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Subject Area: Political Theory

GALLATIN TO J. Q. ADAMS. - Albert Gallatin, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, vol. 2 [1879]

Edition used:

The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879). 3 vols.

Part of: The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3 vols.

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GALLATIN TO J. Q. ADAMS.

No. 141.

Paris, 17th March, 1820.

Sir,—

I had mentioned in my despatch No. 136 that although the insurrection of the Spanish army was considered as decisive with respect to the fate of the intended expedition against the colonies, yet it was the general opinion here that it would have no political result in Spain itself. That belief continued to prevail during nearly two months, and was corroborated by the resistance of Cadiz, and by the total apathy of the people of the adjacent provinces of Andalusia and Granada. It was indeed allowed that the temporizing conduct of the Spanish government arose from the fear that the troops under Freyre and O’Donnell, although they had not joined the insurrection, could not be trusted if brought in contact with the insurgents. But it was presumed that these, confined in the island of Leon, would not remain long united, and that seeing that, although they had proclaimed the constitution of the cortes, they were not supported in any part of the monarchy, they would ultimately submit. The charm was suddenly broken by the unexpected insurrection of the important province of Galicia. As soon as this was known here, Mr. Pasquier acknowledged to me that the question was decided; that if there was any resource left, it was to give instantaneously a charter to the Spanish nation,—a course which, I think, had been at different times strongly recommended by this government,—but that he feared it was too late, and that the constitution of the cortes would be forcibly imposed on the King.

The event, as you must already know, has justified this opinion. The constitution of the cortes was almost at the same time proclaimed in Aragon and Old Castile, and by the troops collected at Ocana, near Madrid. An insurrection would undoubtedly have broken out in the capital during the night of the 7th-8th March had it not been prevented by the King’s decree declaring his acceptance of the constitution. So far the revolution appears complete, and has been effected almost without shedding any blood. But the event is much too sudden and too recent to be able to appreciate all its results. The only thing which is certain is that the whole of Spain was determined to throw off the intolerable yoke under which she groaned, and that she will be free. She has still many difficulties to encounter.

The constitution of the cortes is very imperfect, and appears to be an imitation of that which had been adopted in France in the year 1791. Like this, it has the double defect of having concentred all the important powers in an assembly composed of a single chamber, and of having preserved a nominal King, who, though not personally disliked, is not trusted, and who has not sufficient authority to defend his few remaining prerogatives. Perhaps it has been now resorted to as the only existing rallying-point, and may receive important modifications. There are certainly in Spain strong habits, and even exalted feelings, in favor of royalty, which render that course probable. But if no changes are made by common consent, it is almost impossible that some new convulsion should not take place, unless Ferdinand shall passively submit to be a mere instrument in the hands of the cortes. To this fundamental difficulty must be added those arising from the yet unascertained pretensions of the army, from the hatred between the Josephinos and the Liberales, from the privileges of the provinces, from the deplorable state of the finances, and from the situation of the colonies.

It is not improbable that, taught by experience, the cortes may adopt measures calculated to preserve those colonies which are not in a state of open insurrection; and there seems to be some expectation that some arrangement may be made with Buenos Ayres. The war has been carried on in a too sanguinary way in Venezuela to render it probable that reconciliation with that province will take place.

Spain will probably be indebted to her geographical situation for an exemption from a foreign interference. Symptoms have already appeared here of the wishes of the ultra-royalists that it might take place, and there will be a strong disposition for interfering on the part of some of the continental powers. But it seems improbable that Great Britain should unite in that plan; and the government of France, even if it was so disposed, which I doubt, cannot or dares not send her own troops to Spain, or grant a passage through her territories to a foreign army.

The moral effect of this revolution on other parts of Europe is not yet felt, but will be great. Although no symptom has yet appeared of a disposition on the part of this government to alter the retrograde course which it is now pursuing, the opposition is already emboldened, and it is impossible that such an event should not render the measures proposed still more odious to the people at large. In the mean while, everybody agrees that such an example of a revolution effected by the army is most dangerous, particularly as relates to Prussia. For there also there has been a breach of promise, and there also the army is deeply impregnated with those sentiments of liberty which animate all the enlightened part of the nation. There is an eminent danger of revolutions if the sovereigns are not taught by this example that reliance on a mere physical force is insecure; that their armies may become their most formidable enemies; and that they cannot any longer rely on the stability of their government unless they make in time all the concessions required by the state of society and imperiously demanded by public opinion.

With respect to our differences with Spain, I think that the new administration of that country would make no difficulty on the subject of the grants of land. How far the national pride will be reconciled to the cession itself of Florida may be a more doubtful question. You will undoubtedly recollect that according to the constitution the King cannot grant any portion of Spanish territory without the consent of the cortes. Our treaty will therefore require their ratification.

I have the honor, &c.

[To the duplicate of this letter was added the following:]

P.S.—March 23. I have received, since the above was written, several letters from Mr. Forsyth at Madrid, of which, according to a wish expressed in one of them, I now forward copies herewith enclosed. The proclamations, &c., are the same as are published in the Paris newspapers.