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GALLATIN TO S. L. MITCHELL, U. S. Sen.

Private.

Treasury Department, 3d January, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

I was favored with your letter of the 28th ult., and have been prevented from making an earlier answer by a multiplicity of other avocations. Even now I cannot take as comprehensive a view of a subject which does not come within the sphere of my official duties as I would wish, and you must be satisfied with a few general remarks.

A species of trade may be considered as illicit, either in relation to the laws of the nation of which the traders are citizens or subjects, or in relation to the general law of nations, or to the municipal laws of the nation into whose territories the trade is carried. Let, for the present and in order to avoid confusion of ideas, the definition of illicit trade be confined to that species of commerce which, though not prohibited by the laws of the country to which the traders belong, is contrary either to the acknowledged law of nations or to the regulations of the country with whom the trade is carried.

An illicit trade, if contrary to the law of nations, as in the case of contraband articles, attempt to enter a blockaded port, &c., renders the party liable to capture and condemnation. If contrary to the municipal laws of the country with which carried, whether because absolutely prohibited, as in case of infractions of the colonial commercial system of Spain and other nations, or because done in a manner contrary to the regulations on that subject, as in case of common smuggling or other infractions of the revenue or navigation laws of the country, the party is in same manner liable to capture and condemnation, and, in addition thereto, to such penalties, or even personal punishment, as the laws of the country have provided. In either case, the armed public, revenue, or other authorized vessels of the belligerent power, or of the country whose laws are violated, have a right to capture the offending party; and in either case the courts of the captors are the proper tribunal to try the offence. In either case, also, resistance to an armed vessel duly commissioned and authorized is illegal, becomes by itself a sufficient cause of condemnation, and renders the party liable to distinct punishment. In common cases of illicit trade, of whatever nature that trade may be, the individuals who carry it are responsible for their conduct, and punishable by the aggrieved nation without having a right to call on their own country for protection; but the country to which they belong is not generally bound to pass restrictive laws prohibiting such trade. Neutral nations, though they consider it sometimes to be good policy to do it, are not obliged to enforce the law of nations by positive statutes against their own subjects or citizens; they are not bound, for instance, to prohibit the exportation of even arms or gunpowder, though avowedly exported to the country of either of the belligerent powers. Nor are nations bound to pass laws prohibiting to their subjects or citizens commerce, such as that with the colonies of another nation, which is illicit only by reason of the particular statutes of other nations. But, although this be a good rule in common cases, it will be allowed that there are circumstances under which the conduct of illicit traders might go such length, especially if they shall use force, as would render it necessary for the purpose of preserving national peace that the country to which they belong should, by prohibitory or restrictive statutes, prevent the acts of violence which endanger that peace.

Two questions will, therefore, arise in relation to the San Domingo trade, which is the avowed object of the bill under consideration: 1st, is it illicit? 2d, if illicit, ought the United States, under present circumstances, interfere by restrictive statutes? If those two questions shall be answered in the affirmative, the modifications of which the bill may be susceptible will be a subject of subsequent consideration.

To the first question there can be no hesitation in answering: 1st, that the trade to San Domingo is in itself illicit in toto; 2dly, that it is carried in a manner contrary to the law of nations.

The chambers of commerce, merchants, &c., have indeed acknowledged that so far as that trade might consist of contraband articles it was illicit, and they have affected to consider that question as if the blacks of San Domingo were one of the belligerent powers and France another. But this is not the true state of the question. San Domingo is a French colony, recognized as such by the United States and by every European nation, a colony in a state of rebellion against the mother-country; and the question is whether any nation has a right to carry on commerce with a port, province, or colony in a state of rebellion against that country of which it has heretofore been acknowledged as a part. On that point there does not and there never has existed any doubt. Such trade is, by the common consent of all nations, as well as in conformity with the rules of common justice and common sense, altogether illegal, and will render parties concerned therein liable to capture, condemnation, and such other punishment as the aggrieved nation shall think proper by law to provide. It is clear that in such cases other nations must either continue to acknowledge the supremacy of the nation over its rebellious province or colony, and therefore submit to its laws and regulations respecting the commerce with such province or colony, or acknowledge, at the risk or rather with the certainty of a war, the independence of the rebellious province or colony. During the whole of the Revolutionary American war, England took and condemned every neutral vessel bound to the United States which their vessels met with: there was not on that ground the least objection, not even at the time when the armed neutrality took place; and even France, though she afterwards acknowledged the independence of America, and thereby became a party in the war, did not only, so long as she intended to remain at peace, abstain from asserting the doctrine which she afterwards attempted to uphold on that subject in her declaratory memorial, but went so far as ostensibly to give orders, on the British minister’s complaint, for the detention of such vessels laden with military supplies as were bound for the United States. It is also well known that England made war on Holland because she did not disavow the conduct of Amsterdam in making a conditional treaty of commerce with America; and that the armed neutrality, of which Holland was a member, refused to interfere in her favor, because the powers of which it was composed, anxious as they then were for the freedom of commerce and the doctrine of mare liberum, considered the conduct of Holland as a breach of neutrality, and, in common with all other nations, felt that the principle she had assumed was dangerous to the safety of every government. In that respect the justice or injustice of the nation to its rebellious province or colony is altogether out of the question as it relates to other nations. Of that they have no right to judge unless they think proper to become parties in the civil quarrel; and all they have to do is to wait for the event. Nor is the distinction of government de facto (as different from that de jure) applicable to this case. It is perfectly true that when a revolution takes place which affects a whole country, other nations are bound to consider as the legitimate authority the powers who have the actual possession of government; but they are equally bound to consider every part of the country as under the authority of those who are in possession of the government of the country generally. That doubtful cases might arise, as if the Bourbon family occupied one half of France and Bonaparte the other half, is true; and the prudence of other governments must dictate their conduct in such delicate circumstances; but the instance of San Domingo is no such one: it is a plain one, on which there can be but one opinion. Suppose New Orleans to be in the situation in which San Domingo now is, and let any one answer the question; or even substitute Ireland to San Domingo and England to France, and let Mr. Murray and the New York Chamber of Commerce decide.

But the commerce to San Domingo is not only illicit, but it is carried on in a manner contrary to the law of nations. It has become a trade forced by arms against the public or private armed vessels of France, who, under the law of nations, whether France be considered as a belligerent power, or in the act of preventing her rebellious subjects from receiving any kind of supplies, have an undoubted right to search, capture, and send for adjudication any neutral vessel which they have reason to consider as concerned in such trade. That resistance to such vessels is illegal will not be denied; and it will not be a justification for those illegal acts that resistance may legally be made against other vessels who are not duly commissioned and authorized.

It is for this last reason, it is because the trade to San Domingo, illicit in itself, is carried on, in the most open manner, by force of arms contrary to the law of nations; it is because fleets of armed vessels, insured as if engaged in the most legal trade, openly sail from our ports with the avowed design of forcing their way to San Domingo and of resisting commissioned as well as unauthorized French armed vessels, that the question has acquired national importance, and that legislative interference becomes necessary in order to preserve the peace of the nation which the avidity of a few individuals has already endangered. So long as force was not used, or so long as it was used so rarely as not to create alarm, the United States were not bound to forbid an illicit trade or to provide in a special manner against occasional acts of violence. It is the magnitude of the evil which calls for a remedy.

Three different modes might have been adopted in that respect,—to prohibit the trade altogether; to prohibit arming altogether, or, which is the object of the bill, to restrain only those unlawful acts of violence which had given just cause of complaint to the French government. It will not be denied that the last mode is the mildest, and that which lays the least possible restraint on American commerce.

Here let it be observed that from the year 1793, when the war between Great Britain and France took place, to the year 1798, when government resolved to repel the French aggressions by force, arming private vessels was, with the exception of those bound to the East Indies or Mediterranean, absolutely forbidden by a mere Executive act; and that when the President, in 1798, withdrew the prohibition, Congress immediately took up the subject, and, in the same law in which they authorized private vessels to resist in every case armed French vessels, provided against the unlawful use of force as it related to nations in amity with the United States. That Act, passed the 25th of June, 1798, and which would have expired on the 14th of May, 1800, was continued in force by Act of 22d of April, 1800. It expired by its own limitation on the 3d of May, 1802, at which time, Europe being at peace, the subject was unattended to. Subsequent to the renewal of the European war, the President did not think proper to assume the authority which had been exercised by his predecessors, to permit or forbid, at his pleasure, the arming of vessels; and Congress having neglected, during last session, to renew or modify the provisions of the former Act, the effect of an unrestrained permission to arm has been immediately felt. From that view of facts it results that, except since the renewal of the European war, American merchants had been uniformly either prohibited altogether to arm, or placed under restrictions in some degree similar to those proposed by the bill now under consideration, and that they have abused the permission to arm as soon as it was unrestrained and it became their interest to do it.

The principal features of the present bill are, 1st, that the owners shall give bond in a sum equal to double the value of the vessel, arms, &c., conditioned that no unlawful use of the arms of such vessel (generally) shall be made against nations in amity with the United States; 2dly, that the individuals who may make such unlawful use of arms shall be punished for such acts as if committed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

I cannot perceive that any well-founded objections can be made against either of those two principles. The forfeiture of the bond, as well as the punishment of the individuals, rests altogether on the unlawfulness of the act. As it is lawful to resist, in self-defence, any pirate or non-commissioned or otherwise unauthorized armed vessel, the penalties of the Act cannot attach to any of the cases in which the necessity of using arms has been alleged. It is evident that persons objecting to the principles of the bill must avow an intention to do what they know to be unlawful acts; that they intend, in fact, to resist authorized armed French vessels, and to force at all events an acknowledged illicit trade. Supposing some of the positions which I have assumed respecting the law of nations and an illicit trade to be erroneous, the error will not affect the argument in favor of the principles of the bill; for it is only what is unlawful which is forbidden, and it is left with the courts and juries to decide whether the acts which shall have been committed are lawful or unlawful. By recurring to the memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of New York it will be perceived that the principal act which they omit in their own enumeration of unlawful acts by a neutral, is resistance to the armed vessel of a belligerent which is not a public vessel; they acknowledge resistance to a public armed vessel to be unlawful; by the omission they imply that resistance to a duly commissioned privateer is lawful. I need not say that the distinction is unfounded, and has never been acknowledged, except by special conventions, and only in the case of convoys.

If the principles of the bill are correct, the details alone remain to be examined; and it is principally necessary that they should be such as with certainty to carry the principles into effect. On that subject I have but few observations to make.

In the first section, I think that it would be an improvement if the owners were obliged to give bond in a fixed sum, say ten or twenty thousand dollars, in addition to double the value of the vessel, arms, &c. This would not be liable to the objection which induced the House to strike out the word “cargo,” viz., that in the East India trade the bond would be for an enormous sum; and it would give security in those cases where the vessel itself may be worth but a trifle compared with the value and expected profits of the voyage.

In the same section, it seems to me that there is no reason why the last condition expressed in the 3d Section of the Act of the 25th June, 1798, should not be inserted. The Act is made so mild that the only danger to be apprehended is that its provisions will be inefficient and its intention defeated. The proposed proviso would enable the President to add such restrictions as experience might show to be necessary; and it is not liable to the well-founded objections made against the section rejected by the House, which authorized the President to prevent altogether the sailing of armed vessels under certain circumstances.

The second section is obscure, and, I think, misprinted. Mr. Madison proposes, as a substitute, a much shorter one, which I enclose.

In the third section, the provision which subjects the value of the vessel to forfeiture should be more explicit, by declaring that such value shall be recovered from either the owners or master of the vessel. Penal statutes are construed strictly; in every suit the bias is against the United States; and the penalty might be evaded if the persons from whom it must be recovered, when the vessel cannot be seized, are not described.

I will trouble you no longer, and you must excuse this long, unconnected letter, but I have not time to write either a better or a shorter one.

Believe me to be, with great regard and respect, your very obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

REMARKS ON THE INAUGURAL.

[12th February, 1805.]

Louisiana.—“That the acquisition may pay for itself before we are called on, and keep down the accruing interest,” had, I think, be better omitted, or at least modified, as it is rather going too far in saying that such event is probable: it is barely possible. “The larger our association, the less will it be shaken by local passions”—is not this doubtful and too generally expressed?

Religion.—May not another expression be substituted to that of sects?

I had rather not to particularize the acts of fasting, praying, &c., as things which ought not to be prescribed or controlled by the general government. The sentiment is certainly true, but it implies censure not only on predecessors, but on the State governors, city mayors, &c., who, though they have no more authority under the States than the President under the general government for that object, have nevertheless issued proclamations of that kind.

Indians.—“The virtues” is too general; they have but a few,—I think very few. As it relates to the moral causes which prevent their improvement, I think licentiousness to be the principal, and the consequent want of the social institutions which establish and secure property and marriage to be the greatest obstacles to civilization. But, supposing even the whole of what is stated on that subject in the speech, to be correct, the allusion to old-school doctrines and to New England habits appears to me inexpedient, and I would strike out at least from “great efforts” to “same land.”

Press.—Would it not be better to suppress all which may be considered as expressions of personal feelings, say from “valuing characters” to “indignation”? Yet the idea that the licentiousness of the press lessens its usefulness should not be omitted. In the remainder of that article there is perhaps more said on the subject of the re-election than is necessary. Those two heads, Indians and Press, appear to me susceptible of improvement, and, if the President should think it proper to expunge any considerable part, will of course require some new modifications in the arrangement.

For the same reason which made me object to the general plan of the speech, I would suggest the propriety of dilating more on what is due, in the beneficial results of the Administration, to the legislative acts of Congress, and to the people themselves, both as electors of Congress and as influencing measures by the weight of public opinion.

The more that has been done shall in the speech be ascribed to others than the Executive, the less shall any imputation of self-applause attach to it.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Department Treasury, 28th March, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

The bad arrangement of districts on the lakes had heretofore prevented the organization of the district of Erie, which includes Cayuga. A representation was made on that subject to Congress, and a law was obtained which, amongst other things, authorizes you to designate the port of entry and delivery for the district of Erie. Cayuga is the most proper place for that purpose, and I mentioned to you that as soon as I could hear of a proper character for the office I would submit the appointment to you. This of course has anticipated the request of the Assembly of Ohio, as it will give them not only a port of delivery but one of entry at Cayuga. It may be expected that the district will be organized in the course of the spring.

I have nothing new to mention. The Treasury is poor, and if all the bills come at once from France, it will be difficult, even with the assistance of the bank, to meet them. A loan of about one million and a half will be necessary, but I think we will be able to repay it in the course of the year.

Mr. Livingston’s arrangements on that and some other subjects have not been the best possible; and much do I fear that his interference and schemes respecting Florida have done much to prevent Mr. Monroe’s success in Spain.

With sincere respect and attachment, your obedient servant.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Monticello, April 3, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

Your favor of 26th [28th?] March is received, and I learn with real concern the danger that a temporary loan may be necessary, because we know how it will be perverted to throw dust in the eyes of the people. However, if no other expedient can be used, we must meet it. I have no expectation that Monroe will be able to get any acknowledgment of boundary which we can admit. The next best measure will be to obtain a free use of the rivers of either party, rising within the limits of the other, and that neither party shall either settle or fortify within the disputed country until the limits can be fixed. This will give us time to await and avail ourselves of events. I presume the appointment of Flowers may wait my return. In the mean time the other may be heard from. I have desired the Postmaster-General to forward nothing to me here after the 5th instant, as I expect to be with you in a fortnight. Accept affectionate salutations and assurances of constant friendship and respect.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Treasury Department, 23d April, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

I enclose the sketch of an Act for organizing the new district of Sacket Harbor, in conformity with the Act of 3d March, 1803 (6th vol. p. 273). If you approve of the form and division, a fair copy shall be prepared for your signature.

Pierce’s plan of a depreciating paper is returned. Herman Husband, the Pennsylvania madman, proposed a similar one to the Legislature of that State in the year 1779; only his paper, instead of depreciating at a regular rate each time it passed in the hands of another man, was to depreciate, instead of bearing interest, regularly every day so as to be worth nothing at the end of three years. Pierce’s paper is to be worth nothing when it shall have passed through the hands of ten persons. It is evident that such paper, without the assistance of severe tender laws, will be worth nothing from the day it is issued. But, supposing such laws to exist and to be enforced, what do such plans amount to? If the depreciation is very gradual, say one per cent., or one per thousand, instead of ten per cent. on each payment, it is perfectly similar to a stamp duty on receipts, notes, &c. If the depreciation be at the rate of ten per cent., as suggested by Pierce, it is the Spanish alcabala.

With great respect, your obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Treasury Department, 9th May, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

I enclose Mr. Sanford’s answer respecting a district judge. Van Wyke is certainly very young, not above twenty-five; he is General Van Cortlandt’s nephew, and has the negative recommendation of being neither a Livingston nor a Clinton. The persons proposed are, therefore,

Brockholst Livingston.

George Clinton, Jr.

Tallmage (Governor Clinton’s son-in-law, and would both in New York and in the State be preferred to George).

Van Wyke.

I must repeat that I will not consider the revenue as very safe under B. Livingston. His decision, as a State judge, in the case of the Sandy Hook beacons was very inimical, and at the time ascribed by some to E. Livingston’s removal. If you continue of opinion that Swartwout shall be removed unless he pays, and you will be pleased to direct a commission in the name of Peter A. Schenk, the person recommended by De Witt Clinton, to be sent to me, I will transmit it to Mr. Sanford with instructions to give it, unless Mr. Swartwout shall make payment within a limited time.

I have received Latrobe’s plan of fire-proof buildings, but cannot understand it fully without referring to the general sketch which he has sent you. I will do myself the pleasure to wait on you to-morrow for that purpose, but I had expected that he would come and stay here a few days. Of Tatham’s fitness for any actual employment I cannot judge. He has certainly genius, but the appearance of something bordering on mental derangement. I may be mistaken, and would like to know.

With great respect, your obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Department Treasury, 28th May, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

The last paragraph of the enclosed letter seems to confirm the hints that Great Britain had not succeeded in forming any efficient alliance on the Continent.

There is an Act passed by the Legislative Council of Orleans for dividing the Territory into counties, which, if it has been received either by you or by the Department of State, would assist in dividing the two land districts. It will be necessary to establish it soon, as Mr. Thomson has accepted and writes that he will be on the spot in July.

By a sketch of the revenue (impost) for 1804, I find that after deducting the drawbacks, debentures, bounties, expenses of collection, it amounts to	$13,180,000
That of 1803 was only (on which our estimates are founded)	$11,310,000
making an increase of	$1,870,000
which arises from the following items, viz.:
New Orleans revenue,	$270,000
Light money and specific duties for six months at most,	100,000
Mediterranean fund for six months,	470,000
Natural and war increase,	1,100,000
	$1,940,000
Deduct increased expenses of collection,	$70,000
Increase as above,	$1,870,000

Our receipts have not, however, kept altogether pace this year with that apparent increase, owing principally to the great re-exportations this year of articles imported last season.

The gross revenue of New Orleans has been for the three last quarters of 1804	$232,576
add for another quarter	68,000
makes for the whole year	$300,576

The first quarter of 1804 gave but 34,000 dollars under the Spanish duties and regulations. Our laws commenced on 1st April.

With great respect and attachment, your obedient servant.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

May 29, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

I have no information that the Act dividing Orleans into counties is passed. By the papers which came yesterday it appeared to have been twice read and committed. Would not the waters of the Red River form one proper district, and the residuary country another? or the waters of the Red River and the country above and between that and the Mississippi for one, and the residuary country the other?

The financial part of your letter is highly pleasing. There must be something more in this increase of revenue than the natural and war increase; depreciation to a small degree in other countries, a sensible one in this, and a great one in England, must make a part of it, and is a lesson to us to prefer ad valorem to fixed duties. The latter require often retouching, or they become delusive. As to the Orleans revenue, I presume we may consider it as the consumption of 60,000 people and their increase, added to that of 6,000,000 and their increase; for though the former will increase faster than the latter, it will only be by drawing off numbers from them. But, from whatever cause, the increase of revenue is a pleasing circumstance, as it hastens the moment of liberating our revenue, and of permitting us to begin upon canals, roads, colleges, &c. I presume you will locate on your map the Indians from Sibley’s statement; my maps being in the hands of the binder, I cannot do it; but when you shall have done it, I shall be glad to have a consultation with you on the extent to which we may lay off townships, and of the assurance we may give to the Indians included within them. I enclose you a paper at Mr. Madison’s request. Affectionate salutations.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Department of Treasury, 30th May, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

I have taken notes of the situation of the Indian tribes in Lower Louisiana as given by Sibley, and, having compared them with Humboldt’s and Nolen’s sketches, think that I can locate them all with sufficient correctness for present purposes. But the great desideratum is a map, not good, but at least tolerable. The documents we have are not merely imperfect, but altogether contradictory, principally for the Attacapa and part of the Opelousas districts. I am now preparing at leisure moments a rough sketch, in which the ascertained points will be fixed, and an attempt made to reconcile the clashing authorities. This, till we have better information, will at least do better than any of our existing maps, and I will locate the Indian tribes in it. Most of those tribes within the tract we mean to have surveyed are within the existing settlements, and appear to be cultivators. It is presumable that they have but very limited claims, and, exclusively of the communications to be made by the Indian agent or superintendent, great confidence may be placed on the discretion and tenderness for Indian rights of Mr. Briggs. At present I can only add that in one of Clark’s sketches I have discovered three Indian villages not mentioned by Sibley, one of Chitimachas, at the place where Bayou Plaquemine unites with the Chafalaya, and two of a nation called Ouachas, or Couchas (the writing in French not being very legible), on the branches or bayous of the Chafalaya below the Chitimachas. The Bayou Chico, mentioned by Sibley as a branch of the Opelousa, and the seat of two tribes, I can find in no map or sketch whatever. I believe that on examination of the relative situations, you will find that the Opelousa and Attacapa districts will be much more conveniently united, as a land office district, with the Red River settlement than with those on the Mississippi.

I had earnestly requested that expenditures might be as moderate as possible for a few months, in order that our receipts might so accumulate as to enable us to meet the French bills without borrowing. As it seems by Mr. Armstrong’s last letter that they will not come for some time, it is probable that we will avoid that evil resource. But it is proper that I should state that the War Department has assisted us in that respect much better than the Navy Department, as will appear from the enclosed account of expenditures for each during the first five months of this year. Yet, in relation to the navy, no fleet has been fitted this spring; and four months’ pay to the five or six hundred men sent by the John Adams and gunboats, which was the only extraordinary expense, is an object of only sixty or seventy thousand dollars. As I know that there was an equal wish in both Departments to aid in this juncture, it must be concluded either that the War is better organized than the Navy Department, or that naval business cannot be conducted on reasonable terms. Whatever the cause may be, I dare predict that whilst that state of things continues we will have no navy, nor shall progress towards having one. As a citizen of the United States, it is an event that I will not deprecate; but I think it due to the credit of your Administration that after so much has been expended on that account, you should leave an increase of rather than an impaired fleet. On this subject, the expense of the navy greater than the object seemed to require, and a merely nominal accountability, I have, for the sake of preserving perfect harmony in your councils, however grating to my feelings, been almost uniformly silent; and I beg that you will ascribe what I now say to a sense of duty and to the grateful attachment I feel for you.

With great respect, your obedient servant.

If you have no objection, I would wish to be absent next week, as a short jaunt will be of service to me.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Department of Treasury, 1st July, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

It appears from the enclosed letters of F. Baring and Mr. Merry that the last British instalment of £200,000 will be paid in London on 15th instant. This is a great relief to us, and still more to the banks, as the exportation of that sum in specie would have distressed them at this moment beyond measure. That being paid, the only extraordinary expense to be provided for is the 3,750,000 dollars claims assumed by the convention with France, payment of which may now be daily expected. On this day, after having paid the quarterly interest on the public debt, we have more than 4,200,000 dollars left in the Treasury; so that, instead of paying only two millions of those claims from the Treasury and borrowing the rest as we had stated in our estimates to Congress, we will be able to pay the whole without borrowing anything.

This will, if the bills come all at once and immediately, drain the Treasury very low. But as, if we overcome this difficulty, there is no probability, unless in case of war, that during your Administration any other loan shall be wanted, it was an object to strain every nerve to meet this demand without recurring to that kind of resource. Within six weeks we will be at ease, and may then resume the suspended expenditures, particularly the payments on account of the sinking fund, which are much in arrears.

I submit the draft of an answer to R. Morris, which I have purposely made less explicit than your opinion seemed to purport, in order to be able to decide according to the circumstances of the case when they shall all be known.

I do not recollect any instance of a suit on a revenue bond in which I have interfered. The district attorneys have on some occasions, as I understand, assumed the responsibility of giving some indulgence.

But less is shown in that species of suits than in any other, not only because there must be a certainty in the collection of the revenue, but because the law directs in that case that the bond shall be put in suit on the day it becomes due if not paid. This subject, as to details, is under the immediate superintendence of the Comptroller, as he has the direction both of the revenue and of all the suits in the United States, and if Mr. Sheaff had made an application to me I should have refused it to him.

If you have no objection to his letter to you being thus placed on the public files of that office, it may be referred in that manner; but if you have any, Mr. Sheaff should write to the Comptroller or to me and obtain from the district attorney a statement of the case, with his opinion that the security of the United States will not be injured by the delay which may be granted.

Respectfully, your obedient servant.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Washington, July 2, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

The answer to Morris is perfectly well, as it leaves the case open for decision as the fact or law shall be. I have dropped a line to Sheaff to address either yourself or the Comptroller on his case. The prospect of avoiding a loan is really most pleasing. I observe Mr. Livingston is arrived, and the newspapers seem to suppose the call for the French money will soon take place. You have not told me when you propose to leave this place. I keep back my letter to Mr. Smith till you enable me to fix a day for his coming. Affectionate salutations.

GALLATIN TO SAMUEL SMITH, U. S. Sen.

17th July, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

It is impossible for me to calculate the effect of the measure you propose on our finances. I am very confident, however, that the consumption of foreign linens would be diminished if the importation of Irish linens was forbidden; and the same may be said, though the effect would not be so extensive, of hats, nails, writing-paper, glassware, and medicines.

There is a difficulty, supposing the measure to be proper, in selecting the articles on which the prohibition should fall. For the less of an English article we consume, the less will the prohibition affect them; and the more we consume of it, the more will the prohibition affect our own finances.

As to the general policy of the measure, it is not a question to be solved, at least by me, without more information and consideration, nor to be answered in a short letter. An objection which on first impression strikes me, is that the total prohibition of English manufactures being the strongest measure of retaliation which we can adopt, the mere extra export duty is not perhaps sufficient cause to call forth that remedy. It might perhaps be better to reserve it as an arm for occasions of more importance; and it may be queried whether the enforcement of the Navigation Act in Europe, and of the colonial system in the West Indies, though more susceptible of justification than the difference made against us by the export duty, be not substantially much more injurious to the United States.

Have you consulted Mr. Madison on the subject? I have not sufficiently thought upon it to form an opinion satisfactory to myself.

Your friend and servant.

GALLATIN TO MADISON.

New York, 6th August, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

It cannot be expected that the banks will make a loan to La Fayette; they never lend on real property; of the value of the Louisiana lands no person can at present give them sufficient assurances, and their answer will be that they are ready to make the requested advance on La Fayette’s notes with two approved endorsers. I will confer with Toussard on his arrival, and give every assistance in my power; but everything depends on some fortunate, extraordinary location; for no lands, however fertile, will, merely as objects of common cultivation, realize his expectations.

The demands from Spain were too hard to have expected, even independent of French interference, any success from the negotiation. It could only be hoped that the tone assumed by our negotiators might not be such as to render a relinquishment or suspension of some of our claims productive of some loss of reputation. If we are safe on that ground, it may be eligible to wait for a better opportunity before we again run the risk of lowering the national importance by pretensions which our strength may not at this moment permit us to support. If from the manner in which the negotiation has been conducted, and has terminated, that effect has already been produced, how to save character without endangering peace will be a serious and difficult question. Perhaps a law making efficient provision for building a dozen of ships of the line would be the most dignified and most forcible mode of reopening the negotiation; but it will be a doubt with some whether the remedy be not worse than the disorder. At all events, to go to war for the western boundary of Louisiana, or even for the country between Mississippi and Perdido, after having omitted in our treaty of purchase to bind France to a certain construction of limits, never will do. The refusal to ratify the convention is, in my view of the subject, the most offensive part of the proceeding.

Mr. Randolph and Mr. Nicholson are both anxious to know with precision the time when Mr. Monroe may be expected in England, as they have both placed business of importance in his hands. I will thank you to communicate your knowledge or conjectures on that point.

Mrs. Gallatin joins in affectionate compliments to you and to Mrs. Madison, and sincerely hopes that she will receive prompt and efficient relief in Philadelphia. If she is better, you should come and pay a visit to the American Tyre, which you would hardly recognize.

Yours truly.

I find that Lear has drawn £5000 on the Barings, on the contingent credit of 100,000 dollars which had been given for the ransom in case of peace. Do you know for what reason? and was it not wrong to diminish that fund, or rather to divert it from its intended object?

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Monticello, August 7, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

You have probably learnt through other channels that our Commissioners to Spain have terminated their mission without success in a single point. I have desired Mr. Madison to send you the papers, and when you shall have perused them I will ask a communication of your general view of what is expedient for us to do. I ask the same of the other gentlemen. When I shall have received them it will enable me to form precise points on which to ask their ultimate judgment. This will employ some time; but the case is serious, and is entitled to time and mature consideration.

Tremble declines the office of commissioner in the western district of Orleans. I have not a single person in view for it: can you furnish one? Gideon Fitz, one of Briggs’s deputy surveyors, is gone to Tombigbee to survey; no honester man lives. I know him intimately, and should not fear to trust him with my whole fortune uncounted. His mathematical talents are good; and, though this has been his particular line, his understanding and knowledge of life fit him for other lines. He will make a good receiver at Tombigbee when you want one, and I think it probable he might accept it. If you know of no better, it might be best to appoint him at once, that, if he refuses, we may still have time to name another. Accept affectionate salutations.

P.S.—It seems essential to our success with England that we should not be understood as absolutely committed to war with Spain.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

New York, 17th August, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

An excursion into the country with a sick child has prevented my writing for several days.

But I had indeed very little to say. Enclosed you will find:

1. John Nicholas’s letter recommending Samuel Latta as collector of customs for the district of Genesee. The sooner a commission can issue, [the better,] as the Canadians smuggle; it has been delayed only from want of information.

2. Judge Toulmin’s letter on the subject of the office of receiver of public moneys. I do not know to what he alludes; some mistake, I suppose, of printer Smith. A commission either for him or for Gideon Fitz should be issued this fall.

3. A letter from Holmes, who is already appointed to the office for which he applies.

4. Several letters in favor of John Kittredge as collector of Gloucester vice Gibault, who is dying, but not to my knowledge yet dead.

I received yesterday your letters of 7th and 9th insts.

What to say about a commissioner vice Tremble I do not know, as, he having accepted, all the other applications and recommendations have been left in Washington. If I can recollect or find somebody, I will write you immediately.

On the Spanish affairs I will, in conformity with your request, try to throw my ideas on paper. Generally, I think the present time unfavorable either for urging our claims by further negotiations or for enforcing them by war. The great difficulty is how to keep them suspended without abandoning the ground assumed or loss of reputation. Yet that may not be impossible; but a little delay will do no injury, and if any positive instructions could be delayed till October, it would, I think, be preferable.

With great respect and attachment, your obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

New York, 12th September, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

I enclose at last some observations on the Spanish affairs. The anxiety and occasional absence occasioned by the lingering illness of a child I finally lost had prevented my taking a sufficiently comprehensive view of the subject to commit anything to writing, and even now I feel that it is very defective. Accept my congratulations on the Tripolan peace, and my wishes that you may terminate as favorably the Spanish differences.

With sincere attachment and great respect, your obedient servant.

[Enclosure.]

SPANISH AFFAIRS.

12th September, 1805.

Subjects of difference:

1. Boundaries of Louisiana, East and West.

2. Spoliations, refusal to ratify convention, and French Spanish captures.

Modes of acting:

1. War. 2. Active negotiations. 3. Suspension of discussions.

War.—1. Its justice as it relates to boundaries.

The claim of the United States is not evident, but is derived for the east, by construction, from the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, and rests for the west on the accidental landing of La Salle at St. Bernard, and on the French establishment of the Mississippi being prior to those of Spain east of Rio Norte. It is not presumed that the last object (the west boundary) shall by any one be considered as a just subject of war. To me the claim has always appeared doubtful. The doctrine of European rights to uncivilized countries as derived from discovery and possession is not reducible and never has been reduced to fixed rules. The positive right of discovery extends in this case only to the Mississippi; that of occupancy, beyond what is actually possessed by us on the sea-shore west of that river, is confined to the accidental and transient settlement of La Salle. Crozat’s charter, being a public act acquiesced in by the silence of Spain, gives the most valid title, but embraces only the waters emptying into the Mississippi. On the other hand, the Adayes and Nacogdoches settlement, whatever was its origin (and Spain may assert that it was as legal as that of La Salle), was formed before the short war between the Quadruple Alliance and Spain (the Regent and Alberoni). During that war Pensacola was three times taken and retaken. At the peace it was restored, and Perdido fixed as the boundary of Florida and Louisiana. But, although it does not appear that the western boundary was then fixed, the Adayes settlement was suffered to remain. That acquiescence on the part of France, confirmed by her subsequent silence and by the undisturbed possession and exercise of the rights of sovereignty of Spain during more than forty years (1718-1762), throws such uncertainty on our claims, that a resort to arms for that cause will, I think, appear unjustifiable in the opinion of mankind and even of America. That we have still an undefined claim is true; this may, when a proper opportunity shall offer, be used for the purpose of obtaining a convenient eastern boundary; for it will certainly be the interest of unbiassed Spain to obtain from us a relinquishment to the country bordering on the Mexico settlements; but if no arrangement should take place on that subject during the present generation, the natural growth of the United States will hereafter naturally enforce the claim to its full extent.

The claim of the United States on the east as far as Perdido is much better founded.

The word “retrocede” is the only expression in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso which countenances the construction of Spain. She insists that that expression confines her cession to so much only as she had received from France. But every other expression and sentence of the treaty supports the construction of the United States. Yet it must again be repeated that the claim is not self-evident, but constructive; and the following considerations seem to render the justice of a war in its support extremely doubtful: 1st. Whether ascribed to policy, or to precipitancy, or to any other cause, it is not less the fact that the acquisition of Louisiana without any fixed boundaries was the act of the United States; for the act of their negotiators is theirs; if they intended at all events to obtain the now disputed territory between Mississippi and Perdido, if they then attached such value to it as to risk a war for securing it, they would not have signed the treaty without placing the subject beyond the possibility of dispute. The manner in which the treaty is drawn betrays either unpardonable oversight or indifference to that object, and a disposition to trust to a mere contingency for securing it. 2dly. Not only we neglected, when the treaty was made, to obtain from France, if not a guarantee, at least an official declaration of what she considered as the boundary of the territory ceded to her by the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, but Spain was not consulted on the subject. If, therefore, a previous explanation had taken place between Spain and France on that subject, however we may complain of the duplicity of France for having withheld such communication, Spain may justly oppose it to our demands. If A purchases from B a tract of land, and the boundaries are not precisely defined by the deed; if by subsequent articles the parties explain the meaning of the deed; if neither the deed nor articles have been made matter of public record; and if afterwards C shall purchase from A on the face of the first deed, and, notwithstanding its want of precision, shall neither ask from A a guarantee or even explanation of the boundaries, nor inquire from B what he had intended to convey; it is true that he may have recourse against A for the deception in not showing the articles, but it is very doubtful whether the disputed land can be recovered from B, who has in the mean while never given possession, and who had even, before C’s purchase was ratified, warned him not to purchase. 3dly. We cannot deny that we had before the ratification of the treaty a knowledge of the intention of the parties to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, so far as related to the eastern boundaries. For we knew that Laussat was instructed to demand and the Spanish officers to deliver, east of the Mississippi, that part only which is in our possession.

As it relates to the spoliations.—This appears a more just cause of war; and if the original offence was of a recent date, if the refusal to restrain or compensate for the aggressions had been made whilst they continued to exist, the question would certainly become one of policy alone. The conduct of Spain was not, however, at the time considered as a cause of war; and it may be said at this moment that, in the relation in which she then stood towards France, of alliance against an enemy, and of vassalage to that great power, her conduct was a natural consequence of our hostilities with that nation. It is certain that when we were negotiating for the purpose of obtaining reparation for our merchants, we had no idea of going to war in case of failure. It is her refusal to ratify what by the convention itself she had acknowledged as justly due to us which is the cause of offence. And supposing that the other objections of Spain have been removed, the only ground of dispute on this point is the modification which they ask, and which, although they have no right to demand it, amounts only to expressions which, without impairing the reserved rights of either party, shall only prevent a constructive admission of our right by Spain to be inferred from the instrument. The only words to which Spain objects are those which seem, by construction, to convey an idea that she recognizes in the abstract the justice of our claim for French aggressions originating or countenanced in her ports. Is the preservation of those equivocal words which give us very little more than a mere general reservation of the rights of the parties a just cause of war?

That, in case of rupture on the grounds on which we stand, plausible and in some respects solid arguments may be urged in answer to the preceding remarks I have no doubt; but from the nature of the subject, they will be so refined that they cannot carry that conviction of the justice of our cause which is necessary to justify a war in the public opinion and to our own hearts. The high station which American and, I flatter myself, Mr. J.’s administration now occupy in the eyes of other nations, is principally due to the opinion which is entertained of their wisdom, justice, and moderation; and I think it (exclusively of every reason derived from duty) of primary importance that nothing should be done to weaken those favorable impressions; and that if war must be ultimately resorted to, we should previously place the controversy on such ground as will evidently put Spain in the wrong.

2. Its policy.

Whether the issue of a war be favorable or not, some unavoidable consequences must ensue. 1st. We will be shut up from our commercial intercourse with Italy, Spain, France, and Holland. 2dly. Our remaining commerce, particularly with the West and East Indies, will, to a certain extent, be injured. 3dly. Our existing revenue will be diminished. It is not possible to form any precise calculation or even probable estimate of the degree to which we will be injured in those several respects; but it would be a much more favorable conjecture than comports with my view of the subject to suppose that the unavoidable effect of even a successful war on our revenue would be to reduce it to a level with our current peace expenditure (sinking fund, 8 millions; war, navy, foreign intercourse, civil list, and miscellaneous demands, 2½ to 3 millions; in all, 11 millions), and that all the expenses of the war must be supported by loans or new taxes. The extent of those would depend on that of our operations; their nature would be a matter of subsequent consideration. I will only name the principal resources in the order in which they would probably be resorted to. Increase of impost; sales of lands on cheaper terms by wholesale; stamps; direct tax; taxes on manufactures. Our expected gain by the war (I do not speak of the injury done to the enemy) would be the improbable ratification of the convention; a probable establishment of boundaries eastwardly to Perdido, westwardly on just terms; and perhaps the acquisition of Florida. We would at any time, even after a successful campaign, accept of the terms proposed by Mr. Monroe, viz., establish the boundaries of Louisiana and take Florida in exchange of the convention. What are both Floridas worth? For this is exactly what we may gain. What were we willing to give for them? and what would be the cost of one year’s war?—not merely the positive expense, but the national loss?

(Here let it be observed that in case of rupture, it is to be expected that France and Spain will seize or sequester property to an immense amount. Amsterdam, Antwerp, and even Bordeaux, Cadiz, and Leghorn, are filled with our merchants’ property, exclusively of vessels which might be there at the time. With all those nations the American commerce is now carried on with American capital, and the exchange 5 to 10 per cent. in our favor.)

I think that every view of the subject will enforce a conviction that a war, even more successful than our resources render it probable, would, as a matter of calculation, be most unprofitable; and that the only ground on which it can be defended is the necessity of asserting our rights from a fear that passive endurance will provoke a succession of injuries. That there is a point where forbearance must cease cannot be doubted; whether we have reached that point in relation to Spain I doubt; and it may be questioned whether, both as a real injury and as a point affecting the national dignity, the annual blockade of our ports and the perpetual impressment of our seamen be not more essential wrongs than any we have suffered from Spain. But what will be the probable result of a war, and how shall we carry it on? I believe that we may, with our existing military resources, or at least with little addition, take possession of both Floridas, perhaps reach through the wilderness the miserable establishments of Santa Fé and San Antonio, and alarm the outposts of Mexico. But it does not appear to me that we can go beyond that without a waste of treasure and of men which we cannot supply. The taking of Havana, the most decisive stroke for forcing a peace, would require some naval co-operation on the part of the British, an army of fifteen or twenty thousand men, six months’ siege, and from ten to twenty millions of dollars. Vera Cruz might perhaps cost less, but would be less important. If we were not able to take either, peace must depend less on our exertions than on the course which the French government may pursue. If Bonaparte, haughty and obstinate as he is, shall think proper to persevere, notwithstanding our taking Florida, then our fate becomes linked to that of England, and the conditions of our peace will depend on the general result of the European war. And this is one of the worst evils which the United States could encounter; for an entangling alliance, undefined debts and taxes, and in fine a subversion of all our hopes, must be the natural consequence.

Negotiations.—Three advantages may result from a renewal of negotiations in some shape or another: 1st. The hope of a permanent and complete, or at least temporary and partial arrangement, in which last case war will be at least prevented. 2dly. Such modification of our demands as will, in case of refusal, place the justice of our cause on evident ground. 3dly. Some time gained which may enable us to be somewhat better prepared for the conflict. By active negotiations, I meant such as would have for object a complete arrangement of every existing difference; by suspension of discussion, I contemplated some temporary agreement which, without affecting the question, might save the rights and the credit of both nations, leaving the final result to future contingencies. In whatever shape these negotiations may be carried on, they will still relate either to the boundaries or to the convention; to which I would add the subject of new and existing aggressions, especially from Cuba.

1st. Boundaries.—The present moment does not appear favorable for pressing a renewal of negotiations for a final arrangement on that subject. Unless a very unexpected revolution should take place in the political situation of Spain, it seems that such arrangement must depend on France, and that it is with her that we ought to negotiate. But there is so little hope of success with either, that the attempt would only, in all probability, aggravate the evil we mean to parry. Yet, as it is impossible to foresee the fluctuations which may take place in the councils of both nations and the events which may offer a favorable opportunity, it would be prudent to vest our ministers at Paris and Madrid with such powers as may enable them, not to urge a negotiation, but to be ready to enter into one if it shall be offered; and for that purpose an ultimatum may be prepared and sent to them. The terms may be the subject of further consideration; and I will only say that I would think it for the interest of the United States, and no improper relinquishment of their rights, to take the Sabine and Perdido for boundaries on the sea-shore, including always within Louisiana all the waters of the Mississippi. In the mean while two propositions may be made for a temporary arrangement, which had been already suggested to our ministers, but do not seem to have been mentioned by them, viz., a statu quo, and the free navigation of the Mobile.

Statu quo.—Although this seems to be a simple and reasonable demand in the abstract, its application presents some difficulties. 1st. If Spain be sensible that she can strengthen her positions only by increase of military force, whilst we strengthen ourselves by forming new settlements, she may object to a plan which would preclude only her progress and would not affect us. 2dly. If the arrangement should be proposed for the disputed territory only; as the whole is in the possession of Spain, and as we might in the mean while increase our force at New Orleans and in the now disputed part of Louisiana west of the Mississippi, whilst she should be precluded from adding to her posts from Perdido to the Mississippi and to those of Nacogdoches and San Antonio; the conditions would be substantially unequal, since we would then be enabled at any time to take possession of the whole at a single stroke. And, on the other hand, we could not agree generally not to increase our force at New Orleans, &c., nor Spain to a similar condition for Havana, Pensacola, &c.; so that there is an equal difficulty in forming an arrangement which will preclude either party from reinforcing its existing posts, whether that arrangement be confined to the disputed territory or embrace the adjacent establishments. The only proposition which appears practicable is that neither party should form any new military post in advance of what they have, nor particularly between Natchitoches and San Antonio, leaving both at liberty to reinforce all existing military posts. If Spain shall insist that not only new military posts but also new settlements be precluded, the precise lines must be defined, and so save the pride of Spain, by abandoning our right to settle for the present some part of what she acknowledges to be ours; the river Mermenteau or Calcasieu, at her choice (both lie a little east of the Sabine), might be fixed on our side, and the Colorado on hers; but it would be preferable to say nothing about settlements, for it must be recollected that the offer of a desert for fifteen years was intended, in case the western boundary could not be settled, as an inducement for a relinquishment on the part of Spain of her claim to the country between Perdido and Mississippi. For us the condition of no new military post being erected is sufficient, both as an honorable means to extricate ourselves from our present embarrassment and as a matter of security; for, if an arrangement is made, it is not very material that Spain should increase her existing posts, nor will she be very able now to do it. To this there is but one exception: she must not if possible be permitted to erect new posts on the Mississippi, nor to strengthen her works or military force at Baton Rouge. Nor would it be necessary to consider a refusal on the part of Spain to accede formally to the statu quo as a cause of war. For although, if she shall act in such a manner in every respect as to force a war, that refusal will strengthen the justice of our cause; yet, if other matters be arranged, it might be sufficient on that subject to state that we would advance in case they should, leaving to Spain the odium both of the encroachment and of the rupture, if she should think proper to oppose by force such advance on our part.

Mobile.—Although this subject may be mentioned, I would not consider it as an ultimatum, or a refusal on the part of Spain as cause of war: 1st, because its importance is not at present sufficient to run any great risk on that account; 2dly, because the right is not by the law of nations generally acknowledged. It is undoubtedly a natural right, but usage and treaties have modified it amongst European nations in so many different ways, that I believe there is not a single similar case in which the right when used does not rest on prescription or positive treaty. It will also be well to consider that if acceded to by Spain, she will probably claim the same privilege for Baton Rouge; and yet the cases are not similar, since our settlements on Mobile lie within our boundaries as acknowledged by Spain, and Baton Rouge is within the disputed territory.

2d. Convention.—This, under existing circumstances, seems to be the most delicate part of the business. If we insist on it and fail, it leads to a war, and we cannot abandon it altogether without some disgrace, blended as the subject is with the other negotiation. For had it stood alone, our delay during fifteen months to ratify it, by showing that we did not set a very high value on it, would in fact have served as an apology for our not resenting the refusal of Spain to ratify. It was for that reason that I was of opinion last fall that it was better to lose the whole instrument than to accept the modification, nominal as it was, proposed by Spain. But now that the question presents itself under a very different aspect, it seems to me that it is of primary importance, having failed in the other objects, to obtain the ratification even on terms somewhat similar to those proposed by Spain. What I would then suggest is that, demanding in the first place a pure ratification, should no other objection be made by Spain than that of its containing an admission (by inference) on her part of our right to compensation for French spoliations, our minister should accept a ratification with a bien entendu or a declaration in the procès-verbal of the exchange of ratifications, that nothing contained in the instrument shall be construed as a recognition or relinquishment by either party of the claims not provided for, or any other words to that effect.

3d. New aggressions.—These are to a great extent, and afford a just ground for complaint. I am told that the rate of insurance, which is but 3½ per cent. to the British Windward Islands, is from 10 to 15 to Jamaica, and that almost solely owing to the French and Spanish privateers often armed in Cuba, and who uniformly take their prizes there and plunder them. It might not be advisable under other circumstances to take any other measures on this subject than we do in relation to the aggressions of other nations; but it may be proper, particularly if the refusal of Spain to give us any kind of satisfaction on the other subjects shall render a war probable, to press the subject with great force upon them. I think that it will, at all events, have a good effect on the whole negotiation, and in case of rupture will place the justice of our cause on the best possible ground. For then, supposing the other ideas to have been, under proper modifications, adopted, instead of giving for principal cause of the war a dispute for boundaries on which opinions would be divided, and which might lay us under an imputation of ambition, we would say: the boundaries of Louisiana were not fixed; we proposed to Spain that until they were, no new posts should be established by either party, and Spain will not agree to that proposal; Spain had by a convention acknowledged wrongs formerly done by her, and promised compensation; she afterwards objected to the ratification under pretence that some expressions in the instrument might be construed to bind her beyond her intention; we agreed to a modification in the form of ratification which would remove that objection, and she refuses to ratify; not satisfied with former wrongs, she suffers in her ports the most flagrant violation of the law of nations, the plunder without trial and condemnation of our vessels employed in an innocent trade, and she refuses redress. Unless Spain is predetermined to risk a war in order to obtain a positive relinquishment of our claim to the disputed territory, it appears extremely improbable that she would place herself in such awkward situation.

Nothing else has struck me on the subject of negotiations; and I would only add that if it shall appear, which may easily be previously ascertained by our minister, that Spain will ratify the convention in any admissible shape, it would be more eligible to urge each subject by itself, and as entirely unconnected with each other. But if no ratification is expected, all three, convention, statu quo, and new aggressions, should be pressed together on Spain.

Preparations.—Some time will be gained by the negotiation, which if it produces no other advantage than to accumulate two or three millions of dollars in our Treasury, exhausted by the payment of the French bills, will not have been altogether useless. The militia and military preparations, which cost little or nothing, and which might be necessary to take possession at once of both Floridas the moment a rupture should take place, might also be made. But it is principally on Congress that the decision of those points and of all other preparations will rest; and it is even proper to recollect that as the power of making war is constitutionally vested in that body, it is the duty of the Executive to leave it so substantially, and to do no act which may put the peace of the country in jeopardy. This alone should induce particular moderation in the manner of negotiating; and such course being adopted, the next question will be whether the President should lay the subject before Congress at their next session, and if so, in what shape? As it is not doubted, however, that in some shape or another the subject will be communicated to the Legislature, it will be sufficient to examine what preparatory measures can be taken by that body, on the supposition that they will not as yet vote any additional taxes, nor, on the other hand, diminish, as had been contemplated, the existing revenue, but will even for the present, notwithstanding the Tripolan peace, continue the additional duty of 2½ per cent., which, after discharging all current expenditures (including the 8 millions for the sinking fund and 600,000 dollars for the current navy expenses), will leave a probable annual surplus of two millions of dollars.

It is probable that the greater part of that surplus will be applied to the formation of a navy; and if Congress shall decide in favor of that measure, I would suggest that the mode best calculated in my opinion to effect it, and so impress other nations that we are in earnest about it, would be a distinct act enacted for that sole purpose, appropriating for a fixed number of years (or for as many years as would be sufficient to build a determinate number of ships of the line) a fixed sum of money, say one million of dollars annually, which will be about equal to the 2½ per cent. duty heretofore appropriated for the Tripolan war; and in order effectually to prevent the fund being diverted to current, contingent, or other purposes, to place it under the general superintendence of commissioners, in the same manner as the sinking fund, but leaving, of course, the immediate application and direction under that superintendence to the Navy Department. The money to be exclusively applied to the building of ships of the line; for there would still be a sufficient surplus to add immediately a few frigates to our navy. These last might be built by contract within the year; what progress might be made within the same time with the ships of the line I cannot say; but that it would lay the foundation of an efficient navy I have no doubt; and that the act would have a favorable effect on our foreign relations, and even on the pending negotiation, is also certain. Nor indeed, supposing Congress to be at all events averse to a war with Spain for the present, would it be an undignified course to make efficient provision for the preparation of a force that would prevent a repetition of wrongs which the United States did not at this moment feel prepared properly to resent. Whether the creation of an efficient navy may not, by encouraging wars and drawing us in the usual vortex of expenses and foreign relations, be the cause of greater evils than those it is intended to prevent, is not the question which I mean to discuss. This is to be decided by the representatives of the nation; and although I have been desirous that the measure might at least be postponed, yet I have had no doubt for a long time that the United States would ultimately have a navy. It is certain that so long as we have none, we must perpetually be liable to injuries and insults, particularly from the belligerent powers, when there is a war in Europe; and in deciding for or against the measure, Congress will fairly decide the question whether they think it more for the interest of the United States to preserve a pacific and temporizing system, and to tolerate those injuries and insults to a great extent, than to be prepared, like the great European nations, to repel every injury by the sword. The Executive will, from their decision, know the course which it behoves them to pursue in our foreign relations and discussions.

There is another measure which might be adopted by Congress, if they were determined on peace for the present at all events. It would be the appointment of commissioners to settle the claims for Spanish spoliations, showing thereby that though not willing to enforce at this time that just demand, they were determined not to abandon it, and to wait a favorable opportunity to press it. It is on a somewhat similar principle that the British government has lately ordered a distribution of the Spanish prize-money taken before the declaration of war amongst a certain description of merchants who had claims for former captures and contracts against Spain.

I have but one subject more on which to make any observations; it is on the interference of a war with our revenue system, and on the great advantage of a perseverance in the pacific system, if it was only for three or four years longer. Our existing revenue has been calculated to meet our current expenses. Our neutrality and the Tripolan additional duty may give us a surplus of about two millions, which, and it is a very low calculation, I consider as lost in case of war. These two millions alone applied to the building of a navy during the four ensuing years would, with what we have, give us ten or twelve ships of the line besides frigates, a force nearly equal in point of efficiency, considering the superiority of the men, to the Spanish navy. But this is not the most important consideration. Eight millions of our revenue are pledged for the sinking fund until the redemption of the whole debt, with a proviso (designedly inserted that the resources of the nation might not be palsied beyond a certain period) that when the whole debt, the old six per cent. deferred and three per cent. excepted, shall have been paid, there will be no necessity to apply the whole sum of eight millions annually. There now remain to be paid (besides the six, three, and deferred thus excepted) only 6½ millions eight per cent. and about 4 millions foreign, five and half, and navy six per cent. The redemption of those ten millions and half will be effected during the ensuing three years. And from the year 1809 inclusively, we shall not be compelled to pay any more annually than the interest on the remaining debt and annual reimbursement on the six per cent. and deferred stocks, amounting altogether to less than 4½ millions of dollars, and leaving, therefore, 3½ millions of dollars annually, which may be applied either to the purchase of the debt or to more pressing demands, according to circumstances. If the savings or preparations of the three ensuing years be added to the circumstance of having at once three millions and half of dollars annually at our disposal beyond what we now have, and that exclusively of our intermediate growth, the importance of our preserving peace during those three years will be easily understood.

Respectfully submitted.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Department Treasury, 13th September, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

I enclose a letter from Mr. Gurley showing the continued dissatisfaction or efforts to produce discontents at New Orleans.

The only recommendation I can find here for commissioner is the one enclosed, and it is for Orleans and not for Opelousas. The commissioners must meet on 1st December next. I have not heard whether Lewis will accept for Orleans. The yellow fever is in New York, and the inhabitants leaving the city.

I am asked every day whether there is any probability of a war with Spain. The inquiry comes from merchants, and the insurers hesitate whether to insure.

As far as I can ascertain from our friends, a war would be unpopular. The question of boundaries is considered as of inferior importance at this moment, and as one for which it would not be worth while to entangle the nation. But it is agreed that the refusal to ratify the convention and the continued spoliations by Spain, or by vessels which find asylum in her ports, can with difficulty be tolerated without some loss of reputation; yet, after all, they say, Keep us from war, and depend on the wisdom of Administration for doing it.

With sincere respect and attachment, your obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN GOLD.

Congress omitted last year to renew the temporary laws by which so much of the general act respecting foreign coins, as declares that no foreign gold or silver coin (Spanish dollars excepted) shall be current after the mint shall have been in operation a certain time, had from time to time been suspended. It followed that foreign gold ceased on 1st May last to be a legal tender. At that time nine-tenths of the circulating specie, or of that in the vaults of the several banks, consisted of such gold. A letter was written to the Bank of the United States recommending the importation of dollars from Europe, and the coining into American coins the foreign gold in their possession. Their answer is enclosed, and it must be observed that the omission of Congress, which was accidental, has done as yet no injury; for, as there was no other specie, every one by tacit consent has received and paid it as if it had been a legal tender.

The question which will arise on that subject is, Ought Congress again [to] make foreign gold a legal tender? and if so, should not something be done on the subject of Spanish gold? To the first question I have no hesitation to answer in the affirmative. But the second is more difficult to solve. It is evident that through mistake we have by law rated Spanish gold coins above their value. English and Portuguese coins are of the same standard with our own. French have been rated properly, or rather a little too low. To continue to receive Spanish coins above their value is to persist in error. To declare that they shall pass hereafter only at their real value will throw a loss on the holders and check the importation of that kind of specie, which in the course of trade is not easily obtained, and chiefly supplies us. To reduce our standard to the Spanish, raising of course the English, and Portuguese, and French gold coins to what would become their real value, might properly be considered as an alteration of our coins.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

October 11, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

The reasons of the bank against importing coin seem good under their views of the subject, which perhaps are not broad enough.

I think Congress should renew the tender of foreign coins; but whether any alteration in the comparative value of Spanish gold should be made admits of question. I imagine Colonel Hamilton had assays made wherein he founded his rates of foreign coins. Indeed, I think I recollect his having stated in some of his reports the particulars of his assays. I am almost certain Mr. Rittenhouse on some occasion reported assays to Congress; their result, I presume, was agreeable to what the law established. The assay by the bank on two single pieces is on much too small a scale to shake the legal establishment; they should be made on large masses, and by persons known to us. If the assay of the bank be sufficient to excite any suspicion, it would be better to instruct Mr. Patterson to have a sufficient assay made on a mass of Spanish gold, and to report on the subject. If there be not considerable error in the present rate, I should be against touching it. The merchants will soon learn to correct small errors in what they receive in foreign countries, and for interior circulation a small error is unimportant; it is like the case of worn silver or gold. Affectionate salutations.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

October 23, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

I send for your perusal another letter of Mr. Madison, which I will ask the favor of you to return immediately with the one sent on Saturday, and on which it is necessary to act.

The war on the Continent of Europe appears now so certain, and that peace is at least one year off, that we are now placed at our ease in point of time. We may make another effort for a peaceable accommodation with Spain without the danger of being left alone to cope with both France and Spain; and even if we are driven to war, it is now much more questionable than it was whether we had not better enter into it without fettering ourselves with an alliance, that we may be free to retire whenever our terms can be obtained. Peace cannot now be made in Europe but by a general convention, and that will take best part of a twelvemonth to arrange. Our question now is in what way to give Spain another opportunity of arrangement? Is not Paris the place? France the agent? The purchase of the Floridas the means? Affectionate salutations.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

November 3, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

I wish for an à peu près of the number of seamen we call ours. I suppose the best way of estimating will be by our tonnage, including coasters, bay and river craft, and everything employed on the tide-waters. Can you assist me with the materials for such an estimate? It is of some importance for my bill for a naval militia; that and the one for the land militia I will send you for consideration as soon as you can assist me as above.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Department Treasury, 5th November, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

Annexed is a sketch of the receipts and expenditures for the year ending 30th September last. It cannot be perfectly correct, and several alterations will certainly be made on the official examination of the accounts. But the variations will not be such as to affect any general result. The most imperfect part is the estimate of that part of the customs which arise from the Mediterranean fund, and which we do not consider as part of the permanent revenue.

With respectful attachment, your obedient servant.

Note.—We have actually paid this year about six millions of the principal of the debt contracted before your Administration, viz.:

Domestic and foreign debt, as per note f,	$4,200,000
British convention, being in exchange of the 6th Article of Jay’s treaty,	1,776,000
Payment for lands in stock, as per note b,	45,000
	$6,021,000

A Sketch of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States for the year ending 30th September, 1805.

*Receipts, viz.:*
(a) About 700,000 dollars of this sum arises from the Mediterranean fund.
(b) Besides about 45,000 dollars paid in stock.
(c) Fines, patents, fees, certificates, &c.
Customs(a)	$12,773,045.56
Sales of lands(b)	621,895.08
Postage,	28,500.00
Arrears of direct tax and internal duties,	61,087.80
Incidental(c)	14,718.63
Repayments (principally for bills of exchange protested),	157,506.89
		$13,656,753.96
Cash in Treasury 30th September, 1804,		4,882,351.35
		$18,539,105.31

Expenditures, viz.:

(d) Surveying, bonds on land claims, light-houses, marine hospitals, mint, military pensions, Capitol, Maryland loans, &c.

(e) It is apprehended that the Navy Department will have expended at least 300,000 dollars more than that sum, and more than the appropriations; for which difference they are in debt, and cannot pay till Congress shall have made an additional appropriation.

(f)

Of which the payments for interest are estimated at	$4,156,338.20
and those of principal redeemed at about	4,200,000.00
	$8,356,338.20

Civil list,

$615,652.26

Miscellaneous(d)

545,091.91

Diplomatic and Barbary,

258,017.74

British convention (the two last instalments),

1,776,000.00

Purchase of Louisiana (French bills),

350,559.10

Army and Indian Department,

749,281.28

Navy Department(e)

1,314,001.22

Domestic debt and loans,

$5,724,811.53 }(f)

8,356,338.20

Foreign debt,

2,631,526.67 }

$13,963,941.71

Cash in Treasury 30th September, 1805,

4,575,163.60

$18,539,105.31

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

November 6, 1805.

Th. Jefferson to Mr. Gallatin.

In the case of L. H. Guerlain, of New Orleans, it is undeniable that a fraud on the revenue was meditated. Yet, under all the circumstances of the case, I am of opinion he will be sufficiently punished by forfeiting the difference between his invoice and the appraisement, stated to be $7548.45, by the payment of duties, $9500, and by the loss by the proceeds of sales.

The chief motive, which in other cases might restrain the disposition to remit, would be the interest given by law to the custom-house officer or informer; but I understand the officer was to give an exorbitant fee to his attorney in the case if he obtained a conviction: this completely does away all regard to his interest, and places him under our eye in the most unfavorable light. If lawyers are to be urged to use all the resources of their profession, by exorbitant fees, to convict those accused, the next step will be the subornation of witnesses, and other foul practices. Proceedings leading to such oppression of individuals should be marked with the disapprobation of government. Knowing as I do the correct character of Mr. Brown, I am at a loss to account for this act of impropriety, and think the request of an explanation (if the fact be true) would be a proper admonition to guard his future conduct. Affectionate salutations.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

November 16, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

The Jersey law puts the lands on Sandy Hook completely in our power; and having paid the money, the fee-simple is fixed in the United States unconditionally forever; nor would it be in the power of the Jersey Legislature to alter it were they disposed. Mr. Hartshorne’s conduct has been so sordid as to prove that nothing restrains him from any robbery, private or public, but the power of the law. He is entitled to no indulgence, therefore; but for the sake of peace we may yield something. I think it would be wrong to tack his conditions to the fee-simple of the land forever. It would be a kind of hereditary trammel unknown to our estates in this country, and which would adhere to this land forever, even should it become private property hereafter. I would, therefore, limit the existence of the restrictions to twenty, or any other number of years you please, and substitute the present instead of the reasonable terms therein spoken of, and which is too vague. Affectionate salutations.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

November 20, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

Can you be so good as to let me have the financial paragraph this morning, as there is not more than time enough to submit the message successively to the different gentlemen for correction and then to have copies?

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

[21st November, 1805.]

Dear Sir,—

I stayed yesterday at home preparing my report for Congress, and did not receive your note till evening. The sickness of a clerk who has received the proper instructions to analyze in the form I want the collectors’ returns of revenue prevents yet my giving precise sums, and they may yet be considered as blanks. The first paragraph of that part of the message which relates to the Treasury will, however, be certainly within bounds with the following alterations:

1st. Receipts in the Treasury, say only upwards of 13 millions instead of 13½. The amount of those receipts is correct as I gave it to you, but a part arises from repayments, which do not constitute any part of the revenue.

2d. Instead of the words “upwards of six millions, &c.,” to the word “convention,” say, “have enabled us to pay nearly two millions of the debt contracted by the British treaty and convention, and upwards of four millions of the principal of the funded debt.”

3d. At the end of the paragraph, when speaking of the total redemption of the principal of the funded debt, say “upwards of 17 millions,” instead of “between 16 and 17 millions.”

4th. I would also propose to transpose the sentence, “and there remained in the Treasury, &c., upwards of 4½ millions,” in order to throw it in the ensuing paragraph for the purpose of introducing as connected with it the following information, which is now omitted, viz.: that the increase of receipts and revenue during last year (which are the cause of so much as 4½ millions remaining in the Treasury) will enable us next year not only to pay the current demands, &c., as stated in the second paragraph, but also to pay the whole amount of 3,750,000 dollars for American claims assumed by the French convention, without recurring to the authority which had been given to borrow 1,750,000 dollars for that object. For we had heretofore never engaged to pay more than two millions of that item out of the common Treasury receipts.

By what precedes I have anticipated all I had to say on the second paragraph. The only thing which perhaps should be added to the information given of an expected surplus of one million for next year, is that that expectation is confined to next year.

For it is altogether predicated on the calculations of an European war revenue; and even whilst that war continues, the revenue will be materially affected by the late measures of England, if persisted in and carried to the threatened extent. Every measure of retaliation which we may adopt, however well calculated for that object, will have a tendency rather to diminish than to increase the revenue; and, at all events, will not diminish the decrease produced by the English measures. I must also add that in calculating the surplus I had estimated the navy expenditure at the old agreed-on sum of 650,000 dollars, instead of which the estimate of the Secretary of the Navy, besides the deficiencies of this year, amounts for the current service of next year to 1,070,000 dollars.

Upon due consideration, I think that the two last paragraphs should be omitted. As it relates to foreign nations, it will certainly destroy the effect intended by other parts of the message.

They never can think us serious in any intentions to resist if we recommend at the same time a diminution of our resources. But as it relates to ourselves, the fact is that we want the money to effect the Florida purchase.

The two millions wanted immediately cannot be procured without that fund. If we part with it, we must borrow for that object. To that resource I feel a great reluctance when it can possibly be avoided. It would be very pleasing to give the pattern of an eight years’ Administration who had done the business of the nation without recurring to any loan. We may within three years, with the aid of that fund, pay entirely for Florida, and then the salt duty may be given up. For at the end of the year 1808, Florida being paid for, about 30 millions of the funded debt extinguished, the ordinary revenue increased perhaps one million by our natural increase, and the United States no longer obliged to pay 8 millions a year for the debt unless convenient, you could recommend the abolition of the salt duty instead of merely a substitution. I heartily wish it to be done within our time, but had rather abstain for this time from a positive recommendation than to be obliged to borrow. It is not indeed probable that the proposed plan for Florida will be relished by Congress, unless they see that the object can be obtained without increasing the debt.

It must also be remembered that in the message you leave it a matter of doubt whether it may not prove necessary to increase the army.

With respectful attachment, your obedient servant.

I find amongst my papers a view of the Spanish ports in Texas, taken from Pagès, Sibley, Nolen, and Humboldt; perhaps you may find something in it to add to your notes. Sibley places the settlement at Bayou Pierre in one of his letters 50 and in another 80 miles above Natchitoches, Campti he places uniformly at 20.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

November 24, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

I send you the message to ask a scrupulous revisal, and as early an one as you can, because there does not remain more than time enough to submit it successively to the other gentlemen for their corrections, to make copies, &c. On reviewing what had been prepared as to Great Britain and Spain, I found it too soft towards the former compared with the latter, and that so temperate a notice of the greater enormity of British invasions of right might lessen the effect which the strong language towards Spain was meant to produce at the Tuileries. I have, therefore, given more force to the strictures on Britain.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

REMARKS ON THE MESSAGE.

[25th November, 1805.]

The second paragraph on the yellow fever ends rather abruptly; nothing is proposed or suggested for Congress to do which can remedy the inconvenience complained of.

Third paragraph.—“On the rumor of such an armament, &c.” I would rather suppress those words, and say only, “Most of them have lately disappeared, &c.”

Fourth paragraph.—“Similar aggressions are now renewed and multiplied both in Europe and America.” It seems that this mode of expression might be softened, or some direct allusion made to the favorable change announced by Yrujo’s communication, and especially by Pinkney’s last letter.

Do.—“all this by the regular officers and soldiers, &c.” As this alludes to what has been done in the territory delivered by Spain, and excludes, therefore, the seizure at Bayou Pierre, it is doubtful whether officers have been actually parties to the act, for the only act I remember is the robbery near Opelousas.

Do.—The words added in pencil are, I think, perfectly proper.

Do.—Speaking of the militia—the words “our younger citizens of all times” contain, I suppose, a mistake in transcribing.

Indian treaties, “the whole of both banks from the Ohio, &c.” This is not strictly correct; the lands between the mouth of the Tennessee and the mouth of the Ohio have not been ceded by the Chickasaws.

Financial paragraph—“in the three preceding years.” I had not attended in my former remarks to the period embraced by the message, which exactly covers four years, viz., from 1st October, 1801, to 1st October, 1805; but had taken it to be four years and half, or from 1st April, 1801.

The debt redeemed during the four years is only sixteen millions and half, as you had it at first. The debt redeemed during the four years and half (viz., from the beginning of your Administration) is seventeen millions eight hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars. If you preserve the words “three years” (which is, I believe, necessary to make this message a proper sequel of the preceding ones), then you must say, “upwards of sixteen,” or “sixteen millions and half,” instead of “seventeen millions.”

Same paragraph.—The words, “as fast as the original contracts permit,” should be struck out, as the contracts will not yet this year prevent our applying the whole sum of eight millions. In the same sentence the word redeem is not sufficient: the eight millions are appropriated for both the payment of interest and redemption of principal.

The above remarks are all unimportant; but I really discover, notwithstanding the delicacy of the subjects introduced, nothing which seems objectionable or susceptible of alterations for the better. Perhaps, as there will be a difference of opinion on the efficacy of the various modes of defending our harbors, that part of the message might be so modified as not to exclude altogether the idea of permanent additional fortifications.

I mentioned that the peace establishment navy law was altogether incompetent, inasmuch as it authorizes the employment of frigates only, and those manned with only two-thirds crew, and absolutely directs that six such shall be put in commission.

An authority to preserve and, indeed, to appoint a greater number of captains and lieutenants is also desirable. But whether these points should make part of the message or be introduced in some other way is not for me to say; only some apparent attention to render our small force more efficacious and to provide for the promotion of some of the officers might have a good effect on our foreign relations, and would be popular at home.

Respectfully submitted.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

November 26, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

1. The concessions to Renault. As to those in the Territory of Indiana, that country having been claimed by England at all times, conquered in the war of 1755, and confirmed to her in 1763; conquered by the United States, and confirmed to them in 1783; and all ancient titles there settled and done with by authority of the United States; these claims of Renault are certainly at an end.

2. As to those in Louisiana; I believe it has been a law as well as invariable usage with the Spanish government in that country to consider all concessions void which were not settled within one, two, or three years, which condition was often expressed in the grant, and understood where not expressed. O’Reilly’s Ordinance is evidence of this policy and practice. But independently of positive law, prescription is a law of reason: if Renault ever took possession, which does not appear, he has abandoned that possession more than sixty or seventy years, as appears by Austin’s statement, which is that so long ago as 1738 these mines were considered as public property.

3. As to the concessions in 1797 to Winter and others, exclusive of the fraud and illegality so obvious on their face, they bore the express condition of becoming void if not settled in a year.

However, the commissioners of Congress (I believe) are to report titles for the ultimate decision of Congress. Whether it would be proper for us in the mean time to express sentiments which might discourage speculations is to be considered of.

I had been sensible the passage on the yellow fever appeared bald, for want of a practical application. The real object being to bring important facts before foreign governments, an ostensible one was necessary to cover the reality. I have endeavored at it in the enclosed, as well as some other supplements suggested by you, of which I ask your consideration. Affectionate salutations.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Enclosed for consideration and amendment.

[November, 1805.]

The best ground for estimating the number of seamen of the United States to be enrolled under the Act for establishing a naval militia is the tonnage of our vessels. The latest return of tonnage states it to have been on the 31st of December, 1803, as follows:

		Tons.
Registered tonnage employed in foreign trade,		585,909
In the whale-fisheries,	12,389
Cod-fisheries,	50,969
		63,358
In the coasting trade,		267,787
		917,054
We are supposed to employ usually in navigating our vessels about 6 men to every 100 tons. But allowing for those who are not free white citizens within the military age, we may estimate 5 to the 100 tons.		5
		45,852
To these should be added the seamen then in our navy, and those employed on the tide-waters within the United States, which we may safely state as making the whole number amount to		50,000

*An Estimate of the Land Militia of the United States.*
The census of 1800 gave us of free white males of 16 and under 26	384,554
of 26 and under 45	423,836
Our military age excluding those under 18, we must from the number		384,554
deduct those in their 17th and 18th years, which, by Buffon’s tables, will be		80,405
Remain of the age of 18 and under 45, to wit, the minor and junior classes,		304,149
Our censuses of 1790 and 1800 having showed our increase to be in a geometrical ratio of 3⅓ per cent. per annum, the increase from 1800 to 1805 is		54,184
leaving our whole number of free white males from 18 to 26 in 1805		358,333
From these are to be deducted the naval militia-men, but far the greater part of those employed in the foreign trade and whale-fisheries being always absent, it is believed that not half of them were included in the census. Those supposed included, then, are 35,000, of which, according to Buffon, those of 18 and under 26 will be only		11,711
leaving of free white landsmen from 18 to 26 in 1805		346,622
From these are still to be deducted those not able-bodied: suppose them 1 in 10,		34,662
leaving of free, white, able-bodied landsmen of 18 and under 26		311,960

To find what proportion of these will be of the minor and what of the junior class, we are to inquire, of 311,960 persons of 18 and under 26 years of age, how many will there be of each different year of age? Buffon’s tables resolve them as follows: As 84,589 in Buffon from 18 to 26: to 311,960 in the United States of the same age: so are 11,014 in Buffon in their 19th year: to x, the number in the United States in their 19th year; then x= ×11,014=3.69×11,014. Consequently

			Buffon’s Nos.		in U. S.
those in their	19th year will be 3.69	×	11,014	=	40,619 }	=	120,598	of the minor class.
	20th year will be 3.69	×	10,919	=	40,267 }
	21st year will be 3.69	×	10,768	=	39,712 }
	22d year will be 3.69	×	10,675	=	39,368 }	=	191,358	of the junior class.
	23d year will be 3.69	×	10,514	=	38,775 }
	24th year will be 3.69	×	10,380	=	38,281 }
	25th year will be 3.69	×	10,259	=	37,834 }
	26th year will be 3.69	×	10,060	=	37,100 }
					311,956		311,956

To obtain the respective numbers of the middle and senior classes, the census of 1800 gave for both	423,836
Add the increase from 1800 to 1805,	75,506
	499,342
from which are to be deducted seamen from 26 to 45,	23,289
	476,053
deduct those also not able-bodied, suppose 1 in 10,	47,605
leaves free, white, able-bodied landsmen from 26 to 45,	428,448
Buffon’s tables make the numbers of 26 and under 35=84,182, and those of 35 and under 45=84,018. These are so nearly equal that we may consider the middle class one-half, to wit,	214,224
and the senior class one-half, to wit,	214,224

*Recapitulation.*
Naval militia,			50,000
Land militia,	minor class,	120,598
	junior class,	191,358
	middle class,	214,224
	senior class,	214,224	740,404
			790,404

An Act for classing the militia and assigning to each class its particular duties.

Be it enacted, &c., That every free, able-bodied white male citizen of the United States of the age of 18 years and under the age of 45, whose principal occupation is not on the high sea or the tide-waters within the United States, shall be of the militia for the land service of the United States.

Enrolment.—The persons so to constitute the land militia shall be enrolled by their names and ages in their proper districts, and in books to be kept for that purpose; such enrolment to be made without delay of those now within the description, and from time to time as to others who shall hereafter become so, always noting the date of the enrolment, and placing in a distinct page or part of the book those of every different year of age, from 45 down to 18. In deciding on the ages of the persons to be enrolled, the officer shall make up his judgment from the information of the party himself, and from such other information as he can obtain, and where this is not satisfactory, then from his own inspection.

Classification.—The said militia shall be distributed into classes as follows, to wit: the junior class shall be composed of those above 21 and under 26 years of age; the middle class of those above 26 and under 35 years of age; the senior class of those above 35 and under 45 years of age; and those above 18 and under 21 years of age shall compose the minor class.

Their training.—The junior and minor classes shall each have their separate captains and other inferior officers, those for the juniors being selected with a view to actual service, and shall be strictly trained to the exercises and manœuvres of a soldier, either of artillery, infantry, or cavalry, as may be lawfully designated; for which purpose they shall be mustered and trained one whole day in every month of the year, two of which musters shall be in battalion and the others in companies. The captains of the said two classes, with the general and field officers having command over them, shall form a distinct courtmartial for the rigorous enforcement of the duties of attendance and training. Each person of the said junior class shall be furnished with a good musket, bayonet, and cartridge-box at the public expense, so soon as they can be provided, which, except where he shall be of the cavalry or artillery, he shall be bound to produce in good order at every muster at which he shall be, so long as he shall be under the age of 45 years, after which it shall be his property.

Where, at the passing of this Act, any member of the militia shall be in the possession of such arms provided by his State or Territory, or by himself, the same shall be reviewed and valued by some person appointed on the part of the United States, and if found in perfect order and of proper calibre, they shall be paid for by the United States if such be the choice of the party furnishing them, and shall thereafter be in the hands of the holder as the property of the United States, under the same trust and right as if they had been originally furnished him by the United States.

The middle class shall in like manner be formed into companies by themselves, to be commanded by their own captains and other inferior officers; they shall be mustered and trained twice only in the year in companies, and once in battalion. The senior class, in distinct companies also, and under its own captains and other inferior officers, shall be mustered and trained one day in the year only in companies, and one in battalion; and both the middle and senior classes shall be under the jurisdiction of their captains, formed into one and the same court-martial, with the general and field officers having command over them.

Actual service.—The junior class shall be liable to perform all active military services within the United States, or the countries {next adjacent in their vicinity}, by tours of duty not to exceed one year in any two; and in order that the said services may be required of them equally, those of every {company battalion} shall be divided by lot into ten parts or portions, as nearly equal as may be, each portion to be distinguished by its particular number, from 1 to 10, and to be called into duty in the order of their numbers, such call extending to so many numbers as the exigency may require; and every person so called on may be assigned to the service of the artillery, infantry, cavalry, or of any other description as the competent authority shall direct.

The middle class shall be liable to be called on to do duty within their State only, or in one of the adjoining States; and that by tours not exceeding three months in any year; for which purpose they shall be distributed into portions and numbers, and called on in routine, as is provided in the case of the junior class.

The senior and minor classes shall be liable to be called on to do duty within their own State only, and by tours not exceeding three months in any year; and they shall be separately distributed into portions and numbers, and called on in routine as provided for the other classes.

Exemptions from militia duty shall only extend to the ordinary duties of mustering and training after having entered the middle or senior class. Such exempts shall nevertheless be enrolled in their classes and numbers, and, when called on for actual military service, shall be bound as others are to perform their due tours.

If any person called on to do the actual duties of his class shall refuse or unnecessarily delay to enter on duty, he shall be arrested as a deserter either by the civil or military authority, shall be delivered to the proper military officer, and either punished as a deserter, or compelled to perform his tour of duty; but any person so called on may commute his personal service by tendering as a substitute an able-bodied free white man fit for the service in the judgment of the officer who is to command him, and willing to engage therein. And all persons while engaged in the performance of a tour of duty shall have the pay and rations allowed in the army of the United States, and be subject to the rules, regulations, and articles provided for the government of the same.

All provisions in any law of the United States, or of any particular State or Territory, inconsistent with those of this Act, are hereby repealed; and all provisions in the laws of the United States, or of any particular State or Territory, not inconsistent herewith, shall be understood to be left in force, and liable to alteration by their respective enacting authorities.

A Bill for establishing a Naval Militia.

Be it enacted, &c., that every free, able-bodied white male citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years, and under the age of 45, whose principal occupation is on the high sea or on the tide-waters within the United States, shall be of the militia for the naval service of the United States, and shall be exempt from the services of the land militia.

The persons so to constitute the said naval militia shall be enrolled in the several ports, harbors, or towns thereto adjacent to which they belong or are most convenient, by their names, ages, places of birth and abode, and personal descriptions, with the date of their enrolment; and shall be formed into companies, each to be commanded by a lieutenant-commandant and second lieutenant, to be appointed by the authority of the State to which such company belongs.

It shall be the duty of the senior lieutenant-commandant of each port, harbor, or town thereto adjacent to enroll in a book, to be kept by him for that purpose, all persons who by this Act are made naval militia-men, belonging to his said port or harbor, or within the limits assigned as most convenient to the same; registering in a distinct page or part of his book those of every different year of age from 45 down to 18; and whenever a person enrolled in one port of the United States shall remove to another, the enrolling officer of the latter port shall immediately enter him on his book, noting the date and place of his former enrolment, in addition to the other circumstances before prescribed.

In deciding on the ages of persons to be enrolled, the officer shall make up his judgment from the information of the party himself, from such other information as he can obtain, and from his own inspection.

Every person enrolled shall be entitled to receive from the officer possessing the book of enrolment an authenticated transcript from the same of the entry respecting himself, on payment of twenty-five cents, and to have the same renewed on the same condition from time to time when lost or destroyed, which shall exempt him from training duties at the port of his former enrolment, and from the duties of the land militia; and shall be considered otherwise as instead of the certificate of citizenship heretofore given by the collectors of the customs; which certificates shall hereafter cease to be given.

Every enrolling officer shall on, or immediately after, the 1st day of October in every year make a return of his roll to the Secretary of the Navy of the United States according to its actual state, as affected since the last return by age, discharge, death, removal, new enrolments, or otherwise.

It shall be the duty of the said officers once in every [two] months at least to train the men under their command, who may be within their limits at the time, to the use of artillery or the manœuvring of gunboats or other armed vessels assigned to the defence of their port, or confided to their use. And all acts of disobedience or failure in duty herein, in either officers or men, shall be liable to the same pains, penalties, and coercions, and to trial by a court-martial consisting of three at least of their own officers, as are provided in the corresponding cases by the laws for the government of the land militia of the United States.

In cases of insurrection, of opposition to the civil authority, or of sudden attack by an enemy happening in any port, harbor, or town on the tide-waters, or on the coasts in their vicinities, all persons then and there being who make a part of the said naval militia, whether of the same or of any other place, shall be liable to be called on to do duty with artillery or on board any armed vessels for the special occasion of quelling the insurrection, enforcing obedience to the civil authority, or resisting the attack; and in time of war, either actual or imminent, all under [35] years of age, wheresoever they shall happen to be within the jurisdiction of the United States, shall be liable to be called on to perform tours of duty not exceeding one year in any [two] on board of any of the public armed vessels of the United States, in which the said militia officers, in subordination to the regular officers of the United States of equal or superior grade, shall have the immediate command and care of them.

And if any person so called on shall refuse or unnecessarily delay to enter on duty, he shall be arrested as a deserter either by the civil or military authority, and shall be delivered to the proper military officer, and either punished as a deserter or compelled to perform his tour of duty; but any person so called on may commute his personal service by tendering an able-bodied free white man, a citizen of the United States, fit for the service in the judgment of the officer who is to command him, and willing to engage therein. And all persons while engaged in the performance of a tour of duty shall have the pay and rations allowed in the navy of the United States, and be subject to the rules and regulations provided for the government of the same.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Department of the Treasury, November 27, 1805.

Dear Sir,—

The supplements to the message exactly meet my ideas. Only I do not understand precisely the limitation to the number of captains and lieutenants, which is intended by the words “to the number of frigates which were actually retained for service.” But if I understand it, it seems to me that the word vessels should be substituted to frigates, and employed in that to retained for. Perhaps, however, I am mistaken in your intention of limitation.

The yellow fever part of the message will bring on you all the fever-importers and boards of health of the Union.

With respectful attachment, your obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

REMARKS ON SPANISH MESSAGE.

[3d December, 1805.]

End of first paragraph.—Considering the last proposition made by Spain on that subject, it seems to me that instead of saying “unless we would relinquish all claims, &c.,” it would be more correct to say, “unless we would assent to modifications (or alterations in the instrument) affecting our claims, &c.,” or words to that effect.

Beginning of second page—“to avoid all explanation and engagement.” I think it is going too far to say that Spain avoided all explanation. It seems that Cevallos, in his several letters discussing the questions of right, a discussion by the by which was not calculated to promote a final arrangement, gave sufficient explanations of the claims and views of Spain; it is true that they gave no explanation of the ground on which they would ultimately come to an agreement. But as the sentence might be misconstrued, it may be safer to say only that she avoided any engagement or even proposition leading to an arrangement.

Beginning of third page.—The opinion of the inference to be drawn from the silence of France is perhaps too strongly expressed as to extent. I would prefer to omit mentioning Rio Bravo by name, particularly because it is intended to accept of the Colorado as a boundary; and this, when the treaty shall come before Congress, would be considered as a concession; it might then be said that we had given for Florida both the money and the country between Colorado and Rio Bravo. I would prefer saying only “her opinion in favor of our claim in that quarter; and we had reason to believe that her commissary, &c.” Of the last fact we have only hearsay evidence of Laussat’s declarations.

Last paragraph but one.—It seems to me that the latter part of this, from “formal war” to the end, breaks the connection of the sentiments intended to be conveyed. For it is the object of the two last paragraphs to inform Congress that France being disposed to favor an arrangement, the present moment should not be lost, but that the means must be supplied by Congress. It is also intended to say that in the mean while, and in order to promote an arrangement, force should be interposed to a certain degree. But I think a transposition would make the whole clearer.

To the tenor of the message itself I have but one objection, that it does not explicitly declare the object in view, and may hereafter be cavilled at as having induced Congress into a mistaken opinion of that object. For although the latter end of the third paragraph is expressed in comprehensive terms, yet the omission of the word Florida may lead to error; nor does the message convey the idea that in order to effect an accommodation a much larger sum of money will probably be requisite than had been contemplated. Perhaps if, when speaking of means in the last paragraph, some epithet was added (greater means, or to a greater extent than had been contemplated), it would free the message and subsequent proceedings of the Executive from any objections of that kind.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

SPANISH RESOLUTIONS. 1805.

For consideration and correction. Th. J.

1. Resolved, that no armed men, not being citizens of the United States, ought to be permitted to enter or remain, nor any authority to be exercised but under the laws of the United States, within the former colony or province of Louisiana in the extent in which it was in the hands of Spain.

2. Resolved, that as to the residue of the said “former colony or province of Louisiana, in the extent it had when France possessed it,” a peaceable adjustment of that extent is most reasonable and desirable, so far as it can be effected consistently with the honor of the United States.

3. Resolved, that pending measures for such peaceable adjustment, neither party ought to take new posts therein, nor to strengthen those they held before the 1st day of October, 1800, and that any proceeding to the contrary on the part of Spain ought to be opposed by force, and by taking possession of such posts as may be necessary to maintain the rights of the United States.

4. Resolved, that the subjects of Spain still on the Mississippi and its waters ought to be allowed an innocent passage, free from all imposts, along that part of the river which passes through the territory of the United States. And the citizens of the United States on the Mobile and its waters ought to be allowed an innocent passage, free from all imposts, along that part of the river below them which passes through the territory still held by Spain, but claimed by both parties;

Or that imposts should be levied for and by the United States on the navigation of the Mississippi by Spanish subjects, countervailing those which may be levied for and by Spain on the navigation of the Mobile by citizens of the United States.

And that the navigation of the Mississippi by Spanish subjects should be prohibited whensoever that of the Mobile by citizens of the United States shall be prohibited.

5. Resolved, that in support of these resolutions, and of the consequences which may proceed from them, the citizens of the United States, by their Senate and Representatives in Congress assembled, do pledge their lives and fortunes; and that the execution of these resolutions be vested with the President of the United States.

6. Resolved, that for carrying these resolutions into effect, whether amicably or by the use of force, the President be authorized to apply any moneys in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated.

7. Resolved, that the President of the United States ought to be authorized by law to employ the armed vessels of the United States which may be in commission, for restraining the irregularities and oppressions of our commerce, other than those which amount to piracy, by privateers cruising within the Gulf Stream, in the Gulf itself, or among the islands bordering on it, and that a bill be brought in for that purpose.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

REMARKS ON SPANISH RESOLUTIONS.

[3d December, 1805]

Three distinct objects to be obtained from Congress:

1st. Some public resolutions, bottomed on the public message of the President, expressive of the determination of that body to support the just claims of the United States in case no arrangement should take place.

2d. Some expression of the intention of the Legislature to enable the President to make an arrangement in the manner suggested by his private message; so expressed as to cover the whole ground and as to justify the steps he means to take, but not so as to divulge the extent to which he may go.

3d. An immediate appropriation of a sum which, if necessary, may be paid on obtaining an order of delivery and without waiting for the ratification of the treaty.

The apparent difficulty in framing the resolutions arises from the attempt to blend the three objects together. The same reasons which have induced the President to send two distinct messages render it necessary that the public resolutions of Congress should be distinct from the private ones; that those which relate to the war posture of the Spanish affairs, which are intended to express the national sense on that subject, and to enable the President to take the steps which appear immediately necessary on the frontier, should not be mixed with those proceedings calculated only to effect an accommodation.

The course now recommended is precisely that which was followed in the Louisiana business when the deposit was withdrawn. A public resolution (which was indeed attacked as wanting sufficient energy, but we may easily give a proper tone to those wanted at present) was moved by Randolph and adopted by the House. A committee in the mean while brought in a confidential report sufficient to support and justify the President in the purchase he was going to attempt, and to this an appropriation law in very general terms was added. To follow a similar course appears not only best, but will also, as founded on precedent, be the smoothest mode of doing the business in Congress.

On that ground, the five first resolutions proposed by the President, together with such modifications as may be suggested, and the additional one respecting the spoliations, will form the public resolutions to be adopted either in committee of the whole on the Union, or by the select committee to which the Spanish part of the public message may be referred.

The select committee to whom the private message may be referred will make the report which we want to justify the instructions intended to be given to Mr. Armstrong for the purchase of Florida, &c. We cannot dictate what that report will be, but only suggest generally what we want; and provided we have a good committee and their report favors the object, nothing more is wanted, as no question will be taken in Congress on the report itself. That middle way of previous approbation is perhaps the most congenial to the free exercise of the respective functions of the several Departments. It gives sanction enough to the views of the Executive to enable him to proceed, yet without either taking away his ultimate responsibility or committing the House to an indiscriminate previous approbation.

The only resolution reported by the committee will be that for appropriating, on which a law in general terms, viz., for foreign intercourse, will be bottomed, appropriating the sum which Congress may fix as a payment previous to the ratification; and I presume that two millions will be sufficient and may be obtained from that body. I do not think that they ever will agree to any vague limitation, or to any other, indeed, but that of the sum itself; and the precedent would be so bad that it is not desirable they should.

If the President thinks that course generally eligible, the only object which calls immediate attention is that of the public resolution. I have only those which had been first suggested, and cannot make any remarks precisely applicable to their present shape, modified as they have been since. I have already verbally mentioned that it did not seem to me that the object expressed in the four first resolutions was of sufficient magnitude to justify the solemnity of the fifth resolution; and I would rather that this last should be confined to the vesting in the President the execution of the others.

On the subject of the new (indemnities) resolutions, I am still of opinion that the United States should not pledge themselves to pursue to effect the indemnities for which any nation is answerable to the citizens of the United States. Although the omission of the word justly qualifies the declaration, and it might be argued that that for which Spain is strictly answerable is only what she has recognized, yet the expression is too general not to convey a different meaning.

The true reason why we mean never to abandon the claim for spoliations provided for by the convention is, that their justice was formally acknowledged by Spain; and I think it would be safer to place it on that ground, by either a direct allusion to the convention or by expressions alluding to the recognition by Spain.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

December 4, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

Enclosed is a revised edition of the Spanish resolutions, in which you will find most of your ideas conformed to. That respecting money is omitted; that it may be provided in the way you suggest. In the message, also, I have adopted all your amendments except the last, which respected merely the arrangement of the phrases, and could not be satisfactorily altered.

[Enclosure.]

1. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, that the indemnities for which Spain is answerable to citizens of the United States for spoliations and wrongs committed in violation of the law of nations or of treaty, are objects too just and important not to be pursued to effect by the United States.

2. Resolved, that no armed men, subjects of any foreign power, ought to be permitted to enter or remain, nor any authority but of the United States to be exercised, within the former colony or province of Louisiana, in the extent in which it was delivered by Spain under the Treaty of St. Ildefonso.

3. Resolved, that as to the residue of the said former colony or province of Louisiana, and provisions necessary to avoid future collisions and controversies, an equitable adjustment is most reasonable.

4. Resolved, that pending any measures for such adjustment neither party ought to take new posts therein, nor to strengthen those they held before the 1st day of October, 1800, and that any proceeding to the contrary on the part of Spain ought to be opposed by force, and by taking possession of such posts as may be necessary to maintain the rights of the United States.

5. Resolved, &c., that the subjects of Spain still on the Mississippi and its waters ought to be allowed an innocent passage, free from all imposts, along that part of the river below them which passes through the territory of the United States; and the citizens of the United States on the Mobile and its waters ought to be allowed an innocent passage, free from all imposts, along that part of the river below them which passes through the territory still held by Spain, but claimed by both parties.

6. Resolved, that a copy of these resolutions be presented to the President of the United States for his approbation, with an assurance that he will receive from the Legislature the support necessary for carrying them into execution.

GALLATIN TO JOSEPH H. NICHOLSON.1

7th December, 1805.

Who are the members of the committee on Spanish affairs? If you are one, I am requested to communicate a paper to you; and it would be perhaps as well that you should see the President before the committee meet.

Yours.

Saturday.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Saturday, December 7, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

J. Randolph has just called to ask a conversation with me, for which purpose he will be with me to-morrow morning; everything therefore had better be suspended till that is over.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

December 15, 1805.

Th. J. to Mr. Gallatin.

I return you the papers respecting the Sandy Hook business, which I am content should be closed on the terms already proposed by you. It is well that a government should feel no temper towards a rascally individual, or the present case would justify a high degree of indignation against Mr. Hartshorne.

[1 ]Endorsed, “Mr. Gallatin’s note relative to the appropriation of two millions for the Floridas.”

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1805: GALLATIN TO S. L. MITCHELL, U. S. Sen. - Albert Gallatin, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, vol. 1 [1879]

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GALLATIN TO S. L. MITCHELL, U. S. Sen.

Dear Sir,—

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON. REMARKS ON THE INAUGURAL.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Dear Sir,—

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

With great respect, your obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

With great respect, your obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

With great respect, your obedient servant.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

Respectfully, your obedient servant.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Dear Sir,—

GALLATIN TO SAMUEL SMITH, U. S. Sen.

Dear Sir,—

Your friend and servant.

GALLATIN TO MADISON.

Dear Sir,—

Yours truly.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Dear Sir,—

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

SPANISH AFFAIRS.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON. OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN GOLD.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

With respectful attachment, your obedient servant.

A Sketch of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States for the year ending 30th September, 1805.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

With respectful attachment, your obedient servant.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON. REMARKS ON THE MESSAGE.

Respectfully submitted.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

Enclosed for consideration and amendment.

An Act for classing the militia and assigning to each class its particular duties.

A Bill for establishing a Naval Militia.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Dear Sir,—

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

REMARKS ON THE INAUGURAL.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

OBSERVATIONS ON FOREIGN GOLD.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

REMARKS ON THE MESSAGE.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

REMARKS ON SPANISH MESSAGE.

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

SPANISH RESOLUTIONS. 1805.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

REMARKS ON SPANISH RESOLUTIONS.