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• The Rights of War and Peace Book Ii
• Chapter I: Of the Causes of War; and First, of the Defence of Persons and Goods.
• Chapter II: Of Things Which Belong In Common to All Men.
• Chapter III: Of the Original Acquisition of Things; Where Also Is Treated of the Sea and Rivers.
• Chapter IV: Of a Thing Presumed to Be Quitted, and of the Right of Possession That Follows; and How Such a Possession Differs From Usucaption and Prescription.
• Chapter V: Of the Original Acquisition of a Right Over Persons; Where Also Is Treated of the Right of Parents: of Marriages: of Societies: of the Right Over Subjects: Over Slaves.
• Chapter VI: Of an Acquisition (possession Or Purchase) Derived From a Man’s Own Deed; Where Also of the Alienation of a Government, and of the Things and Revenues That Belong to That Government.
• Chapter VII: Of an Acquisition Derived to One By Vertue of Some Law; Where Also of Succeeding to the Effects and Estate of a Man Who Dies Without a Will.
• Chapter VIII: Of Such Properties As Are Commonly Called Acquisitions By the Right of Nations.
• Chapter IX: When Jurisdiction and Property Cease.
• Chapter X: Of the Obligation That Arises From Property.
• Chapter XI: Of Promises.
• Chapter XII: Of Contracts.
• Chapter XIII: Of an Oath.
• Chapter XIV: Of the Promises, Contracts, and Oaths of Those Who Have the Sovereign Power.
• Chapter XV: Of Publick Treaties, As Well Those That Are Made By the Sovereign Himself, As Those That Are Concluded Without His Order.
• Chapter XVI: Of Interpretation, Or the Way of Explaining the Sense of a Promise Or Convention.
• Chapter XVII: Of the Damage Done By an Injury, and of the Obligation Thence Arising.
• Chapter XVIII: Of the Rights of Embassies.
• Chapter XIX: Of the Right of Burial.
• Chapter XX: Of Punishments.
• Chapter XXI: Of the Communication of Punishments.
• Chapter XXII: Of the Unjust Causes of War.
• Chapter XXIII: Of the Dubious Causes of War.
• Chapter XXIV: Exhortations Not to Engage In a War Rashly, Tho’ For Just Reasons.
• Chapter XXV: Of the Causes For Which War Is to Be Undertaken On the Account of Others.
• Chapter XXVI: Of the Reasons That Justify Those Who Under Another’s Command Engage In War.

CHAPTER XXV

Of the Causes for which War is to be undertaken on the Account of others.

I.War may be justly undertaken by a Prince for the Interest of his Subjects.I. 1. Above, when wea treated of those who make War, we laid down, and explained, that, according to the Law of Nature, every Man is authorized to maintain, not only his own Right, but also that of another Person’s: And therefore those Reasons that can justify a Man in undertaking a War for himself; the very same can justify those who espouse the Cause of others.

2. But our main and chiefest Care should be,1 for thoseb who are under our<500>2 Direction and Management, whether in a Family or in a State. For they are, as it were, a Part of him who governs, as we shewed there. Thus the Hebrews took up Arms, under the Command of Joshua, in Behalf of the Gibeonites,c who had surrendered themselves up to them.3Our Ancestors, says Cicero to the Romans, often commenced a War, if but one of their Merchants and Mariners had been ill dealt with: And in another Passage, How many Wars, (says he) have our Fathers engaged in, upon their hearing that any Roman Citizens had been injured, any Master of a Vessel detained, or any Trader plundered. The same Romans, tho’ they refused to take up Arms in behalf of their Allies, did yet, as soon as ever those Allies had thrown themselves under their Protection, and so became their Subjects, think themselves obliged to do it. The Campanians addressed the Romans thus.4Tho’ you will not guard our State against the Violence and Insults of its Enemies, yet surely you will protect your own. And5Florus tells us, that the Alliance between them and the Romans became more strict, upon the Surrender of all they had. And Livy says,6It was believed to be a Point of publick Faith, not to fail and desert such as gave themselves up to their Disposal.

II.But it is not always to be so undertaken.II. A Prince is not always obliged to take up Arms, whatever just Reasons of Complaint any particular Subject of his may have; unless all or most of his Subjects would be Sufferers on that Account. For it is a Sovereign’s Business to have greater Regard for the Whole than the Part; and the larger the Part is, so much the more does it approach to the Nature of the Whole.

III.Whether an innocent Subject may be delivered up to an Enemy, for preventing some manifest Danger.III. 1. And therefore, If one1Subject, tho’altogether innocent, be demanded by the Enemy to be put to Death,2he may, no Doubtaof it, be abandoned, and left to their Discretion, if it is manifest, that the State is not able to stand the Shock of that Enemy. Ferdinand Vasquezb argues against this Point; but if one does not so much mind his Expressions as his Meaning, one may find that what he intended was, that such a Subject should not rashly be forsaken; provided there were any Hopes of being able to protect him. For, amongst other Instances, he alledges that of the Italian Infantry, who deserted Pompey, before Matters were grown desperate, upon their Assurance of Security on Caesar’s Side, which Act he very justly censures.

2. Whether an inoffensive Subject may be surrendred up into the Hands of the Enemy, to save the State from imminent Ruin, is a Point much controverted now among the learned, as it was in former Times, when3Demosthenes proposed that remarkable Fable concerning the Dogs, whom, as an Article of Peace, the Wolves demanded the Sheep to give them up. Vasquez is not the only Person who is against this, butcSoto too, even he whose Opinion Vasquez4 blames, as authorising Perfidiousness. But Soto would have it, that such a Subject is obliged to surrender up himself to the Enemy: And this is what Vasquez denies for this Reason, because it is not required by the Nature of a Civil Society, which every one enters into for his own Safety and Advantage.

3. But from hence all that can be gathered is, that no Subject is, by any Right strictly so called, obliged to this, but not that Charity permits him to do otherwise. For there are many Duties, not of strict Justice but of Charity, which are not only<501> very commendable, (as Vasquez owns) but which cannot be dispensed with without a Crime.5 Such a Duty does this seem to be, which obliges every one to prefer the Lives of a vast Number of innocent Persons before his own. This is what Praxithea, in Euripides’s Erectheus,6 designs by saying,

• Ἔιπερ γὰρ ἀριθμὸν οἰ̂δα, &c.
• If I know any Thing at all of Numbers,
• Any Thing of more and less, a single House
• Can ne’er a publick Mis’ry exceed or equal,
• However great its own Misfortunes be.

And thus Phociond solicited Demosthenes, and others, after the Example of Leus’s Daughters and theeHyacinthides, to be ready to suffer Death, rather than that on their Account their Country should be ruined,7Cicero in his Oration for P. Sextius says, If sailing with my Friends it should chance that a Crew of Pyrates should attack us and threaten presently to sink our Ship unless they delivered me alone up unto them, if my Companions should refuse, and declare that they would sooner perish than surrender me, I should rather throw myself into the Sea, to save the rest, than bring those who express’d so tender a Concern for my Welfare into any great Danger of their Lives, much less to certain Death. And in his third Book De Finibus he tells us that,8A Man of Goodness and Sense, who conforms himself to the Laws, and understands the Duty of a Subject, hasal way sastricter Regard for the publick Advantage, than for any particular Person’s; nay than for his own. And in Livy we read the following Passage of certain Molossians.9I have often heard indeed of People who have laid down their Lives for their Country, but these are the first that were ever known to judge it reasonable that their Country should perish for them.

4. But granting all this, there still remains a Doubt, Whether he can be forced to do that, which he is in Duty bound to. So to is against it, bringing the Instance of a rich Man who is indeed by the Laws of Charity and Compassion obliged to relieve the Poor, but yet cannot be compelled to do it. But we are to observe that the Case is not parallel between Subjects and Subjects, and between Sovereigns and their Subjects. For one equal cannot compel another, unless it be to that, which by the strictest Right he owes him. But a Sovereign can oblige a Subject10 to other Things also which any Virtue directs, because11 that is a Power included in the Right of Sovereignty as Sovereignty.f Thus in Time of great Scarcity Subjects may be<502> compelled to bring out their Corn, and therefore upon the Question in Hand it seems much more likely that a Subject may be forced to do what Charity demands of him. So Phociong before mentioned, declared that Things were come to such an Extremity, that if Alexander demanded the dearest Friend he had, as Nicocles for Instance, he would be the first to vote for the delivering him up.

IV.That we may lawfully undertake a War in behalf of our Allies, whether the Alliance be equal or unequal.IV. Next to our own Subjects, or indeed equally with them, are our Allies to be defended, when such a Defence is stipulated in the Articles of Treaty; and this, whether they have entirely given themselves up on the Account of such a Protection, and so depend upon it, or whether it be agreed on for a mutual Help and Security. He who defends not his Ally, says St. Ambrose,1from Wrong, if it is in his Power to do it, is as much to blame, as he who wrongs him. But such Articles do not reach so far, (as it was before observed)2 as to involve us in an unjust War; and for this Reason the Lacedemonians3 before they entered into War with the Athenians laid before their Allies the Justice of their Cause, to be determined by their Opinion of it; and so were theaRomans for having the Grecians Judgment upon their War against Nabis. But we may add here that an4 Ally is not obliged to give his Assistance, when there are no Hopes of Success, because Alliances are entered into on the Account of making some Advantage by them, and not to People’s Prejudice. And we may protect one Ally against another of our Allies, unless there is a Clause in a former Treaty to the contrary. Thus might the Athenians5 have come in as Auxiliaries to the Corcyreans if their Cause had been good, against the Corinthians, tho’ their more antient Allies.

V.And also for our Friends.V.1 A third Reason for War is the Protection of oura Friends, whom tho’ not under any formal Promise, yet upon the Score of Friendship we are under an Obligation of assisting, provided we bring not ourselves into any great Trouble, and Inconveniences by it. Thus Abrahamb took up Arms in behalf of his Kinsman Lot. And the2Romans charged the People of Antium not to presume to meddle with the Greeks to plunder them, because related to the Italians. And the same Romans very often actually engaged in War, or at least threatened so to do, not only for their Allies, whom they were bound by Treaties to defend, but for their Friends too.<503>

VI.And indeed for any Body whatever.VI. The last and most extensive Reason of all for assisting others is that Relation that all Mankind stand in to each other; anda this alone is sufficient.1One Man, says Seneca, is born to help and relieve another. And in another Place, A wise Man will, as often as it lies in his Power, turn away a Misfortune. Euripides in his Supplices:2

• The Rocks Protection to the Beasts afford,
• The sacred Altars to the trembling Slaves;
• And for one suff’ring Town a safe Retreat
• Another Town provides.

That Courage, says St. Ambrose, which defends the Weak, is Justice in Perfection; but of this we have already treated.

VII.Yet it may be let alone without any Crime if one’s afraid for himself, or that he must kill the Aggressor.VII. 1. Here it is an Inquiry whether one Man is obliged to defend another from Injuries, or one People another.1Plato is for having him punished,2 who does not keep off a Violence that is offered another. The same the3Aegyptian Laws provided for; but yet it is plain, that in case there appears any manifest Danger we are not bound to do it; for a Man may prefer the Preservation of his own Life and Goods before that of the Life and Goods of another. And thus do I think that Expression of Tully is to be construed,4He who does not take the injured Person’s Part, and oppose the Violence done him, if he can, is as much to blame as if he forsook his Parents, his Country, or his Friends: By, if he can, we are to understand, with his own Convenience: For he himself tells us elsewhere, that5There are some People, perhaps, whom it is no Disreputation not to protect. Sallust in his History has these Words, All who when their own Affairs are as they could wish them, are invited to a confederate War, should thoroughly consider whether they may without any Hazard still be at quiet; and then, whether what they are sollicited to, be a Thing that is just, safe and honourable, or whether it would not be a Disgrace to them to comply.

2. Nor should we overlook this Saying6 of Seneca, I will run to any Man’s Assistance who is just a perishing, provided I can do it without ruining myself; or if I must be ruined, that my Ruin may be the Purchase of some Person, or of some Affair of great Importance. But he is not then bounda to do it, if the assaulted cannot be rescued without killing the Aggressor.7 For if he who is set upon may value the Invader’s Life above his own, as we elsewhere have told you he might, he who is really of Opinion that he does so, or that he ought to do so, is no ways to blame; especially, since on the Aggressor’s Side there is a greater Danger of an irrecoverable and eternal Loss.<504>

VIII.Whether that War is just which is made for the Defence of another’s Subjects, explained by a Distinction.VIII. 1. It is another Question, Whether we have a just Cause for War with another Prince, in order to relieve his Subjects from their Oppression under him. True it is, that since the Institution of Civil Societies, the Governors of every State have acquired some peculiar Right over their respective Subjects: As Euripides says in the Heraclidae.1

• Δίκαιοι δ’ ἐσμὲν, &c.
• We, who this City do inhabit, can
• Ourselves dispense our Justice.

Nor do the following Verses imply any Thing else:

• aThat Sparta beautify which is your Share,
• Upon Mycene I my Care shall fix.

And Thucydidesb amongst the Tokens of Royalty, puts the Supreme Power of Justice, as well as a Power of making Laws, and constituting Magistrates. To which alludes that of Virgil:

• cThe Realms of Ocean and the Fields of Air
• Are mine, not his; by fatal Lot to me
• The liquid Empire fell, and Trident of the Sea. Dryd.

And that of Ovid not unlike it:

• dNor may the Gods the Acts of Gods rescind.

And that also of Euripides,

• eThe Rule and Custom of the Gods is this:
• That none must e’er another’s Will oppose.

The Reason of this is, as2 St. Ambrose very justly explains it: Lest by intruding into each other’s Provinces they should quarrel among themselves. And the Corinthians in Thucydides reckoned it very equitable,3 that every one should punish4his own; and Perseus in his Discourse to Martius, refuses to make any Apology for himself, for what he had acted against the Dolopes; For, says he, I only put my own lawful Authority in Execution, since they were my Subjects, and under my Command; but those Reasons may take place where Subjects are really in Fault, or, if you please, when it is5 uncertain whether they are or no.f For to this End was the Distribution of Empires first made.

2. But if the Injustice be visible, as if a6Busiris, a7Phalaris, or a Thracian8Diomedes exercise such Tyrannies over Subjects, as no good Man living can approve<505> of, the9 Right of human Society shall not be therefore excluded. ThusgConstantine made War against Maxentius and Licinius; and other Roman Emperors against the Persians, or threatned them with it at least,h unless they left off persecuting Christians on the account of their Religion only.

3. And indeed tho’ it were granted that Subjects ought not, even in the most pressing Necessity, to take up Arms against their Prince (which is what those very Gentlemen who are such Advocates for the Power and Prerogatives of the Crown, are, as we shewed you,i in suspence about) we should not yet be able to conclude from thence, that others might not do it for them. For whenever the Obstacle to any Action arises from the Person, and not from the Thing, then what one is not allowed to do himself, another may do for him; supposing the Case be such, as one Man may be serviceable in it to another. Thus for Instance, a Guardian, or any other, may carry on a Suit of Law for a Minor, because he is not capable of doing it himself; and any one10 may without an Order or Commission plead for a Person absent. Now what prohibits the Subject to resist, does not at all proceed from a Cause, which is the same in a Subject, as in him who is not so; but from the Quality and Circumstance of the Person, which Quality does not pass to others.

4. And therefore, according to Seneca,11 I may make War upon a Man, tho’ he and I are of different Nations, if he disturbs and molests his own Country, as we told you in our Discourse about Punishments, which is an Affair often attended with the Defence of12 innocent Subjects. Antient and modern History indeed informs us, that Avarice and Ambition do frequently lay hold on such Excuses; but the Use that wicked Men make of a Thing, does not always hinder it from being just in itself. Pirates sail on the Seas, and Thieves wear Swords, as well as others.

IX.That it is very unjust for People to enter into Confederacies, or to list themselves Soldiers for Money, without any Regard to the Reasons of the War.IX. 1. But as we have already shewed,a that those Alliances which are entered into, with the Design and Promise of Assistance in any War, without regarding the Merit of the Cause, are altogether unlawful; so there is no Course of Lifeb more abominable and to be detested, than that of mercenary Soldiers, who without ever considering the Justice of what they are undertaking, fight for the Pay; who

• By their Wages the Goodness of the Cause compute.

Which1Plato proves from Tyrtaeus. And this is the very Thing that Philip2 <506> objected to the Aetolians; and Dionysius Milesius censured the Arcadians for in the following Terms,3Wars become a Trade, the Arcadians live upon the Greeks Misfortunes, and Groundless Wars engage them on any Side. The Case of a Soldier, as4Antiphanes describes it, is really a miserable one,

• Ὅς ἕνεκα τον̂ ζῃ̑ν ἐρχετ’ ἀποθανούμενος,
• Who to Support his Life to Death resorts.

And5Dion Prusaeensis argues thus, What is there in the World that we have more necessary, or what can be more valuable to us than Life, and yet even this do People throw away for Money.

2. Did they sell only their own Lives it were no great Matter: but they sell also the Lives of many an harmless inoffensive Creature:c So much more odious than Hangmen,6 by how much it is worse to kill without a Reason, than with<507> one. Antisthenes used to say, that7a common Executioner was abundantly better than a Tyrant; for the one puts Malefactors to Death only, but the other the Innocent.8Philip of Macedon said of that Sort of Men, who got their Livelihood by fighting, that War was Peace to them, and Peace War.

3. War is no proper Employment, nay, it is so horrible, that nothing but mere Necessity, or true Charity, can make it lawful, as may be gathered from what has been said in the foregoing Chapter. To bear Arms is, in St.9Austin’s Judgment, no Crime, but to bear Arms on the account of Booty is Wickedness with a Witness.

X.To bear Arms for Pay only, or for the meer sake of Booty is a Crime.X. Nay, it is so to fight for Pay, if that be the sole and principal View tho’ it is otherwise very justifiable to receive Pay, for who (says St. Paul) ever goes to War at his own Cost? 1 Cor. ix. 7.

[a ]B. i. chap. 5.

[1 ]See Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. VIII. Chap. VI. § 14.

[b ]Navar. l. 24. c. 18.

[2. ]Procopius says, it is not sufficient, in Order to be just, that we do no Wrong to any one, but that we must also be ready to protect those who are under our Charge, from the Injuries of others. Persic. Lib. II. (Cap. XV. in the Speech of the Embassadors from the Prince of the Lazians to Chosroez, King of Persia.) Grotius.

[c ]Joshua x. 6.

[3. ]Majores vestri saepe, mercatoribus, &c. Orat. pro Leg. Manil. Cap. V. Quot bella majores nostros & quanto, &c. In Verr. Lib. V. Cap. LVIII.

[4. ]Quandoquidem, inquit [princeps legationis Campanorum]Livy, Lib. VII. Cap. XXXI. Num. 3.

[5. ]Erat foedus cum utrisque, &c. Lib. 1. Cap. XVI. Num. 2.

[6. ]Tum jam fides agi visa, deditos non prodi. Ubi supra. Num. 7.

[1 ]See Pufendorf, B. VIII. Chap. II. § 5.

[2. ]See the Patriarch Nicephorus’s Advice given to Michael Rangaba, about delivering up some Deserters to the Bulgarian General, as an Article of the Peace, where you have in Zonaras the following Period, Κρεɩ̂σσον εἰ̂ναι, &c. Judging it much better for a Few, than an immense Multitude to suffer. (Vol. II. in Mich. Rangab.) Grotius.

[a ]Soto, De Just. & Jure, l. 5. qu. 1. art. 7.

[b ]Controv. lllust. l. 1. c. 13.

[3. ]See his Life in Plutarch, Vol. I. p. 856. E. Edit. Wech.

[c ]Ubi supra.

[4. ]As if the State broke the Engagement they had entered into with the Subject demanded by the Enemy.

[5. ]But as there is no Obligation on a Man to make a Sacrifice of his own Life, unless when there is good Reason to believe he may save the State, or a great Number of Persons, by doing so; it is necessary to know, in the present Case, whether there be sufficient Certainty on that Head. He who demands an innocent Person, in Order to destroy him, gives Reason, by that Demand, to fear every Thing from him. If he be capable of desiring to deprive a Person of Life, who has done nothing that merits Death, he will be as capable of breaking his Engagement to leave the State in Tranquillity, when the Person demanded is delivered up. In a Word, it is my Opinion, that these Demands may generally be considered as the Measures of a Power, which seeks Pretexts for a Rupture, and designs at any Rate to oppress a Prince or State, that it perceives not to be in a Condition to oppose it.

[6. ](Ver. 82. & seqq. Edit. Barnes.) Philo, the Jew, says, it is not just that the Whole should be deemed an Appendix of one of its Parts. De vita Mosis, Lib. I. (p. 652. B.) In the same Place are other Things well worthy of being read. Grotius.

[d ]Diod. Sicul. l. 17. c. 15.

[e ]See Apollod. Biblioth. l. 3. c. 14. § 8.

[7. ]Etenim si mihi in aliqua nave, &c. Orat. pro Sextio, Cap. XX.

[8. ]Ut enim leges omnium, &c. De finib. bon. & mal. Lib. III. Cap. XIX.

[9. ]Quae vos rabies, inquit, agitat, &c. Lib. XLV. Cap. XXVI. Num. 8.

[10. ]So among the Lucani there was a particular Punishment for the Extravagant; among the Macedonians for the ungrateful, and among both the Lucani and Athenians for the idle. Add here what is said B. I. Chap. I.§9. Note 6. Grotius.

As for the Law of the Athenians against Idleness, the Reader may see Diogenes Laertius, Lib. I. § 55. with the Notes of Menage. That of the Lucani upon the same Subject may be found in a Fragment of Nicolaus Damascenus, in Stobaeus, Florileg. Tit. XLII. See other Examples in Aelian, Var. Hist. II. 5. iv. 1. In regard to the Punishment of Ingratitude by the Macedonians, some learned Writers pretend, that this is founded upon an Error in the Editions of Seneca, De Benefic. Lib. III. Cap. VI. where the Word Macedonum is read for Medorum. See what I have said upon Pufendorf, B. III. Chap. III. § 17. Note 3. Edit. II.

[11. ]As Sovereigns may prescribe Things indifferent in themselves, when the Good of the Publick demands it; with much more Reason may they require those Things, which one was before bound to perform by the Rules of some Virtue; tho’ he could not be compelled to it without the Authority of a lawful Sovereign. But the Question is to know, whether in the present Case, there be a plain Obligation of Charity, and which may be preferred to the Care of the Preservation of an innocent Person. See what I have said in the fifth Note upon this Paragraph.

[f ]Lessius, l. 2. c. 9. Dub. 7.

[g ]Plutarch, in ejus vita, p. 749. t. 1. Edit. Wech.

[1 ]Qui enim non repellit a Socio injuriam, &c. Offic. Lib. I. Cap. XXXVI. That Father does not speak there of Allies, to whom our Author applies the Passage, as appears from the Example that follows, of what Moses did in killing the Egyptian, who insulted one of his Nation. Socius therefore means here all those, with whom we have any particular Tie or Relation.

[2. ]See Simler, De Republica Helvetiorum: If the Lord makes War upon any one, and it be known to be just, or not known to be otherwise, the Vassal is obliged to assist him. But if it be visible that he enters into it without any Grounds for so doing, he shall help him to defend himself, but not to offend the other. Lib. II. De Feudis, Cap. XXVIII. at the End. Grotius.

[3. ]In the Peloponnesian War. See Thucydides, Lib. I. Cap. CXIX. CXXV. Edit. Oxon.

[a ]Liv. l. 34. c. 22.

[4. ]See what Pufendorf says upon this Head, Law of Nature and Nations, B. VIII. Chap. VI. § 14.

[5. ]The Case, of which our Author speaks, happened a little before the Peloponnesian War. See Thucydides, Lib. I. Cap. XXXI. & seqq. and what is said above in Chap. XVI. of this Book, § 13. Num. 4.

[1 ]A Person having formerly consulted the Oracle at Delphos, the God told him, he would give him no Answer, only that he should forthwith depart out of the Temple; because he had not assisted one of his Companions, who had been killed by Robbers:

• Ἀνδρὶ ϕίλω θνήσκοντι παρὼν πέλας οὐκ ἐβοήθεις.
• Οὔ σε θεμιστεύσω περικαλλέος ἔξιθι νηον̂.
• Grotius.

This Oracle is in Aelian, Var. Hist. Lib. III. Chap. XLIV.

[a ]Fr. Victoria, De Indis, Part 2. n. 17. Cajetan. 2. 2 Q. 4. Art. 1.

[b ]Gen. xiv.

[2. ]Our Author has without Doubt taken this Fact from Strabo, for neither Livy, nor Dionysius Halicarnassensis, nor any other Author that I know of, says any Thing of it. The Geographer says, that the People of Antium had formerly Ships and exercised Piracy in Conjunction with the Tyrrhenians, even after they were subjected to the Romans. Alexander complained to the Romans upon this account, and Demetrius after him, who sent also all the Pyrates he could take to the Romans, telling them, that he delivered them up, upon account of the Relation that was between the Greeks and Romans; but adding, that it was unworthy of the Romans, who ruled Italy, and had a Temple dedicated to Castor and Pollux, beneficent Divinities, whom all the World honoured with the Name of Saviours, to send Corsairs into Greece. Upon which the Romans put a Stop to those Piracies. Geograp. Lib. V. p. 354, 355. Edit. Amst. 232. Edit. Paris. Casaub. This does not seem to agree entirely with what Livy says; that after the Defeat of the Antiates, they were prohibited Navigation, and their Ships taken from them, some of which were kept at Rome, and others burnt, with the Beaks of which the Pulpit for Harangues was adorned, and from then cetook the Name Rostra: Naves inde longé, &c. Lib. VIII. Cap. XIV. Num. 8. 12. Or else the Romans must soon after have become less rigorous, with regard to the Antiates, and have suffered them to fit out Ships again, and to make Use of them in exercising Piracy. However it be, the Example is ill applied to our Author’s Subject; because it relates to the putting a Stop to Hostilities on the Part of a dependent People, and not the aiding of Friends against an Enemy, over whom one has no Authority.

[a ]See above, B. 1. c. 5.

[1 ]Homo in adjutorium mutuum generatus est. De Ira, Lib. I. Cap. V.

[2. ]Ἔχει γὰρ καταϕυγὴν, &c.

Supplic. Ver. 267. & seqq. The Passage quoted here by our Author from St. Ambrose has been already recited above, B. I. Chap. II. § 10. Num. 5. Note 18.

[1 ]Our Author cites here in the Margin, Lib. IV. De Legibus, in which there is nothing like this. He meant to refer to the ninth Book, where however the Law is not general, as he makes it. The Philosopher speaks of those, who seeing a Son in his right Senses beat his Father or Mother, his Grandfather or Grandmother, do not aid the Person treated with so much Indignity by another, who on the contrary owed him all kind of Respect, p. 881. B. He had said the same Thing in the preceding Page, with some Modification, of those who see any one beaten by a Person twenty Years younger, or less.

[2. ]The Rabbins are also for having such a Man punished. See Moses De Kotzi, Praecept. jubent. LXXVII. LXXX. vetant. CLXIV. CLXV. Grotius.

[3. ]It was a capital Crime, whether they found a Man in danger of being killed upon the Highway, or treated cruelly in any other Manner. Diod. Biblioth. Histor. Lib. I. Cap. LXXVII. p. 49. Edit. H. Steph.

[4. ]Qui autem non defendit, nec obsistit, si potest, injuriae, tam est in vitio, quam si parentes, aut amicos, aut patriam deserat. De Offic. Lib. I. Cap. VII.

[5. ]Non defendi homines sine vituperatione fortasse possunt. This we find in Ammianus Marcellinus, Lib. XXX. Cap. IV. p. 643. tho’ the Passage is not amongst the Fragments, which have been collected of the last Words of Cicero. The other Passage from Sallust is the beginning of Mithridates’s Letter to Arsaces, King of Persia: Omnes qui secundis rebus, &c. Frag. Lib. IV. Num. 2.

[6. ]Succurram perituro, &c. De Benefic. Lib. II. Cap. XV. The same Philosopher says in another Place, that one would defend a Person of Merit at the Expence of his own Blood, and even as to a Person of no Merit, if by crying out one could deliver him from Robbers he would willingly exert his Voice to preserve a Man’s Life: Dignum etiam impendio sanguinis, &c. Lib. I. Cap. X. See what is said above, B. II. Chap. I.§8. Grotius.

[a ]Lessius, l. 2. c. 4. Dub. 15.

[7. ]This is founded upon a Principle we have refuted elsewhere. It is certainly better to save the Life of an innocent Man, than that of a Criminal.

[1 ]The Herald Copraeus demanded on the Part of Eurystheus the Heraclidae to be delivered up; who had taken Refuge at Athens, and had been, as he says, condemned to die in their own Country. To which he adds, that every Prince has a Right to execute Justice upon his own Subjects, Ver. 143, 144.

[a ]Ex Euripid. Frag. Phoenic. apud Barnes, v. 19, 20.

[b ]See B. 1. c. 3. §6.n.1.

[c ]Aeneid. l. 1. v. 142.

[d ]Metamor. l. 14. v. 784, 785.

[e ]Hippolyt. coron. v. 1328. & seqq.

[2. ]Qui [Poetae] mundum in tres ferunt esse divisum, &c. Offic. Lib. I. Cap. XIII. in fin.

[3. ]It relates to Allies and not Subjects. The Orator of the Corinthians says, that every State had a Right to revenge the Injuries done it by its Allies. Lib. I. Cap. XLIII. Edit. Oxon.

[4. ]St. Austin says, Lib. II. De libero Arbitrio: It is no Argument of Justice to punish People who are under another’s Jurisdiction, because it is a Proof of a Man’s Goodness to do Strangers a Kindness.Procopius, Vandal. I. ὑπάρχουσαν, &c. It is proper that every Man should look after his own Province, and not concern himself with Affairs of other States.Grotius.

This last Passage is in Gelimer’s Answer to the Emperor Justinian’s Letter, Cap. IX.

[5. ]In doubtful Cases the Presumption ought to be in Favour of the Sovereign. Otherwise a Handle would be given to other Powers for intermeddling in what passes out of their own Dominions.

[f ]Fr. Victor. De Ind. rel. n. 15.

[6. ]This Busiris is said to have been King of Egypt; and to have sacrificed the Strangers who came into his Country to Jupiter. Thus he is represented in fabulous History. See Apollodorus, Biblioth. Lib. II. Cap. V. § 11. But some antient Authors justify him as to this Charge; and others maintain, that there never was such a Person as Busiris. See Marsham’s Canon Chronicus, p. 50. 79. Edit. Lips.

[7. ]He was a very cruel Tyrant of Sicily, and was said to have eaten his own Son. See Dr. Bentley’s learned Dissertation upon the Letters of Phalaris, p. 512, 513. Edit. 1699.

[8. ]This King of Thrace is said to have fed his Horses with human Flesh. See Diodorus Siculus, Lib. IV. Cap. XV. Apollodorus, Lib. II. Cap. V. § 8.

[9. ]Every Man, as Man, has a Right to claim the Aid of other Men, in Necessity, and every Person is obliged to give it him, if in his Power, by the Laws of Humanity. See Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. III. Chap. III. § 1. Now a Man, neither does, nor can, renounce those Laws by entering into Civil Society; tho’ he may justly be supposed under an Engagement not to implore a foreign Aid for slight Injuries, or even great ones, that affect only few Persons. But when all the Subjects, or the major Part of them, groan under the Oppressions of a Tyrant; the Subjects, on the one Side, re-enter into all the Rights of natural Liberty, which authorizes them to seek Aid where ever they can find it; and on the other, those, who are in a Condition to give it them, without considerable Prejudice to themselves, not only may, but ought, to endeavour with all their Power to deliver the oppressed; forth is very Reason, that they are Men, and Members of human Society, of which Civil Societies are Parts.

[g ]Victor. De Indis. Rel. p. 2. n. 13.

[h ]See another Instance in the History of Pepin, apud Fredegar. in fin.

[i ]B. 1. c. 4. § 11.

[10. ]This is what the Roman Law terms Defensor; a Term which our Author uses here, in Opposition to Procurator. See above, Chap. X.§2. Num. 3.

[11. ]This Passage has been cited above, Chap. XX. § 41. Num 3.

[12. ]All the Editions of the Original have: Cum defensione innocentium conjuncta est. But it is plain the Author, or the Printers, have left out the Word Subditorum. For it is always supposed, that Strangers oppressed, or injured, are innocent.

[a ]§4. n. 2.

[b ]Sylvest. in verbo Bellum, Part. 1. § 10 circa fin.

[1 ]Quod Plato ex Tyrtaeo probat. Our Author expresses himself thus after having cited the Verse only in Latin in these Words:

• ——— Ibi fas, ubi plurima merces.

He does not point out the Place of Plato’s Works, which he had in his Thoughts, and which I shall here set down. There is not one Verse of Tyrtaeus in it, nor even a Thought of that Poet, that relates to the Application our Author makes of it. The Philosopher blames the Poet, because in his lofty Praises of Military Valour, he seems to have considered only that shewn against foreign Enemies. He avers, on the contrary, that those who signalize themselves in Civil Wars, are much the bravest; and alleges this Reason for his Opinion, that to preserve Fidelity and Integrity in the midst of such a War requires every kind of Virtue; whereas in a War against a foreign Enemy, a great Number, even of those who serve for Pay, will fight to the last Moment of their Lives, tho’ most of them are only stupid, insolent, profligate Fellows, and the most imprudent of Mankind: Πιστὸς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγιής, &c. De Legib. Lib. I. p. 630. B. Vol. II. Edit. H. Steph. In speaking of the Intrepidity of those mercenary Soldiers, the Philosopher uses the Word διαβάντες, by which, as Henry Stephens observes, he alludes to the two following Verses of Tyrtaeus, which he explains in Terms not very poetical:

• Ἀλλά τις εν̂̔ διαβὰς μενέτω ποσὶν ἀμϕοτέροισι
• Στηρικθεὶς ἐπὶ γη̂ς, χεɩ̂λος ὀδον̂σι δακών.

That is to say, “A Man of Courage, being well planted, stands firm upon his Legs, and bites his Lips with his Teeth.” So that Tyrtaeus says nothing of Troops, that serve for Pay: It is Plato, who speaks of them, without saying however, whether he blames or approves that Trade in itself; the Defects with which he reproaches them being applicable, according to him, only to most of them.

[2. ]That Prince says, the Aetolians were much in the wrong to complain, that he disturbed the Tranquillity of their Allies, as they themselves had at all Times, if not expressly authorized, at least connived at, their Youth’s serving against their Allies; so that it was common to see Etolians in both Armies at War: An quod a sociis, &c. Liv. Lib. XXXII. Cap. XXXIV. Num. 5. See another antient Instance cited by our Author, Lib. III. Chap. XX. § 31. Note 1. And add here what the late Mr. Bayle says of the Swiss in the Article Bullinger of his Diction. Hist. & Critic. Letter E. p. 696. B. Third Edition.

[3. ]Ἀγορὰ πολέμου, &c. which Passage our Author cites, and translates without saying from whence he takes it. But I have found it in Philostratus, Vit. Sophist. Lib. I. Cap. XXII. And I observe that our Author has omitted the following Words, which clearly express the ill Repute of the Arcadians in regard to the Point in Question: Τοɩ̂ς κρινομένοις ἐπὶ τῷ μισθοϕορεɩ̂ν Ἀρκάσιν ἀγορὰ πολέμου,&c. This Omission is the more remarkable, because, if we may believe the last Editor of Philostratus, the Passage will not otherwise include what our Author finds in it; for he translates the last Words thus: The War is carried on every where, and none can blame the Arcadians on that Account: And instead of saying, That the Arcadians made a Market of War,Demosthenes, whom the Sophist introduces speaking here, says, according to our learned Interpreter, that the Greeks make a Trade of the Waramongst the Arcadians, by endeavouring to list them; whereas it was their Custom to endeavour to list themselves wherever they could. It will not be improper to add here a Passage, which I find in Thucydides, and which confirms what is said there of the Arcadians. That Author observes, that the Arcadians were accustomed at all Times to engage in Wars against any Enemy whatsoever; and he says, that in the Syracusan War, there were auxiliary Troops of Mantinea, and other Parts of Arcadia, that served the Athenians even against those of their own Nation, who were in the Pay of the Corinthians, the Allies of the Syracusans, Lib. VII. Cap. LVII. Edit. Oxon.

[4. ]Plutarch expresses this in his Bacchides:

• Suam qui auro vitam venditant.
• Grotius.

The last Passage is not in the Comedy cited by our Author, and I doubt whether it is in any other Piece of that Poet. It is not cited in the Lexicon Plautinum of Pareus, which is very exact in pointing out all the Passages, where there is any Expression in the least remarkable. But I remember a Thought very like it in Manilius, in regard to those who sold themselves to fight in the Shews of Gladiators:

• Nunc caput in mortem vendunt & funus arenae.

Astronomic. Lib. IV. p. 87. Edit. Scalig. 1655. The second Greek Verse of Antiphanes is in Stobaeus, where there is one before it, which, joined with it, makes the whole Passage, to be, That it is taking pay of Death, to hazard Life for the Means of living:

• Τίς δ’ οὐχὶ θανάτον μισθοϕόρος ὠ̑ ϕίλτατε
• Ὅς ἕνεκα, &c.

Florileg. Tit. LIII. Our Author cited here also a Passage from Seneca, which however treats of something else. The Philosopher ridicules the Passion for amassing Riches at the hazard even of Life, in order to employ them in Things, which contribute to shorten Life: Magis ridebis, quum cogitaveris, vitâ parari ea, in quibus vita consumitur. Quaest. Natur. Lib. V. Cap. XVIII. in fine, Lib. & Cap.

[5. ]Καὶ τοι τί τον̂ ζη̂ν, &c. which the ingenious La Bruyere has expressed thus in his excellent Characters of the Age: There is nothing Men are more fond of preserving, and take less Care of, than their Lives, p. 362. Edit. de Brux. 1697.

[c ]Bellinus, De re militari, par. 2. t. 2. n. 4.

[6. ]Seneca says, What can a Man call this but Madness? To carry our Dangers about us, and to invade People we know nothing of, to be angry without any Provocations to ruin and destroy all we meet with, and like so many wild Beasts, to murder a Man we have no Manner of Hatred against. Hoc vero quid aliud, &c. Lib. V. Cap. XVIII. A German Poet, describing those who serve thus without examining whether the War be just or unjust, says, that they seek nothing but Pay; that they change Sides according as it suits their Interest, and look upon, as Enemies, whomsoever those that pay them please:

• Aere dato conducta cohors, & bellica miles
• Dona sequens, pretiosque suum mutare favorem
• Suetus, & accepto pariter cum munere bello,
• Hunc habuisse, dator pretii quem jusserit hostem.

Gunther. Ligurin. (Lib. VII. p. 389. Edit. Raub.) Grotius.

[7. ]Stobaeus has preserved this Saying in his Florilegium. Tit. XLIX.

[8. ]Diod. Sicul. Bibl. Hist. Lib. XVIII. Cap. X. p. 632. Edit. H. Steph.

[9. ]This Passage is quoted before as St. Ambrose’s, B. I. Chap. II. § 10. Num. 5. Note 17.