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Subject Area: Economics
Subject Area: Political Theory

GALLATIN TO J. Q. ADAMS. - Albert Gallatin, The Writings of Albert Gallatin, vol. 2 [1879]

Edition used:

The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1879). 3 vols.

Part of: The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3 vols.

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GALLATIN TO J. Q. ADAMS.

No. 98.

Paris, January 19, 1819.

Sir,—

I had the honor to receive a few days ago, through Mr. Rush, your despatch to us of the 2d of November last.

The subject of the slave-trade was not even hinted at in the course of our negotiation. But I have been informed by Pozzo that the British ministers proposed at Aix-la-Chapelle a general agreement between the five great European powers, founded on the same basis which had been adopted in the several treaties of England with the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. It was explicitly declared by Richelieu that France would never subscribe any agreement which recognized the right of the public vessels of any nation to visit French vessels in time of peace. A similar declaration having been made by Russia and countenanced by Prussia, the plan was abandoned. I am also informed that one of many causes which prevented any general association against the Barbary powers was a jealousy of the naval preponderance of Great Britain, to which, in case of a maritime alliance, it was apprehended that the other powers must to a certain degree submit.

When the proposal of Great Britain that the agreement respecting impressment might be revoked at will by either party was mentioned by Lord Castlereagh, we immediately observed that this stipulation would be altogether unfavorable to the United States; that they would make an immediate sacrifice by excluding British seamen from their service; that this sacrifice would operate in favor of Great Britain, by increasing the expenses of our navigation, and thereby giving some comparative advantage to hers in the commerce between the two countries; and that it was extremely objectionable that the equivalent for which the United States were willing to make that sacrifice should not only be remote and contingent, but that the contingency should depend not merely on a renewal of the contemplated temporary agreement, but also on the will of Great Britain at any time whatever she might choose to notify it.

Lord Castlereagh expressed a great anxiety that an arrangement might be made on that difficult subject. It had been explicitly declared by our government that the United States would not be satisfied with a correction of the abuses in the practice; that an absolute suppression of the practice itself was on their part a sine qua non. As an equivalent, the non-employment of British seamen was offered, a stipulation to be enforced exclusively by our own laws. An agreement founded on that basis was, he said, so contrary to public opinion in England that it would be utterly impracticable to obtain public support for it unless it was accompanied by the stipulation which he had proposed. I understand, indeed, though not expressly stated, that without it the consent of the Cabinet could not be obtained. He added that this was the only motive for the proposed condition, and that it would be purely nominal if, as we believe and as he hoped, our laws proved efficient in carrying the agreement substantially into effect.

It being ascertained that the British government would not treat on the basis proposed by the United States without this reservation, which had not been anticipated and on which we had not been instructed, we did not feel ourselves justifiable in rejecting it altogether, and thought it desirable to obtain the whole British plan rather than to refer previously to our government the single question of the reserved power to annul the agreement. Some considerations, without removing altogether the objection, seemed also to lessen its weight. It was only in the case of Great Britain being engaged in war that there was any danger that she should avail herself of the right to dissolve the convention; and the probability was that this would expire by its own limitation before the contingency took place. The objection, in fact, applied with nearly as much force to the temporary nature of the agreement as to the right reserved to annul it. It was believed, as is suggested in your despatch, that if the arrangement was once made, the principle never could afterwards be altered and the practice of impressment be renewed. If Great Britain should, without having any just right to complain of our having violated the compact, dissolve it in time of war, after having enjoyed its advantages during the peace, it would be such a violent outrage as would unite the whole of our nation against any attempt on her part to resume the practice of impressment. Indeed, such a conduct on her part could not take place unless she intended to be at war with us; and in that case, other pretences for it would not be wanting if thought necessary.

It may also be the opinion of some persons that the stipulations being reciprocal is not without its advantages to the United States; that the exclusion of British seamen may prove more injurious to our navigation than has been anticipated, and that it may on that account become eligible to put an end to the agreement before it expires by its own limitation. I must acknowledge that I do not share that opinion, and that I believe the inconveniences, whatever they may be, to be less than those which must necessarily follow the practice of impressment, and that they are counterbalanced by the advantage resulting from having a navy purely national.

The stipulation appears, therefore, to me on the whole unfavorable to us; but I do not believe that there is at this time any probability of concluding an agreement unless we consent to that reservation.

You already know that our observations induced Lord Castlereagh to abandon the other condition, by which the commanders of British armed vessels would have had the right of examining our crews; and that it was not made a part of their official projet.

I have the honor, &c.