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Subject Area: Political Theory

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON. - Albert Gallatin, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, vol. 1 [1879]

Edition used:

The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879). 3 vols.

Part of: The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3 vols.

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GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

Treasury Department, 16th August, 1802.

Dear Sir,—

I received this morning your letter of the 9th instant on the subject of Morocco and the Barbary powers. The arrangement of the mail between this and Monticello is not favorable, since this answer to yours of the 9th cannot leave Washington before to-morrow evening, 17th. This I regret, as time on such occasions is precious. I will write on the supposition that you have received the account of the engagement of the Boston with the Tunisian flotilla, which, although we have not yet received any confirmation, carries, unfortunately, strong marks of its being true.

Our object must clearly be to put a speedy end to a contest which unavailingly wastes our resources, and which we cannot, for any considerable time, pursue with vigor without relinquishing the accomplishment of the great and beneficial objects we have in view. The most ample powers and orders if practicable to make peace, and a sufficient force to protect, and at least have time to withdraw, our Mediterranean trade, appear to me necessary. In respect to peace, taking it for granted that the instructions for Tripoli are sufficient, there remain Morocco and Tunis. However contrary to the usage of civilized nations the pretensions of Morocco may be, we cannot decide whether they are considered as unreasonable by a nation not within the pale of civilization, and the conduct of Morocco has certainly been far from unfriendly since our treaty with that country.

That treaty has been till now faithfully adhered to by the Emperor; he has shown no disposition to favor Algiers during our negotiations with that regency, and he even evinced forbearance during his blockade of a rebellious port.

Hence I am not without hopes that he may still be smoothed, and I would at all events send the gun-carriages which had been promised, in order that our negotiator may be able to give them if they shall be useful in bringing on a friendly arrangement; nor do I see any objection to sending the intended letter, properly modified to accord with the present circumstances.

And if Simpson can be fully trusted with a negotiation of that kind, I would also, out of the general Mediterranean appropriation, send twenty or thirty thousand dollars, which may be wanted either there or at Tunis to assist in accommodating differences. As to Tunis, I would not hesitate to promise an indemnity if McNeil shall have been the aggressor; in that supposition it is due in justice to them as much as it would to any other nation under similar circumstances, and to refuse it would be an inducement to Algiers to make a common cause, since there would be no security to any of the Barbary powers, whilst we had a frigate left in the Mediterranean, if we shall countenance an interference of that kind.

As to the force necessary there I feel no hesitation. The Secretary of the Navy had consulted me before I received your letter, and I advised that Captain Morris should be immediately instructed to retain the Boston in case hostilities should have commenced either with Tunis or Morocco, and that the General Greene should be sent with her full complement of men instead of going half manned. Mr. Smith has since informed me that that frigate, which was originally a merchant vessel, being a bad fighting vessel, he had substituted the New York to her. That change, of which I am no judge, was, I take for granted, necessary; the difference of expense between the two vessels is at the rate of twenty-five thousand dollars a year.

If there is war with Morocco, no less than four frigates are necessary, viz.: two at Tripoli, one at least in the vicinity of the gut to convoy our vessels in and out, and one off Sallee, to protect principally our Madeira and other island trade, if not to blockade effectually that port. I do not know whether Morocco has any other ports from which cruising vessels (not boats) can sail on the Atlantic.

If Tunis is also at war, five frigates will hardly be sufficient, as three frigates could not keep in constant blockade the ports of that regency and Tripoli. If we had two small ships instead of one of our large frigates, they could, I think, be more advantageously disposed; but we have no option, and it is clear that we cannot do less than to provide the five frigates under present circumstances, which will be effected if the Boston is kept and the New York sent; but I much apprehend that if we have to encounter Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco, we will be compelled to give up the Mediterranean trade and be satisfied with defending the gut. Under that impression, I sincerely wish you could reconcile it to yourself to empower our negotiators to give, if necessary for peace, an annuity to Tripoli. I consider it no greater disgrace to pay them than Algiers. And indeed we share the dishonor of paying those barbarians with so many nations as powerful and interested as ourselves, that, in our present situation, I consider it a mere matter of calculation whether the purchase of peace is not cheaper than the expense of a war, which shall not even give us the free use of the Mediterranean trade.

It is also worth considering, that the capture of some of our merchantmen would, at all events, ultimately compel us to pay much more for their redemption than the value of an annual tribute. Eight years hence we shall, I trust, be able to assume a different tone; but our exertions at present consume the seeds of our greatness and retard to an indefinite time the epoch of our strength.

As our present differences with Morocco have taken rise in the war with Tripoli, it is probable that peace with this power would terminate the hostilities with the Emperor. Might not that man’s pride be flattered with an intimation either that his offices would not be rejected if he chose to act as mediator, or that a wish to preserve harmony with him contributes in accelerating our endeavors to make a reasonable peace with Tripoli?

The application of the force in the Mediterranean towards Tunis and Morocco, in case of hostilities existing between either of those powers and ourselves, appears to me a matter of course.

The Executive cannot declare war, but if war is made, whether declared by Congress or by the enemy, the conduct must be the same, to protect our vessels, and to fight, take, and destroy the armed vessels of that enemy. The only case which admits of doubt is whether, in case of such war actually existing, we should confine our hostilities to their armed vessels or extend them by capture or blockade to the trade. The policy of adopting either course must depend on the power we may have to injure that commerce. How far are they commercial and liable to be affected by an attack upon that commerce? Something may also depend on the personal disposition of the sovereigns of the two countries. If there is hope of peace by a conciliating conduct, perhaps it might be better, whilst we offer it, to show our favorable disposition by only doing what is strictly self-defence, fighting their cruisers. I presume that in that particular respect some discretion must be left to our commanding officer.

Whatever shall be done, I think that no delay ought to take place. The New York will, it is said, be ready to sail in ten days, say a fortnight. She should not be detained, and the instructions should be sent by her.

I do not know that anything else occurs to my mind. You will, I hope, excuse the incorrectness of these hastily-digested ideas. I have only to add that our Mediterranean appropriation is on account of the twenty-four thousand dollars sent by the Adams to Cathcart, and of the heavy drafts made by Eaton, reduced to forty-four thousand dollars. The thirty thousand dollars destined for Algiers will be taken from another appropriation made especially for that object.

The naval appropriations will be sufficient to fit the New York, but we will be embarrassed if the Boston shall return before the meeting of Congress. That is, I believe, owing to miscalculation in the estimate of repairs, which, especially for the Constitution, have cost much more than had been estimated.

I remain, with attachment and respect, your obedient servant.

I had forgotten to say that Mr. Smith suggested the idea of joining Morris to Cathcart for the negotiation with Tripoli. That would have been desirable, in order to provide against accidents; and in the instructions which may be sent to treat with Morocco, and conditionally with Tunis, it would not be amiss that two persons should be named, either of whom might act.