of his estate without consent of his vassal. If therefore either of them alienated any part of their estates without the others consent his right was forfeited.

The duty of vassals to their lords continued [in] longer in Scotland than in England, which may be accounted for from the difference of their government, for that <of> England all along favoured democracey, and that of Scotland aristocracey. After society was fully established there was no occasion for mutual consent, because the tenant was protected by law, whatever the lord was.

In the time of the civil wars a new sort of delivery took place. When a person transferred his estate to another for his own use it was not affected by forfeiture. The person to whom it was transferred was considered as the bailliff, and took possession in the others name.

| The second species of real rights is servitudes, or burthens which one man has on the property of another. These rights were at first personal, as they were entered into by a contract between the persons. It is necessary that I should have a road to the market town. If a man’s estate lye between me and it, I must bargain with him for the priviledge of a road thro’ it. This contract produces only a personal right, tho’ I should bind him not to sell this estate without the burthen. But here was an inconveniencey, for if the land were sold and the new proprietor refused the road, I could not sue him on a personal right upon the former proprietor. Before I can come at the new purchaser I must pursue the person from whom I had the right, who must pursue him to whom he sold it. If the land has gone thro’ several hands this is very tedious and inconvenient. The law, to remedy this, made servitudes real rights, demandable a quocumque possessore. Servitudes were rusticae, such as the right of a road to the town, or to the river, and of feeding so many cows on another man’s pasture grounds; or urbanae, such as the right of leaning the beams of my house on your gabel, the right of obliging him who is proprietor of the under story to make his wall strong enough to support mine, and the like. These are all naturaly personal rights and are only made real by lawyers. Life rents on estates and many other things are also servitudes, and are properly personal. Feudal burthens wre only persons rights | and therefore every new vassal must renew his homage and the promise of fealty.

In the begining of the feudal law, if the proprietor did not perform his duty in every article he forfeited his feu. In like manner, if the tenant encroached on his lord’s grounds what he had feued returned to the superiour. The right of the vassal is founded on the charter of the superiour, and every article of it must be fullfilled, and every new possessor must renew the obligation. When tenants became independant and had a real property they were said to have the dominium directum, not the dominium utile.90

Pledges and mortgages are certain securities for the payment of debts. At first they could not be claimed as real rights, tho’ afterwards the law considered them as such. Pledges properly regard moveable subjects and mortgages immoveable. If a pledge be not redeemed at a certain time it is forfeited. As people in bad circumstances are naturaly slothfull, the negligence of debtors among the Romans gave occasion to the Lex Com<m>issaria by which the creditor was impowered to seize the pledge and return the overplus if there was any. By the English law, if no day be named the pledge falls to the pawntaker on the death of the pawner.91 In immoveables lands are mortgaged but not delivered, and in case of failure they are forfeited. The Roman law and ours are much the same on this head. If payment be not made within some few months after demand, the creditor adjudges the land for the whole sum and the penalty incurred, but his property is not secure without long possession, for the proprietor has a power of redeeming it | within a reasonable time. But as upon redemption much trouble must be occasioned in examining old accompts and the like, the law has made 20 years the stated time in England for redeeming mortgages.

Hypothecs are another kind of pledges realy arising from contract, but made real rights by the civil law. By them anciently the landlord was impowered to detain the furniture and whole stock of the tenant if he turned bankrupt, and could claim them a quocumque possessore. This arose from the practice of keeping tenants by steelbow, by which the whole stock in the farm was the landlords. At present the landlord has only a right of preference, and we have not so many hypothecs as the Romans had. All pledges are naturally personal rights, and are only made real by the civil law.

Exclusive priviledges are the last division of real rights. Among these is the right of inheritance, which is not a creature of the civil law but arises from nature. The heir, previous to any other person, has a priviledge of demanding what belonged to the deceased, and after he is admitted heir it is his real property. Again, if a person start a wild beast he has an exclusive priviledge of pursuing, and whatever person comes in upon the chace is liable to punishment not <?for breach of property but> because he breaks in upon his exclusive priviledge.92 In the year 1701 an English man–of–war engaged with a French merchant fleet under convoy which was just about to fall into their hands, when a Scotch privateer came and carried off the prize. A lawsuit commenced and the Scotch privateer was declared guilty of breach of property. | But upon strict inquiry we shall find that it was only breach of priviledge.

Tho’ these and some other exclusive priviledges arise from nature, they are generaly the creatures of the civil law. Such are monopolies and all priviledges of corporations, which tho’ they might once be conducive to the interest of the country are now prejudicial to it. The riches of a country consist in the plenty and cheapness of provisions, but their effect is to make every thing dear. When a number of butchers have the sole priviledge of selling meat, they may agree to make the price what they please, and we must buy from them whether it be good or bad. Even this priviledge is not of advantage to the butchers themselves, because the other trades are also formed into corporations, and if they sell beef dear they must buy bread dear. But the great loss is to the public, to whom all things are rendered less comeatible, and all sorts of work worse done. Towns are not well inhabited and the suburbs are encreased. The priviledge however of vending a new book or a new machine for 14 years has not so bad a tendencey. It is a proper and adequate reward for merit. A right to servitudes and exclusive priviledges, it is to be observed, may be acquired by prescription.

So much for the different kinds of real rights. We proceed now to personal rights, which arise either from contract, quasicontract, or delinquencey.

Of Contract

That obligation to performance which arises from contract is founded on the reasonable expectation produced by a promise, which considerably differs from a mere declaration of intention. | Tho’ I say I have a mind to do such a thing for you, yet on account of some occurrences do not do it, I am not guilty of breach of promise. A promise is a declaration of your desire that the person for whom you promise should depend on you for the performance of it. Of consequence the promise produces an obligation, and the breach of it is an injury.

Breach of contract is naturaly the slightest of all injuries because we naturaly depend more on what we possess than what is in the hands of others. A man robbed of five pounds thinks himself much more injured than if he had lost five pounds by a contract. Accordingly in rude ages crimes of all kinds, except those that disturb the public peace, are slightly punished, and society is far advanced before a contract can sustain action or the [or the] breach of it be redressed. The causes of this were the little importance of contracts in these times, and the uncertainty of language.

The first contracts that sustained action would be those where the damage done was very great, and where there could be no doubt but the person once intended to perform. Accordingly among the ancients promises entered into with great solemnity first sustained action. Among them no stipulation could be made unless the contractors were personaly present, and no promissary note in writing was binding.

As no promises by the Roman law sustained action without a stipulation, so by the English a consideration or cause for the promise was at first necessary to make it obligatory. | It was thought contrary to good manners to insist on a promise. If a man promised with his daughter a certain sum, there is a consideration and therefore he was obliged to perform it. But if he promised it with any other man’s daughter it was sine causa, and unless she was a relation could not sustain action. If I made you a promise it did not sustain action, but if I again promised not to forget my former promise, the latter promise was obligatory, and the former was the consideration that made it so.93

By the civil law the first promises that sustained action were those entered into in presence of a court where there could be no doubt of the intention, and accordingly recognizance of every promise was taken before some court. A recognizance is when the debtor comes before a court with the creditor, and acknowledges that he owes him a certain sum; a copy of this acknowledgement was given to the creditor and another lodged in the hands of the clerk, and whenever the creditor produced this, if it was found to correspond to the other, he might pursue for his money. Afterwards a recognizance before the magistrate of a staple town served the purpose.94

The next contracts that sustained action were the contractus reales, or those which were entered into by the delivery of a thing to be returned itself, or in species, or in value. These are of four kinds, the mutuum, commodatum, depositum, and pignus.

The mutuum is when I lend any thing to be returned in value, as money. This soon sustained action.

| Commodatum is when the thing itself is to be restored, as a borrowed horse.

Depositum is when a thing is committed to anothers care, but not to his use.

Pignus is a security for debt.

All these sustained action before the consensual^u contracts, which are also four, to witt, buying and selling, letting and hireing, partnership, and commission. In buying, if the contract be not fullfilled you lose your earnest money. Letting and hireing once comprehended leases, days wages, building, and almost every thing with regard to society. If the contract of commission was performed gratuitously it could not at first sustain any action. But if a reward was given it was nearly the same with the commodatum. If a small price be paid for the loan of a thing it becomes letting and hireing. The mutuum does not inferr interest, and in a bond unless the interest be specified it will carry none.

Besides these there was in the Roman law what was called a pactum nudum, when there was a bare promise without any consideration, which produced an exception or defence against the action of the pursuer. As contracts deprive men of that liberty which every man wishes to enjoy, a very small defence sett them free. Originally no95 contracts were sued before any court but the ecclesiastic, but they came gradually to civil courts. The common96 law, which judged from principles of honour and virtue, | obliged men to perform even these promises that were made gratuitously. This was imitated by the civil law, and by our law if a promise be clearly proven he who promises must perform it. In general the law gave only action for damages till the Court of Chancery was introduced. It is indeed the natural idea of <a> court to redress injuries, and accordingly if a person refused to perform his contract he was only obliged to pay the loss which the other had sustained. But the Court of Chancery forced the person to a performance of the agreement.

Nothing can be more different than the present and ancient state of contracts. Execrations and the most solemn ceremonies were scarce thought sufficient to secure the performance of a contract; drinking blood and water mixed, bleeding one another, promising before the altar, breaking a straw, and a number of other ceremonies to impress the mind, were invented; at present almost any thing will make a contract obligatory.

There are some questions concerning contracts much agitated by lawyers, especially one in the case when the coin happens to be debased. <?If> I borrow £100 when the coin is 4 oz. the pound, and it be afterwards debased to 2 oz., whether should I pay £100 of the new coin or 200£. When the government makes any alteration in the coin it is to answer some urgent necessity. In 170397 the crown of France had a demand for 10 million and could raise only five. They cried up the coin and paid the 10 with five. | As the government allows private persons to pay with the new coin, the injury is not great. The debasement of the coin cheapens for sometime all commodities and provisions, as all are paid in the new coin, and therefore the uses of money may be served by the new as well as the old coin.

Quasi contract is founded on the duty of restitution. If you find a watch on the way, you are obliged to restore it by the right of property, because a man loses not property with possession. But if you and I balance accompts, and you pay me a sum which both think due, but you afterwards find you did not owe that sum, how will you claim it? You cannot ask it as your property, for you alienated that sum, nor can you claim it by contract, for there never was one made between us, yet it is evident that I am a gainer by your loss and therefore restitution is due.

In the same manner if a man was called away by a sudden order of the state without leaving an attorney to manage a law suit that he had going on, and a friend undertakes this office without commission, as the defence is necessary and the undertaking it prudent, restitution of his expences are due. On the same principle were founded the actiones contrariae of the Roman law. If you lent me a horse which had cost me extraordinary expences, by the contract commodate you could redemand your horse in the same <?condition> in which you lent him, but I could claim | my extraordinary expences by an actio contraria.

The same principle takes place in many other cases. If a person borrows money and gets three of his acquaintances sureties for him jointly and severally, and if he turn bankrupt, the creditor pursues the ablest surety, who has a claim by the duty of restitution on the other two for their thirds. The Scotch law carries this still farther.98 If a bankrupt had two estates, and two creditors A and B. A has a security on both estates, B has security only on the best. A has a liberty of drawing his money from either estate he pleases, and draws from that on which B has his security. As B in this case is cut out, the law obliges A to give up his security on the other estate to B. The same was the case in the Roman–law with regard to tutory.

We come now to the third kind of personal rights, those, to witt, ex delicto.

Delicts are of two kinds, as they arise ex dolo when there is a blameable intention, or ex culpa when they are done thro’ a culpable negligence.

Injury naturaly excites the resentment of the spectator, and the punishment of the offender is reasonable as far as the indifferent spectator can go along with it. This is the natural measure of punishment. It is to be observed that our first approbation of punishment is not founded upon the regard | to public utility which is commonly taken to be the foundation of it. It is our sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer which is the real principle. That it cannot be utility is manifest from the following example. Wool in England was conceived to be the source of public opulence, and it was made a capital crime to export that commodity. Yet tho’ wool was exported as formerly and men were convinced that the practice was pernicious, no jury, no evidence, could be got against the offenders. The exportation of wool is naturaly no crime, and men could not be brought to consider it as punishable with death. In the same manner if a centinel be put to death for leaving his post, tho’ the punishment be just and the injury that might have ensued be very great, yet mankind can never enter into this punishment as if he had been a thief or a robber.

Resentment not only prompts to punishment but points out the manner of it. Our resentment is not gratified unless the offender be punished for the particular offence done ourselves, and unless he be made sensible that it is for that action. A crime is always the violation of some right, natural or acquired, real or personal. The non performance of a contract indeed is not a crime, unless it be thro’ some fraudulent intention.

The greatest crime that can be done against any person | is murther, of which the natural punishment is death, not as a compensation but a reasonable retaliation. In every civilized nation death has been the punishment of the murther<er>, but in barbarous nations a pecuniary compensation was accepted of, because then government was weak and durst not meddle in the quarrells of individuals unless in the way of mediation. In the age of hunters particularly, there was little more than the name of authority, and a man of superiour influence can do no more than perswade the parties to an agreement. When one man killed another the whole society met and advised the one party to give and the other to take a compensation. In America when one member of a family kills another the society does not intermeddle with them, as this cannot hurt the peace of the society. They only take notice of it when one family attacks another. It was long before the government could call a man before them and tell him what he must do, because it was long before people would submitt to such absolute authority. In the laws of all nations we have the remains of this ancient state of weakness.

When government became more powerfull, the murtherer was not only obliged to make a compensation to the relations of the slain, | but likewise to the publick, who were put to the trouble of lending him their protection on that occasion, against the revenge of those who were concerned. This was the state of criminal law among the Germans at the declension of the Roman Empire.

The Germans were much farther advanced than the Americans at this day. Tho’ they seldom punished with death yet they seemed to make the punishment in some measure proportioned to the crime. A price was sett on every person according to his station. There was one price paid for killing the king, and another for killing a slave. The compensation was proportioned to the dignity of the person and of his relations. What was paid to the prince for interposition was increased and diminished in the same proportion. It was a higher fine to kill a man belonging to a lord than one belonging to a little baron. To disturb the kings peace subjected to [to] a greater fine than to disturb the peace of a baron or lord. If the injurer refused to pay the compensation he was left to the resentment of the injured, and if he was not able to pay it he was obliged to implore the assistance of his friends. As the compensation was not adequate to the offence, the government after it acquired strength took this additional compensation to itself, as the price of the offenders freedom. From this the sovereign acquired the right of pardoning criminals, | for naturaly he has no more right to pardon a crime than to discharge an unpaid debt.

Anciently a crime was considered in two lights, as committed against the family injured and against the peace. The government had the exclusive right of punishing those who had disturbed the peace and killed any of the kings vassals. The compensation to the government was afterwards changed into a capital punishment. After the king’s pardon the offender was free, and the relation had no right to pursue him. In England the offender can be punished for the relation as well as for the king. When an appeal is made to the king he cannot pardon. But appeals are seldom or never used, as it is difficult to bring them about. If a man was murthered no body but the wife could pursue for an appeal, or if she was accessory, the legal heir. Any mistake in the process, such as a word wrong spelled, stopped the procedure, for the statute of amendment, which permitted courts to overlook errors, did not extend to appeals. Appeals in former times were often made in cases of maiming, hurting, etca.

There are several kinds of murther by the English law. The word originaly signified stealth as the crime was usually committed in private. Afterwards felony and99 killing of every kind was called murther and | compensation made for it accordingly. Murther arises either from malice propense, or from sudden provocation, or from chance per infortunium. Of these the first alone is properly called murther. The second is manslaughter, and the last chance medley, which is often excusable and often justifiable. Murther committed se defendendo is when two persons quarrel, and the one is obliged to kill the other for his own safety. This is excusable, not justifiable homicide. Justifiable homicide is of two kinds. 1st. In defence <of> one’s person, goods, or house. It differs from homicide se defendendo in this, that there is no quarrel, but an attack on the highway or in a man’s own house. 2^d. Homicide is justifiable in support of a constable or officer of justice.

These are the different species of murther and homicide; we shall next shew what is the nature of each. When a person lyes in wait for another and kills him it is plainly murther. It is the same when a man kills another without provocation. By the English law there is no provocation without a blow, no words or menaces are sufficient. However, if a man give you a blow and you return it and kill him it is not murther but manslaughter. If a man be shooting at tame fowl or doing any other criminal action | and without intending it kill a man, it is murther. Wherever there is any appearance of malice or forethought, it is murther. If a person kills another in the afternoon for some provocation received in the forenoon, it is murther. But if he has only retired a few steps and returned to do it immediately, it is not murther but manslaughter. Homicide se defendendo is not punishable if there was no possibility of escape, but if a man had time to retire and draw his sword it is punishable because he might have escaped. The Scotch law makes no distinction between manslaughter and murther. In England manslaughter was introduced by what is called benefit of clergy. When civil government encreased in authority, the punishments of crimes were made more severe that the peace might be less disturbed. The clergy pled that this was not agreable to the word of God, and as they derived their authority from Jesus Christ and the Pope they would answer before no civil judicatory. They pretended that the scripture did not consider any crime where there was no malice or forethought as murther, and this they proved from Deuteronomy XIX^th. When any <?such> person therefore had committed a crime, the bishop had a power to claim him and take him out of the hands of the secular power. If a person could get 12 persons to swear for him he was acquitted; if not, the bishop judged whither he was corrigible or not. | If he was incorrigible he was degraded. The bishop could claim in this manner all clergy and beadles, wardens, or other persons who had any connection with the church. But the civil courts after allowed him only to claim those that could read, as this was^v more immediately connected with the office of the clergy. Queen Ann afterwards extended the priviledges aris[is]ing from benefit of clergy with regard to manslaughter to all equally.

For chance medley a man forfeits his goods, but he has the power of suing for them again and of obtaining pardon. In justifiable homicide a man must plead not guilty of any thing the court can meddle <with>, and if he can bring in his evidence he is not arraigned.

Our resentment naturaly falls upon inanimate as well as animate objects, and in many places the sword or instrument that had killed any person was considered as excrable, and accordingly was destroyed, particularly among the Athenians.

By the English law if a man fell from a house1 and was killed, the house1 was forfeited by the law of deodand. Deodand signifies to be given to the devil, by the same sort of metaphor that the scripture uses where it is said he blessed God in his heart, that is, he cursed him. Afterwards the clergy applied deodands to charitable uses. If a man was killed by an object at rest, only the part by which he was killed was forfeited. If he was killed <?falling> from the wheel of a waggon standing, only that wheel was deodand, but if the waggon was in motion the whole team was forfeited. It was long questioned if a ship was forfeited by a man being killed in it | but as mariners are so much exposed it was thought hard that it should.

A person may also be injured in his body by demembration, mutilation, assault and battery, or restraint on his liberty. Maiming and mutilation originaly by the Roman law were compensated for in the same way with murther, and if the person was incapable with the assistance of his friends to pay the compensation he was given over to the person maimed, to be maimed in the same manner, as we are acquainted by the Salic law which gives us the form of their procedure. In the same manner all hurts among many nations, particularly among the Lombards, were compounded for; they paid so much for a tooth, so much more if it was a foretooth, so much for two teeth, but, what is very remarkable, tho’ twenty were knocked out the injured person could claim no more than the price of three. They had a precise sum for every member of the body. Among the Romans, if a man could not pay his composition, he was obliged to make satisfaction by the law of retaliation; he received as many blows as he gave. An eye went for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. This custom continued long, and is in general reasonable, but in some cases it is not proper. If a man got his arm broken in wrestling, it was hard that anothers should be broken for it in cold blood. In some cases it was impracticable, as when a man causes an abortion in a woman, he could not be punished in the same manner. This custom by degrees went out, and pecuniary fines | according to the circumstances of him who was to pay them were introduced, and the praetor at Rome caused them to be received, but in some countries it continued longer and there are remains of it in Holland to this day. When a person was maimed in any member that rendered him incapable of military service the punishment was more severe.

By the Coventry Act, maiming in the face from malice or forethought was punished with death. The reason of this was that Sir John Coventry had spoken impertinently against the king in Parliament. The Prince of Wales2 with some others, probably not without the king’s permission, laid wait for him and cut his ears and his face. The Parliament immediately enacted that maiming in the face from forethought should be punishable with death. There was never one, however, executed upon this law but one Cook, who lay in wait to murder his brother, but did not get it executed, only he maimed him in the face. He was therefore by the Coventry Act found guilty of deliberate malice. He pled that his intention was to murther, not to maim, but the court from the instrument he used found that he intended to maim as well as murder.

A man may also be injured by assault and battery. When a person is put to bodily fear it is assault, and when he is actualy beat it is battery. Originaly no assault by words subjected to punishment, unless there was likewise a shaking of the fist, drawing an instrument or something of this kind; | a composition was the first punishment for these crimes, but now it is fine and imprisonment.

A man may further be injured in his body by restraining his liberty, therefore the laws of every country are particularly carefull of securing it. No magistrate in this country has an arbitrary power of imprisonment. It is indeed reasonable that he should have it in his power to imprison when there is ground of suspicion, tho’ an innocent man may sometimes suffer a little by it. Nothing is more difficult than perfectly to secure liberty. If the person can bring some circumstances to alleviate the suspicion, he may be sett at liberty upon bail, unless it be a capital crime. If the bail be not sufficient it is unjust in the magistrate to accept of it. But if it be, he is punishable if he do not. If a person be wrongously kept in prison beyond the time when he ought to have been tried, he has so much a day according to his station. In England, if a person be confined the day after the assizes, 40 days after he may have the benefit of the Habeas Corpus Act, that is, he may be carried to London at his own expence, but if he cannot afford this he must wait till the next assizes. In Scotland, there is no occasion for the Habeas Corpus Act. A person may be tried by the sherriff if he pleases, and at any rate can be carried to Edinburgh to the Kings Court. All this is for the security of liberty in free governments, but in despotic governments the will of the magistrate is law.

| It is to be observed with respect to what is done thro’ fear, that a bond given from this principle is not binding. No obligation is valid unless the person acted voluntar<il>y. However, if a person is threatned to be pursued and gives a bond to avoid it, the bond is valid, and the fear is not considered as a metus injustus.

A rape or forcible marriage is capital, because the woman is so dishonoured that no other punishment can be a sufficient retaliation. Tho’ forcible marriage be forbidden by law, yet if the woman afterwards consent the friends can have no appeal, yet the king may pursue it.

A man may be injured in his reputation, by affronts, by words, and by writings. An affront in company is a real injury; if the affront be offered in words it is a verbal injury, if in writing it is a written injury. In all these the law gives redress. Affronts by the old law were punished in the same manner with assault and battery. Affronts in company are most atrocious crimes. The triffling fine of five or ten pounds is by no means an adequate compensation for them. Where the law denies justice we are naturaly led to take it ourselves. This introduced dueling in Europe, which brings along with it an additional injury. I must not only receive a box on the ear, but I am obliged to expose my life or become altogether odious. It is to be observed that in Socrates time | the affront of giving the lie was little thought of. He does it himself without any ceremony.

Verbal injuries are redressed both by ancient and modern laws. When a person is accused by words it sustains a process before a court of justice. If he be accused of forgery, theft, or any crime, as he may be subjected to great dammages he is entitled to sufficient redress. In the same manner if a person’s right or tittle be slandered he suffers an injury. If I say you have no more right to your own house than I have, it is an injury, as it may excite those who have pretended tittles. Tho’ it be true, this is only an alleviation and will not secure me from a prosecution. There are some offences that are only prosecuted in spiritual courts, as if a person call a woman a whore.

Written injuries are subjected to severer punishments than verbal ones, as they are more deliberate malice. Abusive words in a lybel give a process tho’ the same words would not if spoken. Lybels and satyres are punished according to the nature of the government. In aristocratical governments they are punished severely. Little petty princes may be quite destroyed by abusive lybels, whereas kings and ministers of state in a free country, being far out of their reach, cannot be hurt by them. In governments and in Rome for a long time they were not punished.3 Augustus at last revived the law, subjecting the authors to a capital punishment. | In general people of circumstances take no notice of such lybels, unless it be absolutely necessary to clear themselves of some crime.

A person may be injured in his estate, real or personal. With regard to his real estate he may be injured either in his moveables or immoveables. In his immoveables^w he may be injured by arsine or forcible entry. Arsine is wilfull fire raising, either in the house of another or in our own, so as to affect that of another. By the Roman, English, and Scotch law this is punished capitally. If the fire be occasioned by negligence no punishment is inflicted. Forcible entry is the violently putting a man out of his estate. The laws are so strict on this head that the person outed may retake his own by violence.4 This was occasioned by the feudal customs, by which it was very common for barons and their vassals to deprive one another of their possessions, and this was the only way <that> then could be fallen on to get it restored. Afterwards it was enacted that if any person could prove that he was violent<ly> disspossessed his estate should be restored.5 But if the violent possessor had kept it three years, the old possessor must prove not only that he was disspossessed by violence, but that he has a real right to it, before it be restored.

A man may be injured in his moveables three ways, by theft, robbery, and piracey. Theft is the clandestinely taking away the property of another. This crime does not naturaly excite that degree of resentment which prompts to capital punishment, and for a long time it was not punished with death. | By the old Roman law the thief was obliged to restore what he had taken, and to add to it as much more; if he stole a sheep he restored two. There was however a peculiar distinction between the fur manifestus and fur nec manifestus. The former as he was taken with the goods about him paid quadruple, and the latter only double the value of things stolen. This they borrowed, it is said, from the Lacedemonians, who taught their youth to steal and hide well as they thought it improved them in that cunning which is necessary in war. However, the Lacedemonians never encouraged the stealing the property of another. In their feasts nothing was prepared for their young men, and it was expected that they should purloin from the tables of their fathers what was sufficient for themselves. To steal such triffles as a crust of bread was indulged, but nothing else. The real reason of their punishing the fur manifestus more severely than another was that barbarous nations punish crimes according to the degree of resentment they excite, and when the thief was catched in the act their resentment was very high, and consequently disposed them to punish him severly. Since the 13^th century this crime has been punished capitaly. The vassals of great lords were continually making incursions into the neighbouring territories and carrying off bootty. When government came to be established, it naturaly punished most severly these crimes to which men had the greatest propensity, | and consequently endeavoured to restrain this practice. The Emperor Barbarossa first made this crime capital, and he was followed by all civilized nations, tho’ undoubtedly the punishment is too great, for a thief is but a petty mean creature and does not excite a very high degree of resentment. He seems to be in some degree below this passion. By the old Scotch law theft in a landed gentleman was considered as treason, because the gentry were considered as the abutters and assistants of thieves and vagrants, and as they made war on one another, which looked like an usurpation of soveraignty, they were considered as guilty of treason. By the English law any theft below a shilling was punished with the pillory, and above that with death. In Scotland it requires a much greater sum. Nothing is theft with us but what belongs to particular persons. The man who stole deer in a forrest or pidgeons at a distance from a pidgeon house could not be punished till by a late statute.6 Housebreaking indeed, tho’ there was not the value of a shilling carried off, was punished capitaly. Such punishments, however necessary once, are certainly now too severe. Government was^x at first weak and could not punish crimes, but was obliged to interpose in these cases in which the interest of society was concerned. But when it acquired more strength it made punishments severe that it might | restrict the licentiousness of manners which lax discipline had introduced. Accordingly we find that the laws of the 12 Tables made almost every crime capital. In Europe after the custom of compensations went out, they punished every thing as treason. Theft in a landed man, a servant killing his master, a curate his bishop, or a husband his wife7 were all petty treason. Afterwards only crimes respecting the state were considered as treason, and this crime came by degrees to it’s proper extent.

Robbery, as it puts a man to the greatest bodily fear, is subjected to the greatest punishment; no occasion can save the robber, even tho’ he should cover the injury by pretending to buy a man’s goods after he has forced him to sell them to him.8

Piracey is punished still more severly.

A man may be injured in his personal estate by fraud or forgery. The natural punishment of the dolus malus is not death, but some sort of ignominy such as the pillory. Some frauds, however, on account of the facility and security with which they may be committed and the loss which they occasion, are justly subjected to capital punishment. When an insured ship, for instance, is cast away, it is difficult to prove that it was done by fraud. But if she be insured to the full value there is a great temptation to cast her away, and therefore the law, in order to intimidate the merchant, | make death the punishment. It was a question whether a ship ought to be insured for her value at the port whence she setts out, or at the port to which she is bound, and it was determined that it should be at the port where she setts out. If a Glasgow merchant sends out a ship with 3000£’s worth of goods for Virginia, they are worth more than 4000£ when they arrive there. And if the merchant were allowed to insure for this last sum he would have a great temptation to make shipwreck of her. He can expect no more when he is at the expence of taking his goods to Virginia; he may meet with bad debtors and he can lose nothing by the insurers. In the same manner it was anciently capital to steal any thing from the plow,9 as it was so much exposed.

In England a bankrupt may have a discharge on surrendering himself and all his effects, but as he has it in his power to defraud his creditors, if he does not give up all he has he is punishable by death.10

Forgery is also punished capitally, and nobody complains that this punishment is too severe, because when contracts sustain action property can never be secure unless the forgeing of false ones be restrained. However, the forgery of every deed is not capital, but only the forgery of deeds payable to the bearer on demand, because any forgery of a deed regarding the conveyance of land may easily be discovered before any dammage be done.

| Perjury is not punished capitaly.

As there are several ways of acquiring personal rights, so there are several ways in which they expire. First, by payment of what is due by contract or quasi contract, because the fullfillment of the obligation satisfies the other party. Secondly, by discharge or acquittance, even tho’ the debt be not paid. This also takes place with regard to crimes, for when the king or the injured person choose to drop prosecution or to give a pardon the person is free. Thirdly, by prescription. If a debt be not claimed within a certain time the debtor is free. This is very reasonable, for if a debt be not claimed for a long time the negligence of the debtor is encouraged. By the Scotch law, if he call for neither principal nor interest of a bond for forty years, it very justly prescribes. No body of common prudence would neglect any part of his affairs for forty years, if ever he intended to meddle with them again. According to strict law, if the interest be demanded in the 39^th year the capital does not prescribe. Crimes likewise prescribe, and it is reasonable that they should, whether they be punished from a sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer, or from public utility, or to satisfy the public. Resentment wears out in a few years, | and a person who has behaved well for twenty years, the time fixed on by our law, cannot be very dangerous to the public. Appeals by the English law prescribe in one year, but an indictment does not prescribe so soon, because the king prosecutes for public security and not to gratify private resentment and therefore the law favours his claim. At any rate it would be unreasonable to prosecute a man for a crime committed 40 years ago, because he may now be a quite different man from what he was then. Besides, the thing is quite forgotten and the end of punishing and public example is entirely lost. Treason itself prescribes in a few years. From a resentment in law, however, if sentence have actualy <been> passed upon a person, and he have made his escape, he may be executed on his former sentence. The escape is considered as a new crime. However, this is not very natural, and if a man live quietly after his return he is seldom troubled. We had an instance of an earl who had been sentenced in 1715 and had returned to his native country and lived peaceably in it till the year 1745, when he again joined the rebells and was executed on his former sentence. Dr. Cameron suffered in Scotland in the same manner. In every country, if a person return after twenty years he is not troubled; it would be thought invidious in the officers of justice to meddle with him.

Some general observations on the criminal law is all that remains on this subject.

| Resentment seems best to account for the punishment of crimes. If a person fires a pistol down a street, tho’ he do no harm, public utility requires that he should be punished. But such crimes are by the laws of every country more slightly punished than if some mischief had ensued. The reason is plain. Resentment never rises to any great pitch unless some injury be actualy done. Some things that are in themselves criminal are not punished unless some bad consequence follow. A man meets with little resentment for riding an unruly horse in the market place, but if he kill any body resentment is very high. For the same reason deodands, tho’ inanimate objects, are accounted execrable. In many cases the resentment falls upon the very member of the body which perpetrated the action. Resentment is on the whole a very indiscriminating principle and pays little attention to the disposition of the mind.

Certain persons are not to be considered as objects of punishment, such as ideots, madmen, and children. We are not so much shocked by an action done by a madman as one done by another person. We think binding the only punishment adequate to their crimes.

This is all we intended on the injuries that may be done to a man as a man.

Having now considered man as a member of a state, as a member of a family, and as a man, we proceed to Police, 2^d division of jurisprudence.

Whole of 202 left blank in MS.

| Juris–prudence Part II.

Of Police

Police is the second general division of jurisprudence. The name is French, and is originaly derived from the Greek πολιτεια, which properly signified the policey of civil government, but now it only means the regulation of the inferiour parts of government, viz. cleanliness, security, and cheapness or plenty. The two former, to witt, the proper method of carrying dirt from the streets, and the execution of justice, so far as it regards regulations for preventing crimes or the method of keeping a city guard, tho’ usefull, are too mean to be considered in a general discourse of this kind. An observation or two before we proceed to the third particular is all that is necessary.

We observe then, that in cities where there is most police and the greatest number of regulations concerning it, there is not always the greatest security. In Paris the regulations concerning police are so numerous as not to be comprehended in several volumes. | In London there are only two or three simple regulations. Yet in Paris scarce a night passes without somebody being killed, while in London, which is a larger city, there are scarce three or four in a year. On this account one would be apt to think that the more police there is the less security, but this is not the cause. In England as well as in France, during the time of the feudal government and as late as Queen Elizabeth’s reign, great numbers of retainers were kept idle about the noblemen’s houses, to keep the tenants in awe. These retainers, when turned out, had no other way of getting their subsistance but by committing robberies and living on plunder, which occasioned the greatest disorder. A remain of the feudal manners, still preserved in France, gives occasion to the difference. The nobility at Paris keep far more menial servants than ours, who are often turned out on their own account or thro’ the caprice of their masters, and, being in the most indigent circumstances, are forced to committ the most dreadfull crimes. In Glasgow, where almost no body has more than one servant, there are fewer capital crimes than in Edinburgh. In Glasgow there is not one in several years, but not a year passes in Edinburgh without some such disorders. Upon this principle, therefore, it is not so much the police that prevents the commission of crimes as the having as few persons as possible to live upon others. Nothing tends so much to corrupt mankind as dependencey, while independencey still encreases the honesty of the people. | The establishment of commerce and manufactures, which brings about this independencey, is the best police for preventing crimes. The common people have better wages in this way than in any other, and in consequence of this a general probity of manners takes place thro’ the whole country. No body will be so mad as to expose himself upon the highway, when he can make better bread in an honest and industrious manner. The nobility of Paris and London are no doubt much upon a level, but the common people of the former, being much more dependent, are not to be compared with these of the latter, and for the same reason the commonality in Scotland differ from these in England, tho’ the nobility too are much upon a level.

Thus far for the two first particulars which come under the general division of police. In the following part of this discourse we are to confine ourselves to the consideration of cheapness or plenty, or, which is the same thing, the most proper way of procuring wealth and abundance. Cheapness is in fact the same thing with plenty. | It is only on account of the plenty of water that it is so cheap as to be got for the lifting, and on account of the scarcity of diamonds (for their real use seems not yet to be discovered) that they are so dear. To ascertain the most proper method of obtaining these conveniences, it will be necessary to shew first wherein opulence consists, and still previous to this we must consider what are the natural wants of mankind which are to be supplied; and if we differ from common opinions we shall at least give the reasons for our non–conformity.

Nature produces for every animal every thing that is sufficient to support it without having recourse to the improvement of the original production. Food, cloaths, and lodging are all the wants of any animal whatever, and most of the animal creation are sufficiently provided for by nature in all these wants to which their condition is liable. Such is the delicacey of man alone, that no object is produced to his liking. He finds that in every thing there is need of improvement. Tho’ the practice of savages shews that his food needs no preparation, | yet being acquainted with fire he finds that it can be rendered more wholesome and easily digested, and thereby may preserve him from many diseases which are very violent among them. But it is not only his food that requires this improvement. His puny constitution is hurt also by the intemperature of the air he breathes in, which tho’ not very capable of improvement must be brought to a proper temperament for his body and an artificial atmosphere prepared for this purpose. The human skin cannot endure the inclemencies of the weather, and even in these countries where the air is warmer than the natural warmth of the constitution, and where they have no need of cloaths, it must be stained and painted to be able to endure the hardships of the sun and rain. In general, however, the necessities of man are not so great but that they can be supplied by the unassisted labour of the individual. All the above necessities every one can provide for himself, such as animals and fruits for his food, and skins for his cloathing.

As the delicacey of a man’s body requires much greater provision | than that of any other animal, the same or rather the much greater delicacey of his mind requires a still greater provision, to which all the different arts <are> subservient. Man is the only animal who is possessed of such a nicety that the very colour of an object hurts him. Among different objects a different division or arrangement of them pleases. The taste of beauty, which consists chiefly in the three following particulars, proper variety, easy connection, and simple order, is the cause of all this niceness. Nothing without variety pleases us: a long uniform wall is a dissagreable object. Too much variety, such as the crowded objects of a parterre, is also dissagreable. Uniformity tires the mind; too much variety, too far encreased, occasions an overgreat dissipation of it. Easy connection also renders objects agreable; when we see no reason for the contiguity of the parts, when they are without any natural connection, when they have neither a proper resemblance nor contrast, they never fail of being dissagreable. If simplicity of order be not observed, so as that the whole may be easily comprehended, it hurts the delicacey of our taste.

| Again, imitation and painting render objects more agreable. To see upon a plain, trees, forrests, and other such representations is an agreable surprize to the mind. Variety of objects also renders them agreable. What we are every day accustomed to does but very indifferently affect us. Gems and diamonds are on this account much esteemed by us. In like manner our pinchbeck and many of our toys were so much valued by the Indians, that in bartering their jewels and diamonds for them they thought they had made by much the better bargain.

These qualities, which are the ground of preference and which give occasion to pleasure and pain, are the cause of many insignificant demands which we by no means stand in need of. The whole industry of human life is employed not in procuring the supply of our three humble necessities, food, cloaths, and lodging, but in procuring the conveniences of it according to the nicety and [and] delicacey of our taste. To improve and multiply the materials which are the principal objects of our necessities, gives occasion to all the variety of the arts.

| Agriculture, of which the principal object is the supply of food, introduces not only the tilling of the ground, but also the planting of trees, the producing of flax, hemp, and inumerable other things of a similar kind. By these again are introduced different manufactures, which are so very capable of improvement. The mettals dug from the bowells of the earth furnish materials for tools, by which many of these arts are practised. Commerce and navigation are also subservient to the same purposes by collecting the produce of these several arts. By these again other subsidiary <arts> are occasioned. Writing, to record the multitude of transactions, and geometry, which serves many usefull purposes. Law and government, too, seem to propose no other object but this, they secure the individual who has enlarged his property, that he may peaceably enjoy the fruits of it. By law and government all the different arts flourish, and that inequality of fortune to which they give occasion is sufficiently preserved. By law and government domestic peace is enjoyed and security from the forreign invader. Wisdom and virtue too derive their lustre from supplying these necessities. | For as the establishment of law and government is the highest effort of human prudence and wisdom, the causes cannot have a different influence from what the effects have. Besides, it is by the wisdom and probity of those with whom we live that a propriety of conduct is pointed out to us, and the proper means of attaining it. Their valour defends us, their benevolence supplies us, the hungry is fed, the naked is cloathed, by the exertion of these divine qualities. Thus according to the above representation, all things are subservient to supplying our threefold necessities.

In an uncivilized nation, and where labour is undivided, every thing is provided for that the natural wants of mankind require; yet when the nation is cultivated and labour divided a more liberal provision is allotted them; and it is on this account that a common day labourer in Brittain has more luxury in his way of living than an Indian sovereign. The woolen coat he wears requires very considerable preperations; the wool gatherer, the dresser, the spinster, the dyer, the weaver, the taylor, and many more must all be employed befor the labourer is cloathed. The tools by which all this is effectuated employ a still greater number of artists, the loom maker, miln wright, ropemaker, not to mention the bricklayer, the treefeller, the miner, the smelter, | the forger, the smith, etc. Besides his dress, consider also his houshold furniture, his coarse linens, his shoes, his coals dug out of the earth or brought by sea, his kitchen utensils and different plates, those that are employed in providing his bread and beer, the sower, the brewer, the reaper, the baker, his glass windows and the art required in preparing <?them>, without which our northern climate could hardly be inhabited. When we examine the conveniences of the day labourer, we find that even in his easy simple manner he cannot be accomodated without the assistance of a great number, and yet this is nothing compared with the luxury of the nobility. An European prince, however, does not so far exceed a commoner as the latter does the chief of a savage nation. It is easy to conceive how the rich can be so well provided for, as they can direct so many hands to serve their purposes. They are supported by the industry of the peasant. In a savage nation every one enjoys the whole fruit of his own labour, yet their indigence is greater than any where.

It is the division of labour which encreases the opulence of a country. | In a civilized society, tho’ there is indeed a division of labour there is no equal division, for there are a good many who work none at all. The division of opulence is not according to the work. The opulence of the merchant is greater than that of all his clerks, tho’ he works less; and they again have six times more than an equal number of artizans, who are more employed. The artizan who works at his ease within doors has far more than the poor labourer who trudges up and down without intermission. Thus he who, as it were, bears the burthen of society has the fewest advantages.

We shall next shew how this division of labour occasions a multiplication of the product, or, which is the same thing, how opulence arises from it. In order to this let us observe the effect of the division of labour in some manufactures. If all the parts of a pin were made by one man, if the same person dug the ore, <s>melted it, and split the wire, it would take him a whole year to make one pin, and this pin must therefore be sold at the expence of his maintenance for that time, which taking <it> at^y a moderate computation would at least be six pounds for a pin. If the labour is so far divided that the wire is ready made, he will not make above 20 per day, which allowing 10 pence for wages makes the pin twopence.11 The pin maker therefore divides the labour among a great number of different persons, | the cutting, pointing, heading, and gilding are all seperate professions. Two or three are employed in making the head, one or two in putting it on, and so on, to the putting them in the paper, being in all eighteen. By this division every one can with great ease make 2000 a day. The same is the case in the linen and woolen manufactures. Some arts, however, there are which will not admit of this division, and therefore they cannot keep pace with other manufactures and arts. Such are farming and grazing. This is entirely owing to the returns of the seasons, by which one man can only be for a short time employed in any one operation. In countries where the season<s> do not make such alterations it is otherwise. In France the corn is better and cheaper than in England. But our toys, which have no dependance on the climate and in which labour can be divided, are far superiour to those of France.

When labour is thus divided, and so much done by one man in proportion, the surplus above their maintenance is considerable, which each man can exchange for a fourth of what he could have done if he had finished it alone.12 By this means the commodity becomes far cheaper, and the labour dearer. It is to be observed that the price of labour by no means determines the opulence of society. | It is only when a little labour can procure abundance. On this account a rich nation, when it’s manufactures are greatly improven, may have an advantage over a poor one by underselling it. The cotton and other commodities from China would undersell any made with us, were it not for the long carriage and other taxes that are laid upon them.

We must not judge of the dearness of labour by the money or coin that is paid for it. One penny in some places will purchase as much as eighteenpence in others. In the country of the Mogul, where the days wages are only twopence, labour is better rewarded than in some of our sugar islands, where men are almost starving with four or five shillings a day. Coin therefore can be no proper estimate. Further, tho’ human labour be employed both in the multiplication of commodities and of money, yet the chance of success is not equal. A farmer by the proper cultivation of an acre is sure of encrease, but the miner may work again and again without success. Commodities must therefore multiply in greater proportion than gold and silver.

But again, the quantity of work which is done by the division of labour is much encreased by the three following articles, first, encrease of dexterity, secondly, the saving of time lost in passing from one species of labour to another, | and thirdly, the invention of machinery. Of these in order.

1st. When any kind of labour is reduced to a simple operation, a frequencey of action insensibly fits men to a dexterity in accomplishing it. A country smith not accustomed to make nails will work very hard for 3 or 400 a day, and these too very bad. But a boy used to it will easily make 2000, and these incomparably better; yet the improvement of dexterity in this very complex manufacture can never be equal to that in others. A nail maker changes postures, blows the bellows, changes tools, etca. and therefore the quantity produced cannot be so great as in manufactures of pins and buttons, where the work is reduced to simple operations.

2^dly. There is always sometime lost in passing from one species of labour to another, even when they are pretty much connected. When a person has been reading he must rest a little before he begin to write. This is still more the case with the country weaver, who is possessed of a little farm; he must saunter a little when he goes from one to the other. This in general is the case with the country labourers; they are always the greatest saunterers, the country employments of sowing, | reaping, threshing being so different. They naturaly acquire a habit of indolence and are seldom very dextrous. By fixing every man to his own operation, and preventing the shifting from one piece of labour to another, the quantity of work must be greatly encreased.

3^dly. The quantity of work is greatly encreased by the invention of machines. Two men and three horses will do more in a day with the plow than 20 men without it. The miller and his servant will do more with the water miln than a dozen with the hand miln, tho’ it too be a machine. The division of labour no doubt first gave occasion to the invention of machines. If a man’s business in life is the performance of two or three things, the bent of his mind will be to find out the cleverest way of doing it, but when the force of his mind is divided it cannot be expected that he should be so successfull. We have not nor cannot have any compleat history of the invention of machines, because most of them are at first imperfect, and receive gradual improvements and encrease of powers from those who use them. It was probably a farmer who made the original plow, tho’ the improvements might be owing to some other. Some miserable slave who had perhaps been employed for a long time in grinding corn between two stones probably first found out the method of supporting the upper stone | by a spindle. A miln wright perhaps found out the way of turning the spindle with the hand. But he who contrived that the outer wheel should go by water was a philosopher, whose business it is to do nothing, but observe every thing. They must have extensive views of things, who as in this case bring in the assistance of new powers not formerly applied. Whether he was an artizan, or whatever he was who first executed this, he must have been a philosopher; fire machines, wind and water–milns, were the invention of philosophers, whose dexterity too is encreased by a division of labour. They all divide themselves, according to the different branches, into the mechanical, moral, political, chymical philosophers. Thus we have shewn how the quantity of labour is encreased by machines.

We have already shewn that the division of labour is the immediate cause of opulence. We shall next consider what gives occasion to the division of labour, or from what principles in our nature it can best be accounted for. We cannot imagine this to be an effect of human prudence. It was indeed made a law by Sesostratis13 that every man should follow the employment of his father. But this is by no means suitable to the dispositions of human nature | and can never long take place. Every one is fond of being a gentleman, be his father what he would. They who are strongest and in the bustle of society have got above the weak, must have as many under as to defend them in their station; from necessary causes, therefore, there must be as many in the lower stations as there is occasion for. There must be as many up as down, and no division can be overstretched. But it is not this which gives occasion to the division of labour. It flows from a direct propensity in human nature for one man to barter with another, which is common to all men and known to no other animal. No body ever saw a dog, the most sagacious animal, exchange a bone with his companion for another. Two greyhounds, indeed, in runing down a hare, seem to have something like compact or agreement betwixt them, but this is nothing else but a concurrence of the same passions. If an animal intends to truck, as it were, or gain any thing from man, it is by it’s fondness and kindness. Man, in the same manner, works on the selflove of his fellows, by setting before them a sufficient temptation to get what he wants; the language of this disposition is, give me what I want, and you shall have what you want. It is not from benevolence, as the dogs, but from selflove that man expects any thing. | The brewer and the baker serve us not from benevolence but from selflove. No man but a beggar depends on benevolence, and even they would die in a week were their entire dependance upon it.

By this disposition to barter and exchange the surplus of ones labour for that of other people, in a nation of hunters, if any one has a talent for making bows and arrows better than his neighbours he will at first make presents of them, and in return get presents of their game. By continuing this practice he will live better than before and will have no occasion to provide for himself, as the surplus of his own labour does it more effectualy.

This disposition to barter is by no means founded upon different genius and talents. It is doubtfull if there be any such difference at all; at least it is far less than we are aware of. Genius is more the effect of the division of labour than the latter is of it. The difference between a porter and a philosopher in the first four or five years of their life is properly speaking none at all. When they come to be employed in different occupations, their views widen and differ by degrees. As every one has this natural disposition to truck and barter | by which he provides for himself, there is no need for such different endowments, and accordingly among savages there is always the greatest uniformity of character. In other animals of the same species we find a much greater difference than betwixt the philosopher and porter antecedent to custom. The mastiff and spaniel have quite different powers, but tho’ these animals are possessed of talents they cannot, as it were, bring them into the common stock and exchange their productions, and therefore their different talents are of no use to them.

It is quite otherwise among mankind; they can exchange their several productions according to their quantity or quality. The philosopher and the porter are both of advantage to each other. The porter is of use in carrying burthens for the philosopher, and in his turn he burns his coals cheaper by the philosopher’s invention of the fire machine. Thus we have shewn that different genius is not the foundation of this disposition to barter, which is the cause of the division of labour. The real foundation of it is that principle to perswade which so much prevails in human nature. When any arguments are offered to perswade, it is always expected that they should have their proper effect. If a person asserts any thing about the moon, tho’ it should not be true, | he will feel a kind of uneasiness in being contradicted, and would be very glad that the person he is endeavouring to perswade should be of the same way of thinking with himself. We ought then mainly to cultivate the power of perswasion, and indeed we do so without intending it. Since a whole life is spent in the exercise of it, a ready method of bargaining with each other must undoubtedly be attained. As was before observed, no animal can do this but by gaining the favour of those whom they would perswade. Sometimes, indeed, animals seem to act in concert, but there never is any thing like bargain among them. Monkeys when they rob a garden throw the fruit from one to another till they deposit it in the hoard, but there is always a scramble about the division of the booty, and usually some of them are killed.

From all that has been said we may observe that the division of labour must always be proportioned to the extent of commerce. If ten people only want a certain commodity, the manufacture of it will never be so divided as if a thousand wanted it. Again, the division of labour, in order to opulence, becomes always more perfect by the easy method of conveyance in a country. If the road be infested with robbers, if it be deep and conveyance not easy, the progress of commerce must be stopped. | Since the mending of roads in England 40 or 50 years ago, its opulence has increased extremely. Water carriage is another convenience, as by it 300 ton can be conveyed at the expence of the tare and wear of the vessel and the wages of 5 or 6 men, and that too in a shorter time than by 100 waggons, which will take 6 horses and a man each. Thus the division of labour is the great cause of the increase of public opulence, which is always proportioned to the industry of the people, and not to the quantity of gold and silver as is foolishly imagined, and the industry of the people is always proportioned to the division of labour.

Having thus shewn what gives occasion to public opulence, in farther considering this subject we propose to consider:

1st. What circumstances regulate the price of commodities.

2^dly. Money in two different views, first as the measure of value and then as the instrument of commerce.

3^dly. The history of commerce, in which shall be taken notice of the causes of the slow progress of opulence both in ancient and modern times, | which causes shall be shewn either to affect agriculture or arts and manufactures. Lastly, the effects of a commercial spirit on the government, temper, and manners of a people, whether good or bad, and the proper remedies. Of these in order.

Of every commodity there are two different prices, which tho’ apparently independent will be found to have a necessary connection, viz. the natural price and the market price. Both of these are regulated by certain circumstances. When men are induced to a certain species of industry rather than any other, they must make as much by the employment as will maintain them while they are employed. An arrow maker must be sure to exchange as much surplus product as will maintain him during as long time as he took to make them. But upon this principle in the different trades there must be a considerable difference, because some trades, such as these of the taylor and weaver, are not learned by casual observation and a little experience, like that of the day–labourer, but take a great deal of time and pains | before they are acquired. When a person begins them, for a considerable time his work is of no use to his master or any other person, and therefore his master must be compensated both for what maintains him and for what he spoils. When he comes to exercise his trade, he must be repaid what he has laid out, both of expences and of apprentice fee. And as his life is not worth above 10 or 12 years purchase at most, his wages must be high on account of the risque he runs of not having the whole made up. But again, there are many arts which require more extensive knowledge than is to be got during the time of an apprenticeship. A blacksmith and weaver may learn their business well enough without any previous knowledge of mathematics. But a watch maker must be acquainted with several sciences in order to understand his business well, such as arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy with regard to the equation of time, and their wages must be high in order to compensate the additional expence. In general, this is the case in all the liberal arts, because after they have spent a long time in their education it is ten to one if ever they make any thing by it. Their wages therefore must be higher in proportion to the expence they have been at, | the risk of not living long enough, and the risk of not having dexterity enough to manage their business. Among the lawyers there is not one among twenty that attains such knowledge and dexterity in his business as enables him to get back the expences of his education, and many of them never make the price of their gown, as we say. The fees of lawyers are so far from being extravagant, as they are generally thought, that they are rather low in proportion. It is the eminence of the profession, and not the money made by it, that is the temptation for applying to it, and the dignity of that rank is to be considered as a part of what is made by it.

In the same manner we shall find that the price of gold and silver is not extravagant if we consider it in this view, for in a gold or silver mine there is a great chance of missing it altogether. If we suppose an equal number of men employed in raising corn and digging silver, the former will make more than the latter, because perhaps of forty or fifty employed in a mine only twenty make any thing at all. Some of the rest may indeed make fortunes, but every cornman succeeds in his undertakings, so that upon the whole there is more made this way than the other. | It is the ideal acquisition which is the principal temptation in a mine. A man then has the natural price of his labour when it is sufficient to maintain him during the time of labour, to defray the expence of education, and to compensate the risk of not living long enough and of not succeeding in the business. When a man has this, there is sufficient encouragement to the labourer and the commodity will be cultivated in proportion to the demand.

The market price of goods is regulated by quite other circumstances. When a buyer comes to the market, he never asks of the seller what expences he has been at in producing them. The regulation of the market price of goods depends on the three following articles:

1st. The demand or need for the commodity. There is no demand for a thing of little use; it is not a rational object of desire.

2^dly. The abundance or scarceity of the commodity in proportion to the need of it. If the commodity be scarce, the price is raised, but if the quantity be more than is sufficient to supply the demand, the price falls. Thus it is that diamonds and other precious stones are dear, | while iron, which is much more usefull, is so many times cheaper, tho’ this depends principally on the last cause, viz.

3^dly. The riches or poverty of those who demand. When there is not enough produced to serve every body, the fortune of the bidders is the only regulation of the price.

The story which is told of the merchant and the carrier in the desarts of Arabia is an evidence of this. The merchant gave 10,000 ducats for a certain quantity of water. His fortune here regulated the price, for if he had not had them, he could not have given them, and if his fortune had been less, the water would have been cheaper. When the commodity is scarce, the seller must be content with that degree of wealth which they have who buy it. The case is much the same as in an auction; if two persons have an equal fondness for a book, he whose fortune is largest will carry it. Hence things that are very rare go always to rich countries. The King of France only could purchase that large diamond of so many thousand pounds value. Upon this principle every thing is dearer or cheaper according as it is the purchase of a higher or lower sett of people.

Utensils of gold are comeatible only by persons in certain circumstances.

These of silver fall to another sett of people | and their prices are regulated by what the majority can give. The prices of corn and beer are regulated by what all the world can give, and on this account the wages of the day–labourer have a great influence upon the price of corn. When the price of corn rises, wages rise also, and vice versa. When the quantity of corn falls short, as in a sea voyage, it always occasions a famine and then the price becomes enormous. Corn then becomes the purchase of a higher sett of people, and the lower must live on turneeps and potatoes.

Thus we have considered the two prices, the natural and the market price, which every commodity is supposed to have. We observed before that however seemingly independant they appear to be, they are necessarily connected. This will appear from the following considerations. If the market price of any commodity is very great, and the labour very highly rewarded, the market is prodigiously crouded with it, greater quantities of it are produced, and it can be sold to the inferiour ranks of people. If for every ten diamonds there were ten thousand, they would become the purchase of every body, because they would become very cheap, and would sink to their natural price. Again, when the market is overstocked and there is not enough got for the labour of the manufacture, no body will bind to it; they cannot have a subsistence by it, because the market price falls then below the natural price. | It is alledged that as the price of corn sink<s>, the wages of the labourer should sink, as he is then better rewarded. It is true that if provisions were long cheap, as more people would flock to this labour where the wages are high, thro’ this concurrence of labour the wages would come down. But we find that when the price of corn is doubled the wages continue the same as before, because the labourers have no other way to turn themselves. The same is the case with menial servants.

From the above we may observe that whatever police tends to raise the market price above the natural, tends to diminish public opulence. Dearness and scarceity are in effect the same thing. When commodities are in abundance, they can be sold to the inferiour ranks of people, who can afford to give less for them, but not if they are scarce. So far therefore as goods are a conveniencey to the society, the society lives less happy when only the few can possess them. Whatever therefore keeps goods above their natural price for a permanencey, diminishes <a> nations opulence. Such are:

| 1st. All taxes upon industry, upon leather, and upon shoes, which people grudge most, upon salt, beer, or whatever is the strong drink of the country, for no country wants some kind of it. Man is an anxious animal and must have his care swept off by something that can exhilarate the spirits. It is alledged that this tax upon beer is an artificial security against drunkeness, but if we attend to it, <?we shall find> that it by no means prevents it. In countries where strong liquors are cheap, as in France and Spain, the people are generally sober. But in northern countries, where they are dear, they do not get drunk with beer but with spirituous liquors. No body presses his friend to a glass of beer unless he choose it.

2^dly. Monopolies also destroy public opulence. The price of the monopolized goods is raised above what is sufficient for encourageing the labour. When only a certain person or persons have the liberty of importing a commodity, there is less of it imported than would otherwise be: the price of it is therefore higher, and fewer people supported by it. It is the concurrence of different labourer[er]s which always brings down the price. In monopolies such as the Hudson’s Bay and East India companies | the people engaged in them make the price what they please.

3^dly. Exclusive priviledges of corporations have the same effect. The butchers and bakers raise the price of their goods as they please, because none but their own corporation is allowed to sell in the market, and therefore their meat must be taken, whether good or not. On this account there is always required a magistrate to fix the prices. For any free commodity, such as broad cloth, there is no occasion for this, but it is necessary with bakers, who may agree among themselves to make the quantity and price what they please. Even a magistrate is not a good enough expedient for this, as he must always settle the price at the outside, else the remedy must be worse than the disease, for no body would apply to these businesses and a famine would ensue. On this account bakers and brewers have always profitable trades.

As what rises the market price above the natural one diminishes public opulence, so what brings it down below it has the same effect.

It is only upon manufactures to be exported that this can usualy be done by any law or regulation, such as the bounty allowed by the government upon coarse linen, by which it becomes exportable | when under 12 pence a yard. The public paying a great part of the price, it can be sold cheaper to forreigners than what is sufficient for encourageing the labour. In the same manner, by the bounty of five shillings upon the quarter of corn when sold under 40 shillings, as the public pays an eight part of the price, it can be sold just so much cheaper at a forreign market. By this bounty the commodity is rendered more comeatible, and a greater quantity of it produced, but then it breaks what may be called the natural balance of industry. The disposition to apply to the production of that commodity is not proportioned to the natural cause of the demand, but to both that and the annexed bounty. But14 has not only this effect with regard to the particular commodity, but likewise people are called from other productions which are less encouraged, and thus the balance of industry is broken.

Again, after the ages of hunting and fishing, in which provisions were the immediate produce of their labour, when manufactures were introduced, nothing could be produced without a great deal of time. It was a long time before the weaver could carry to the market the cloth which he bought in flax. Every trade therefore requires a stock of food, cloaths, and lodging to carry it on.

| Suppose then, as is realy the case in every country, that there is in store a stock of food, cloaths, and lodging, the number of people that are employed must be in proportion to it. If the price of one commodity is sunk below it’s natural price, while another is above it, there is a smaller quantity of the stored stock left to support the whole, on account of the natural connection of all trades in the stock. By allowing bounties to me15 you take away the stock from the rest. This has been the real consequence of the corn bounty.

The price of corn being sunk, the rent of the farms sinks also, yet the bounty upon corn, which was laid on at the time of the taxes, was intended to raise the rent, and had the effect for sometime, because the tenants were assured of a price for their corn both at home and abroad. But tho’ the effects of the bounty encourageing agriculture brought down the price of corn, yet it raised the grass–farms, for the more corn the less grass.

The price of grass being raised, butcher’s meat, in consequence of its dependance upon it, must be raised also. So that if the price of corn is diminished, the price of other commodities is necessarily raised. The price of corn has indeed fallen from 42 to 35, but the price of hay has risen from 25 to near 50 shillings. | As the price of hay has risen, horses are not so easily kept, and therefore the price of carriage has risen also. But whatever encreases the price of carriage diminishes plenty in the market. Upon the whole, therefore, it is by far the best police to leave things to their natural course, and allow no bounties, nor impose taxes on commodities. Thus we have shewn what circumstances regulate the price of commodities, which was the first thing proposed.

We come now to the second particular, to consider money, first as the measure of value and then as the medium of permutation or exchange.

When people deal in many species of goods, one of them must be considered as the measure of value. Suppose there were only three commodities, sheep, corn, and oxen, we can easily remember them comparatively. But if we have a hundered different commodities, there are ninety nine values of each arising from a comparison with each of the rest. As these cannot easily be remembered, men naturaly fall upon one of them to be a common standard with which they compare all the rest. This will naturaly at first be the commodity with which they are best acquainted. Accordingly we find that black cattle and sheep were the standard in Homer’s time. | The armour of one of his heroes was worth nine oxen, and that of another worth an hundered. Black cattle was the common standard in ancient Greece. In Italy, and particularly in Tuscany, every thing was compared with sheep, as this was their principal commodity. This is what may be called the natural measure of value.

In like manner there were natural measures of quantity, such as fathoms, cubits, inches, taken from the proportions of the human body, once in use with every nation. But by a little observation they found that one man’s arm was longer or shorter than anothers, and that one was not to be compared with the other, and therefore wise men who attended to these things would endeavour to fix upon some more accurate measure, that equal quantities might be of equal values. This method became absolutely necessary when people came to deal in many commodities and in great quantities of them. Tho’ an inch was altogether inconsiderable when their dealings were confined to a few yards, more accuracey was required when they came to deal in some thousands. We find, in countries where their dealings are small, the remains of this inaccurracey. | The cast of the balance is nothing thought of in their coarse commodities.

Since, then, there must of necessity be a common standard of which equal quantities should be of equal values, mettals in general seemed best to answer this purpose, and of these the value of gold and silver could best be ascertained. The temper of steel cannot be precisely known, but what degree of alloy is in gold and silver can be exactly found out. Gold and silver were therefore fixed upon as the most exact standard to compare goods with, and were therefore considered as the most proper measure of value.

In consequence of gold and silver becoming the measure of value, it came also to be the instrument of commerce. It soon became necessary that goods should be carried to market, and they could never be cleverly exchanged unless the measure of value was also the instrument of commerce. In the age of shepherds it might be no great inconvenience that cattle should be the medium of exchange, as the expence of maintaining them was nothing, the whole country being considered as one great common. But when lands came to be divided and the division of labour introduced, this custom would be productive of very considerable inconveniences. The butcher and shoemaker might at times have no use for one another’s commodities. | The farmer very often cannot maintain upon his ground a cow more than he has; it would be a very great hardship on a Glasgow merchant to give him a cow for one of his commodities. To remedy this, these materials which were before considered as the measure of value came also to be the instrument of exchange. Gold and silver had all advantages; they can be kept without expence, they do not waste, and they are very portable. Gold and silver however do not derive their whole utility from being the medium of exchange. Tho’ they never had been used as money, they are more valuable than any other mettals. They have a superiour beauty, are capable of a finer polish, and are more proper for making any instrument except these with an edge. For all these reasons gold and silver came to be the proper measure of value and the instrument of exchange. But in order to render them more proper for these purposes, it was necessary that both their weight and their fineness should be ascertained. At first their balances were not very accurate and therefore frauds were easily committed; however, this was remedied by degrees.

| But common business would not allow of the experiments which are necessary to fix precisely the degree of fineness; tho’ with a great quantity of alloy, they are to appearance good. It was necessary therefore, to facilitate exchange, that they should fall upon some expedient to ascertain with accuracey both weight and fineness. Coinage most effectualy secures both these. The public, finding how much it would tend to facilitate commerce, put a stamp upon certain pieces, that whoever saw them might have the public faith that they were of a certain weight and fineness; and this would be what was at first marked upon the coin, as being of most importance.

Accordingly the coins of every country appear to have been16 the names of the weights corresponding to them, and they contained the denomination they expressed. The British pound sterling seems originaly to have been a pound weight of pure silver. As gold could be easily exchanged into silver, the latter came always to be the standard or measure of value. As there cannot be two standards, and in the greater part of purchases silver is necessary, we never say a man is worth so many guineas, but always pounds.

It is to be observed that the measure of | quantity has always encreased, while that of value has decreased. The British pound has now decreased to less than a third of its original value, which was sixty three shillings, while the measure of quantity has considerably encreased. The reason is that the interest of the government requires this. It is the interest of the baker and the brewer to make the measure of quantity as little as possible, and therefore there are inspectors appointed who, when it is brought down, always settle it a little farther up. All our measures which were taken from the Roman foot, fathom, and inch, are now a great deal more. In like manner what was called Troy weight, from Troy, a town in Champaigne where then the greatest commerce was carried on, gave rise to a heavier weight, because there was usualy given the cast of the balance along with it, and as this render’d dealings inaccurate, it was necessary that this cast of the balance should be determined. Accordingly, averdupois (avoir du poise) or heavy weight was settled at 13 ounces, but as this was a number not easily divided, it was settled at 16, the ounces being made proportioned to it.

Thus the measure of quantity has been encreasing. We shall next shew how the coin decreased.

| When the government takes the coinage into its own hands, the expences naturaly fall upon it, and if any private man coins, he must lessen the value or have nothing but his labour for his pains; and besides, as no man’s authority can be so great as to make his coin pass in common payments, he must forge the stamp of the government. As the government took the task upon themselves, they would endeavour, in order to prevent frauds, to prevent counterfeiting the king’s coin and encroaching on his prerogative. Besides, as the public faith was engaged, it was necessary to prevent all kinds of fraud, because it was likewise necessary that people should be obliged to receive the coin according to its denomination, and that if any refused it after a legal tender of payment was made, the debtor should be free and the creditor guilty of felony.17

In rude and barbarous periods the government was laid under many temptations to debase the coin or, according to the Mint language, to raise it. When, for instance, on any important occasion, such as paying of debts, or of soldiers, it has occasion for two millions, but has no more than one, it calls in the coin of the country and, mixing with it a greater quantity of alloy, makes it come out 2 millions, as like as possible to what it was before. Many operations of this kind have | [have] been performed in every country. But England, from the freedom which it has almost uninterruptedly enjoyed, has been less troubled with this than any other nation. There it has only fallen to one third. But in many other countries it is not a fiftieth of its original value.

The inconveniences of such practices are very great. The debasement of the coin hinders commerce or at least greatly embarrasses it. A new calculation must be made, how much of the new coin must be given for so much of the old. People are disposed to keep their goods from the market, as they know not what they will get for them. Thus a stagnation of commerce is occasioned. Besides, the debasing of the coin takes away the public faith. No body will lend any sum to the government, or bargain with it, as he perhaps may be paid with one half of it. As there is a fraud committed by the government, every subject must be allowed to do the same and pay his debts with the new money, which is less than he owed. This scheme, however, serves the purpose for some small time, on the following account. The use of money is twofold, for the payment of debts and the purchasing of commodities. When the coin is debased, a debt of twenty shillings is then paid with ten, but if the new coin be carried to a forreign market | it will give nothing but the old value. All day labourers are paid in the new coin. The necessities of life must be sold at what the greater part of people can give, and consequently their price will for sometime be diminished. However, the king himself loses much, tho’ he gains in the meantime. His doubling it is no doubt a present advantage, but it necessarily diminishes his revenue, because all his taxes are paid in the new coin. To prevent this loss the French, and indeed all other nations on the like occasion, when they double the money by edict without recoinage, make the augmentation after the money is called in and before it goes out, and a diminution is made before next term of payment.18 A diminution has always a worse effect than an augmentation. An augmentation injures the creditor, a diminution the debtor, who should always be favoured. If I bind for ten pounds and be obliged to pay fifteen, common industry must be excessively embarrassed.

The coins of most countries are either of copper, silver, or gold. We are obliged even to receive payment in sixpences, which sometimes is the occasion of confusion and loss of time. The different coins are regulated not by the caprice of the government, but by the market price of gold and silver, and according to this the proportion of gold and silver <is> settled.

| This proportion sometimes varies a little. The guineas sometime ago were valued at 22 shillings, and at other times they have been at 20. The gold rises more in proportion in Brittain than any where else, and as it makes the silver of somewhat less value it is the cause of a real inconvenience. As silver buys more gold abroad than at home, by sending abroad silver they bring gold in return, which buys more silver here than it does abroad. By this means a kind of trade is made of it, the gold coin encreasing and the value19 diminishing. Sometime ago a proposal was given in to remedy this, but it was thought so complex a case that they resolved for that time not to meddle with it. We have shewn what rendered money the measure of value, but it is to be observed that labour, not money, is the true measure of value. National opulence consists therefore in the quantity of goods and the facility of barter. This shall next be considered.

The more money that is necessary to circulate the goods of any country, the more is the quantity of goods diminished. Suppose that the whole stock of Scotland in corn, cattle, money, etca. | amounts to 20 millions, and if one million in cash is necessary to carry on the circulation, there will be in the country only 19 millions of food, cloaths, and lodging, and the people have less by one million than they would have if there were no occasion for this expedient of money. It is therefore evident that the poverty of any country encreases as the money encreases, money being a dead stock in itself, supplying no convenience of life. Money in this respect may be compared to the high roads of a country, which bear neither corn nor grass themselves but circulate all the corn and grass in the country. If we could find any way to save the ground taken up by highways, we would encrease considerably the quantity of commodities and have more to carry to the market. In the same manner as <?the value of> a piece of ground does not lye in the number of highways that run thro’ it, so the riches of a country does not consist in the quantity of money employed to circulate commerce, but in the great abundance of the necessaries of life. If we could therefore fall on a method to send the half of our money abroad to be converted into goods, and at the same time supply the channel of circulation at home, we would greatly encrease the wealth of the country. | Hence the beneficial effects of the erection of banks and paper credit. It is easy to shew that the erection of banks is of advantage to the commerce of a country. Suppose as above that the whole stock of Scotland amounted to 20 millions, and that 2 millions are employed in the circulation of it, the other 18 are in commodities. If then the banks in Scotland issued out notes to the value of 2 millions, and reserved among them 300,000£ to answer immediate demands, there would be one million seven hundered thousand pounds circulating in cash, and 2 millions of paper money besides. The natural circulation however is 2 million, and the channel will receive no more. What is over will be sent abroad to bring home materials for food, cloaths, and lodging. That this has a tendencey to enrich a nation may be seen at first sight, for whatever commodities are imported, just so much is added to the opulence of the country.20 The only objection against paper money is that it drains the country of gold and silver, that bank notes will not circulate in a forreign mercat, and that forreign commodities must be paid in specie. This is no doubt the case. | But if we consider attentively we will find that this is no real hurt to a country. The opulence of a nation does not consist in the quantity of coin but in the abundance of the commodities which are necessary for life, and whatever tends to encrease these tends so far to encrease the riches of a country.

Money is fit for none of the necessaries of life; it cannot of itself afford either food, cloaths, or lodging, but must be exchanged for commodities fit for these purposes. If all the coin of the nation were exported and our commodities proportionably encreased, it might be recalled on any sudden emergencey sooner than any one could well imagine. Goods will always bring in money, and as long as the stock of commodities in any nation encreases, they have it in their power to augment the quantity of coin, if thought necessary, by exporting their stock to forreign countries. This reasoning is confirmed by matter of fact. We find that the commerce of every nation in Europe has been prodigiously encreased by the erection of banks. In this country every body is sensible of their good effects, and our American colonies, where most of the commerce is carried on by paper circulation, are in a most flourishing condition.

| What first gave occasion to the establishment of banks was to facilitate the transferrence of money. This at this day is the only design of the bank at Amsterdam. When commerce is carried to a high pitch, the delivery of gold and silver consumes a great deal of time. When a great merchant had ten or 20 thousand pound to give away, he would take almost a week to count it out in guineas and shillings. A bank bill prevents all this trouble. Before the erection of the bank[s] at Amsterdam, the method the merchants fell upon to lessen the trouble of counting out great quantities of cash was to keep certain sums put up in bags to answer immediate demands. In this case you must either trust the honesty of the merchant or you must take the trouble of counting it over. If you trusted his fidelity, frequent frauds would be committed; if not, your trouble was not lessened. The inconveniences arising from this gave occasion to the erection of that bank, of which the whole transaction is this: you deposit a certain sum of money there, and the bank gives you a bill to that extent. This money is secure, and you never call for it, because the bill will generally | sell above par, and it is therefore an advantage to yourself to let it ly. The bank has no office for payment, because there is seldom any payment demanded. In this manner the bank of Amsterdam has a good effect in facilitating commerce, and it’s notes circulate only there. The credit of that city is not in the least endangered by the bank. In 1701,21 when the French army was at Utrecht, a sudden demand was made upon it, and all Holland was alarmed with the expected fatal consequences, but no danger ensued. Before this a suspicion prevailed that the bankers had fallen into a custom of trading with the money, but at that time it was found that a great quantity of the money had been scorched by a fire that happened in the neighbourhood about 50 years before that. This plainly shewed that there was no ground for the suspicion, and the credit of the bank remained unhurt. It has been affirmed by some that the bank of Amsterdam has always money in its stores to the amount of 80 or 90 millions. But this has lately been shown by an ingenious gentleman to be false, from a comparison of the trade of London and Amsterdam.22

| The constitution of the banks in Brittain differs widely from that in Amsterdam. Here there is only about a sixth part of the stock kept in readiness for answering demands, and the rest is employed in trade. Originaly they were on the same footing with the Amsterdam bank, but the directors taking liberty to send out money, they gradually came to their present situation.

The ruin of a bank would not be so dangerous as is commonly imagined. Suppose all the money in Scotland was issued by one bank and that it became bankrupt, a very few individuals would be ruined by it, but not many, because the quantity of cash or paper that people have in their hands bears no proportion to their wealth. Neither would the wealth of the whole country be much hurt by it, because the 100 part of the riches of a country does not consist in money. The only method to prevent the bad consequence arising from the ruin of banks is to give monopolies to none, but to encourage the erection of as many as possible. When several are established in a country, a mutual jealousy prevails, they are continualy making unexpected runs on one another. This puts them on their guard and obliges them to provide themselves against such demands. Was there but one bank in Scotland it would perhaps be a little more enterprizing | as it would have no rival, and by mismanagement might become bankrupt, but a number puts this beyond all danger. Even tho’ one did break, every individual <would> have very few of it’s notes. From all these considerations it is manifest that banks are beneficial to the commerce of a country, and that it is a bad police to restrain them.

Several political writers have published treatises to shew the pernicious nature of banks and paper money. Mun, a London merchant, published one with this intention,23 in answer to a book that had been written on the opposite before. He affirms that as England is drained of it’s money it must go to ruin. The circulation of paper banishes gold and silver from the country. All other goods which we have in our possession, being spent upon our subsistence, gradually diminish, and must at last come to an end. Money never decays, a stock of it will last for ever, and by keeping up great quantities of it in the country we shall insure our riches as long as the world stands. This reasoning was in these days thought very satisfactory. But from what has been said before concerning the nature of public opulence, it appears evidently absurd.

| Sometime after that, Mr. Gee, likewise a merchant, wrote with the same intention.24 He endeavours to shew that England would soon be ruined by trade with forreign countries; by the exchange he calculates that the balance is always against us, and consequently that in almost all our commercial dealings with other nations we are losers. As they drain us of our money, we must soon come to ruin.25 The absurdity of this is likewise evident from former considerations, and we find that tho’ no stop was put to the manner of carrying on forreign commerce by any regulations, the nation has prodigiously encreased in riches, and is still encreasing. He proposed indeed some regulations to prevent our ruin from this quarter, which if the government had been foolish <?enough> to have complied with, they would more probably have impoverished the nation.

Mr. Hume published some essays shewing the absurdity of these and other such doctrines.26 He proves very ingeniously that money must always bear[s] a certain proportion to the quantity of commodities in every country, that wherever money is accumulated beyond the proportion of commodities in any country the price of goods will necessarily rise, that this country will be undersold at the forreign market and consequently the money | must depart into other nations; but on the contrary whenever the quantity of money falls below the proportion of goods the price of goods diminishes, the country undersells others in forreign marketts and consequently money returns in great plenty. Thus money and goods will keep near about a certain level in every country.27 Mr. Hume’s reasoning is exceedingly ingenious. He seems however to have gone a little into the notion that public opulence consists in money, which was considered above.28

We may observe upon this that human industry always multiplies goods and money together, tho’ not always in the same proportion. The labour of men will always be employed in produceing whatever is the object of human desire, and things will encrease in proportion as it is in the power of man to cultivate them. Corn and other commodities of that kind must always be produced in greater abundance than gold, precious stones, and the like, because they are more within the reach of human industry. Almost any part of the surface of the earth may by proper culture be made capable of produceing corn, but gold is not to be found every where, and even where it is to be found it lies concealed in the bowells of the earth, | and to produce a small quantity of it long time and much labour are requisite. For these reasons money never encreases in proportion to the increase of goods, and consequently money will be sold at a cheaper rate in proportion as a country becomes opulent. In savage nations money gives a vast price because savages have no money but <?what> they acquire by plunder, for they have not that knowledge which is necessary for produceing money in their own country. But when a nation arrives at a certain degree of improvement in the arts, it’s value diminishes; then they begin to search the mines and manufacture it themselves. From the fall of the Roman Empire to the discovery of the West Indies, the value of money was very high and continualy encreasing. Since that latter period it’s value has decreased considerably.

Mr. Locke, too, published a treatise to show the pernicious consequences of allowing the nation to be drained of money. His notions were likewise founded upon the idea that public opulence consists in money, tho’ he treats the matter in a more philosophical light than the rest.

He affirms with Mr. Mun that if there is no money in a nation it must soon come to ruin, | that all commodities are soon spent, but money lasts for ever. Upon the whole we may observe on this subject that the reason why our riches do not consist in money, but commodities, is that money cannot be used for any of the purposes of life, but that commodities are fitted for our subsistence. The consumptibility, if we may use the word, of goods is the great cause of human industry, and an industrious people will always produce more than they consume. It is easy to shew how small a proportion the cash in every country bears to the public opulence. It is generally supposed that there are 30 millions of money circulating in Brittain, but the annual consumption amounts to much more than a 100 millions, for, computing the inhabitants of the island at 10 millions, and allowing 10 pounds per annum for the subsistence of each person, which is by much too little, the whole annual consumption amounts to that sum. So it appears that the circulating cash bears but a small proportion to the whole opulence of the country.29 It is probable however that there are not 30 millions in Brittain, and in that case the proportion will be still less.

It is said by some who support the notion that the riches of a country consists in money, that when a person retires from trade he turns his stock immediately into cash. | It is plain, however, that the reason of this is that as money is the instrument of commerce, a man can change it for the necessaries and elegancies of life more easily than any thing else. Even the miser who locks up his gold in his chest has this end in view. No man in his senses hoards up money for it’s own sake, but he considers that by keeping money always by him he has it in his power to supply at once all the necessities of himself and his family. This opinion that riches consist in money, as it is absurd in speculation, so it has given occasion to many prejudicial errors in practice, some of which are the following.

It was owing to these tenets that the government prohibited the exportation of coin.^z Which prohibition has been extremely hurtfull to the commerce of the country, because whatever quantity of money there is in any country above what is sufficient for the circulation is merely a dead stock.

In King William’s time there were two species of coin, milled and unmilled. The unmilled was frequently clipped by different persons in it’s circulation. This occasioned frequent disorders among the people, and therefore the Parliament ordered all the clipt money to be brought into the Mint, and the government was at the expence of recoining it, | which operation cost them about 2 millions. As they had been at this expence, they thought it just and proper to prohibit the exportation of money for the future. The merchants however complained of this hardship, and were then allowed to export money to a small extent. The great complaint, however, was always scarceity of money. In order to remedy this, the government established a common office for coining money where every one might get their gold and silver turned into coin without any expence. The consequence of this was that as coin was of no more value than bullion a great deal of coin was melted down and exported. To prevent this it was rendered felony to melt coin, but it is so simple an operation, and so easily gone about, that the law was easily eluded. The immediate effect of this regulation was that more coin was exported than ever. This might have been easily prevented by fixing a certain price upon the coinage of bullion, or by ordaining the Master of the Mint to be paid by the persons who brought their money to be coined. But such a regulation was never thought of. Any regulation of the above kind is very absurd, for there is no fear if things be left to their free course that any nation will want money sufficient for the circulation of their commodities, and every prohibition of exportation is always ineffectuall, | and very often occasions the exportation of more than otherwise would be. Suppose for instance the Portuguese prohibited from exporting their money by a capital punishment. As they have few goods to give in exchange for ours, their forreign trade must cease; or if they attempt to smuggle, the British merchant must lay such a price upon his goods as will be sufficient to reward him for the risk he runs of being detected, and the Portuguese merchant, being obliged to buy his goods too dear, must be a loser. In general, every prohibition of this kind^a hurts the commerce of a country. Every unecessary accumulation of money is a dead stock which might be employed in enriching the nation by forreign commerce. It likewise raises the price of goods, and makes the country undersold at forreign markets.

It is to be observed that prohibiting the exportation of money is realy one great cause of the poverty of Spain and Portugal. When they got possession of the mines of Mexico and Peru, they thought they could command all Europe by the continual supplies which they received from thence, if they could keep the money among them, and therefore they prohibited the exportation of it. But this had a quite contrary effect, for when money is, as it were, dammed up to an unatural height, and there is more than the circulation requires, the consequences are very unfavourable to the country. | For it is impossible that the exportation of gold and silver can be wholly stopped, as the balance of trade must be against them, that is, they must buy more than they sell, and it is indispensibly necessary that this balance be paid in money. Every commodity rises to an extravagant height. The Portuguese pay for English cloth, additional to the natural price of it, the expence and risk of carrying it there, for no body ever saw a Spanish or Portuguese ship in a British harbour. All the goods sent to these countries are carried by ourselves and consigned to the British factors, to be disposed of by them. But besides the carriage and insurance, the British merchant must be paid for the risk of having his money seized in Portugal in consequence of the prohibition. All risk of forfeiture or penalty must ly upon the goods. This has a miserable effect upon the domestic industry of these countries, and has put a stop to their manufactures. No body ever saw a piece of Spanish cloth in any other country, yet they have the best materials in the world and, with the same art that we have, might monopolize the trade of Europe. It drew the attention of the nations who trade with them in these commodities, when a general on a certain occasion presented to His Majesty | the regiment of which he had the command cloathed in the manufactures of Spain. In general they export no manufactured commodities, swords and armour excepted, as they have confessedly the best steel in the world, but only the spontaneous productions of the country such as fruits and wines.

Regulations of a similar nature were made in Brittain in King William’s time. Money was thought to constitute opulence, and therefore the accumulation of it commanded the whole of the public attention. They coined all money brought in for nothing, and the expences of coinage, which amounted to about fourteen thousand pounds, were entirely thrown away; and, besides, great encouragement was given to exportation, because, as gold and silver were coined for nothing, coined money could never be dearer than bullion. As the exportation of bullion was free they melted down the coin and sent it abroad. At present there is a great temptation to such practices, for an oz. of pure silver at mint price is exactly valued at 5 sh. 2^d., but bullion is often bought at 5 sh. 6^d.. As nothing is lost in melting, here is a profit of 4^d. per oz. It is on this account that we seldom or never see a new shilling, and it is one of the causes that silver is so scarce in proportion to gold.

| The idea of publick opulence consisting in money has been productive of other bad effects. Upon this principle most pernicious regulations have been established. These species of commerce which drain us of our money are thought dissadvantageous and these which increase it beneficial; therefore the former are prohibited and the latter encouraged. As France is thought to produce more of the elegancies of life than this country, and as we take much from them and they need little from us, the balance of trade is against us, and therefore almost all our trade with France is prohibited by great taxes and duties on importation. On the other hand, as Spain and Portugal take more of our commodities than we of theirs, the balance is in our favours, and this trade is not only allowed but encouraged. The absurdity of these regulations will appear on the least reflection.

All commerce that is carried on betwixt any two countries must necessarily be advantageous to both. The very intention of commerce is to exchange your own commodities for others which you think will be more convenient for you. When two men trade between themselves it is undoubtedly for the advantage of both. | The one has perhaps more of one species of commodities than he has occasion for, he therefore exchanges a certain quantity of it with the other, for another commodity that will be more usefull to him. The other agrees to the bargain on the same account, and in this manner the mutual commerce is advantageous to both. The case is exactly the same betwixt any two nations. The goods which the English merchants want to import from France are certainly more valuable to them than what they give for them. Our very desire to purchase them shews that we have more use for them than either the money or the commodities which we give for them. It may be said indeed that money lasts for ever, but that claret and cambrics are soon consumed. This is true. But what is the intention of industry if it be not to produce these things which are capable of being used, and are conduceive to the convenience and comfort of human life? Unless we use the produce of our industry, unless we can subsist more people in a better way, what avails it? Besides, if we have money to spend upon forreign commodities, what purpose serves it | to keep it in the country? If the circulation of commodities require it, there will be none to spare; and if the channel of circulation be full, no more is necessary. And if only a certain sum be necessary for that purpose, why throw more into it?

Again, by prohibiting the exportation of goods to forreign mercats, the industry of the country is greatly discouraged. It is a very great motive to industry that people have it in their power to exchange the produce of their labour for what they please, and wherever there is any restraint on people in this respect they will not be so vigorous in improving manufactures. If we be prohibited to send corn and cloth to France, that industry is stopped which raises corn and prepares cloth for the French market. It may be said indeed that if we were allowed to trade with France we would not exchange our commodities with theirs, but our money, and thus human industry is by no means discouraged. But if we attend to it we shall find that it comes to the same thing at last. By hindering people to dispose of their money as they think proper, you discourage these manufactures by which this money is gained. All jealousies therefore between different nations, | and prejudices of this kind, are extremely hurtfull^b to commerce and limit public opulence. This is always the case betwixt France and us in the time of a war.

In general we may observe that these jealousies and prohibitions are most hurtfull to the richest nations, and that in proportion as a free commerce would be advantageous. When a rich man and a poor man deal with one another, both of them will encrease their riches, if they deal prudently, but the rich man’s stock will encrease in a greater proportion than the poor man’s. In like manner, when a rich and a poor nation engage in trade the rich nation will have the greatest advantage, and therefore the prohibition of this commerce is most hurtfull to it of the two. All our trade with France is prohibited by the high duties imposed on every French commodity imported. It would however have been better police to encourage our trade with France. If any forreign commerce is to be prohibited, it ought to be that with Spain and Portugal. This would have been much more advantageous to England. France is much more populous, a more extensive country, farther advanced in arts and manufactures of every kind, and the industry which a commerce | with that country would have exerted30 at home would have been much greater. Twenty millions of people perhaps in a great society, working as it were to one anothers hands, from the nature of the division of labour before explained would produce a thousand times more goods than another society consisting only of 2 or 3 millions. It were happy, therefore, both for this country and for France, that all national prejudices were rooted out, and a free and uninterrupted commerce established. It may be observed in general that we never heard of any nation ruined by this balance of trade. When Gee published his book, the balance with all nations were against us, except Spain and Portugal. It was then thought that in a few years we would be reduced to an absolute state of poverty. This indeed has been the cry of all political writers since the time of Charles II^d. Notwithstanding all this we find ourselves far richer than before, and when there is^c occasion for it we can raise much more money than ever has been done. A late Minister of State levied in one year 23 millions with greater ease than Lord Godolphin could levy 6 in Q. Ann’s time.

| The French and Dutch writer’s, embraceing the same principle, frequently alarmed their country with the same groundless terror, but they still continue to flourish.

It is to be observed that the poverty of a nation can never proceed from forreign trade if carried on with wisdom and prudence. The poverty of a nation proceeds from much the same causes with these which render an individual poor.

When a man consumes more than he gains by his industry, he must impoverish himself unless he has some other way of subsistence. In the same manner, if a nation consume more than it produces, poverty is inevitable. If its annual produce be 90 millions and it’s annual consumption an 100, then it spends, eats and drinks, tears, wears, 10 millions more than it produces, and it’s stock of opulence must gradualy <?come> to nothing.

There is still another bad effect proceeding from that absurd notion that national opulence consists in money. It is commonly imagined that whatever people spend in their own country cannot diminish public opulence, if you take care of exports and imports. | This is the foundation of Dr. Mandevilles system that private vices are public benefits. What is spent at home is all spent among ourselves, none of it goes out of the country. But it is evident that when any man tears and wears and spends his stock, without employing himself in any species of industry, the nation is at the end of the year so much the poorer by it. If he spend only the interest of the money he does no harm, as the capital still remains and is employed in promoting industry, but if he spend the capital the whole is gone. To illustrate this let us make a supposition, that my father at his death, instead of a thousand pounds in cash, leaves me the necessaries and conveniences of life to the same value, which is precisely the same as if he left it in money because I afterwards purchase them in money. I get a number of idle folks about me and eat, drink, tear and wear, till the whole is consumed. By this I not only reduce myself to want, but certainly rob the public stock of a 1000 pounds, as it is spent and nothing produced for it. As a farther illustration of the hurt which the public receives from such practices, let us suppose that this island was invaded by a numberous band of Tartars, a people who are still in the state of shepherds, a people who lead a roving life and have little or no idea of industry. | Here they would find all commodities for the taking, they would put on fine cloaths, eat, drink, tear and wear every thing they laid their hands upon. The consequence would be that from the highest degree of opulence the whole country would be reduced to the lowest pitch of misery and brought back to its ancient state. The 30 millions of money would probably remain for sometime. But all the necessaries of life would be consumed. This shews the absurdity of that opinion that no home consumption can hurt the opulence of a country.

Upon this principle that no public expence employed at home can be hurtfull, a war in Germany is thought a dreadfull calamity, as it drains the country of money, and a land war is always thought more prejudicial than a sea one for the same reason. But upon reflection we will find that it is the same thing to the nation how or where its stock be spent. If I purchase a thousand pounds worth of French wines and drink them all when they come home, the country is 2000 pounds poorer, because both the goods and money are gone. If I spend a 1000 pounds worth of goods at home upon myself, the country is only deprived of 1000 pounds, as the money still remains. But in maintaining an army in a distant war it is the same thing whether we pay them in goods or money, because the consumption is the same at any rate. | Perhaps it is the better police to pay them in money, as goods are better fitted for the purposes of life at home. For the same reason there is no difference between land and sea wars, as is commonly imagined.

From the above considerations it appears that Brittain should by all means be made a free port, that there should be no interruptions of any kind made to forreign trade, that if it were possible to defray the expences of government by any other method, all duties, customs, and excise should be abolished, and that free commerce and liberty of exchange should be allowed with all nations and for all things.

But still further, and on the same principles as above, an apology is made for the public debt. Say they, tho’ we <owe> at present above 100 millions, we owe it to ourselves, or at least very little of it to forreigners. It is just the right hand owing the left, and on the whole can be little or no disadvantage. But <it> is to be considered that the interest of this 100 millions is paid by industrious people, and given to support idle people who are employed in gathering it. Thus industry is taxed to support idleness. If the debt had not been contracted, by prudence and oeconomy the nation would have been much richer than at present. Their industry would not be hurt by the oppression of these idle people who live upon it. | Instead of the brewer paying taxes which are often improper, the stock might have been lent out to such industrious people as would have made 6 or 7 per cent. by it, and have given better interest than the government does. This stock would then have been employed for the country<’s> wellfare. When there are such heavy taxes to pay, every merchant must carry on less trade than he would otherwise do; he has his taxes to pay before he sell any of his commodities. This narrows as it were his stock, and hinders his trade from being so extensive as it otherwise would be. To stop this clamour Sir Robert Walpole endeavoured to shew that the public debt was no inconvenience, tho’ it is to be supposed that a man of his abilities saw the contrary himself.31

The last bad effect that shall be taken notice of is the notion of Mr. Law, a Scotch merchant. He thought that national opulence consists in money, and that the value of gold and silver is arbitrary and depends on constitution and agreement. He imagined that the idea of value might be brought to paper, and it preferred to money. If this could be done, he thought it would be a great convenience, as the government then might do what it pleased, | raise armies, pay soldiers, and be at any expense whatever. Mr. Law proposed his scheme to the Scotch Parliament in 1701.32 It was rejected, and he went over to France, where his project was relish’d by the Duke of Orleans. In this book33 he agrees with the forementioned writers that, the balance of trade being against a nation, it must soon be drained of its money. In order to turn the balance of trade in our favours, he proposed to the Scotch Parliament the following scheme.

As there was little gold or silver in this country, he thought they might fall upon some other method of creating money independent of it, to witt, by paper. On this account he proposed the erecting of a land bank at Edinburgh, in which it is to be observed he falls into many blunders concerning tenures and the nature of property. At this bank they were to keep by them only 20 or 30 thousand pounds to answer small demands, and to give out notes for land. For 2 acres of arable land they were to issue out a note of equal value, and if any extraordinary demand was made upon them, they would pay so much of it in money and so much in land. By this means in a very short time the whole land of Scotland would go from hand to hand, | as a 20 shilling note does. As this project never was executed, it is hard to say what the consequence might have been; it is however obviously liable to the following inconveniences. Taking the land rent of Scotland at 5 million per annum, tho’ it be much more, at 20 years purchase it amounts to an 100 millions; there would then be just so much currency in the country, and if one million was then necessary for circulation there would just be 99 millions for no purpose, as none of it could go abroad. They would not have been able to maintain one man more than formerly, as their food, cloaths, and lodging would not have been encreased, and every commodity would have risen to 99 times it’s present value.

Mr. Law, not meeting with the encouragement he expected, went over to France in the year[s] 1714 and, as was before mentioned, found favour with the Duke of Orleans, then Regent,34 and got liberty to erect a bank there, which at first was only to the extent of 6 millions of livres35 or 3200£ sterling. From this beginning he carried it on to a very great height, issued out many notes, and in a short time engrossed the whole circulation of France. | As Mr. Law’s notes were received in payment of the revenue, this contributed to the success of the scheme. This too had a greater effect in France than it could have had here, considering the number of taxes and the manner in which they are levied. By this and other circumstances his notes were always at par with gold and silver, especially as they were making continual changes in their coin. About that time 28 livres, which were equal to 8 ounces of pure silver, were raised to 60, and as a diminution of coin is always the consequent of a sudden rise,36 this was daily expected. Mr. Law made his notes payable in what was called the money of the day. Instead of promising to pay his notes, as we would say, in pounds sterling, he did it in crowns and half crowns, which was a very proper method to make them par with gold and silver. Suppose that our coin were raised to double, a half crown would become a crown, and so in this manner the bank notes and money would rise and fall together.37

| As Law wanted to make his notes above par, he fell upon the following scheme. He issued out his bank notes payable in livres turnois,38 by which, when the coin came to be diminished, he would not be obliged to pay above one half. The coin was not received in the market or elsewhere, as the diminution was still expected and did not come for sometime. This favoured his design and kept the notes above par, by which the credit of his bank was established. The next step Mr. Law fell upon was the relieving of the public debts, which amounted to 200 millions.39 As he saw the diminution must needs come, he took another method to keep up his notes. He got a grant of the exclusive priviledge of trading to Canada, and established the Mississippi Company. To this he joined the African, the Turky, and the East India companies. He also farmed the tobacco and all the public revenues of France at 12 millions,40 | for in France the whole revenue is farmed by one man, who undertakes it and levies it without excisemen, and the farmers there are the richest in the country, and must be skilled in the finances and public revenues. Mr. Law undertook this, and having the whole trade of the country monopolized, it was difficult to say what profits he would make.

He wanted to lend the government 80 or 90 millions, which he could easily do by issuing notes to that value, but then he saw that they would soon return upon him. To prevent this his invention was sett on work, and we shall see how far he succeeded. As the company he erected seemed to be in a very flourishing condition, shares were purchased in it at a very considerable rate. He opened a subscription to it at 500 livres, so that a navy ticket or billet d’etat purchased a share into it, which raised them to a par as they had for a long time been far below it. The government of France was never in such a miserable condition as then. The interest of the money which should have paid the billets d’etat | was seized upon for other purposes. Never was monarch more degraded than Lewis XIV^th. After the Treaty of Utrecht he had occasion to borrow 8 millions of livres from Holland, and not only to give them his bond for 32 millions but to get some merchants to be security for him.41 Since that was the case, we need not be surprized that the billets d’etat sold at great discount, as they bore no interest and it was quite uncertain when they would be paid. Law published a declaration that one of these, which was granted for 500 livres, should purchase a share in the company, and thus they came again to par. The people still continuing in great expectations of profit, he in a few days opened a new subscription at 5000 livres, and afterwards another at 10000. At this time he was enabled to lend the government 1600 millions of livres at 3 per cent.42 Had he stopt here it is probable that he would have answered all engagements, but his future proceedings ruined all. It was impossible that the value of shares could long continue at such a high rate.

| He thought, however, that it was necessary to do all that he could to keep them up, as the whole fortunes of many people were in the bank. He had issued out notes to double the circulation of the country, which raised the price of every thing to an enormous pitch, and consequently the exchange was against France in all forreign trade. This was principaly occasioned by his opening an office to purchase 500 livres shares at 9000 livres,43 which obliged him to issue out many notes. People of prudence who were concerned opposed this scheme, and indeed it was the first thing that made his bank lose credit and occasioned it’s dissolution. As he was not obliged to pay the capital sums, only the annual dividend of 200 livres arising from the profits, he might have let them fall to their original 500 without any great loss but that of reputation. But his buying up the shares occasioned his issuing out so many notes that they must of necessity return upon him. This was so much the case that he was obliged to open offices in different parts of Paris for the payment of them. When in this manner oppressed, he was making continual changes on the coin, in order to dissuade people from returning on the bank, and disgust them at gold and silver.44 | He cried up gold, but as coin cannot be kept much above the level of the mettal, when it was so much depreciated it was not taken. If a person had 20,000 guineas, as he was affraid that the coin would not continue at that value, he went to the bank and got it exchanged for notes. The same consideration prevented them from returning upon the bank, as they would there be paid in coin. By this means he not only prevented his notes from coming upon him, but filled his coffers with almost all the gold in the country. In order to accomplish this part of his scheme more perfectly, he most arbitrarily published an edict prohibiting any persons from keeping by them gold or silver beyond a certain sum.45 He also took away the severe penalties that were in force against the exportation of coin, and every person was allowed to export money free from duty.46 By this means much of it went to Holland. He reasoned with himself, some instrument of exchange is necessary. Paper, gold, and silver at present are the medium. If gold and silver be utterly exported, paper only remains, and may be rendered the sole instrument of commerce. | This he thought he had done effectualy when by an edict he had swept a part into his coffers, and cleared the country of the remainder. They would therefore be obliged to take paper. At last, however, after a great number of expedients he found it was impracticable. By paying out great sums he kept off ruin for some months, but at last published an edict that all bank notes were to be paid only in one half; and indeed if he had stood to this, as some imagined he might have done, it would have been far better than to have suffered the after consequences. Upon this edict the credit of the bank was entirely broken, and the bank notes all on a sudden sunk to nothing.47

This ruined an immense number of people. Brittain can never be much hurt by the breaking of a bank, because few people keep notes by them to any value.48 A man worth 40,000£ will scarce ever have 500£ of notes by him. But the breaking of this bank in France occasioned the most dreadfull confusion. The greatest part of people had their whole fortunes in notes and were reduced to a state of beggary. The only people who were safe were the stockjobbers who had sold out in time, or with their bank notes had purchased all the valuable goods and a great deal of land, tho’ | [tho’] at the highest prices. These made immense fortunes by it.

The South Sea scheme in our own country was nothing to this. No body was under any obligations of going into it, the government had no share in it, and the loss was but a triffle in comparison. The clamour which Laws last edict made caused it soon to be rescinded, and the notes were again declared to be paid at value. But the bank never recovered it’s credit, and this had no effect. However, by raising the coin and other expedients he kept it from May to October, and then49 was obliged to leave France, which with difficulty he accomplished; his goods were confiscated and he died soon after.50

This amazing scheme was founded on these two principles, that public opulence consists in money, and that the value of money is arbitrary, founded upon the common consent of mankind. Consistent with these principles he thought he might easily encrease the public opulence if he could annex the idea of money to paper, and the government could never be at any loss to produce any effect that money could do.

This scheme of Mr. Laws was by no means contemptible; he realy believed in it | and was the dupe of it himself. It was thought he had provided well for himself, but it was found to be otherways. If the Duke of Orleans had lived only a few days longer, it was agreed upon that he was to have been reestablished. After his death it was not thought expedient to have it put in execution.

This scheme of Laws was imitated all over Europe. It gave occasion to the South Sea Company in England, which turned out at last a meer fraud, and, could it have been carried to as great an extent as Laws, would have been productive of the same consequences. It was erected in the latter end of Q. Ann’s reign, and the intention of it was to carry on a trade to the South–Seas. For this purpose they bought up the greater part of the debts of the nation. Their stock however was not great, and the profits which could be expected from it were very inconsiderable, the expectations of the people were never greatly raised, and it’s fall was not very prejudicial to the nation.

We have only two things further to mention relating to the price of commodities, to witt, interest and exchange.

It is commonly supposed that the premium of interest depends upon the value of gold and silver.51 | The value of these are regulated by their quantity, for as the quantity encreases the value diminishes, and as the quantity decreases the value rises. If we attend to it, however, we shall find that the premium of interest is regulated by the quantity of stock. About the time of the discovery of the West Indies, it is to be observed that common interest was at 10 or 12 per cent, and since that time it has gradualy diminished. The plain reason is this. Under the feudal constitution there could be very little accumulation of stock, which will appear from considering the situation of these three orders of men which made up the whole body of the people, the peasants, the landlords, and the merchants. The peasants had leases which depended upon the caprice of their masters. They could never encrease in wealth because the landlord was ready to squeeze it all from them, and therefore they had no motive to acquire it. As little could the landlords encrease their wealth as they lived so indolent a life and were involved in perpetual wars. The merchants again were oppressed by all ranks, and were not able to secure the produce of their industry from rapine and violence. | Thus there could be little accumulation of wealth at all. But after the fall of the feudal government, these obstacles to industry were removed and the stock of commodities began gradualy to encrease. We may further observe that what one trade lends to another is not so much to be considered as money, as commodities. No doubt it is generaly money which one man delivers another in loan. But then it is immediately turned into stock, and thus the quantity of stock enables you to make a greater number of loans.

The price of interest is entirely regulated by this circumstance. If there be few who have it in their power to lend money, and a great number of people who want to borrow it, the price of interest must be high. But if the quantity of stock on hand be so great as to enable a great number to lend, it must fall proportionably.

Exchange is a method invented by merchants to facilitate the payment of money at a distance. Suppose I owe 100£ to a merchant at London, I apply to a banker in Glasgow for a bill upon another merchant in London, payable to my creditor. For this I must not only give the banker £100 but I must also reward him for his trouble. | This reward is called the price or premium of exchange. Between Glasgow and London it is sometimes at 2 per cent, sometimes more, sometimes less. Between London and Glasgow again it is sometimes 4 or 5 per cent below par, and between Glasgow and the West India colonies it is often at 50 per cent below par. The value of exchange is always regulated by the risk of sending money between two places. It is often, however, greater than the risk can be supposed to be, and this is owing to paper circulation. Between Glasgow and London one can easily get £100 carried for 15 or 16 sh^s, but as paper in Scotland makes a great part of the currencey, and as there is an inconveniencey in getting bank notes exchanged for gold and silver, a merchant chooses rather to pay 2 per cent than take the trouble of changeing the notes for cash and sending the money. This too is the cause of the high price of exchange between Virginia and Glasgow. In the American colonies the currencey is paper, and their notes are 40 or 50 per cent below par because the funds are not sufficient. In every exchange you must pay the price, | the risk, some profit to the banker, and so much for the degradation of money in notes. This is the cause of the rise of exchange. Whenever it rises beyond the price of insurance, it is owing to the money of one country being lower than that of another. This was the cause of the high price of exchange between France and Holland about the time of the Mississippi Company. It was then at 80 or 90 per cent. All the money had been expelled from France by the scheme of Mr. Law, and the whole circulation was paper, and the credit of the bank had fallen. All these reasons conspired to raise the exchange to such an enormous pitch.

We come now to the next thing proposed, to examine the causes of the slow progress of opulence.

When one considers the effects of the division of labour, what an immediate tendencey it has to improve the arts, it appears somewhat surprizing that every nation should continue so long in a poor and indigent state as we find it does. The causes of this may be considered under these two heads, first, natural impediments, and secondly, the oppression of civil government.

A rude and barbarous people are ignorant | of the effects of the division of labour, and it is long before one person, by continualy working at different things, can produce any more than is necessary for his daily subsistence. Before labour can be divided some accumulation of stock is necessary. A poor man with no stock can never begin a manufacture. Before a man can commence farmer he must at least have laid in a years provision, because he does not receive the fruits of his labour till the end of the season. Agreably to this, in a nation of hunters or shepherds no person can quit the common trade in which he is employed, and which affords him daily subsistence, till he have some stock to maintain him and begin the new trade. Every one knows how difficult it is, even in a refined society, to raise one’s self to moderate circumstances. It is still more difficult to raise one’s self by these trades which require no art nor ingenuity. A porter or day labourer must continue poor for ever. In the beginings of society this is still more difficult. Bare subsistence is almost all that a savage can procure, and having no stock to begin upon, nothing to maintain him but what is produced by the exertion of his own strength, | it is no wonder that he continues long in an indigent state. The meanest labourer in a polished society has in many respects an advantage over a savage. He has more assistance in his labour; he has only one particular thing to do, which by assiduity he attains a facility in performing; he has also machines and instruments which greatly assist him. An Indian has not so much as a pick–ax, a spade, or a shovel, nor any thing else but his own labour. This is one great cause of the slow progress of opulence in every country; till some stock be produced there can be no division of labour, and before a division of labour take place there can be very little accumulation of stock.

The other cause that was assigned was the nature of civil government. In the infancey of society, as has been often observed, government must be weak and feeble, and it is long before it’s authority can protect the industry of individuals from the rapacity of their neighbours. When people find themselves every moment in danger of being robbed of all they possess, they have no motive to be industrious. There could be little accumulation of stock, because the indolent, which would be the greatest number, would live upon the industrious, and spend whatever | they produced. When the power of government becomes so great as to defend the produce of industry, another obstacle arises from a different quarter. Among neighbouring nations in a barbarous state there are perpetual wars, one continualy invading and plundering the other, and tho’ private property be secured from the violence of neighbours, it is in danger from hostile invasions. In this manner it is next to impossible that any accumulation of stock can be made. It is observable that among savage nations there are always more violent convulsions than among those farther advanced in refinement. Among the Tartars and Arabs, great bands of barbarians are always roaming from one place to another in quest of plunder, and they pillage every country as they go along. Thus large tracts of country are often laid waste and all the effects carried away: Germany too was in the same condition about the fall of the Roman Empire. Nothing can be more an obstacle to the progress of opulence.

We shall next consider the effect of oppressive measures, first with regard to agriculture, and then with regard to commerce.

| Agriculture is of all other arts the most beneficent to society, and whatever tends to retard its improvement is extremely prejudicial to the public interest. The produce of agriculture is much greater than that of any other manufacture. The rents of the whole lands in England amount to about 24 millions, and as the rent is generaly about a third of the produce, the whole annual produce of the lands must be about 72 millions. This is much more than the produce of either the linen or woolen manufactures; for as the annual consumption is computed to be about 100 millions, if you deduce from this the 72 millions, the produce of agriculture, there will remain only 28 millions for all the other manufactures of the nation. Whatever measures, therefore, discourage the [the] improvement of this art are extremely prejudicial to the progress of opulence.

One great hindrance to the progress of agriculture is the throwing great tracts of land into the hands of single persons. If any man’s estate be more than he is able to cultivate, a part of it is in a manner lost. When a nation of savages takes possession of a country, the great and powerfull divide the | [the] whole lands among them, and leave none for the lower ranks of people. In this manner the Celtae, and afterwards the Saxons, took possession of our own island.

When land is divided in great portions among the powerfull, it is cultivated by slaves, which is a very unprofitable method of cultivation. The labour of a slave proceeds from no other motive but the dread of punishment, and if he could escape this he would work none at all. Should he exert himself in the most extraordinary manner, he cannot have the least expectations of any reward, and as all the produce of his labour goes to his master, he has no encouragement to industry. A young slave may perhaps exert himself a little at first, in order to attain his masters favour, but he soon finds that it is all in vain, and that, be his behaviour what it will, he will always meet with the same severe treatment. When lands, therefore, are cultivated by slaves, they cannot be greatly improven, as they have no motive to industry.

A cultivation of the same kind is that by villains. The landlord gave a man a piece of ground | to cultivate, allowing him to maintain himself by it, and obliging him to restore whatever was over his own maintenance. This was equally unfavourable to the progress of agriculture, because the villains, who were a kind of slaves, had no motive to industry but their own maintenance. This objection lyes equaly against all cultivation by slaves. Some of the West India islands have indeed been cultivated by slaves, and have been greatly improven, but they might have been cultivated by freemen at less expence; and had not the profits of sugar been very great, the planters could not have supported the expence of slaves, but their profits have been so enormous that all the extraordinary expence of slave cultivation has vanished before it. In the northern colonies they employ few slaves, and tho’ they are in a very flourishing condition in these colonies, the lands are generaly cultivated by the proprietors, which is the most favourable method to the progress of agriculture. A tenant of the best kind has always a rent to pay, and therefore has much less to lay out on improvements. When a country sends out a colony, it may hinder a large | tract of land to be occupied by a single person. But when savages take possession of a country, they are subject to no laws, the strongest man takes possession of most ground, and therefore among them agriculture cannot be quickly promoted.

After villains went out, as was explained before,52 tenants by steel bow succeeded. The landlord gave a farm with a stock to a villain, which were restored with half of the produce at the end of the year to the landlord. But as the tenant had no stock nor, tho’ he had, any encouragement to lay it out on improvements, this method always was unfavourable to agriculture. For the same reason that tythes, by depriving the farmer of a tenth of his produce, hinder improvement, this, tho’ in a higher degree, was a hindrance, because the tenant was deprived of one half of the produce. A great part of France is still cultivated by tenants of steel bow, and it is said that it still remains in some parts of the Highlands of Scotland.

The next species of cultivation was that by tenants, such as we have at present. | Some of the tenants by steel bow, by extreme pinching and cunning, got a small stock laid up and offered their masters a fixed rent for the ground. Thus in progress of time the present method of cultivation was introduced, tho’ it was long liable to inconveniences. If the landlord sold his land the new proprietor was not bound to the terms of agreement, and the tenant was often turned out of his farm. The landlord too invented a method to get rid of the tenant when he pleased by selling the estate to another, on whom he had a back bond to make him return the estate whenever the tenants were turned out. As the tenants were continualy in danger of being turned out, they had no motive to improve the ground. This takes place to this day in every country of Europe except Brittain. In Scotland contracts of this kind were rendered real rights in the reign of James III^d53 and in England in that of Henry VII^th.54

Besides these there were several other impediments | to the progress of agriculture. At first all rents were paid in kind, by which, in a dear year, the tenants were in danger of being ruined. A diminution of produce seldom hurts the tenant who pays his rent in money, because the price of corn rises in proportion to its scarceity. Society however is considerably advanced before money comes to be the whole instrument of commerce.

Another embarrassment was that the feudal lords sometimes allowed the king to levy subsidies from their tenants, which greatly discouraged their industry. Besides all, under the tyranny of the feudal aristocracey the landlords had nothing to stop them from squeezing their tenants and raising the rents of their lands as high as they pleased. England is better secured in this respect than any country, because every one who hold but 40^s/a year for life has a vote for a Member of Parliament, by which, if he rent a farm, he is secure from oppression.

Several circumstances concurred to continue the engrossment of lands. The right of primogeniture | was pretty early established and hinderd estates from being divided. The institution of entails is to this day attended with the same bad consequences. The embarrassment too of the feudal law in transferring property detarded the progress of agriculture. Any quantity of any other commodity may be bought or sold in an instant, but in purchasing 4 or 5 acres of land a great deal <of> time must be spent in examining the progress of writts and getting your right legally constituted. This tends greatly to the engrossment of lands and consequently stops their improvement.

If all the forms in buying lands were abolished, every person almost who had got a little money would be ready to lay it out on land, and the land by passing thro’ the different hands would be much better improved. There is no natural reason why a 1000 acres should not be as easily purchased as a 1000 yards of cloth. The keeping land out of the market always hinders its improvement. A merchant who buys a little piece of land has it in his eye to improve it and make the most of it he can. Great and ancient families have seldom either stock or inclination to improve their estates, except a small piece of pleasure ground about their house.

| There are many errors in the police of almost every country, which have contributed greatly to stop the progress of agriculture. Our fathers, finding themselves once in every two or three years subject to the most grievous dearths, to escape that calamity prohibited the exportation of corn. This is still the police of the greater part of Europe, and it is the cause of all that dearth it is intended to prevent. In a plentifull year the corn of Spain, tho’ the most fertile country in the world, is not worth the cutting down. They suffer it to lye rotting on the ground, because they would get nothing for it. The cause of this is not the indolence of the people, as is commonly imagined. The fact is, the farmer, finding he cannot dispose of his corn this year, will not risk a crop next year, but turns his grounds to grass. Next year a famine ensues, and he sows more than can be disposed of for the following season. It is to be observed that this was one great cause of the depopulation of ancient Italy. Exportation of corn was prohibited by severe penalties, and the importation of it encouraged | by high premiums. So that the Italian farmers had no encouragement to industry, not being sure of a market. In the latter times of the republic the emperors tried several methods of promoting the cultivation of the country, but being ignorant that the real cause of their want was the immense quantity of corn daily imported from Egypt and other parts of Africa, all their endeavours were ineffectuall. Caligula and Claudius gave their soldiers land for nothing, upon condition that they would cultivate it. But as the soldiers had no other motive, very inconsiderable improvements were made. Virgil too published his Georgicks to bring the cultivation of land into fashion, but all was in vain. Forreign corn was always sold cheaper than their own could be raised. Agreabley to this we find Cato, in the 3^d Book of Cicero’s Offices,55 preferring pasturage of any kind to farming. The kings of Spain have also done all in their power to promote the improvement of land. Phillip IV^th went to the plow himself in order to sett the fashion. He did every thing for the farmers except bringing them a good market. He conferred the tittles of nobility upon several farmers. He very absurdly endeavoured to oppress manufacturers | with heavy taxes in order to force them to the country. He thought that in proportion as the inhabitants of towns became more numerous, these in the country decreased. This notion was highly ridiculous, for the populousness of a town is the very cause of the populousness of the country, because it gives greater encouragement to industry. Every man in a town must be fed by another in the country, and it is always a sign that the country is improving when men go to town. There are no parts of the country so well inhabited nor so well cultivated as those which lye in the neighbourhood of populous cities. All these causes have hindered and still hinder the improvement of agriculture, the most important branch of industry.

We may observe that the greater number of manufacturers there are in any country, agriculture is the more improved, and the causes which prevent the progress of these re–act, as it were, upon agriculture. It is easy to shew that the free export and import of corn is favourable to agriculture. In England the country has been better stored with corn, and the price of it has gradualy sunk, since the exportation of it was permitted. The bounty on exportation does harm in other respects, but it increases the quantity of corn. | In Holland corn is cheaper and plentyer than any where else, and a dearth is there unknown. That country is, as it were, the magazine of corn for a great part of Europe. This is entirely owing to the free export and import they enjoy. If no improper regulations took place, any country of Europe might do more than maintain itself with all sorts of grain.

The slow progress of arts and commerce is owing to causes of a like kind. In all places where slavery took place the manufactures were carried on by slaves. It is impossible that they can be so well carried on by slaves as by freemen, because they can have no motive to labour but the dread of punishment, and can never invent any machine for facilitating their business. Freemen who have a stock of their own can get any thing accomplished which they think may be expedient for carrying on labour. If a carpenter think that a plane will serve his purpose better than a knife, he may go to a smith and get it made; but if a slave make any such proposal he is called a lazy rascal, and no experiments are made to give him ease. At present the Turks and Hungarians work mines of the same kind, situated upon opposite sides of the same range of mountains, but the Hungarians make a great deal more of them than the Turks, because | they employ freemen while the Turks employ slaves. When the Hungarians meet with any obstacle every invention is on work to find out some easy way of surmounting it, but the Turks think of no other expedient but to sett a greater number of slaves to work.56 In the ancient world, as the arts were all carried on by slaves, no machinery could be invented, because they had no stock. After the fall of the Roman Empire, too, this was the case all over Europe.

In a rude society nothing is honourable but war. In the Odyssey, Ulysses is sometimes asked, by way of affront, whether he be a pirate or a merchant.57 At that time a merchant was reckoned odious and despicable. But a pirate or robber, as he was a man of military bravery, was treated with honour. We may observe that these principles of the human mind which are most beneficial to society are by no means marked by nature as the most honourable. Hunger, thirst, and the passion for sex are the great supports of the human species. Yet almost every expression of these excites contempt.58 In the same manner, that principle in the mind which prompts to truck, barter, and exchange, tho’ it is the great foundation of arts, commerce, and the division of labour, | yet it is not marked with any thing amiable. To perform any thing, or to give any thing, without a reward is always generous and noble, but to barter one thing for another is mean. The plain reason for this is that these principles are so strongly implanted by nature that they have no occasion for that additional force which the weaker principles need.

In rude ages this contempt rises to the highest pitch, and even in a refined society it is not utterly extinguished. In this country a small retailer is even in some degree odious at this day. When the trade of a merchant or mechanic was thus depreciated in the beginings of society, no wonder that it was confined to the lowest ranks of people. Even when emancipated slaves began to practise these trades, it was impossible that much stock could accumulate in their hands, for the government oppressed them severely, and they were obliged to pay licences for their liberty of trading. In Dooms–day–Book we have an account of all the different traders in every county, how many of them were under the king, and how many under such a bishop, and what acknowledgements they were obliged to pay for their liberty of trading.

| This mean and despicable idea which they had of merchants greatly obstructed the progress of commerce. The merchant is, as it were, the mean between the manufacturer and the consumer. The weaver must not go to the market himself, there must be somebody to do this for him. This person must be possessed of a considerable stock, to buy up the commodity and maintain the manufacturer. But when merchants were so despicable and laid under so great taxations for liberty of trade, they could never amass that degree of stock which is necessary for making the division of labour and improving manufactures.

The only persons in these days who made any money by trade were the Jews, who, as they were considered as vagabonds, had no liberty of purchasing lands, and had no other way to dispose of themselves but by becoming mechanics or merchants. Their character could not be spoiled by merchandize because they could not be more odious than their religion made them. Even they were grievously oppressed and consequently the progress of opulence greatly retarded.

Another thing which greatly retarded commerce | was the imperfection of the law with regard to contracts, which were the last species of rights that sustained action, for originaly the law gave no redress for any but those concluded on the spot. At present all considerable commerce is carried on by commissions, and unless these sustained action little could be done. The first action on contracts extended only to the moveable goods of the contractor, neither his lands nor his person could be touched. His goods were often very inconsiderable, and probity is none of the most prevalent virtues among a rude people. It is commerce that introduces probity and punctuality.

Another obstacle to the improvement of commerce was the difficulty of conveyance from one place to another. The country was then filled with retainers, a species of idle people who depended on the lords, whose violence and disorders rendered the going from one place to another very difficult. Besides, there were then no good highways. The want of navigable rivers in many places were also an inconvenience. This is still the case in Asia and other eastern countries; all inland commerce is carried on by great caravans, consisting of several thousands, for mutual defence, with waggons, etca. | In our own country a man made his testament before he sett out from Edinburgh to Aberdeen, and it was still more dangerous to go to forreign countries. The laws of every country to aliens and strangers are far from being favourable. It is difficult, or rather impossible, for them to obtain satisfaction. After this was a little remedied, still conveyance by sea remained difficult. Piracey was an honourable occupation. Men were ignorant of navigation and exposed to dangers on this account. The price of all these risks was laid upon the goods, and by this means they were so much raised above the natural price that the improvement of commerce was greatly retarded.

Another piece of police which was thought a wise institution by our forefathers had the same effect. This was the fairs and markets all over Europe. Till the sixteenth century all commerce was carried on by fairs. The fairs of Bartholomew, of Leipsic, of Troy in Champaigne, and even of Glasgow, are much talked of in antiquity. These were the most centrical places and best fitted for carrying on business. All linen and black cattle were brought in from the country to these assignations or trysts, and, least the purchaser should be dissappointed, | they were all brought on a certain day and were not allowed to be sold on any other day. Forestallers,59 who went up and down the country buying up commodities, were severely punished, as this was a temptation not to bring them to the market. This might be necessary when it was not safe to go any where alone, but tho’ you make no fairs, buyers and sellers will find a way to each other. Easy conveyance and other conveniences of trafficking will be of more advantage than the bringing them to a fixed market and thereby confining buying and selling to a certain season. All fairs, however necessary they then were, are now real nusances. It is absurd to preserve in people a regard for their old customs when the causes of them are removed.

Another obstacle to commerce was staple towns, which had the exclusive priviledge of selling a certain commodity within that district. Calais, when it belonged to the English, was long the staple for wool. As men were obliged to carry their wool to such a distance, it’s price was very high. It was however a very great advantage to any town to have the staple, and therefore the king gave it to that town with which he was best pleased, and took it away whenever it dissobliged him. | Staple–towns had all the dissadvantages of fairs and markets with this additional one, that the staple commodity could be sold at no fair nor market except one. By this the liberty of exchange, and consequently the division of labour, was diminished.

All taxes upon exportation and importation of goods also hinder commerce. Merchants at first were in so contemptible a state that the law, as it were, abandoned them, and it was no matter what they obliged them to pay. They however must lay the tax upon their goods, their price is raised, fewer of them are bought, manufactures are discouraged, and the division of labour hindered.

All monopolies and exclusive priviledges of corporations, for whatever good ends they were at first instituted, have the same bad effect. In like manner the statute of apprenticeship, which was originaly an imposition on government, has a bad tendencey. It was imagined that the cause of so much bad cloth was that the weaver had not been properly educated, and therefore they made a statute60 that he should serve a seven years apprenticeship before he pretended to make any. But this is by no means a sufficient security against bad cloth. | You yourself cannot inspect a large piece of cloth, this must be left to the stampmaster, whose credit must be depended upon. Above all other causes the giving bounties for one commodity, and the discourageing another, diminishes the concurrence of opulence and hurts the natural state of commerce.

Before we treat of the effects of police upon the manners of a people, we propose to consider taxes or revenue, which is in reality one of the causes that the progress of opulence has been so slow.

In the beginings of society all public offices were performed by the magistrate without any reward, and he was fully satisfied with the eminence of his station. This is the case among the Tartars, Arabs, and Hottentots even to this day. Voluntary presants only are accepted, which have always a bad effect, but cannot be prevented while one is willing to give and another to receive. It was in this manner too that the governours of the Roman provinces got their revenues. When government becomes so complex as to take up the whole attention of the public magistrate he must undoubtedly have some reward, and if this be not given him by the public he will fall upon some more dangerous method of obtaining it. Few will be so generous as to exact nothing. When applications are made, every one must bring his presant and the man who pays best will be best heard.

| When government is a little farther advanced, magazines must be provided, ships built, palaces and other public buildings erected and kept up, and consequently a public revenue levied; at first indeed among the Romans there was no revenue levied for carrying on war, because the soldiers required no pay. In savage nations this is always the case; every one of the Athenians went out to war at his own expence. The same was the case with our feudal lords; the burthen of going to war was connected with the duty of the tenant or vassal. Such a practice cannot be of long duration, and accordingly we find that it ceased at Rome and was the great cause of the dissolution of that republic.

The governours of provinces made such grievous exactions from the people that they alienated their affections, so that they gave no assistance in defending the state when it stood in need of assistance.

After the appropriation of land property, a portion of lands was commonly assigned for the maintenance of government. The free states of Greece had land set apart for this purpose, and we find Aristotle61 giving his opinion that private property should surround the royal lands, because those who were near a city were always for war, because they were sure of defence, and as the enemy would first come upon these lands | which were near the boundaries. In all <?barbarous> countries we find lands appropriated to the purposes of sovereignty, and therefore little occasion for taxes and customs. We shall shew that this is a bad police, and one cause of the slow progress of opulence.

Let us conceive what an immense tract of land would be required to support the British government. The annual expence of it in times of peace amounts to 3 millions, the whole land rents amounts to 24 millions; therefore the government must have an 8^th part in it’s own hands. If we conceive further how such a tract of land would be cultivated, the quantity requisite would be prodigious. Allow it but to be half as well cultivated as the rest, which for many reasons would not be the case, the government would have in its hands a 4^th of the whole country. By this therefore the stock of the country would be greatly diminished and fewer people maintained. After government becomes expensive, it is the worst possible method to support it by a land rent. We may observe that the government in a civilized country is much more expensive than in a barbarous one; and when we say that one government is more expensive than another, it is the same as if we said that the one country is farther advanced in improvement than another. To say that the government is expensive and the people not oppressed | is to say that the people are rich. There are many expences necessary in a civilized country for which there is no occasion in one that is barbarous. Armies, fleets, fortified places and public buildings, judges and officers of the revenue must be supported, and if they be neglected disorder will ensue. A land rent to serve all these purposes would be the most improper thing in the world.

All taxes may be considered under two divisions, to witt, taxes upon possessions, and taxes upon consumptions. These are the two ways of making the subjects contribute to the support of government. The land–tax is of the former kind, and all taxes upon commodities of the latter.

Possessions are of three kinds, to witt, land, stock, and money. It is easy to levy a tax upon land because it is evident what quantity every one possesses, but it is very difficult to lay a tax upon stock or money without very arbitrary proceedings. It is a hardship upon a man in trade to oblige him to shew his books, which is the only way in which we can know how much he is worth. It is a breach of liberty, and may be productive of very bad consequences by ruining his credit. The circumstances of people in trade are at sometimes far worse than at others. But if on account of this difficulty you were to tax land, | and neither tax money nor stock, ye would do a piece of very great injustice. But tho’ it be a difficult thing to tax money or stock without being oppressive, yet this method is used in several countries. In France, for example, in order to ascertain the circumstances of the subject, every bill is assigned and all business transacted in presence of a public notary and entered into his books, so that land, stock, and money are there all taxed in the same manner. Of these three only land is taxed in England, because to tax the other two has some appearance of despotism, and would greatly enrage a free people. Excepting the land tax, our taxes are generaly upon commodities, and in these there is a much greater inequality than in the taxes on land possession. The consumptions of people are not always according to what they possess, but in proportion to their liberality. When taxes are laid upon commodities, their prices must rise, the concurrence of tradesmen must be prevented, an artificial dearth occasioned, less industry excited, and a smaller quantity of goods produced. Taxes upon land possessions have this great advantage, that they are levied without any great expence. The whole land tax of England does not cost the government above 8 or 10,000 pounds. | Collectors are chosen by the gentlemen of the county, and are obliged to produce proper security for their carrying safely to the exchequer the money which they collect. The taxes of customs and excise, which produce such immense sums, are almost eaten up by the legions of officers that are employed in collecting them. These officers must have supervisors over them to examine their proceedings. The supervisors have over them collectors, who are under the commissioners, who have to account to the exchequer. To support these officers there must be levied a great deal more than the government requires, which is a manifest dissadvantage.

Another advantage of a land tax is that it does not tend to raise the price of commodities, as it is not paid in proportion to the corn and cattle, but in proportion to the rent. If the tenant pay the tax he pays just so much less rent. Excise raises the price of commodities and makes fewer people able to carry on business. If a man purchase a 1000£ worth of tobacco he has an 100£ of tax to pay, and therefore cannot deal to such an extent as he would otherwise do. Thus as it requires greater stock to carry on trade, the dealers must be fewer and the rich have, as it were, a monopoly against the poor. | It was observed before that in England, from a kind of delicacey with regard to examining into the circumstances of particular persons, which is apparently an infringement upon liberty, no tax is laid upon stock or money, but all upon consumptions. Whatever advantages this method may have, there is evidently in it an inequality. The landlord who pays his annual land tax pays also a great part of the taxes on consumptions. On this account the landed interest complains first of a war, thinking the burthen of it falls upon them. While on the other hand the moneyed men are gainers, and therefore oppose them. This perhaps occasions the continuance of what is called the Tory interest. Taxes upon possessions are naturaly equal, but those upon consumptions naturaly unequal, as they are sometimes paid by the merchant, sometimes by the consumer, and sometimes by the importer, who must be repaid it by the consumer. In Holland all goods are deposited in a public warehouse, one key of which is kept by the commissioner of the customs and another by the owner of the goods. If the goods are exported no tax is advanced, but if they go into the country the consumer pays down the price to the merchant and the custom to the commissioner. This method is much the same with the famous excise scheme | of Sir Robert Walpole, which was at last his ruin. It was to this effect, that a general excise should be established, and all goods imported deposited in a public warehouse, and the tax should only be paid upon the inland sale of them. Tho’ this scheme be liable to inconveniences, such as subjecting the owner to anxiety from not having his goods entirely in his own power, yet it is plainly this which gives the Dutch so great an advantage over all the other nations of Europe. The Dutch are in a manner the carriers of the other Europeans; they bring corn from the Baltic and these places where it is cheap, and wines from these places where there has been a good vintage, and keep them by them till they hear of a dearth, and then export them to the places where it is. But in England the moment you bring the commodities to the country, you must pay the tax and sell them where you please. Thus the merchant may lye out of his interest for a long time, and therefore must sell his commodities dearer. The Dutch, having no tax to pay but upon inland sale, are enabled to sell cheaper than the English or any other nation.

Taxes on consumptions have however some advantage over those on possessions. | They are not felt, being paid imperceptibly, but a person possessed of a 1000£ of land–rent feels very sensibly an 100£ going from him. The taxes on consumptions are not so much murmured against, because they are laid upon the merchant, who lays them on the price of goods, and thus they are insensibly paid by the people. When we buy a pound of tea we do not reflect that the most part of the price is a duty paid to the government, and therefore pay it contentedly as tho’ it were only the natural price of the commodity. In the same manner when an additional tax is laid upon beer the price of it must be raised, but the mob do not directly vent their malice against the government, who are the proper objects of it, but upon the brewers, as they confound the tax price with the natural one. Taxes upon consumptions, therefore, which are paid by the merchant, seem most to favour liberty, and will always be favoured by this government. In Holland they buy a hogshead of wine and first pay the price to the merchant, and then so much to the officers of excise, as it were to get leave to drink it. We in reality do the very same thing, but as we do not feel it immediately we | imagine it all one price, and never reflect that we might drink port wine below sixpence a bottle were it not for the duty.

Taxes on consumptions have still another advantage over those on possessions. If a person be possessed of a land rent of an hundered pounds per annum, and this estate be valued at a high rate, he perhaps pays 20£ to the government. The collector must be paid at a certain time of the year, and few people have so much self command as to lay up money to be ready. He has therefore 20£ to borrow to answer his present demands. When next payment comes, he has not only the tax to pay but also the interest of the money borrowed the former year. He begins to encumber his estate, and thus upon examination it will be found that many landholders have been ruined. The best method of preventing this is to make the tenant pay the land tax in part payment of his rent. The taxes on consumptions are not liable to this inconvenience. When a person finds that he is spending too much on the elegancies of life, he can immediately diminish his consumption. Taxes upon consumptions are therefore more eligible than taxes upon possessions, as they have not so great a tendencey to ruin the circumstances of individuals.

It is to be observed that taxes both on consumptions | and possessions are more or less advantageous to industry according to the manner in which they are levied. The land tax in England is permanent and uniform and does not rise with the rent, which is regulated by the improvement of the land. Notwithstanding modern improvements it is the same that it was formerly. In France the tax rises proportionably to the rent, which is a great discouragement to the land–holder. It has much the same effect with the tythes in England. When we know that the produce is to be divided with those who lay out nothing, it hinders us from laying out what we would otherwise do upon the improvement of our lands. We are better financeers than the French, as we have also the advantage of them in the following particulars.

In the method of levying our customs we have an advantage over the French. Our customs are all paid at once by the merchants, and goods, after their entry in the custom house books, may be carried by a permit thro’ any part of the country without molestation and expence, except some triffles upon tolls, etca. In France a duty is paid at the end of almost every town they go into, equal, if not greater, to what is paid by us at first. Inland industry is embarrassed by theirs, and only forreign trade by ours.

We have another advantage in levying our taxes by commission while theirs are levied by farm, by which means | not one half of what they raise goes into the hands of the government. In England the whole expence of levying above 7 millions does not come to 300,000£. In France 24 millions are levyed every year, and not above 12 goes to the expence of the government, the rest goes for defraying the expence of levying it and for the profit of the farmer. In England no excise officers are requisite but at the seaports, except a few up and down the country. The profits of the farmers in France would pay the expence of them all. In the collecting of our excise there is a regular subordination of officers who have their fixed salaries and nothing more. But in France the highest bidder has the place, and as the man who undertakes it must advance the sum at a certain time, and runs a risk of not getting it up, he deserves a very high profit. Besides, in an auction of this kind there are few bidders, as none are capable of undertaking the office but those who are brought up to business, and are possessed both of a great stock and credit, and can produce good security. When there are few bidders they can easily enter into an association among themselves and have the whole at a very easy rate. Upon the whole we may observe that the English are the best financeers in Europe, and their taxes are levied with more propriety than those of any country whatever.

| Upon this subject it is in general to be observed that taxes upon exportation are much more hurtfull than those upon importation. When the inhabitants of a country are in a manner prohibited by high taxes from exporting the produce of their industry, they are confined to home consumption and their motives to industry are diminished. Taxes upon importation, on the contrary, encourage the manufacturing of these particular commodities. The tax upon Hamburgh linen, for example, hinders the importation of great quantities of it and causes more linen to be manufactured at home. In general, however, all taxes upon importation are hurtfull in this respect, that they divert the industry of the country to an unatural channel. The more stock there is employed in one way, there is the less to be employed in another; but the effects of taxes upon exportation are still more pernicious.

This is one great cause of the poverty of Spain. They have imposed a high tax on the exportation of every commodity, and think that by this means the taxes are paid by forreigners, whereas, if they were to impose a tax on importation, it would be paid by their own subjects, not reflecting that by bringing a burthen on the exportation of commodities they so far confine the consumption of them and diminish industry.

To conclude all that is to be said of taxes, we may observe that the common prejudice that wealth consists in money has not been in this respect so hurtfull as might have been imagined, | and has even given occasions to regulations not very inconvenient. These nations to whom we give more goods than we receive, generaly send us manufactured goods; these on the contrary from whom we receive more goods than we give, or with respect to whom the balance is in our favour, generaly send us unmanufactured goods. To Russia for example we send fine linen and other manufactured goods, and for a small quantity of these receive in return great quantities of unmanufactured goods. This kind of trade is very advantageous, because goods in an unmanufactured and rude state afford employment and maintenance to a great number of persons. It is merely from the absurd notion that wealth consists in money, that the British encourage most these branches of forreign trade where the balance is paid in money.

There are still some other species of taxes, but as their nature is much the same it is unecessary to mention them. Having thus given a general view of taxes, it will not be improper here, on account of their connection, to consider the nature of stocks and the causes of their rising and falling.

Soon after the Revolution, on account of the necessities of government, it was necessary to borrow money from subjects, generaly at a higher rate than common interest, to be repaid in a few years. The funds allotted for payment of this interest were taxes on certain commodities. These taxes were at first laid on for a certain number of years, according to the term for which the money was borrowed. But when by various arts of government these loans came to be perpetual, | the taxes came of course to be perpetual, and thus the funds were mortgaged. Tho’ they were made perpetual when money could no longer be borrowed upon them, yet they were still redeemable upon paying up the money borrowed on them. When these taxes were laid on, nothing would have shocked people more than to have thought that they were to be perpetual. But their progress was so insensible that it was never murmured at. What shocks at first will soon become easy from custom, which sanctifies every thing. Thus <?these> taxes were first laid on, and thus they came to the situation in which they are at present.

When a sum of money is lent to a private person, the creditor can come upon the debtor when he pleases for both capital and interest, but it is not on this footing that the government borrows money; they give you a right to a perpetual annuity of 3 or 4 per cent, but not to redemand your capital. It seems very odd at first sight that the creditor should consent to such an inconvenience as that his money should never be paid up, but this is realy his advantage. If you lend to the government a 1000£ in time of war, as they have immediate use for it they will perhaps be obliged to give you 5 per cent of interest, and when peace comes they continue your annuity. You have it in your power to dispose of your annuity, and as your money is perfectly secure, and interest is paid by no private person with so much punctuality as by the government, | you may very often sell the annuity of your 1000£ at 1100 or more. The government, finding that these annuities sold above par, and for the same reason that people were much disposed to subscribe to the government funds, they resolved, as the funds were still redeemable, to take the advantage by paying up the sums borrowed at 5 per cent and borrowing money at a lower rate. This made the contractors with the government to be on their guard, and as they saw their design, they would not lend them any more money without at least some part of the interest should be irredeemable, perhaps 2 per cent of the 4 they were to receive. In every fund therefore there was a part irredeemable, which made them continue to sell above par.

In the reigns of King William, Q. Ann, and in the begining of that of K. George the 1st, the funds rose and fell according to the credit of the government, as there was still some risk of a revolution. Of late, tho’ there be no danger of a revolution, even in the times of peace stocks are sometimes at 10, 20, and even 50 per cent below par, and sometimes as much above it. No body can suspect any risk of losing that money by change of government. How then comes it that stocks are thus every day fluctuating without any visible cause? How comes it that good or bad news have such an influence on the rising and falling of stocks? The real cause is as follows.

Every misfortune in war makes peace to be at a greater | distance, and every fortunate occurrance seems to favour it’s approach. When war continues, the necessities of government must be supplied, more money levied, and new subscriptions opened for these purposes. As in war the interest must necessarily rise, every one is eager to be in the new subscription, and they who have annuities find that it will be for their advantage to sell out of the old stocks in prospect of a higher interest. The number of sellers therefore increases with the prospect of a war, and consequently stocks fall. On the other hand, whenever there is a prospect of peace, as there are no expectations that new subscriptions will be opened, they who have annuities are not fond of selling them, and therefore, the number of sellers decreasing, stocks must rise. In time of war, every one who has any stock runs to have it in the hands of the government, as it cannot be so advantageously employed any where else, as they got interest perhaps at 7 or 8 per cent, of which two or three perhaps is redeemable,62 and frequently a lottery ticket into the bargain. A person who has an annuity only at 3 per cent will do all he can to sell it, that he may employ his stock to greater advantage, and for this reason will often sell it below par, and consequently stocks must necessarily fall.

But in time of war, for the following reasons, even the new subscriptions come to sell below par.

As there are a great many stockholders who are merchants, and who keep their stocks in the hands of the government | that they may be ready to sell out on any sudden demand and take the advantage of a good bargain when it casts up, and as these chances occurr most frequently in time of war, they have often occasion to sell out, and thus more stock runs to the market and the new subscriptions sink[s] below par.

But further, in time of war, as was observed before, stock cannot be so advantageously employed, and every body is tempted to subscribe. Even those whose circumstances are but very inconsiderable, subscribe for great sums in hopes that stocks will rise and that they may sell out before the time of delivery to great advantage; but when things do not answer their expectations, and they are forced to sell out one way or another to support their credit, they are often obliged to sell below par. In this manner the new subscriptions may fall. Stockjobbers that are well acquainted with their business observe particularly when a number of indigent persons are in the subscriptions, and as they are soon obliged to sell out, and consequently stocks fall, it is their proper time to purchase them.

The practice of stockjobbing, or the buying stocks by time, has too on all occasions a very considerable influence on the rise and fall of stocks. The method in which this practice is carried on is as follows. A man who has not perhaps 1000£ in the world subscribes for 100,000£, which is to be delivered at several fixed times and in certain portions. | He therefore hopes to get these several portions sold out to great advantage by the rising of the stocks before they fall due. But as any thing he is worth would go if the stocks should fall, he uses all means to make them rise. He spreads reports at Change Alley that victories are gained, that peace is to be concluded, etca. On the other hand they who want to purchase a stock, and want that it should fall, propogate such reports as will sink the stocks as low as possible, such as that war will continue, that new subscriptions are thought on, etca. It is owing to this that in time of war our newspapers are so filled with invasions and schemes that never were thought of. In the language of Change Alley the buyer is called the bull and the seller the bear, and as the bulls or bears predominate stocks rise or fall.

This practice of buying stocks by time is prohibited by the government, and accordingly, tho’ they should not deliver up the stocks they have engaged for, the law gives no redress.63 There is no natural reason why 1000£ in the stocks should not be delivered or the delivery of it enforced, as well as 1000£ worth of goods. But after the South Sea scheme this was thought upon as an expedient to prevent such practices, tho’ it proved ineffectual. In the same manner all laws against gaming never hinder it, and tho’ there is no redress for a sum above 5£,64 yet all the great sums that are lost are punctualy paid. | Persons who game must keep their credit, else no body will deal with them. It is quite the same in stockjobbing. They who do not keep their credit will soon be turned out, and in the language of Change Alley be called lame duck. It is unecessary here to give any account of particular funds, as they are all of the same nature and the security equal. If the interest of any sum of money be not paid by the funds allotted for that purpose, it is paid out of the sinking fund, which is the surplus of all the rest. There is perhaps some little difference in the facility of payment, but this is by no means considerable and merits not our attention.

In65 remains now that we consider the last division of police, and shew the influence of commerce on the manners of a people.

Whenever commerce is introduced into any country, probity and punctuality always accompany it. These virtues in a rude and barbarous country are almost unknown. Of all the nations in Europe, the Dutch, the most commercial, are the most faithfull to their word. The English are more so than the Scotch, but much inferiour to the Dutch, and in the remote parts of this country they <are> far less so than in the commercial parts of it. This is not at all to be imputed to national character, as some pretend. | There is no natural reason why an Englishman or a Scotchman should not be as punctual in performing agreements as a Dutchman. It is far more reduceable to self interest, that general principle which regulates the actions of every man, and which leads men to act in a certain manner from views of advantage, and is as deeply implanted in an Englishman as a Dutchman. A dealer is afraid of losing his character, and is scrupulous in observing every engagement. When a person makes perhaps 20 contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbours, as the very appearance of a cheat would make him lose. Where people seldom deal with one another, we find that they are somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than they can lose by the injury which it does their character. They whom we call politicians are not the most remarkable men in the world for probity and punctuality. Ambassadors from different nations are still less so: they are praised for any little advantage they can take, and pique themselves a good deal on this degree of refinement. The reason of this is that nations treat with one another not above twice or thrice in a century, and they may gain more by one piece of fraud than <lose> by having a bad character. France has had this character with us ever since the reign of Lewis XIV^th, yet it has never in the least hurt either its interest or splendour.

But if states were obliged to treat once or twice | a day, as merchants do, it would be necessary to be more precise in order to preserve their character. Wherever dealings are frequent, a man does not expect to gain so much by any one contract as by probity and punctuality in the whole, and a prudent dealer, who is sensible of his real interest, would rather chuse to lose what he has a right to than give any ground for suspicion. Every thing of this kind is <as> odious as it is rare. When the greater part of people are merchants they always bring probity and punctuality into fashion, and these therefore are the principal virtues of a commercial nation.

There are some inconveniences, however, arising from a commercial spirit. The first we shall mention is that it confines the views of men. Where the division of labour is brought to perfection, every man has only a simple operation to perform. To this his whole attention is confined, and few ideas pass in his mind but what have an immediate connection with it. When the mind is employed about a variety of objects it is some how expanded and enlarged, and on this account a country artist is generally acknowledged to have a range of thoughts much above a city one. The former is perhaps a joiner, a house carpenter, and a cabinet maker all in one, and his attention must of course be employed about a number of objects of very different kinds. | The latter is perhaps only a cabinet maker. That particular kind of work employs all his thoughts, and as he had not an opportunity of comparing a number of objects, his views of things beyond his own trade are by no means so extensive as those of the former. This must be much more the case when a person’s whole attention is bestowed on the 17^th part of a pin66 or the 80^th part of a button, so far divided are these manufactures. It is remarkable that in every commercial nation the low people are exceedingly stupid. The Dutch vulgar are eminently so, and the English are more so than the Scotch. The rule is general, in towns they are not so intelligent as in the country, nor in a rich country as in a poor one.

Another inconvenience attending commerce is that education is greatly neglected. In rich and commercial nations the division of labour, having reduced all trades to very simple operations, affords an opportunity of employing children very young. In this country67 indeed, where the division of labour is not far advanced, even the meanest porter can read and write, because the price of education is cheap, and a parent can employ his child no other way at 6 or 7 years of age. This however is not the case in the commercial parts of England. A boy of 6 or 7 years of age at Brimingham can gain his 3 pence | or sixpence a day, and parents find it to be their interest to set them soon to work. Thus their education is neglected. The education which low people’s children receive is not indeed at any rate considerable; however, it does them an immense deal of service, and the want of it is certainly one of their greatest misfortunes. By it they learn to read, and this gives them the benefit of religion, which is a great advantage, not only considered in a pious sense, but as it affords them subject for thought and speculation. From this we may observe the benefit of country schools, and, however much neglected, must acknowledge them to be an excellent institution. But besides this want of education, there is another great loss which attends the putting boys too soon to work. The boy begins to find that his father is obliged to him, and therefore throws off his authority. When he is grown up he has no ideas with which he can amuse himself. When he is away from his work he must therefore betake himself to drunkeness and riot. Accordingly we find that in the commercial parts of England, the tradesmen are for the most part in this despicable condition: their work thro’ half the week is sufficient to maintain them, and thro’ want of education they have no amusement for the other but riot and debauchery. So it may very justly be said that the people who cloath the whole world are in rags themselves.

| Another bad effect of commerce is that it sinks the courage of mankind, and tends to extinguish martial spirit. In all commercial countries the division of labour is infinite, and every ones thoughts are employed about one particular thing. In great trading towns, for example, the linen merchants are of several kinds, for the dealing in Hamburgh and Irish linens are quite distinct professions. Some of the lawyers attend at King’s Bench, some at the Court of Common Pleas, and others at the Chauncery. Each of them is in a great measure unacquainted with the business of his neighbour. In the same manner war comes to be a trade also. A man has then time to study only one branch of business, and it would be a great dissadvantage to oblige every one to learn the military art and keep himself in the practice of it. The defence of the country is therefore committed to a certain sett of men who have nothing else ado; and among the bulk of the people military courage diminishes. By having their minds constantly employed on the arts of luxury, they grow effeminate and dastardly.

This is confirmed by universal experience. In the year 1745 four or 5 thousand naked unarmed Highlanders took possession of the improved parts of this country without any opposition from the unwarlike inhabitants. | They penetrated into England and alarmed the whole nation, and had they not been opposed by a standing army they would have seized the throne with little difficulty. 200 years ago such an attempt would have rouzed the spirit of the nation. Our ancestors were brave and warlike, their minds were not enervated by cultivating arts and commerce, and they were already68 with spirit and vigor to resist the most formidable foe. It is for the same reason too that an army of 4 or 500 Europeans have often penetrated into the Mogul’s country, and that the most numerous armies of the Chinese have always been overthrown by the Tartars. In these countries the division of labour and luxury have arrived at a very high pitch, they have no standing army, and the people are all intent on the arts of peace. Holland, were its barriers removed, would be an easy prey. In the begining of this century the standing army of the Dutch was beat in the field, and the rest of the inhabitants, instead of rising in arms to defend themselves, formed a design of deserting their country and settling in the East Indies.69 A commercial country may be formidable abroad, and may defend itself by fleets and standing armies, but when they are overcome and the enemy penetrates into the country, the conquest is easy. The same observation may be made with respect to Rome and Carthage. | The Carthaginians were often victorious abroad, but when the war was carried into their own country they had no share with the Romans. These are the dissadvantages of a commercial spirit. The minds of men are contracted and rendered incapable of elevation, education is despised or at least neglected, and heroic spirit is almost utterly extinguished. To remedy these defects would be an object worthy of serious attention.

Thus we have finished the three first great objects of law, to witt, Justice, Police, and Revenue. We proceed now to treat of Arms, the fourth part of the general division of jurisprudence.

Remainder of 333 left blank in MS.

| of Arms.

In the begining of society the defence of the state required no police, nor particular provision for it. The whole body of the people rose up to oppose any attempt that was made against them, and he who was chief in time of peace naturaly preserved his influence in time of war. But after the division of labour took place, it became necessary that some should stay at home to be employed in agriculture and other arts, while the rest went out to war. After the appropriation of lands and the distinction of ranks were in some measure introduced, the cultivation of the ground would naturaly fall to the meanest rank. The less laborious but more honourable employment of military service would be claimed by the highest order. Accordingly we find that this was the practice of all nations in their primitive state. The Roman equites or knights were originaly horsemen in the army, and no slaves or those who did not pay taxes ever went out to war. In like manner, among our ancestors only they who held by what was called knight’s service were employed in the defence of the state, and the ancient villains were never considered as a part of the national force. When the state was thus defended by men of honour who would do their duty from this principle, | there was no occasion for discipline. But when arts and manufactures encreased and were thought worthy of attention, and men found that they could rise in dignity by applying to them, and it became inconvenient for the rich to go out to war, from a principle of avarice, these arts which were at first despised by the active and ambitious soon came to claim their whole attention. The merchant who can make 2 or 3000£ at home will not incline to go out to war. But it was an amusement to an ancient knight who had nothing else ado. When the improvement of arts and manufactures was thought an object deserving the attention of the higher ranks, the defence of the state naturaly became the province of the lower, because the rich can never be forced to do any thing but what they please. In Rome, after the knights gave over serving in the army, the lowest of the people went in their stead, and in our own country, after the feudal militia went out, another of the lowest ranks succeeded. This therefore is the progress of military service in every country. Among a nation of hunters and shepherds, and even when a nation is advanced to agriculture, the whole body goes out together to make war. When arts and manufactures begin to advance the whole cannot go out, and as these arts are laborious and not very lucrative, for the reasons formerly adduced, the highest go out. After that, when arts and commerce are still farther advanced and begin to be very lucrative, it falls to the meanest to defend the state.70 This is our present condition in Great Brittain. | When the whole body went out together there could be no occasion for military discipline, they being all as it were upon the same level, and as their common cause was so well discerned it was quite unecessary. When the highest orders went out, a principle of honour would supply the place of discipline. But when this office fell upon the lowest order, the most severe and rigid discipline became necessary, and accordingly we find that it has been introduced into all standing armies. In general it is necessary that they should be kept under such authority as to be more afraid of their general and officers than of the enemy. It is the fear of their officers and of the rigid penalties of the martial law which is the chief cause of their good behaviour, and it is to this principle that we owe their valiant actions. In the late war 800 Prussians defended a pass a whole day against several thousands of Austrians, and at night in their retreat deserted almost to a man. What could be the foundation of this courage? It was not a principle of honour, nor love to their country, nor a regard to their officers, for these would still have detained them; it was nothing but the dread of their officers, who were hanging as it were over their heads, and whom they durst not dissobey. This, by the bye, shows the governableness of our nature, and may also shew how much that manly courage we so much boast of depends upon external circumstances. We may further observe how far this principle of fear may be carried. If a bold, fierce, and tyrannic adjutant be succeeded by one of a mild and gentle disposition, the ideas of terror are conveyed with the coat, | and it is sometime before it be perceived that he is not so terrible as the other. In this manner standing armies came to be introduced, and where there are none the country is an easy prey to its enemies. The only thing to be observed concerning them is that they should be raised in the most convenient way and with as little hurt as possible to the country. However much standing armys may be exclaimed against, in a certain period of society they must be introduced. A militia commanded by landed gentlemen in possession of the public offices of the nation can never have any prospect of sacrifising the liberties of the country for any person whatever. Such a militia would no doubt be the best security against the standing army of another nation.

Standing armies are of two kinds. The first is when the government gives offices to particular persons and so much for every man they levy. From such a standing army as this, which is the model of our own, there is less danger than from the second kind, when the government makes a slump bargain with a general to lead out a certain number of troops for their assistance, which is the model of the standing armies in some little states of Italy. They make a bargain with some chieftan in these parts where the arts have not yet reached, and as the officers are all dependent on him, and he independent of the state, his employers lye at his mercey. But a standing army like ours is not so apt to turn their arms against the government, because the officers are men of honour and have great connections in the country.

| Yet on some occasions a standing army has proved dangerous to the liberties of the people, when that question concerning the power of the sovereign came to be disputed, as has been the case in our own country, because the standing army generaly takes the side of the king. The principle of the soldier is to obey his leader, and as the king appointed him and pays him it is to him that he thinks he owes his service. This would never be the case if a proper militia were established. In Sweden, where it takes place, they are in no danger. Thus far concerning standing armies. It is needless to enter into any account of their pay and other circumstances.

Having considered the laws of nature as we proposed, as they regard Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms, we shall proceed to the last part of our plan, which is to consider the Law of Nations, or the claims which one nation may have upon another.

Remainder of 338 left blank in MS.

| of the Laws of Nations

It is to be observed that the rules which nations ought to observe or do observe with one another cannot be treated so accurately as private or public law. We find the rules of property pretty exactly established in every nation. The extent of the sovereigns power, as well as the duty of the subject, so far as justice is concerned, are pretty uniform every where. But with respect to the laws of nations, we can scarce mention any one regulation which is established with the common consent of all nations,71 and observed as such at all times. This must necessarily be the case, for where there is no supreme legislative power nor judge to settle differences, we may always expect uncertainty and irregularity.

The laws of nations are such as take place either in peace or war. Those that take place in times of peace have been formerly explained, where it was shewn with respect to aliens that they are entitled to security as to their persons and effects, but that they have no power to make a will, but all goes to the sovereign at their death.72

The laws or rules observed in time of war shall be considered in the following order.

1st. What is a just cause of war, or according to the Latin phrase, quando liceat bellare.

| 2^dly. What it is lawful for one nation to do to another in time of war, or quantum liceat in bello, and upon this head we shall consider the differences between the ancient and modern governments and the great modifications of the latter.

3^dly. What is due to neutral nations from the belligerant powers.

4^thly. The rights of ambassadors between different nations.

1st. Quando liceat bellare? In general whatever is the foundation of a proper law suit before a court of justice may be a just occasion of war.73 The foundation of a law–suit is the violation of some perfect right whose performance may be extorted by force, and is so extorted in a rude society, but in modern times is decided by the magistrate, lest the society should be disturbed by every one taking justice at his own hands. When one nation encroaches on the property of another, or puts to death the subjects of another, imprisons them or refuses them justice when injured, the sovereign is bound to demand satisfaction for the offence, as it is the intention of the government to protect it’s several members from forreign enemies, and if redress be refused there is a foundation for war. In the same manner breach of contract, as when a debt is due by one nation to another, and payment refused, is a very just | occasion of war. If, for example, the King of Prussia should refuse to pay the money advanced for him by the British nation in the time of the last war:74 a declaration of war against him would be just and reasonable. Every offence of the sovereign of one country against the sovereign of another, or of the sovereign against the subject, or of the subject of one country against the subject of another, without giving reasonable satisfaction, may be the cause of a war. There seems to be only one exception to the general rule that every thing that is the subject of a law suit may be a cause of war, and that is with respect to quasi contracts. In this case indeed it is difficult to determine whether a war would be reasonable or not, and we find no instance of a war declared upon the violation of this right. It must be allowed that the introduction of quasi contract was the highest stretch of equity, and except in the Roman law75 it was never perfected nor introduced. In England, if you repair a man’s house in his absence you must trust to him for the payment of it, for you have no action by law. In the same manner, if a Russian do a piece of service to an English merchant, which if he had not done, the merchant would have suffered extremely, and afterwards demand satisfaction for his trouble, if he be refused it and apply to the courts of justice they will tell him that he must depend on the honour of the merchant for payment. Excepting this, every thing which is the foundation of a proper law suit will also make war just and reasonable.

| Quantum liceat <in> bello? How far a nation may push the resentment of an injury against the nation which has injured them, is not easy to determine. The practice of ancient and modern nations differs extremely. In general, when an injury is clearly and distinctly done or when it is plainly intended, and satisfaction refused, resentment is necessary and just. There are a few cases in which it is lawful even without satisfaction being demanded. If a robber was plainly intending to kill you, it would be quite lawfull in you to do all you could to prevent him. The injury is plain. In the same manner, when one nation seems to be conspiring against another, tho’ it may have done no real injury, it is necessary that it should be obliged to declare its intentions and to give security when this demand would not subject it to inconveniences. Tho’ this satisfaction be not demanded, when the King of Prussia saw his dominions about to be overwhelmed by the Elector of Saxony and the Queen of Hungary,76 it was quite right in him to be beforehand with them and to take possession of their territories, and nothing would have been more absurd than for him to have told them that he was going to attack them. On the other hand, if it be only a debt that is due, it would be as unreasonable to go to war without demanding satisfaction, and it is only upon the dilatory and evasive manner of giving satisfaction that a war in this case becomes lawfull. But to consider a little more particularly what is lawfull | in war, suppose a subject of any government is injured, they who have injured him become natural objects of resentment, and also the government which protects him if it refuse satisfaction, but the greater part of the nation is perfectly innocent and knows nothing about the affair. In the late war with France not one out of twenty, either of the French or us, knew any thing of the offences done. Upon what principle or foundation of justice therefore do we take their goods from them, and distress them in all possible ways? This can by no means be founded upon justice and equity properly so called; it must be upon necessity, which indeed in this case is a part of justice. Mr. Hutchinson indeed very ingeniously accounts for this,77 but if we examine his opinion thoroughly we shall find that he has not built his reasoning on a proper foundation. Every nation, says he, maintains and supports the government for it’s own good. If the government commit any offence against a neighbouring soveraign or subject, and it’s own people continue to support and protect it, as it were, in it, they thereby become accessary and liable to punishment along with <it>. As by the Roman law,78 if any of these slaves which every private person kept for his own advantage had done any damnage to another, one of these two things was to be done, he must either keep the slave no longer, or pay the damnage. | In like manner a nation must either allow itself to be liable for the damnages, or give up the government altogether. It is to be observed that in this reasoning, tho’ excessively ingenious, the cases are not in the smallest degree parallel. A man can do with his slave as he pleases, he can either put him away or pay what damnages he has occasioned, but a nation in most cases can neither do the one nor the other. A government is often maintained, not for the nation’s preservation, but it’s own. It was never the doctrine of any public law that the subjects had a right to dispose of the sovereign, not even in England, where his right has been so much contested. How then comes it that a nation should be guilty of an injury which was not in it’s power. The real cause why the whole nation is thought a reasonable object of resentment is that we do not feel for those at a distance as we do for those near us. We have been injured by France, our resentment rises against the whole nation instead of the government, and they, thro’ a blind indiscriminating faculty natural to mankind, become the objects of an unreasonable resentment. In a war between France and us, a Dane would naturaly enter into the same sentiments that we do, and would involve together without distinction both the guilty and the innocent. | This is however quite contrary to the rules of justice observed with regard to our own subjects. We would rather chuse that 10 guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer.

Another cause is that it is often very difficult to get satisfaction from a subject or from a sovereign that may have offended. They are generaly in the heart of the country and perfectly well secured. If we could get at them, no doubt they would be the first objects of our resentment, but as this is impossible we must make reprizals some other way. We have suffered unjustly on account of our connections, let them also suffer unjustly on account of theirs. In war there must always be the greatest injustice but it is inevitable.

The practice of ancient and modern nations differs widely with regard to the length to which the outrages of war may be carried. Barbarians, if they do not kill these taken in war, may dispose of them as they please. As all who made war were considered as robbers and violators of the peace of society, such punishments were by no means thought inadequate. Even among the Romans, if the battering–ram had once struck the walls no agreement nor capitulation was allowed, but every thing fell into the hands of the conquerors, | and they were at liberty to use it as they pleased. So much was this the case in Cicero’s time that he represents it as the greatest stretch of humanity that a capitulation was allowed after the ram had once struck the walls.79 But tho’ force and fraud were in former periods the great virtues of war, modern manners have come to a greater degree of refinement, both with respect to persons and effects. Captives in war are now by no means made slaves or liable to oppression. An officer is sett free upon his parole or word of honour; and in the war between France and us, they generaly treated our wounded prisoners better than their own wounded soldiers.80 Indeed there is no nation that pushes this point of gallantry farther than we do. When the sixpence a day which was allowed the French prisoners at Edinburgh and elsewhere, was thought insufficient to maintain them on account of the diminution it sustained before it came to their hands by subcontracts, etc., a collection of 10,000£ was generously made for them. In general, prisoners of war are now as well treated as other people.

In the same manner cartel–treaties,81 by which soldiers and sailors are valued at so much | and exchanged at the end of every campaign, the nation which has lost most prisoners paying the balance, is an evidence of our refinement in humanity. In the late war indeed, we refused to enter into any such treaty with France for sailors, and by this wise regulation soon unman’d their navy, as we took a great many more than they. It was the want of humanity, no doubt, which rendered ancient towns so obstinate, for it was better to sustain the most terrible hardships than to surrender. But now the besieged know very well how they will be treated before they capitulate, and will run no great risk before they do so.82

This superiour degree of humanity was introduced during the time of popery. We never find it among the Greeks and Romans, notwithstanding all their attainments. The Pope was considered as the common father of Christendom, the clergy were under his subjection, and he had intercourse by his legates with all the courts of Europe. By this they were more nearly connected, and he obliged them to treat one another with more humanity. The Holy War too, which at that time was undertaken by most of the princes in Europe, made them turn their arms against all those of a different religion, who they thought | deserved to be treated in the most cruel manner. But when they came to be engaged in a war among themselves, as they had all been on one side in that common cause, and as they thought that Christians should not be treated in the same manner with infidells, a greater degree of humanity was introduced. From those causes moderns behave differently from the ancients with regard to the persons of prisoners.

It is more from motives of policey than humanity that the effects of enemies are secured. When a French army invades Germany, the general makes a law that all the people who will live quietly and do not rise against him shall be secure in their persons and possessions, and he will punish a soldier as severely for injuring the peasants of his enemys country as those of his own. But this is not the case in a sea war. An admiral seizes and plunders all the merchant ships he can get. Many of the merchants have done as little harm as the peasants. Why then this distinction? It is the interest of the general not to rob the peasants, because it would be difficult to march an army carrying all it’s provisions thro’ the country of an enemy. But by engageing them to stay | he is supplyed without any other expedient. By this means war is so far from being a dissadvantage in a well cultivated country that many get rich by it. When the Neitherlands is the seat of war all the peasants grow rich, for they pay no rent when the enemy are in the country, and provisions sell at a high rate. This is indeed at the expence of the landlords and better sort of people, who are generaly ruined on such occasions. This is so much the case that all the poor people who are abroad, whenever they hear of a war, will not stay from their native country. It is quite otherways in a sea war. Every ship carrys it’s own provisions and has no dependance for them upon the ships which it meets.

Another cause of modern refinement is that courtesy, or rather gallantry, which takes place between hostile nations, by which even ambassadors are kept at their several courts.

Anciently it was the greatest gallantry to kill the general of an army,83 but nothing could make a person more infamous at present than such a practice. When the King of France84 in person besieged a certain castle, the governour sent to know in what part of the camp the king lodged, that he might not canonade it. The King of Prussia indeed did not grant the princes of Saxony this request, when they | informed him where the royal tent stood, but this was because he was assured that the chief magazine was there. Now if there be any in a nation who have injured more than others, they are the king and generals. How comes it then that it is not now thought lawfull to kill them as well as formerly. The plain reason is that monarchies, whose interest it always is to shew respect to those in authority, set the example at present, but republics, whose interest lyes in adopting the opposite maxim, formerly led the fashion.85

The same policey which makes us not so apt to go to war makes us also more favourable than formerly after an entire conquest. Anciently an enemy forfeited all his possessions, and was disposed of at the pleasure of the conquerors. It was on this account that the Romans had often to people a country anew and send out colonies. It is not so now. A conquered country in a manner only changes masters. They may be subjected to new taxes and other regulations, but need no new people. The conqueror generaly allows them the possession of their religion and laws, which is a practice much better than the ancient. Modern armies too are less irratated at one another because fire arms keep them at a greater distance.86 When they always fought sword in hand their rage and fury were raised to the highest pitch, and as they were mixed with one another the slaughter was vastly greater.

| 3^d, we are next to shew what is due to neutral nations from the belligerant powers.87

The rule of justice with respect to neutral nations is that as they have offended no party they should suffer no injury. In a war between France and England, the Dutch should have the liberty of trading to both countries as in the time of peace, as they have injured neither party. Unless when they carry contraband goods or are going to a town that is besieged, they can trade to any part of the country without molestation. A neutral bottom will not however protect the goods of the enemy, nor does the hostility of the bottom, so to speak, forfeit the goods of the neutral power.

There is some difference between the practice of ancient and modern nations with respect to the ius postliminii, or the recovery of what was lost.88 The maxim in time of war anciently was, we are always in the right, and our enemies always in the wrong. Whatever is taken from the enemy is justly taken, whatever is taken from us is unjustly taken. On this account if a Carthaginian had sold to a Roman a Roman ship taken in war, the former owner, whenever he had an opportunity, took it back, as on the above principle | it was unjustly taken from him. Now it is quite otherways. We consider every thing done in war as just and equitable, and neither demand nor would take back any captures made in it. If an English ship be taken by the French and sold to the Dutch, and come to a British harbour, the former owner pretends no claim to her, for he had lost all hopes of it when it had gone into the possession of the enemy.

It is to be observed that there is a very great difference in the conduct of belligerant nations towards one that is neutral, in a land–war from what <it> is in a sea war, which is more the effect of policey than humanity. When an army retreats and the conqueror pursues into a neutral nation, unless it have power to hold out both, it becomes the seat of war, as is often the case, and little or no satisfaction is given for damages. But in a sea war, a ship taken from the most inconsiderable neutral power is always restored. The reason commonly assigned, that it injures their commerce more to take their ships than any thing else, is unsatisfactory, for a land war hurts commerce more than it does. The real reason is that a small country has it not in its power to assert it’s neutrality in a land war, but the smallest is able to do it in a sea war. A small fort can oblige <?ships> of the greatest nation to respect the neutrality of it’s harbour.

| 4. We are in the last place to consider the rights of ambassadors between different nations.

When nations came to have a great deal of business one with another, it was found necessary to send messengers betwixt them, who were the first ambassadors. Anciently, as there was little commerce carried on between different nations, ambassadors were only sent on particular occasions and were what we now call ambassadors extraordinary, who returned home after their business was transacted. We find nothing like resident ambassadors in Rome or Greece; their whole office was on particular occasions to conclude peace, make alliances, etca. The first time that resident ambassador’s were employed was in the beginning of the 17^th century, by Ferdinand, King of Spain. Even the word ambassador comes from the Spanish verb ambassare, to send.89 The Pope indeed from the earliest times had residents, or legates, at all the courts of Europe. The very same reason that makes embassies now so frequent induced the Pope formerly to fall upon this method. He had business in all the countries of Europe and a great part of his revenue was collected from them, and as they were continualy attempting to infringe the right he claimed, | he found it necessary to have a person constantly residing at their courts to see that his priviledges were preserved. The Pope from this custom derived several advantages. When commerce was introduced into Europe, and the priviledges of every country, with the duties payable on goods in another, were settled, the merchants of one country had constant claims on those of another; they themselves were strangers in these countries, and would very readily be injured and oftener think themselves so. It became necessary therefore to have one of their countrymen constantly residing at the courts of different nations to protect the rights of his fellow subjects. Anciently, as was observed, there was little intercourse with different nations and therefore no occasion for resident ambassadors; but now, as there is something almost every day to adjust betwixt dealers, it is necessary that there should be some person of weight and authority who has access to the court, to prevent any occasion of quarrel betwixt them. We have already observed that it was Ferdinand of Spain who established this practice. At first it gave great jealousy to the neighbouring nations to keep ambassadors residing at their courts. He indeed pretended to have no right to do this, but by sending an ambassador upon a certain occasion, and starting different questions, he found means of keeping him there. This practice was soon imitated, and it immediately became the universal custom of the European princes, and was so far from being taken amiss that it was | reckoned a grat affront not to send one. Grotius, whose opinions are founded on the practice of ancient nations, declares against resident ambassadors and calls them resident spies.90 But if he had lived in the present age, he would have found that extensive commerce renders it impossible to preserve peace a month, unless grievances be redressed by a man of authority who knows the customs of the country and is capable of explaining what injuries are realy done. The custom of sending ambassadors preserves peace and, by giving intelligence, prevents one country from being invaded by another without timeous notice. When any kind of dispute happens, and the ambassador is recalled, you can have intelligence by your communication with other courts, your ambassador there being informed, for ambassadors in general are acquainted with all the business in Europe.

Though one country might attain some kind of pre–eminence by the influence and assiduity of it’s ambassador, no attention was for a long time given to it, and that balance of power which has of late been so much talked of was never then heard of. Every sovereign had enough to do within his own dominions and could bestow little attention on forreign powers. Before the institution of residents they could have little intelligence. But ever since the begining of the 16^th century the nations of Europe were divided into two great alliances. On the one hand were England, Holland, Hungary, Muscovy, etca. | On the other France, Spain, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, etca. In this manner a kind of alliance was kept up, sometimes one leaving the one side and another joining it, as at present Prussia is with England and Hungary on the other side. A system of this kind was established in Italy about <the> 15^th century among the great families there. The resident ambassadors of these nations hinder any one country from domineering over another either by sea or land, and are formed into a kind of council not unlike that of the Amphictyons in ancient Greece. They have power to advise and consult concerning matters but not to determine any, and by combining together can threaten any one country pretending to superiority or making an unreasonable demand. Post offices too are of great importance for procuring intelligence, as communication is open thro’ all these countries both in peace and war, which makes commerce easy and gives notice of every movement.

An ambassador’s person must be sacred and not subject to any of the courts of justice in the country where he resides.91 If he contract debts or do any injury, a complaint must be made to his country. When the Dutch arrested the Russian ambassador in the year 1718, it was complained off as a violation of the laws of nations.92 The goods which an ambassador buys are not subject to any custom. As a sovereign would be exempted from taxes, so must his ambassador who represents him. | When an ambassador makes any attempt to disturb the peace by entering into conspiracies or the like, he may be imprisoned. By way of compliment, and to keep up the dignity of an ambassador, his house is considered as an asylum for offenders. He must be cautious however of this priviledge, and extend his authority only to the protection of debtors and small delinquents, for the right will be broken thro’ if he harbour those guilty of capital crimes. The servants of ambassadors, too, are entitled to some considerable priviledges. If indeed they have contracted debts they may be arrested, but this is never done voluntarily.

All the words that signify these persons employed by one court at another are derived from the Spanish language. The Spanish court was then the most ceremonious in the world, and Spanish dress was every where affected. As ambassadors were obliged to keep up much ceremony, they were hindered in the prosecution of their business. A man that has to negociate matters of the highest importance could not allow so much time to be spent in the endless ceremony of paying and returning visits. Envoys were therefore sent, to whom less ceremony was due, and who could be addressed on any occasion. Their dignity, too, soon advanced and incapacitated them to transact business. | As they continued for sometime, they were called resident ambassadors ordinary, being of an inferiour order to the ambassadors extraordinary. Below this rank is the minister, who resides in the country on account of his own business, and has power to transact any little business of the country to which he belongs.

A consul is a particular magistrate who is a judge of all matters relating to the merchants of his own country, and takes care to do them justice in these places where it may not be very accurately administered.

These are the names and offices of the several persons employed in the forreign affaires of the nation, occasioned by the introduction of commerce, and now become absolutely necessary.

Thus we have considered both the laws of nature and the laws of nations.

Finis.

[1 ]Cf. TMS VII.iv.37 (the last paragraph of the book): ‘. . . natural jurisprudence, or a theory of the general principles which ought to run through and be the foundation of the laws of all nations. . . . Grotius seems to have been the first who attempted to give the world any thing like a system of those principles which ought to run through, and be the foundation of the laws of all nations; and his treatise of the laws of war and peace, with all its imperfections, is perhaps at this day the most complete work that has yet been given upon this subject.’

[2 ]Grotius, II.1.2.

[3 ]De Iure Naturae et Gentium (1672), especially II.2.6 ff., attacking Hobbes’s De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651).

[4 ]Henrici de Cocceii Grotius Illustratus (4 vol. folio, 1744–52), together with his son’s commentary Samuelis de Cocceii Introductio ad Henrici de Cocceii Grotium Illustratum (1 vol. folio, 1748).

[5 ]Loan, being the result of agreement, is a contract, not a quasi–contract. Smith may have been misled by Hutcheson, System, II.82–3, where ‘advances upon hazard’ are treated as quasi–contractual.

[6 ]Notably Hutcheson, M.P., Books II and III, and System, Books II and III. LJ(A) follows Hutcheson’s order of treatment.

[7 ]Cf. TMS I.ii.5.1: ‘An upstart, though of the greatest merit, is generally disagreeable, and a sentiment of envy commonly prevents us from heartily sympathizing with his joy.’

[8 ]Copyist’s error for ‘ship’.

[9 ]1 George I, st. 2, c. 4 (1714).

[10 ]Possibly copyist’s error for ‘different’.

[11 ]Probably reporter’s error for ‘Arabia’. Cf. LJ(A) iv.40, above.

[12 ]Cf. the corresponding passage in LJ(A) iv.88, above.

[13 ]Particularly the two speeches Against Verres.

[14 ]Probably reporter’s error for ‘Britons’ or ‘Picts and Scots’: cf. LJ(A) iv.102, above.

[15 ]i.e. the patricius Aetius, who was in fact later than the reign of Honorius, when Stilicho held power. Cf. LJ(A) iv.101–4, above.

[a]Originally ‘country’ and then apparently emended

[16 ]Presumably copyist’s error for ‘resort’.

[17 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘decennary’.

[18 ]This should read ‘on redeeming him when taken prisoner, or on the knighting of his son’. See Dalrymple, 52; and cf. LJ(A) iv.131, above.

[b]Contraction for ‘lordships’

[19 ]Not John but Henry III: 20 Henry III, c. 6 (Statute of Merton, 1236).

[20 ]4 Henry VII, c. 24 (1490); Dalrymple, 136.

[21 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘1,200,000’.

[22 ]i.e. at the Restoration.

[23 ]For a less abbreviated and more accurate account, see LJ(A) iv.174–6, above.

[24 ]i.e. stay the proceedings by pardon. Cf. LJ(A) v.6–7, above.

[25 ]The fines were actually 100,000 marks: see LJ(A) v.23, above.

[26 ]The process is that of a Bill of Middlesex, not of writ of error. See p. 280, note 85, above.

[27 ]In fact Edward I: 13 Edward I, c. 24 (Statute of Westminster II, 1285, the in consimili casu clause). Cf. LJ(A) v.27, above.

[28 ]Possibly reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘deceits’.

[c]At the top left–hand corner of 77, outside the frame containing the text, there is written ‘A’. Cf. ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ at 82, 87, 88, and 93 below. The letters were evidently intended to come at intervals of five pages.

[d]Originally ‘sovereigns’ and then apparently emended

[29 ]C. 9.8.5.

[e]A second hand, probably eighteenth–century, has underlined ‘wishing’ and has written ‘compassing’ beside it in the margin

[f]Last two words added in margin by a second (probably eighteenth–century) hand

[30 ]Under 25 Edward III, st. 5, c. 2, it was high treason to take, but not merely to attempt, the life of a judge on the bench.

[g]At the top right–hand corner of 82, outside the frame containing the text, there is written ‘B’. See textual notec to 77 above.

[31 ]In fact only writing was treason; cf. LJ(A) v.71, above.

[32 ]i.e. his wife forfeits her dower.

[33 ]31 Elizabeth, c. 4 (1589).

[34 ]5 Elizabeth, c. 1 (1563); Hawkins, I.19.23.

[35 ]In fact negative misprision: Hawkins, I.20.

[36 ]In fact positive misprision.

[37 ]Forging foreign coin current by consent of the crown was high treason by 1 Mary, sess. 2, c. 6 (1553), and forging foreign coin not current here was misprision of treason by 14 Elizabeth, c. 3 (1572).

[h]The last twelve words, which are interlined, are written in different ink and apparently by a different (eighteenth–century) hand. A mark of omission has been made after ‘belongs’ in the ink of the original text.

[i]At the top left–hand corner of 87, outside the frame containing the text, there is written ‘C’. See textual notec to 77 above.

[38 ]i.e. states.

[j]At the top right–hand corner of 88 there is written ‘C’, presumably a mistaken repetition of ‘C’ on 87. See textual notec to 77 above.

[39 ]Alien friends in England could make wills.

[k]At the top left–hand corner of 93 there is written ‘D’. See textual notec to 77 above.

[40 ]12 ff. above.

[41 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘proscribed’.

[42 ]As a result of the Peace of Fontainebleau, 3 November 1762, confirmed in the Peace of Paris, 10 February 1763. See Introduction, p. 8.

[43 ]Montesquieu, XVI.16.

[l]Interlined, in different ink and apparently by a different hand

[44 ]iv.261 ff.

[45 ]Lafitau, Mæurs des sauvages amériquains (1724), I.477.

[46 ]Heineccius, I.10.1.

[47 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘Confarreation’.

[m]Emended in the margin by a second (probably eighteenth–century) hand to ‘Coemption’

[48 ]Deductio in domum, a ceremony evidencing the parties’ consent to the marriage, but never itself a legal requirement. Cf. LJ(A) iii.8–9, above.

[49 ]In fact it was as much a legal marriage, whose issue was legitimate, as the manus marriage. Cf. LJ(A) iii.9, above.

[50 ]i.e. the prohibited degrees of consanguinity.

[51 ]The meaning of this very condensed paragraph will be clearer if a comparison is made with the corresponding passage in LJ(A) iii.13, above.

[52 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘confarreation’.

[53 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘coemption’.

[54 ]The last two words are probably a copyist’s error for ‘contract in praesenti’.

[55 ]Presumably reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘his’.

[56 ]Probably copyist’s error for ‘20’. The MS. entry suggests that he hesitated between the two.

[57 ]i.e. the supposed fact that girls are old at 20.

[58 ]The meaning of this sentence will be clearer if a comparison is made with the corresponding passage in LJ(A) iii.42, above.

[59 ]Of Rome.

[60 ]For her life.

[61 ]Her dower.

[62 ]A life interest in a third of the land and a third of the movables if there are children or half the movables if there are no children of the marriage.

[n]A later hand has, in pencil, underlined this word and inserted the emendation ‘heirs’ in the margin

[o]A much later hand has, in pencil, struck out the letters ‘al’ and inserted ‘ine’ above them

[63 ]Cornelius Nepos, V.1.2; cited by Montesquieu, V.5.

[64 ]Presumably ‘consanguinity’ was intended. Civil law and canon law have been interchanged in the account which follows, the actual position being the opposite of what is stated. Cf. p. 166, note 72, above.

[65 ]Decurions, municipal officials; cf. LJ(A) iii.73, above.

[66 ]Cf. TMS II.ii.1.3–5.

[67 ]The last two words are probably a copyist’s error for ‘to have’. He first wrote ‘& have’ and then altered ‘have’ to ‘has’.

[68 ]His own house.

[69 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘steelbow’.

[70 ]i.e. the half formerly handed over to the landlord and now kept by the tenant in addition to the other half.

[71 ]This remark was probably occasioned by a judgement of Lord Chancellor Henley (later Lord Northington) in 1762 (2 Eden 126), reiterating the maxim that a man becomes free as soon as he sets foot in England. This had been affirmed by Lord Chief Justice Holt in 1706 (2 Salkeld 666), but had since been challenged (see next note).

[72 ]The word ‘altered’, written in a different ink and hand, appears in the margin at about this point. In 1729 Sir Philip Yorke, attorney–general, and Charles Talbot, solicitorgeneral, gave an opinion that a slave coming to the British Isles from the West Indies did not become free and could be compelled by his master to return to the plantations (reported in Morison’s Dictionary of Decisions, 14547). The first part of this opinion was disapproved by Lord Chancellor Henley (see previous note). The second part was finally overruled by Lord Mansfield in Sommersett’s Case in 1772 (Howell’s State Trials, XX.1), which was followed by the Scottish Court of Session in Knight v. Wedderburn in 1778 (Morison’s Dictionary of Decisions, 14545).

[73 ]Presumably moenia, though ‘menial’ is not in fact so derived.

[74 ]Hawkins, I.29.5.

[75 ]Hale, I.40.2.

[76 ]In Roman law tutela impuberum for boys not in the power of a paterfamilias ended at fourteen years when they became adults and had full legal capacity. Later, curators (an office first developed for insane persons and prodigals) were appointed for those over fourteen and under twenty–five years of age, who were known as minors rather than pupils.

[77 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘side’.

[78 ]Hawkins, I.41,42.

[79 ]1 James I, c. 11 (1603).

[p]The copyist wrote ‘punishes’ and this has been emended by a second (eighteenth–century) hand to ‘kills’

[80 ]Hawkins, I.32; II.48.6.

[81 ]Her master, since the statement applies to a servant woman who kills (but not one who merely attempts), and not to a manservant.

[82 ]The meaning of this sentence will be clearer if a comparison is made with the corresponding passage in LJ(A) i.98, above.

[83 ]To the gens, or members of the deceased’s clan: Twelve Tables, V.5.

[84 ]Heineccius, III.5.5.

[q]Inserted by a second (eighteenth–century) hand

[r]Sic

[85 ]Stair, III.4.33. Conquest was land acquired otherwise than by inheritance.

[86 ]Cf. TMS I.i.1.13: our imagined idea of the feelings of the dead arises ‘from our lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own living souls in their inanimated bodies’.

[87 ]Pupillary substitution: cf. LJ(A) i.154, above.

[s]Emended in pencil by a later hand to ‘Voconian’

[t]The copyist wrote ‘commissary’; ‘fide’ has been added in the margin by another hand

[88 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘to’.

[89 ]No doubt Theodosius and Valentinian, emperors respectively of the eastern and western Roman Empire in the early fifth century, are intended. But if the reference is to the ruling of the Fourth Council of Carthage in 398 (cf. p. 68 above), that was in the reign of their predecessors, Arcadius and Honorius.

[90 ]Directum and utile should be transposed.

[91 ]M. Bacon, New Abritlgement of the Law, s.v. Bailment, I.239.

[92 ]Cf. LJ(A) i.28–9, above.

[93 ]Never quite English law, although attempts were being made to modify the doctrine of consideration in this direction before it was reasserted in Rann v. Hughes (1778), 7 T.R. 30n.

[94 ]M. Bacon, New Abridgement of the Law, s.v. Execution, II.330–2.

[u]Originally ‘consential’ and emended by a second (eighteenth–century) hand to ‘consensual’

[95 ]This is an exaggeration.

[96 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘canon’.

[97 ]The last digit is not clear and might be ‘5’. The date is given as 1701 in the corresponding passage in LJ(A) ii.81, above, but it seems likely (as there noted) that the reference is in fact to the recoinage of 1709.

[98 ]Kames, Essays upon Several Subjects in Law (1732), II (‘Beneficium cedendarum actionum’); Kames, Principles of Equity (1760), I.1.2.1; Erskine, II.12.29.

[99 ]The last two words are perhaps a copyist’s error for ‘felonious’.

[v]Inserted by a second (eighteenth–century) hand

[1 ]Probably copyist’s error for ‘horse’. Cf. LJ(A) ii.120, above.

[2 ]In fact Charles II’s natural son, the Duke of Monmouth. Cf. LJ(A) ii.124–5, above.

[3 ]Something has evidently been omitted from this sentence. Cf. LJ(A) ii.142–3, above.

[w]The copyist wrote ‘moveables’ and a second (eighteenth–century) hand has inserted ‘imm’

[4 ]Hawkins, I.64.1.

[5 ]5 Richard II, c. 7 (1381); 15 Richard II, c. 2 (1391); 8 Henry VI, c. 9 (1429).

[6 ]Probably 24 George II, c. 34 (1751), applying to Scotland.

[x]Inserted by a second (eighteenth–century) hand

[7 ]Should be ‘a wife her husband’.

[8 ]Hawkins, I.34.10.

[9 ]Sir G. Mackenzie, Laws and Customes of Scotland in Matters Criminal (1678), I.19.9, citing Act, 1587, c. 82 (A.P.S. III.460).

[10 ]5 George II, c. 30 (1732); Hawkins, I.57.

[y]The copyist first wrote ‘it’ and then emended to ‘at’

[11 ]An allowance is apparently being made here for the price of the wire; cf. the similar calculation in LJ(A) vi.29, above.

[12 ]This sentence, the meaning of which is a little obscure when it is considered in isolation, is probably best regarded as an attempt by the reporter to summarize the over–all conclusions to be drawn from a set of numerical illustrations similar to those given in LJ(A) vi.32–3, above, and in ED 10–11, below.

[13 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘Sesostris’.

[14 ]Sic. Presumably copyist’s error for ‘It’.

[15 ]Probably copyist’s error for ‘one’.

[16 ]Probably copyist’s error for ‘borne’.

[17 ]In fact to refuse legal tender was never a felony. Cf. the formulation in LJ(A) vi.115, above.

[18 ]Augmentation was by increasing, and diminution by decreasing, the number of livres (money of account, not actual coins) in a coin of given weight. Cf. LJ(A) ii.81 and vi.123, above.

[19 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘silver’.

[20 ]There is no direct counterpart in LJ(A) of most of the material between this point and the end of the first paragraph on 253 below. Cf. p. 380 above.

[21 ]In fact 1672.

[22 ]Nicholas Magens, The Universal Merchant (London, 1753), 32–3. Cf. also the same author’s Farther Explanations of some Particular Subjects . . . contained in the Universal Merchant (London, 1756), 24–7.

[23 ]Mun did not in fact publish any treatise with the intention of showing ‘the pernicious nature of banks and paper money’. Smith has evidently been rather badly misreported in this passage, of which there is unfortunately no counterpart in LJ(A). In order to reconstruct Smith’s actual argument, the best starting–point is his own summary of this section of the Lectures in ED 35–6, below. Under the general heading of money as an instrument of commerce, or medium of exchange, his aim is to make three separate but closely related points: first, that the greater the amount of the precious metals necessary to circulate the goods of a country, the smaller will be the amount of food, clothing, and housing in the country; second, that any contrivances (e.g. banks and paper money) which can enable the goods of a country to be circulated with a smaller quantity of the precious metals will be very advantageous to the country; and third, that national opulence neither consists in nor depends upon the quantity of the precious metals in the country, and that no kind of preference ought to be given to this species of goods above any other. Under this third subheading, Smith sets out to deal in particular with what he calls in ED ‘the bad effects of the contrary opinion both in speculation and practice’. In the passage in the Lectures to which the present note refers, Smith is evidently embarking upon his discussion of ‘the bad effects of the contrary opinion’ in speculation—i.e., roughly, in economic theory. He probably began this discussion by reminding his class of a point he had made a little earlier under the second subheading (246–7 above), to the effect that those writers (Hume and Harris, for example) who objected to paper money on the ground that it drained the country of gold and silver were implicitly adopting (at any rate up to a point) the notion that opulence consists in and depends upon the quantity of the precious metals. He may then have gone on to say that the same notion, in more explicit form, lay behind the advocacy by earlier writers like Mun of measures to attract ‘treasure’ by means of foreign trade. Unfortunately the reporter apparently lost the thread, and attributed to Mun, quite incorrectly, the idea that banks and paper money were pernicious—together with the idea that ‘money never decays’, which Smith usually in fact attributed to Locke. On this interpretation, the passages which follow the present one fall neatly into place. Gee’s book, which was concerned, as Mun’s had been, with the relation between the balance of trade and the quantity of ‘treasure’ in a country, comes up next for consideration. Then, by way of a reply to Mun and Gee, Smith outlines and commends Hume’s famous theory of the specie–flow mechanism in international trade—although not without a critical backward glance, in the last sentence of the relevant paragraph, at Hume’s ideas about paper money. The next paragraph (marking the point at which the text of LJ(A) resumes) is perhaps best considered as a digression; and the following one, dealing specifically with Locke’s ‘money never decays’ idea, is self–explanatory.

[24 ]Joshua Gee, The Trade and Navigation of Great–Britain Considered (1729). Gee’s intention, of course, was not to show ‘the pernicious nature of banks and paper money’. See previous note.

[25 ]Cf. op. cit., ‘Conclusion’ (separately paginated), 16: ‘A Nation may gain vast Riches by Trade and Commerce, or for Want of due Regard and Attention may be drained of them. I am the more willing to mention this, because I am afraid that the present Circumstances of ours carries out more Riches than it brings home.’

[26 ]Smith is probably referring here not only to Hume’s essay ‘Of the Balance of Trade’, which contains the argument he is about to describe, but also to the essays ‘Of Money’ and ‘Of the Jealousy of Trade’.

[27 ]‘Of the Balance of Trade’, Essays, I.333–4.

[28 ]The reference is probably to those places in his essays where Hume argues against paper money. Cf. Essays, I.311–12 (‘Of Money’) and I.337–8 (‘Of the Balance of Trade’).

[29 ]The reporter has missed the point here, as a reference back to LJ(A) vi.138 will show. The comparison which Smith is making is not between the 30 millions of money and an ‘annual consumption’ estimated at upwards of 100 millions, but between the 30 millions of money and the value of the ‘stock’ which may be conceived to have produced this ‘annual consumption’—approximately 1,000 millions, according to Smith’s account as reported in LJ(A).

[z]The copyist wrote ‘corn’. This has been emended, both in the text and in the margin, by a second (probably eighteenth–century) hand, to ‘coin’.

[a]The copyist apparently began to write ‘sort’ and then overwrote ‘kind’

[b]Inserted by a second (probably eighteenth–century) hand

[30 ]Probably copyist’s error for ‘excited’.

[c]‘no’ deleted

[31 ]This was alleged against Walpole (later Lord Orford) by Hume, ‘Of Public Credit’, Essays, I.362, note 2 (a passage omitted in editions after 1768).

[32 ]In fact 1705. The date in the text is that of Law’s Proposals and Reasons for Constituting a Council of Trade in Scotland (now attributed to William Paterson).

[33 ]Money and Trade Considered; with a Proposal for Supplying the Nation with Money (1705), especially ch. VII.

[34 ]In fact the Duke became Regent on the death of Louis XIV on 1 September 1715.

[35 ]P. Du Verney, Examen du livre intitulé Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce (1740), I.207 ff.

[36 ]Cf. 243 above.

[37 ]The pound, like the French livre, was then not a particular coin but a money of account, and its value could be changed by altering the amount of silver coined in twenty shillings.

[38 ]The livre tournois was the livre (of 20 sous) minted at Tours.

[39 ]The figure should probably be 2,000 millions, which is near to that given by Dutot, Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce (1738), in E. Daire, ed., Économistes financiers du XVIIIe siècle (1843), 806.

[40 ]Du Verney, op. cit., I.249, gives the figure as 52 millions.

[41 ]Cf. Dutot, op. cit., 805.

[42 ]Du Verney, op. cit., I.250, 273, 289.

[43 ]Ibid., I.280–1.

[44 ]Ibid., I.316.

[45 ]Ibid., I.335.

[46 ]Ibid., I.320–1.

[47 ]Ibid., II.6–8.

[48 ]Cf. 250 above.

[49 ]In December 1720.

[50 ]In fact not until 1729.

[51 ]This view, which was held by many writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (including Locke, Law, and Montesquieu), had been attacked by Hume, ‘Of Interest’, Essays, I.320 ff.

[52 ]140–1 above.

[53 ]In fact James II, Act, 1449, c. 18 (A.P.S. II.35, c. 6).

[54 ]In 1498 or 1499: A. Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium, 220 H.

[55 ]In fact De Officiis, II.89.

[56 ]Montesquieu, XV.8.

[57 ]Cf. p. 224 above.

[58 ]Cf. TMS I.ii.1.1–2.

[59 ]i.e. people who buy up goods in order to profit by their enhanced price.

[60 ]4 and 5 Philip and Mary, c. 5, sec. 22 (1558).

[61 ]Cf. p. 22 above.

[62 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘irredeemable’.

[63 ]7 George II, c. 8 (1734).

[64 ]9 Anne, c. 14 (1710) allowed the loser of more than £10 who paid to recover from the winner.

[65 ]Presumably copyist’s error for ‘It’.

[66 ]Cf. 213–14 above.

[67 ]Scotland.

[68 ]Reporter’s or copyist’s error for ‘all ready’.

[69 ]In fact 1672: Hume, History of Great Britain (1757), II.226.

[70 ]Cf. Hutcheson, M.P., III.8.5.

[71 ]Grotius, I.1.14.

[72 ]88–90 above.

[73 ]Grotius, II.1.2; Hutcheson, M.P., II.15.6 and System, II.350 ff.

[74 ]An annual subsidy of £670,000 was granted to Frederick the Great from April 1758, but it was withheld by Bute in 1762, on account of disagreement with Frederick’s policy.

[75 ]Negotiorum gestio, looking after another’s affairs without his authority, gave one a right of action for expenses: Inst. 3.27.1.

[76 ]In 1756, at the beginning of the Seven Years War.

[77 ]Hutcheson, M.P., III.9.4; System, II.355 ff.

[78 ]The principle of noxal surrender: Inst. 4.8.

[79 ]De Officiis, I.11.35, cited by Grotius, III.11.14.

[80 ]See, e.g., Gentleman’s Magazine, January 1759, 42.

[81 ]Cf. Hume, ‘Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations’, Essays, I.402.

[82 ]Grotius, III.12.8; Hume, loc. cit.

[83 ]Grotius, III.4.18.

[84 ]Louis XIV: A. M. Ramsay, Histoire de Henri de la Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne (1735), I.416.

[85 ]Cf. 79 above.

[86 ]Hume, Essays, I.401.

[87 ]Hutcheson, M.P., III.9.5; System, II.357 ff.

[88 ]Grotius, III.6.3; III.9.15.

[89 ]Wicquefort, L’Ambassadeur et ses fonctions (1681), 4.

[90 ]Grotius, II.18.3, criticizes ambassadors; Cocceius’s note ad loc., quoting Wicquefort, refers to their role as spies.

[91 ]Hutcheson, M.P., III.10.2; System, II.367.

[92 ]As Cannan (279) notes, this is probably a conflation of three cases. The Dutch arrested the Swedish minister in 1717; the English arrested the Russian ambassador for debt in 1708; and the French arrested the Spanish ambassador in 1718.

[d]Two pages are left blank before the Index appears. Both they and the pages of the Index are unnumbered.

Home

The Forum

Econlib

The Library

Other Sites