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• The Rights of War and Peace Book Ii
• Chapter I: Of the Causes of War; and First, of the Defence of Persons and Goods.
• Chapter II: Of Things Which Belong In Common to All Men.
• Chapter III: Of the Original Acquisition of Things; Where Also Is Treated of the Sea and Rivers.
• Chapter IV: Of a Thing Presumed to Be Quitted, and of the Right of Possession That Follows; and How Such a Possession Differs From Usucaption and Prescription.
• Chapter V: Of the Original Acquisition of a Right Over Persons; Where Also Is Treated of the Right of Parents: of Marriages: of Societies: of the Right Over Subjects: Over Slaves.
• Chapter VI: Of an Acquisition (possession Or Purchase) Derived From a Man’s Own Deed; Where Also of the Alienation of a Government, and of the Things and Revenues That Belong to That Government.
• Chapter VII: Of an Acquisition Derived to One By Vertue of Some Law; Where Also of Succeeding to the Effects and Estate of a Man Who Dies Without a Will.
• Chapter VIII: Of Such Properties As Are Commonly Called Acquisitions By the Right of Nations.
• Chapter IX: When Jurisdiction and Property Cease.
• Chapter X: Of the Obligation That Arises From Property.
• Chapter XI: Of Promises.
• Chapter XII: Of Contracts.
• Chapter XIII: Of an Oath.
• Chapter XIV: Of the Promises, Contracts, and Oaths of Those Who Have the Sovereign Power.
• Chapter XV: Of Publick Treaties, As Well Those That Are Made By the Sovereign Himself, As Those That Are Concluded Without His Order.
• Chapter XVI: Of Interpretation, Or the Way of Explaining the Sense of a Promise Or Convention.
• Chapter XVII: Of the Damage Done By an Injury, and of the Obligation Thence Arising.
• Chapter XVIII: Of the Rights of Embassies.
• Chapter XIX: Of the Right of Burial.
• Chapter XX: Of Punishments.
• Chapter XXI: Of the Communication of Punishments.
• Chapter XXII: Of the Unjust Causes of War.
• Chapter XXIII: Of the Dubious Causes of War.
• Chapter XXIV: Exhortations Not to Engage In a War Rashly, Tho’ For Just Reasons.
• Chapter XXV: Of the Causes For Which War Is to Be Undertaken On the Account of Others.
• Chapter XXVI: Of the Reasons That Justify Those Who Under Another’s Command Engage In War.

CHAPTER XXIV

Exhortations not to engage in a War rashly, tho’ for just Reasons.

I.We are often to abate of our Right for avoiding a War.I. 1. Tho’ it be somewhat foreign to the Matter in Hand, which is designed only to treat and discourse of the Right of War, to explain what other Virtues, distinct from Justice, require or direct with respect to War; yet by the way we must obviate a certain Mistake, lest any one should imagine, that whenever he has a just Cause given him, he is thereupon immediately obliged to declare War, or that it is warrantable at any Time for him so to do. On the contrary, it happens that it is commonly a greater Piece of Goodness and much more commendable to abate somewhat of our Right, than rigorously to pursue it. For we observed abovea in its proper Place, that we may very laudibly hazard our own Lives to secure another’s, or to promote as far as in us lies his eternal Salvation. And this Duty obliges us Christians most of any, who therein follow the exact Pattern of Christ, who laid down his Life for us, while we were yet Sinners and Enemies to him, Rom. v. 6. which Instance should much more excite and direct us not to be so eager in pursuing our Rights to that Degree, as to bring upon others all those Inconveniences and Mischiefs which War is attended with.

2. It is the Advice ofbAristotle and1Polybius, that2 we should not make War on every such Account. Hercules3 was condemned by the Antients for declaring War against4Laomedon, and5Augeas for not paying him for his Labour. Dion Prusaeensis in an Oration of his about War and Peace, says that this was not the only<492> Question, εἰ συμβέβηκεν, &c. Whether any Injury was received from them we intend to make War on, but also, of what Importance the Injury offered us was.

II.Especially when that Right consists in inflicting Punishments.II. 1. There are indeed several Reasons to dissuade us from punishing. We may observe, how many Offences Parents will connive at, and overlook in their Children: On which Topick Cicero has a Discourse in aDion Cassius. A Father1 (as Seneca says) will not disinherit his Son, unless the Provocations given be so many and so intolerable as to overcome his Patience, and unless he foresees more heinous Crimes like to ensue than those which he has been already guilty of. Much to the same Purpose is Phineus’s Saying, whichbDiodorus Siculus records, μηδένα πατέρα,&c. No Father willingly brings his Son to Punishment, unless the Greatness of his Fault exceeds the natural Affection of Parents to their Children, and that Saying ofcAndronicus Rhodius imports as much, οὐδεὶς πατὴρ, &c. No Father casts off his Son, unless he be notoriously wicked.

2. But whoever he be who goes about to punish another,2 does, as it were, personate a Magistrate, that is, a Father; in Allusion to which St. Austin,3 speaking to Count Marcellinus says,dDischarge and perform, Sir, you who are a Christian Judge, the Duty and Office of a kind and religious Father. Julian the Emperor was a great Admirer of Pittacus’s Maxim, ὃς τὴν συγγνώμην, &c.eWho preferred Pardon to Punishment. And Libanius in an Oration of his De seditione Antiochena says, That he who would be like his Heavenly Father ἀϕιεὶς, &c. Must take a greater Delight in forgiving than punishing.

3. Circumstances too may sometimes fall out so, thatf it may not only be laudable, but an Obligation in us to forbear claiming our Right, on account of that Charity which we owe to all Men, even tho’ our Enemies; whether this Charity be considered in itself, or as it is what the sacred Rule of the Gospel requires at our Hands. And thus, as we have alreadyg mentioned, there are some Persons, for whose Safety, tho’ they assault us, we should wish to lay down our Lives, because we know they are either necessary or very useful for the common Good of Mankind. If Christ would have us undervalue and neglect some Things, rather than quarrel, and contend for them in Law; without doubt he would have us neglect much greater Things for the Prevention of War which is infinitely more pernicious and destructive than a Law Suit.

4. St. Ambrose4 says, that to remit something of what is our Right, is not only an Act of Generosity, but is commonly much to our Advantage.5Aristides advises<493> States συγχωρεɩ̂ν, &c. to resign and give up Matters of indifferent Consequence; and gives this as a Reason ὥσπερ γάρ, &c. for you highly extol those private Men who are of so mild a Temper, as to choose rather to sustain some Losses than go to Law.6Xenophon in the sixth Book of his Grecian History tells us, that wise People will not engage in War, no, tho’ there are important Reasons for it. And Apollonius in Philostratus,7that War is not to be undertaken, even where the Provocations are great.

III.And particularly must an injured Prince do so.III. 1. As for Punishments, it is a principal Duty of ours, if not as Men,1 yet certainly as Christians, to be ready and willing to forgive those Injuries that are committed against us, as GOD forgives us in CHRIST, Eph. iv. 32. Not to be angry at those Things, says2Josephus, for which they who are guilty of them are liable to suffer Death, is a near Approach to the Divine Nature.

2. Seneca says of a Prince,a that He should be more easily prevailed on to pardon Injuries done against himself, than those done against others; for as he is far from generous, who is only lavish of what is none of his, but he is certainly liberal who takes from his own Stock what he bestows upon another. So I cannot call him kind and good-natured, who is easy under another’s Affliction, but him, who, when himself is wronged, bears it patiently, and does not sally out into Passion and Resentment; who considers, that it is the Property of a noble and elevated Spirit, to support itself under Injuries, at a Time when it has the greatest Power of returning them; and that3nothing is really more glorious than an injured Prince, who scorns to take any Revenge. And Quintilian, We would persuade a Prince to aim at the Reputation of Tenderness and Humanity, rather than to seek the barbarous Pleasure of being cruel and revengeful. This was the sublimest Character thatbCicero could bestow upon C. Caesar, that he was never forgetful of any Thing but Injuries. Livia, in her Discourse to Augustus, incDion, speaks thus, Τον̂ς ἄρχοντας, &c. It is the Opinion of most Men, that Sovereigns ought to bring to condign Punishment, all Offenders against the State, but to forgive those who offend against their own Persons.4Antoninus the Philosopher, in his Oration to the Senate, says, that The Revenge of a personal Injury looks little and mean in a Prince; for tho’ the Punishment be just and deserved, yet it carries along with it the Appearance of Cruelty. St. Ambrose, in his Epistle to Theodosius, You have pardoned the Antiochians your own Injury. And Themistius, in his Encomiums on the same Theodosius to the Senate, says, ὅτι οὐκ, &c. that A good Prince should be above those that offend him, and not only not return their Wrong, but be forward to do them any kind Office.

3. Aristotle5 denies that he can be a Man of any great Spirit, who retains in his Breast the Memory of every Ill he receives: Which Cicero expresses thus,dNothing can be more worthy of a Man of Honour than Clemency and Good-nature. The Holy Scriptures afford us very remarkable Instances of this noble Virtue in Moses, Num. xi. 12. and in David, 2 Sam. xvi. 7. And this we are especially obliged to, when we are conscious to ourselves of some Offence of our own;e or when what is committed against us, proceeds from human Frailty, and consequently excusable, or when the Offender gives plain Demonstration of his Sorrow and Repentance. Cicero says,6There is a Measure to be observed in our Revenge, and our Punishments, and I do not know whether7the Offender’s Repentance be not a sufficient Satisfaction. A wise Man (saysfSeneca) forgives many a Crime, and will save many an ill-inclined Person, provided he finds him not incurably bad.<494> And these are the Reasons which Charity suggests to us for abstaining from War; a Charity we either owe to, or which we may and ought to bestow upon our Enemies.

IV.A Prince is often to decline going to War, both for his own and his Subjects Safety.IV. 1. Besides it often happens, that it is1 for the Interest of us and ours to do all we can to decline a War. Plutarch, in the Life of Numa, acquaints us, that after it had been concluded by the Priests called Feciales, that a War might justly be undertaken,2 the Senate had a Debate whether it was convenient or no. It is said in one of CHRIST’s Parables, Luke xiv. 31, &c. that If one King is going to make War with another King, he sitteth down first, (the Manner and Posture of such as deliberate with great Care and Attention) and considereth, whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand; or else, whilst the other is yet a great Way off, he sendeth an Embassage, and desireth Conditions of Peace.

2. Thus the Tusculans,a by suffering every Thing, and refusing nothing, merited a Peace from the Romans. And in Tacitus we have,3In vain did the Romans seek an Occasion of quarrelling with the Aedui, who not only, according to the Contributions demanded of them, supplied them punctually with Money and Arms, but did, over and above, furnish them with Provisions at their own Expence. So Queen Amalasuntha declared positively, to Justinian’s Embassadors,b that she would not break out into a War with him.

3. One may sometimes too moderate the Matter, as Straboc mentions that Syrmus King of the Triballi did, who denied Alexander the Great the Liberty of Landing upon the Island Peuce, and yet, at the same Time, sent him some very valuable and magnificent Presents, in Order to make it appear to him, that he did it out of a just Fear, and not out of any Hatred or Disrespect to his Person. And what4Euripides spoke of the Greek States, may not improperly be applied to any other,

• When by the State it is decreed for War,
• Not one does ever think his Ruin near,
• But all of us some other’s Death mark out:
• In their Debates, had they but seen their Fate,
• Mad Greece had never fallen by the Sword.

Think with yourself, says5Livy, not only of your own Strength, but of the Power of Fortune, and the common Hazards of War. And6Thucydides gives this Caution, Consider before you enter into it, what unexpected Incidents there are in War.

V.Rules of Prudence directing our Choice of what is good.V. 1. When People are deliberating, they lay before them not only the1 subordinate Ends, but the Means too which lead to those Ends. The End we have in View, is always some Good, or, at least, the declining some Evil, which is much the same Thing. The Means are not sought for in themselves, but only as they conduce to the End, either one Way or the other. And therefore, in all our Consultations, we should compare, not only the Ends with one another, but the Capacity of the Means for bringing about those Ends: For, as Aristotle wisely observes, in his Treatise De Motione Animalium,2What one proposes by any Action is of<495> two Sorts, either an Advantage or a Possibility. Which Comparison has these three3 following Rules for its Direction.

2. The first is, that if the Matter under Consideration appear, morally speaking, to be as much disposed to produce Good, as to produce Evil, we may venture upon it, provided the Good includes a greater Degree of Good than the Evil includes of Evil. This is what Aristides means by the Expression,4When the Good hoped for is less than the Evil apprehended, it is better to make Peace. Andronicus Rhodius, in his Character of a Man of Bravery, says, thataHe will not expose himself to Danger upon every slight Occasion, but when he has Reasons of the last Importance for it.

3. The second is, that if the Good and the Evil which may possibly result from the Thing in dispute are equal, we may undertake the Affair, if there be a greater Tendency in it to the Good, than to the Evil.

4. The third is, that if the Good and the Evil seem disproportionable, and the Disposition of the Affair in Hand to produce the one or the other, no less disproportionable, we may still venture upon it,5 if its Disposition to produce Good, compared with its Disposition to produce Evil, does more considerably exceed that, than the Evil itself, compared with the Good, exceeds the Good; or if the Good compared with the Evil, is more considerable than the Disposition of the Thing to produce Evil, compared with its6 Disposition to produce Good.

5. Cicero establishes some Maxims which are not indeed so exact as the Rules we have laid down, but which express the same Thing in a more plain and familiar Way, when he advises us to7Take Care not to thrust ourselves into Hazards and Difficulties, where there is no Manner of Occasion for it, there being no greater Folly upon Earth than such a Rashness: And therefore, in Attempts of any Danger, we should imitate the Practice of skilful Physicians, who to their Patients that are but a little indisposed, administer very gentle Medicines; but in desperate Cases are forced to have Recourse to desperate Cures. It is Madness to wish for a Storm when we enjoy a Calm; but it is a wise and prudent Part, when a Storm is come, to use all Means to remedy it, especially, if the Good to be obtained by dissipating it is greater than the Evil that results from the Trouble.

6. And in another Place,8Where no great Advantage can accrue to us, if we meet with Success, and the least Miscarriage may be fatal, what need we run any Risque at all? Dion Prusaeensis, in his second Tarsensis, delivers himself thus, ἔστω δεινὸν, &c. Suppose this be an unhandsome and unworthy Treatment of us: We must not however, tho’ our Usage be unjust, by our strugling and contentious Humours expose ourselves to farther Inconveniences. And afterwards, ὥσπερ οἰ̂μαι, &c. As we endeavour to shake off those Burdens, the Weight of which is so great that we are not able to bear it; so when we have Shoulders answerable to our Load, and we are loaded with such Things that we must either stand under them, or something more intolerable, we in this Case make ourselves as easy as we can.9When our Fears, says Aristides, are greater than our Hopes, we ought not to expose ourselves to the Danger.

VI.An Example directing us in our Consultations about Liberty and Peace, when it is to save a State from utter Ruin and Destruction.VI. 1. Let what1Tacitus relates, that the States of Gaul consulted about, Whether they should chuse Liberty or Peace, be a Precedent for us in this Affair. By Liberty is meant Civil Liberty, that is, a Right of governing themselves by their own Laws; which Right, in a popular State, is full and absolute, but in an Aristocracy is something limited, especially in such a-one where no Citizen is excluded from Offices. But by Peace we are to understand such a-one, as by preventing the<496> War, prevents the utter Ruin of the whole State; that is, as Cicero illustrates this Question, in a Greek Passage, ἐὰν, &c.2If the State be in Danger of being entirely undone. As when, suppose, having examined and considered thoroughly the Consequence of the Matter, we can find nothing but the sad Presage of a total Destruction; as was the Condition of Jerusalem, besieged by Titus. It is obvious what Cato would say in this Case, he who had rather die than be subject to one Man. And agreeable to this Resolution is that of the3 Poet,

• How easily may
• A Man’s own Hand from Slav’ry set him free?

And several other Expressions to the same Effect.

2. But right Reason suggests quite another Thing; she tells us, that Life is far preferable to Liberty, as being the Foundation on which all temporal Blessings are built, and the Occasion of those that are eternal, whether you consider one or the other, with Respect to a single Person or a Community. And therefore GOD himself imputes ita as an Act of his Favour, that he did not cut off his People with the Sword, but made them Captives. And in another Place, heb advises the Hebrews, by his Prophet, to surrender themselves into the Hands of the King of Babylon, lest they should die by Famine and Pestilence. Wherefore, tho’ the Antients highly extolled

• 4 ——— What brave Saguntum did
• By Hannibal blocked up.

Yet is it a Conduct very far from deserving any such Commendation, no more than the Means that lead to it.

3. For utter Destruction,c in such Circumstances, is to be looked on as the greatest of Evils.5Cicero, in his second Book of Invention, lays down this as a Case of extreme Necessity, that the Casilinenses were forced to surrender themselves to Hannibal, tho’ their Necessity had this Exception,6 unless they chose rather to starve. And Diodorus Siculus’s Judgment of the Thebans, who lived in Alexander the Great’s Time, was Τοɩ̂ς παρασήμασιν, &c. That7with greater Courage than Prudence they had drawn upon themselves the entire Ruin of their Country.<497>

4. And Plutarchd pronounces against Cato before mentioned, and Scipio, who after Caesar’s Victory at Pharsalia, would not submit to him, Αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν, &c. that They were highly to blame for destroying so many brave Men in Africa, without any Occasion for it.

5. What I have spoken in Relation to Liberty, I would have understood of other desirable Things; we ought to sacrifice them, when we have as much or more Reason to fear a greater Evil. For, as Aristides8 well observes, The Custom is to save the Vessel, with the Loss of the Cargo, and not by throwing the Passengers overboard.

VII.That he ought to forbear pursuing a Punishment by Force of Arms, who is not much superior in Power.VII. We are also particularly to take Notice, that No Prince should ever make War upon another, who is of equal Strength with himself, on the Account of inflicting Punishment: For as thea Civil Magistrate is supposed to have greater Power than the Criminal; so should he also who attempts to revenge Injuries by Arms, be stronger than him he attacks. And indeed it is not only Prudence, or Affection for his Subjects, that requires him to forbear engaging in a dangerous War, but very oftenb Justice itself, that political Justice, which from the very Nature of Government does no less oblige a Prince to take Care of his Subjects, than it does the Subjects to obey their Prince. From whence it follows, (as Divines do with Reason teach us) that A King who undertakes a War upon frivolous Accounts, or to inflict some needless Punishments, and such as will involve his Subjects in a great Deal of Trouble, is obliged to make up the Damages they suffer thereby: For tho’ he cannot be accused with any Injury done to his Enemies, yet may there be a heavy Charge laid against him of wronging his Subjects, by plunging them in so much Misfortune and Misery for such Reasons. Livy1 says, that War is justifiable in those who are under a Necessity of being engaged in it, and that Arms are warrantable, when we have no Hopes but in our Arms. This is what Ovid desires when he says, Fast. 1.

• Let the Soldier wear
• No other Arms than what defensive are.

VIII.War not to be engaged in but out of Necessity.VIII. The1 Case therefore very seldom happens, wherein War cannot, nor ought not to be for born; and that is, as Florus2 expresses it, When all the Justice we can expect is more cruel than War itself. One runs into Danger, says Seneca,3when one apprehends the same Inconveniences if one sits still: Or perhaps greater. Which4Aristides thus explains, Τότε χρὴ, &c. It is then adviseable, tho’ the Event be uncertain, to prefer an Hazard, when to be at Quiet is evidently worse. It is Prudence, says5Tacitus, to exchange a miserable Peace for a War, when, as the same Author has it,6either our Courage will procure us our Liberty, or, if we lose the Day, we are just as we were before; or, when (as7Livy speaks) Peace<498> with Slavery is more insupportable than War with Freedom. But not if (according to8Cicero) it be likely, that Being conquered you shall be proscribed, or being Conqueror you will be a Slave still.

IX.Or when there is an important Reason, joined with a very favourable Opportunity.IX. Another Time for going to War is, If, upon a just Estimation, we find that we have not only Right on our Side, and such a Right as is of the greatest Importance, but likewise superior Strength. This is what Augustus meant, when he said, that1War was not to be undertaken, but when there appeared a greater Prospect of Advantage, than Fear of Loss. And here may be applied that which2Scipio Africanus and L. Aemilius Paulus3 used to say of an Engagement, that We should never fight,4but in Cases of extream Necessity, or of some very favourable Opportunity. What I have said ought especially to be observed, when there is a Prospect of gaining our Point5 by the Terror and Rumour of our Preparations, with little or no Hazard on our Side. This was Dion’sa Advice for delivering Syracuse. And in6Pliny’s Epistles there is this Passage, He vanquished them by the Fear of him, which is the handsomest Victory in the World.

X.The Miseries of War displayed.X. 1. War, says Plutarch,1 is a most cruel Thing, and brings along with it an Ocean of Calamities and Violences. And St.2Austin very wisely expresses himself thus, If I should attempt to speak of what Mischiefs and Massacres, what Misery and Hardships are occasioned by War, I should not only want Words, but not know when to put a Period to so large a Field of Discourse; but a Prince of Prudence and Thought (say they) will engage only in a just War; as if, when he reflects upon himself to be a Man, he will not, on the contrary, heartily lament, that there could ever be a Necessity of entring into any just Wars, because, unless he were satisfied of the Justice of them, he could not have had any Hand in them, and from hence it is plain, that a Prince of Prudence and Thought would, by his good Will, have no Wars at all; for it is the Injustice of the adverse Party that thrusts him into Wars, which are not only just, but sometimes inevitable; which Injustice3every Man ought to bewail, as it is human Injustice, tho’ it did not oblige us to Arms. Whoever therefore considers with Regret, such great, such horrid, such barbarous Ills,<499> must own that he is unfortunate, in being obliged to occasion them; but whoever can endure them, or make them the Objects of his Thoughts, without Grief and Emotion, that Wretch is still more miserable, because he counts himself happy in having cast off the Sentiments of Humanity. And in another Place he tells us,4That the Good never engage in War but out of Necessity, whereas the Wicked take Delight in it.5Maximus Tyrius tells us, τη̂ς τον̂ πολεμεɩ̂ν, &c. that Tho’there were no Injustice in a War, yet the very Necessity of it is deplorable. And again, ϕάινεται, &c. It is certain that good People make War only when compelled to it, but the Wicked do it out of Choice.

2. To which we may add that of Seneca,6 that One Man should not be profuse of another’s Blood. Philiscus gave Alexander this Advice,7 that he should have a Desire of Glory, but not to indulge his Ambition so far as to become the common Pest and Scourge of Mankind; meaning that Massacres and Devastations of Cities were Acts that most resembled a Plague, and that nothing was more worthy of, and heroick in a King, than to have a tender Regard for the Preservation of all Men, which is the Fruit of Peace.

3. If according to the Law of the Hebrews, he who killed a Man, tho’ involuntarily,a was obliged to fly for it. If GOD would not suffer bDavid to build him a Temple,8 because he had been the Occasion of so much Bloodshed, tho’ his Wars are said to be just.9 If among the ancient Greeks it was a Custom, that they who had defiled their Hands with human Blood, tho’ without any Fault of theirs, had need of Expiation; what Person living, and particularly if he be a Christian, does not see how unfortunate and ominous a Thing War is, and with what Endeavours we should strive to keep ourselves from it, tho’ it were not unjust? And it is certain, that among the Christian Greeks, a Canon was for a long While observed, by Vertue of which, Whosoever killed his Enemy, in what War soever, wascexcommunicated for the Term of three Years.

[a ]Chap. 1. § 8. of this Book. See Fr. Victor. De Jure Bell. n. 14. & 33.

[b ]Rhet. ad Alexandr. Cap. 3.

[1 ]Our Author cites in the Margin the fourth Book of that Historian, where I find nothing that has any Relation to the present Subject, but the Reflection he makes in blaming the Messenians for not entering into a War against the Aetolians: I agree, said he, that War is what we ought to fear, but not so far as to suffer every Thing to avoid it. Cap. XXXI. p. 416. Edit. Amst. It is plain he supposes here, that we ought to suffer something, rather than come to a War.

[2. ]Seneca, Suasor V. Gallio said, That we ought to engage in War for the Defence of our Liberty, our Wives and our Children; but that we ought not to do so for any trifling Matter, or for what, if it did happen, could not hurt us. Apollonius said something more to the King of Babylon, προσετίθει, &c. He added, says Philostratus, Lib. XXIII. that one should not differ with the Romans for a few small Villages, much larger than which some private Men often possess, and that one should not even for greater Matters commence a War against them.Josephus in his second Book against Apian, speaking of his Countrymen, Ο οὐδὲ τὴν ἀνδρίαν, &c. Nor do we exercise our Courage, or enter into Wars out of Avarice and Ambition, but for the Security and Preservation of our Laws; and therefore, tho’ other Damages we bear with abundance of Patience, yet if once they attempt to force us to recede from our Constitutions, we then even beyond our Strength betake us to our Arms, and will maintain them to the last Extremities. (P. 1080. C.) Grotius.

[3. ]But where do they condemn him? Pausanias, whom our Author cites here in the Margin, Lib. V. says only, that Hercules had not Opportunity to signalize himself very much in the War he undertook against Augeas, Cap. II. p. 148. Edit. Graec. Wech. And he adds, that this was occasioned by the powerful Support of the Actorides. Our Author, in reading this Passage hastily, or quoting it by Memory, might have imagined to find there that this Expedition was not glorious to Hercules, and explained the Word λαμπρὸν, implied that the Occasion of the War was frivolous.

[4. ]See an Account of this in Apollodorus, Biblioth, Lib. II. Cap. IV. § 9. in Diodorus Siculus, Lib. IV. Cap. XXXII.

[5. ]The Authors, I have cited in the foregoing Note, speak of this: The first at § 5. of the same Chapter; and the other at Chapter XXXIII. of the same Book.

[a ]Lib. 44. p. 290. Edit. H. Steph.

[1 ]Where he speaks of Abdication or disinheriting: Numquid aliquis sanus filium, &c. De Clement. Lib. I. Cap. XIV. Philo the Jew says also, that Fathers do not resolve to disinherit their Sons, till the Wickedness of the latter has overcome their paternal Tenderness and Affection. De Nobilitat. (p. 904. C. Edit. Paris.) A Father, who tried his Son for parricide [at the Time when Fathers had a Power of Life and Death over their Children] took Augustus Caesar for one of his Counsellors, or Assessors, according to Custom; who was of Opinion, that the Father should content himself with banishing him whither he thought fit; and for this Reason, because a Father ought to punish his Children with as little Rigour as possible. Dixit [Caesar Augustus] relegandum, &c.Seneca, De Clement. Lib. I. Cap. XV. The same Thought is expressed thus in a Verse of Terence,

• Pro peccato magno paululum supplicii satis est patri.

Andr. (Act. V. Scen. III. Ver. 32.) Cicero says, that when a Person is accused before his Father, he asks Pardon, confesses his Fault, imputes it to Ignorance, promises never to be guilty of the like again, and submits upon Breach of Word to all the Indignation his Offence deserves. Whereas, before the Judges he denies the Fact, maintains that the Crime is forged, and the Witnesses false: Ignoscite, judices: erravit, &c. Orat. pro Legario. Grotius.

[b ]Lib. 4. c. 45. p. 172. Edit. H. Steph.

[c ]Lib. 8. c. 18. p. 569. Edit. Heins. 1616.

[2. ]Seneca in his eighty seventh Epistle says, That good Nature spares another’s Blood as it would its own, knowing that one Man must not be lavish of another’s Life.Diodorus Siculus, in Frag. Οὐ δεɩ̂ τοὺς ἀμαρτήσντας, &c. Not every one who offends must by all Means be punished, but those only who persist in their Crimes without Repentance. St. Chrysostom, De Statuis vi, μαθέτωσαν, Let all who are Strangers to our Faith know that the fear of Christ bridles and restrains every Power. Honour your Master, and forgive your Fellow Servants that he may have the greater Regard to you, that he may at the Day of Judgment remembring this Tenderness and Humanity of yours, shew you a kind and propitious Countenance. And Gratianus, Caus. XXIII. Quaest. IV. cites the following Expression out of St. Austin, It is not in vain that we use these two Words, a Man and a Sinner together; for if the Sinner deserves Punishment, the Man claims our Pity. See both what follows there, and what we have said above, at Chap. XX. § 12. § 26. and 27. Grotius.

[3. ]This Passage is quoted in the Jus Canonic. Caus. XXIII. Quaest. V. Can. I.

[d ]Epist. 159.

[e ]Orat. 2. p. 50. Edit. Spanheim.

[f ]Molin. De Justit. Tractat. 2. Disp. 103. Lorca, Disp. 153. n. 2. Aegid. Reg. De Act. Supern. Disp. 31. Dub. 7. n. 107.

[g ]Chap. 1. § 9. of this Book.

[4. ]Si quidem de suo jure, &c. De Offic. Lib. II. Cap. XXI.

[5. ]I doubt whether this Passage be in Aristides or not. I do not find it either in the Harangue of this Orator to the States of Greece, to exhort them to Union, or in any other Place. Our Author perhaps wrote the Name of one Greek Orator for another, as for Instance, Aristides for DionPrusaeensis.

[6. ]It is in the Discourse of Callias to the Lacedemonians: Καὶ σωϕρόνων μὲν δή, &c. Hist. Graec. Lib. VI. Cap. III. § 4. Edit. Oxon.

[7. ]This Passage is cited above in Note 2. upon Paragraph I.

[1 ]See Note 2. upon § 2. of this Chapter; and what has been said above, Chap. XX. § 26. at the End.

[2. ]Antiq. Jud. Lib. II. Cap. III. p. 49. C.

[a ]De Clement. l. 1. c. 20.

[3. ]St. Chrysostom, speaking in commendation of Clemency, ἅπαντα μὲν, &c. For this is glorious to every one, particularly to People in Power. For since Sovereignty allows a Man to do any Thing, it is prodigiously for a Prince’s Reputation and Glory, to put a Restraint upon his Passions, and to make the Law of GOD the Director of his Actions. St. Austin, in his 104th Letter to Count Boniface. Remember to forgive as soon as he who has injured you asks your Pardon.Grotius.

[b ]Orat. pro Ligar. c. 12.

[c ]Lib. 55. p. 643. Edit. H. Steph.

[4. ]In Vulcatius Gallicanus’s Life of Avidius Cassius. (Cap. XII.) Grotius.

[5. ](Ethic. Nicomach. Lib. IV. Cap. VIII. p. 51. C. Vol. II. Edit. Paris.)

[d ]De Offic. l. 1. c. 25.

[e ]Dried. de Libert. Christ. l. 2. c. 6.

[6. ]This Passage of Cicero is cited above, Ch. XX. § 39. Num. 2.

[7. ]Procopius, Vandal. II. Μεταμελὸς γὰρ, &c. When Offenders are seized with a timely Sorrow and Concern for what they have done, the Parties injured are commonly induced to forgive them.Grotius.

[f ]De Clement. l. 2. c. 7.

[1 ]Procopius, Gotth. Lib. II. Cap. VI. says, that the Goths addressed themselves to Belisarius in the following Manner, ὅταν δὲ αὐτὰ, &c. Since Matters stand thus, the Governors on either Side should not, out of their own Vanity and Ambition, sacrifice their Subjects Safety, but prefer what is just and advantageous, not only for themselves but their Enemies.Grotius.

[2. ]Plutarch speaks of the King, In Vit. Numae, p. 68. B. Vol. I. Edit. Wech. Our Author cites here, in a Note, a Passage from Thucydides, which is recited above, Chap. XX. § 4. Num. 1.

[a ]Plut. in Vit. Camill.

[3. ]Frustra adversus Aeduos, &c. (Histor. Lib. I. Cap. LXIV. Num. 5.) In the Reign of Septimius Severus, a King of Armenia prevented a War with which that Emperor threatened him, by sending him Hostages and Presents of his own Accord. See Herodian, Lib. III. (Cap. IX. Num. 3. Edit. Boecl.) Grotius.

[b ]Procop. Vandal. l. 2. c. 5. Goth. l. c. 3.

[c ]Geograph. l. 7. p. 462. Ed. Amst. (301 Ed. Paris.)

[4. ]

• Ὅταν γὰρ ἔλθη, &c.
• Supplic. ver. 481. & seq.

[5. ]In Hannibal’s Harangue to Scipio, Quum tuas vires, tum, &c. Lib. XXX. Cap. XXX. Num. 20.

[6. ]The Embassadors of Athens say this to the Lacedemonians. Lib. I. Cap. LXXVIII. Edit. Oxon. Our Author, from his having quoted this Passage after Stobaeus, (Florileg. Tit. L.) expresses it a little differently from the Terms in the Original.

[1 ]These subordinate Ends may be considered as Means, with Regard to the last End.

[2. ]Cap. VII. p. 705. D. Vol. I. Edit. Paris.

[3. ]See an Explanation of these Rules in Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. I. Chap. II. § 7.

[4. ][Orat. I. De pace, Vol. II. p. 63. B. Edit. P. Steph.]

[a ]Paraphr. in Ethic. Nicom. l. 4. c. 5. p. 219.

[5. ]Narses makes a very wise Use of this Rule in Procopius, Gotth. Lib. II. (Cap. XVIII.) Grotius.

[6. ]I have observed, in my Notes upon Pufendorf, at the Place referred to Note. 3. that in the Original there is comparata ad malum, for comparata efficaciae ad malum. This Omission had been in the first Edition, and was suffered to pass, amongst other Faults of the like Nature, in all subsequent Revisals and Editions. But I have restored the Text, as the Author’s Thought and Intention required.

[7. ]Sed fugiendum etiam illud, &c. De Offic. Lib. I. Cap. XXIV.

[8. ]Ubi enim ἐπίτευγμα, magnum, &c. Lib. XIII. Epist. ad Attic. XXVII.

[9. ]Orat. Sic. II. Vol. II. p. 52. D.

[1 ]The Passage is recited above B. I. Chap. IV. § 19.

[2. ]This Passage from Cicero, is quoted in the Place referred to in the foregoing Note.

[3. ]Lucan says this,

• Non tamen ignavae, post haec exempla virorum,
• Percipient gentes, quam sit non ardua virtus
• Servitium fugisse manu ———
• Pharsal. Lib. IV. v. 575, & seq.

[a ]2 Chron. xii. 7, 8.

[b ]Jer. xxvii. 13.

[4. ]They burnt themselves, with their Wives, Children, and all their Effects. See Livy, Lib. XXI. Cap. XIV. Our Author cites here, without saying from whom he takes it, a Verse which makes a Part of the Speech that Lucan puts into the Mouth of the Marseillian Deputies, addressed to Caesar. This is it, with that which precedes,

• Nec pavet hic populus pro libertate subire
• Obsessum Paeno gessit quod marte Saguntum.
• Lib. III. ver. 349, 350.

[c ]See St. Austin, De Civit. Dei, l. 22. c. 6.

[5. ]Atque etiam hoc mihi, &c. De Invent. Lib. II. Cap. LVII.

[6. ]Anaxilaus, who had surrendered the City of Byzantium, for Want of Provisions, justified his Conduct by saying, that Men are to fight against Men, but not against Nature. This Xenophon tells us, (Hist. Graec. Lib. I. Cap. III. § 12.) Procopius observes, that Men do not commend those who make Death their Choice, whilst there is any Hope that appears greater than the Danger. Gotthic. Lib. IV. (seu Hist. Misc. Cap. XII. in Bessas’s Speech to persuade the Garrison of a Citadel to surrender). A German Poet makes Guido Blandratensis say, in a Discourse to the People of Milan, no Man of Sense loves his Liberty better than his Life; and that it is not Love of Liberty but Vain Glory, to expose one’s Self to certain Destruction when it may be avoided;

• Omnia securi pro libertate feremus.
• Sed libertatem contempta nemo salute
• Sanus amat: Neque enim certae susceptio cladis,
• Quam vitare queas, nisi cum ratione Salutis,
• Libertatis amor, sed gloria vana putanda est.

Gunther. Ligurin. (Lib. VIII. p. 397. Edit. Reuber.) Grotius.

Anaxilaus does indeed excuse himself on Account of the Famine which oppressed the City; but the Sentence our Author puts in his Mouth, is not in the Place of Xenophon referred to, which speaks of that Governor of Byzantium. I imagine our Author has confounded this with what the same Historian makes Cyrus say, That there is no Man valiant and vigorous enough to contend with Hunger and Cold. Cyrop. Lib. VI. Cap. I. § 10.

[7. ]Lib. XVII. (Cap. X.) The same Author, when he has given an Account of the War the Athenians engaged in, after Alexander’s Death, says, that in the Opinion of the wisest Men, They had consulted their Glory well, but had vastly mistaken their Interest; because it was a Danger they hurried themselves into, without any Manner of Necessity for it; no Ways warned by the Fate of the unhappy Thebans. (Lib. XVIII. Cap. X.) Grotius.

[d ]In vit. Othon.

[8. ]Our Author had evidently the Passage of that Orator in his Thoughts, where he says, the Master of a Ship cannot command any of the People on board to be thrown into the Sea; but only the Goods, for the People’s Safety. Orat. Platon. II. Vol. III. p. 283. B.

[a ]Cajetan, ii. 2. qu. 95. art. 8.

[b ]Molin. De Instit. tract. 1. c. 102.

[1 ]Justum est bellum, Samnites, &c. Lib. IX. (Cap. 1. Num. 10.) Ovid’s Words are

• Sola gerat miles, quibus arma coerceat, arma.
• (Ver. 715.)

Grotius.

[1 ]The Grammarian Servius supposes, that there is none just enough to engage Men to enter into a War. It is where he explains a Verse of Virgil, in which the Poet says, that the Gods pitied the foolish Rage of the two Parties at War, and the great Trouble that Men give themselves,

• Dî Jovis in tectis iram miserantur inanem
• Amborum, & tantos mortalibus esse labores.

[Iram Miserantur Inanem.] Generaliter dicit omnem iram bellicam, &c. In Aeneid. X. (ver. 758, 759.) Grotius.

[2. ]Here is only the Expression which suits our Author’s Sense, and that different from the Historians. It relates to Quintilius Varus, the Roman General, who administred Justice to the Germans newly conquered, in a Manner more cruel, in their Opinion, than the War itself; which obliged them to revolt, under their Leader Arminius, Ut primum Togas, & saeviora armis jura viderunt, duce Arminio arma corripiunt. Lib. IV. Cap. XII. Num. 32.

[3. ]Incurri in pericula, ubi quiescenti paria metuuntur. This is the Manner in which our Author quotes the Passage, which I can find no where.

[4. ]In his first Oration concerning Peace. Vol. II. p. 67. B.

[5. ]Miseram pacem vel bello bene mutari. Annal. Lib. III. Cap. XLIV. Num. 3.

[6. ]Denique ausos aut Libertas sequetur, aut victi iidem erimus. Hist. Lib. IV. Cap. XXXII. Num. 6.

[7. ]The Samnites say this, when about to throw off the Yoke of the Romans: Rebellasse, quod pax servientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum esset. Lib. X. Cap. XVI. Num. 5.

[8. ]He speaks of the Course that was to be taken in the War between Caesar and Pompey, Depugna, inquis, potius quam servias. Ut quid? Si victus eris, proscribare? Si viceris, tamen servias. Lib. VII. ad Attic. Epist. VII.

[1 ]He speaks both in Regard to undertaking War, and giving Battle, after having had Recourse to Arms. Praelium quidem aut bellum suscipiendum omnino negabat, nisi quum major emolumenti spes, quam damni metus ostenderetur.Suetonius, in August. Cap. XXV.

[2. ]Idem [Scipio Africanus] negabat aliter cum hoste confligi debere, quam si aut occasio obvenisset, aut necessitas incidisset.Valerius Maximus, Lib. VII. Cap. II. Num. 2.

[3. ]In quo de Publico Africano, Pauli filio ita scriptum est: Nam se patrem suum audisse dicere L. Aemilium Paulum, nimis bonum imperatorem signis collatis non-decertare, nisi summa necessitudo, aut summa ei occasio data esset. Aulus Gellius, Noct. Attic. Lib. VII. Cap. II. Num. 2.

[4. ]Plutarch, in his Gracchus’s, Οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τὴς, &c. It is neither like a good Surgeon nor a good Politician, to cut and hack, unless there is the utmost Necessity for it. It is Marcian’s Expression in Zonaras, Μὴ δεɩ̂ν ὅπλα βασιλέα κινεɩ̂ν, ἕως εἰρηνεύειν ἐξόν, A Prince ought never to think of War as long as he may enjoy Peace. St. Austin, in his fiftieth Epistle to Boniface: Peace should be our Choice, but War the Result of Necessity alone; that so GOD may deliver us from that Necessity, and preserve us in Peace.Grotius.

The last Passage is not in the fiftieth, but the two hundred and fifth Epistle to Boniface, and there is even some Difference as to the Terms in the Editions I have seen.

[5. ]The Lion scorning to use the Weapons Nature gives him, for a long Time defends himself by his Terror only, and does as it were shew that he is forced to engage. This Passage is in Pliny’s Natural History, Lib. VIII. Cap. XVI. Grotius.

[a ]Diod. Sicul. l. 16. c. 17.

[6. ]Ostentatoque bello, ferocissimam gentem (quod est pulcherrimum victoriae genus) terrore perdomuit [Spurinna] Lib. II. Epist. VII. Num. 2.

[1 ]Vit. Camill. p. 134. B. Vol. I. Edit. Wech.

[2. ]Quorum malorum, [quae ex bello nascuntur] &c. De Civit. Dei, Lib. XIX. Cap. VII.

[3. ]The Lacedemonians say, in an Harangue extant in Diodorus Siculus, Lib. XIII. Θεωρον̂ντες τὰς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, &c. Seeing so many Animosities, and so many other shocking Incidents in War, we think it our Duty to declare, both to GOD and Man, that we are not any Ways the Authors of these Things.Plutarch, in his Numa, Τὶ ον̂̔ν ϕήσει, &c. If any one says to me, Has not Rome improved by Wars? He asks me a Question that requires a long Answer; when we have to do with those who make Improvement to consist rather in Riches, Luxury and Empire, than in Safety and Humanity, in Justice and Contentment. Stephanus, a Physician, says in Procopius, Persic. Lib. II. to Chosroes the Persian King, Οὐκω̂ν ὠ̑ κράτιστε βασιλεν̂, By being employed in Massacres and Battles, and enslaving of People, you may probably, great Prince, acquire some other Titles, but you can never by such Methods be reputed Good. Add to this a famous Passage in Guicciardin, Lib. XVI. (§ 4. in the Speech of the Bishop of Osima.) Grotius.

[4. ]Belligerare, malis videtur felicitas, bonis necessitas. De Civit. Dei. Lib. IV. Cap. XV.

[5. ](Dissert. XIV. p. 146. Edit. Davis.)

[6. ]Quae (Clementia) alieno sanguini, tanquam suo parcit, &c. Epist. LXXXVIII. p. 390. Edit. Gron. maj.

[7. ]Aelian. Var. Hist. Lib. IV. Cap. XI.

[a ]Numb. xxxv. Deut. xix.

[b ]1 Chron. xxviii. 3.

[8. ]Οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, &c. He would not suffer him, a Man who had been engaged in so many Wars, and who was stained with Blood, tho’ it was the Blood of his Enemies. These are Josephus’s Words, Lib. VII. Cap. IV. where there follow more to the same Purpose. And Pliny, Lib. VII. Cap. XXV. after having related the Battles of Caesar the Dictator, says, I cannot indeed think it for his Reputation, to have brought so many Miseries upon Mankind, tho’ he had even been forced to it.Philo, in his Life of Moses, καὶ γὰρ εἰ νόμιμοι, &c. For tho’ the Laws allow us to kill an Enemy, yet whoever kills any Man, tho’ justly, tho’ in his own Defence, tho’ forced to it, seems to be guilty of Blood, on the Account of that common Relation we bear to one another, and therefore such Homicides were obliged by some Purgations to expiate the reputed Crime.Grotius.

[9. ]See Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. II. Chap. V. § 15. Note 2.

[c ]Basil. ad Amphil. ii. 13. Zonar. Niceph. Phoc. vol. 3.