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• The Rights of War and Peace Book Ii
• Chapter I: Of the Causes of War; and First, of the Defence of Persons and Goods.
• Chapter II: Of Things Which Belong In Common to All Men.
• Chapter III: Of the Original Acquisition of Things; Where Also Is Treated of the Sea and Rivers.
• Chapter IV: Of a Thing Presumed to Be Quitted, and of the Right of Possession That Follows; and How Such a Possession Differs From Usucaption and Prescription.
• Chapter V: Of the Original Acquisition of a Right Over Persons; Where Also Is Treated of the Right of Parents: of Marriages: of Societies: of the Right Over Subjects: Over Slaves.
• Chapter VI: Of an Acquisition (possession Or Purchase) Derived From a Man’s Own Deed; Where Also of the Alienation of a Government, and of the Things and Revenues That Belong to That Government.
• Chapter VII: Of an Acquisition Derived to One By Vertue of Some Law; Where Also of Succeeding to the Effects and Estate of a Man Who Dies Without a Will.
• Chapter VIII: Of Such Properties As Are Commonly Called Acquisitions By the Right of Nations.
• Chapter IX: When Jurisdiction and Property Cease.
• Chapter X: Of the Obligation That Arises From Property.
• Chapter XI: Of Promises.
• Chapter XII: Of Contracts.
• Chapter XIII: Of an Oath.
• Chapter XIV: Of the Promises, Contracts, and Oaths of Those Who Have the Sovereign Power.
• Chapter XV: Of Publick Treaties, As Well Those That Are Made By the Sovereign Himself, As Those That Are Concluded Without His Order.
• Chapter XVI: Of Interpretation, Or the Way of Explaining the Sense of a Promise Or Convention.
• Chapter XVII: Of the Damage Done By an Injury, and of the Obligation Thence Arising.
• Chapter XVIII: Of the Rights of Embassies.
• Chapter XIX: Of the Right of Burial.
• Chapter XX: Of Punishments.
• Chapter XXI: Of the Communication of Punishments.
• Chapter XXII: Of the Unjust Causes of War.
• Chapter XXIII: Of the Dubious Causes of War.
• Chapter XXIV: Exhortations Not to Engage In a War Rashly, Tho’ For Just Reasons.
• Chapter XXV: Of the Causes For Which War Is to Be Undertaken On the Account of Others.
• Chapter XXVI: Of the Reasons That Justify Those Who Under Another’s Command Engage In War.

CHAPTER XXII

Of the unjust Causes of War.

I.The Difference between the real and pretended Causes of War shew’d.I. 1. Ina beginning to treat of the Causes of War, we divided them into1 justifying Reasons and Motives. Polybius, the first Author of the Distinction, calls the one Προϕάσεις, as being usually such as are openly assigned for the War, (Livyb sometimes terms them the Title of the War) to the other he gives the general Name of αἰτίαι, Causes.

2. Thus in the War of Alexander against Darius, to take Vengeance of the Persians, for the2 Injuries they had formerly done the Greeks, was the justifying Reason, whilst the Motive was a strong Desire of Glory, Empire, and Riches, in Conjunction with confident Hopes of Success, conceived from the fortunate Expeditions of3Xenophon and4Agesilaus. So in the second Carthaginian War, the justifying Reason was a Controversy about Saguntum, but the Motive was an old Grudge, entertained by the Carthaginians against the Romans, for the hard Terms they were obliged to accept of, when reduced to a low Condition, and (as Polybiusc takes Notice) their being animated and flushed by the Successes which had of late attended their Arms in Spain. So5Thucydides is of Opinion, that the true Cause of the Lacedemonian War was a Jealousy of the over-growing Power of the Athenians, but a Quarrel of the Corcyreans, Potidians, and some other Things, were the Pretence made use of for justifying the War; tho’ in this Place he seems to confound the Terms Προϕάσεις, and Αἰτίαι. The same Distinction do we find in the Speech of the Campanians6 to the Romans, where they profess that it was in<475> Order to aid the Sidicines that they took up Arms against the Samnites; whereas, in Reality, their own Interest induced them to it, foreseeing that if the Sidicines were once set on Fire, the Flames would soon reach them. Livy reports too, that7Antiochus made War upon the Romans, for the Murder of Brachyllas, and under some other Pretext, but the real Incitement was, some extraordinary Hope she had conceived from the Remissness of the Roman Discipline. Plutarch8 remarks, that Cicero’s Charge against Antony, as being the Cause of the Civil War, was not true; for Antony only furnished Caesar, who was already determined for the War, with a plausible Pretence for it.

II.To engage in a War without either of these Causes is brutish.II. But there are some who engage themselves in War, having neither of these Causes,1Coveting (as Tacitus represents them) Dangers2for Danger’s Sake. This Vice so far passes the Bounds of Humanity, that by3Aristotle it is stiled Brutishness. Seneca speaking of such Wretches, says4To take Pleasure in Massacres is not so properly Cruelty as Ferity and Savageness: One might call it Distraction; for there are several Sorts of this, but none of them more visibly so, than that which carries People to the Murders and Butcheries of their own Kind. Consonant to this is that of Aristotle, Δόξαι γὰρ, &c.aFor he is superlatively barbarous, who for nothing but the Sake of Fighting, and Spilling human Blood, converts his Friends into Enemies. And Dion Prusaeensisb says, that To be engaged without any Reason in Wars and Broils is perfect Madness, a seeking one’s own Destruction. And Seneca, in his fourteenth Epistle, The Effusion of human Blood for its own Sake, and no other Reason, is what scarce any Man can be guilty of.

III.A War without a just Reason is no better than Robbery.III. 1. But the Generality of those who engage in Wars, are induced thereto by Motives, either in Conjunction with justifying Reasons, or without them. Some there are who do not care whether they have any justifiable Reasons at all, of whom we may pronounce, as the Roman Lawyers do, that such are Robbers, who being called to Account how they came by such and such Things, can shew no1 Right they have to them, but only that they are in their Possession: And<476> Aristotle says of the common Instigators to War, thataThey seldom consider the Injustice of enslaving their inoffensive Neighbours, and such as no Ways injure them.

2. Of this Stamp was2Brennus, who asserted, that The strongest have always the best Title. So Hannibal, whose Motto, according to Silius,3 was

• Justice and Leagues to me my Sword points out.

And so Atila,4 and all others who tell you, that

• 5The Reason of the War they ne’er inquire,
• It’s Conclusion’s all they care for.

And,

• 6To be o’ercome is Argument of Guilt.

And,

• 7Successful Arms are always in the Right.

Applicable to this is that of St. Austin,8To make War on our Neighbours, from thence to push our Violence farther on, and so to oppress inoffensive People, out of a Thirst after Empire, what Title does it deserve, but that of a notorious Robbery? Of these Wars Velleius says, thatbThey are not entered into on Account of any just Provocation, but only for the Advantage that is expected from them. And we read in Cicero,9That Elevation of Soul which discovers its self in Hazards and Fatigues, unless contending for Justice, is so far from being a Principle of Virtue, that it is indeed the greatest Inhumanity. They, says10Andronicus Rhodius, who for some great Interest of their own, take where they ought not to take, are called wicked, impious, and unjust, such as Tyrants, and those who depopulate Cities.

IV.There are some Reasons which upon first Appearance seem justifiable, but will not bear the Test of Examination.IV. There are those who alledge some Sort of justifying Reasons, but such as, being weighed in the Balance of right Reason, are found to be unjust. And in<477> this Case, (to use Livy’s1 Expression) The Dispute is not who is in the Right, but who is the most powerful. The Generality of Princes, says2Plutarch, employ the two Terms of War and Peace, as they do their Money, not for what is just and honest, but for what will serve their Turns. The Knowledge of what Causes are unjust, may be pretty well collected from the just Causes already mentioned. For the Windings of a crooked Line presently appear upon its Application to a strait one. However, to make the Matter as plain as we can, we will insist a little upon the3 principal of them.

V.Such as an uncertain Fear.V. 1. First therefore, the Dread (as we beforea observed) of our Neighbour’s encreasing Strength, is not a warrantable Ground for making War upon him. To justify taking up Arms in our own Defence, there ought to be a Necessity for so doing, which there is not, unless we are sure, with a moral Certainty, that he has not only Forces sufficient, but a full Intention to injure us.

2. Wherefore their Opinion is not to be assented to, who maintain that it is lawful to bring War upon a neighbouring Prince, who, in his own Territories shall erect a Castle, or other fortified Place, which may some Time or other be detrimental to us, tho’ he is under no Obligation to the contrary by any previous Compact. For to remove such Apprehensions, we should apply ourselves to the raising such within our own Dominions, and look out for other Remedies, rather than immediately have Recourse to War. From whence it is deducible, that the War of the Romans againstbPhilip King of Macedon, and of1Lysimachus against Demetrius, if they had no other Cause (than this uncertain Fear) were not just. I am wonderfully pleased with that of Tacitus, about the2Cauchi, They are a People of the greatest Repute and Figure in all Germany, and chuse to maintain their Grandeur by their Justice, living quiet, and keeping at Home; as free from Ambition as from Envy. They give no Occasion for Wars, committing neither Outrage nor Robbery; and what is a great Proof of their Valour, and their Strength, they preserve their Superiority, without Injury and Oppression: However, they are always in a Readiness for War, and can, if their Affairs require it, raise an Army in an Instant, being well provided with Men and Horses, and in the midst of Peace are equally respected and feared.

VI.An Advantage without a Necessity.VI. Nor does the1 Advantage from a War give us as good a Right as a Necessity for one.

VII.Refusal of Marriages, when there is Plenty of Women.VII. Nor is the Refusal of supplying us with Wives, tho’ there be great Plenty of Women, a just1 Provocation to War, which was what moved Hercules against2 <478> Eurytus, and3Darius against the Scythians.4

VIII.The Desire of a better Land.VIII. Nor is the Desire of changing our former Settlements, of removing from moorish and desert Ground to a more fertile Soil, a just Plea for making War, which Tacitus reports to be the1 Cause of most of the Wars amongst the antient Germans.

IX.The Discovery of Things that belong to others.IX. Nor is it less unjusta to go to War, and lay Claim to a Place upon the Score of making the first Discovery of it, if already inhabited, tho’ the Possessor should be a wicked Man, or have false Notions of GOD, or be of a stupid Mind; because by the Right of Discovery we can pretend to those Places only which are not appropriated.

X.But what if the first Possessors are Fools.X. 1. Nor is the being endued with Virtues, moral or divine, or an extraordinary Capacity, a Qualification absolutely requisite for Property, unless if there be a Peoplea entirely destitute of the Use of Reason, that then dispossessing them may seem defensible, as having no Right of Property; and all that Charity would in that Case oblige one to, is to allow them Necessaries sufficient for Life. What has been alreadyb delivered with Respect to the Provisions made by the Law of Nations, for preserving the Rights and Properties of Infants and Idiots, is to be applied to those with whom Compacts and Agreements can be made, which these People totally void of Reason, are not qualified for, if any such there be, which I very much question.

2. The Greeks therefore were to blame, who thought the Barbarians naturally1 their Enemies, because they were different in their Manners, and of more shallow Apprehensions (in their Opinions) than themselves. But how far upon the Account of enormous Crimes, Crimes against Nature, or prejudicial to human Society, it is lawful to dispossess People, is a different Query, and alreadyc discussed in our Discourse about The Right of Punishments.

XI.The Desire of Liberty in a People who are subject, is also an unjust Reason.XI. Nor is the taking up Arms upon the Account of Liberty, justifiable in particular Persons, or a whole Community;1 as if to be in such a State, or a State of Independence, was naturally, and at all Times, every one’s Right. For when Men are said to be2 by Nature in a State of Freedom, by Nature is to be understood the Right of Nature, as it is antecedent to all human Acts to the contrary; and the Freedom there meant, is an Exemption from Slavery, and not an absolute Incompatibility with Slavery, that is, no Man naturally is a Slave, but no Man has a Right never to become such, for in this Sense no Body living is free. And this is what Albutius3 intends, when he says, that No Man is born either a Freeman or Slave, but these Names Fortune gives them afterwards. Thus Aristotle,4 Νόmω τὸν μὲν δον̂λον εἰ̂ναι τὸν δ’ ἐλεύθερον, To the Law it is owing, that one is in a free, another in a servile Condition. And therefore it is every Man’s apparent Duty, who is reduced to a State of Servitude, either civil or personal, to be content with his own Condition, as the Apostle St. Paul teaches us, Art thou called, says he, being a Servant, care not for it. 1 Cor. vii. 21.<479>

XII.And the Desire of ruling others against their Wills, under Pretence of its being their Interest to be governed by them.XII. It is unjust likewise to bring under Subjection by Force of Arms, such as we may fancy are fit for nothing else, or (as the Philosophers sometimes stile them) are Slaves by Nature; for I must not compel a Man even to what is advantageous to him. For the Choice of what is profitable or not profitable, where People enjoy their Senses and theira Reason, is to be left to themselves, unless some other Person has gained any Right over them. But that of Infants1 is a quite different Case, for as they have not the Power to manage themselves, Nature gives it to the first that will take upon him to manage them, and who is qualified for such a Charge.

XIII.The Emperor has no Claim to universal Monarchy, tho’ some give him that Title.XIII. 1. I should not here have observed the Vanity of the Titlea with which some have dignified the Roman Emperor, as if the Right of governing the most distant, and even undiscovered Parts of the World, was his, had not Bartolus (who for a long Time passed for the most celebrated Civilian) presumed to declare that Man anb Heretick, who should dare to deny it; because, forsooth, the Emperor does sometimes1 stile himselfcLord of the Universe; and because that the Empire (to which modern Historians have given the Name of2Romania) is in Holy Writ3 called by the Name τη̂ς ὀικουμένης, of thed World; which is no more than such Strains and Flights as

• 4The whole World to Rome’s victorious Arms
• Subjection already paid,

and many such other Expressions, by Way of Hyperbole or Eminence; especially if we consider, that in the same Sacred Pages,5Judaea alone has frequently the Name of the World given it. And in this Sense we are to apprehend that old Expression of Jerusalem’s being situated6 in the Middle of the Earth, that is, of the Land ofeJudaea: So Delphos being in the Centre of Greece, is called the7Navel of the World. Nor are the Arguments used by8Dante for the universal Jurisdiction of the Emperor, drawn from its Tendency to the Interests of Mankind, at all convincing; for the Advantages he proposes are counterpoised by the Inconveniences that attend them. For as a Ship may be built to so vast a Bulk, as to be unweildy, and not manageable, so an Empire may be extended over so great a Number of Men and Places so widely distant from each other, that the Government of it becomes a Task, to whichf no one Sovereign can be equal.

2. But however, allowing what he contends for, the Expediency of such an universal Monarchy, yet the Right of Empire cannot beg thence inferred. For Consent is the Original of all Right to Government, unless where Subjection is inflicted as a Punishment. Neither can the Roman Emperor now lay Claim to all the Dominions of his Predecessors, many of which, as they were acquired in War, so were they lost by War. Some have been alienated by Contract, and others by<480> Abdication,9 are become subject to other Potentates and Nations. And some States that once were entirely subject, are since become so only in Part, or made a Sort of Confederates on unequal Conditions. For all these Methods of losing, or changing a Right, hold equally good against the Roman Emperor as against any other Potentate.

XIV.Nor the Church as others alledge.XIV. 1. But some there are,a who would confer on the Church a Power over the Inhabitants of even the undiscovered Parts of the World;1 whereas St. Paul openly declares, that he had no judicative Power where Christianity was not embraced. For What (says he) have I to do to judge them that are without? 1 Cor. v. 12. And this Power of the Apostle, tho’, after its Manner, it belonged to earthly Things, yet was it of a celestial (if I may so say) not of a terrestrial Nature, I mean, not to be exerted by Arms and Blows; but by the Word of GOD, delivered both in general, and applied to particular Circumstances; by administring or refusing the Sacraments, which are the Seals of the divine Grace, as it was proper and most expedient; and lastly, by a Vengeance not natural, but above the Power of Nature, and therefore derived from GOD, as is manifest in the Punishment of Ananias, Elymas, Hymenaeus, and others.

2. CHRIST himself, from whom all Ecclesiastical Power is derived, who was a Pattern for the Church to walk by, declared thatb his Kingdom was not of this World, that is, not of the same Nature with other Kingdoms; adding, that if it were, he, like other Princes, should make use of Soldiers. And had he been willing to demand any Legions, they would not have been Legions of Men, but of Angels, Matt. xxvi. 53. And whatever Authority he used, he did it not by a human Power, but a divine Virtue, even then when He drove out of the Temple the Buyers and Sellers. For the Scourge which he then used, was not the Instrument, but only the Symbol of GOD’s Wrath; as at another Time the Spittle and the Oil was not the Salve, butc the Token of the Cure. St. Austin, upon the forementioned Passage of St. John, breaks forth into these passionate Expressions:2Give ear, O ye Jews and Gentiles, circumcised and uncircumcised, attend to what I say, all ye Kingdoms of the Earth; your Dominion here below I do not interrupt, for my Kingdom is not of this World. Disturb not yourselves with imaginary Terrors, as Herod the Great did, when he received the News of CHRIST’s Birth, who was more cruel by his Fear than by his Passion, when he caused so many Infants to be destroyed, in Hopes that JESUS might be among them. My Kingdom (says he) is not of this World: What would you have more? Come to the Kingdom which is not of this World: Come to it by Faith, and let not your Fears transport you to Cruelty.

3. St. Paul, among his other Charges, gives this for one, that A Bishop be no Striker, 1 Tim. iii. 3. And St. Chrysostomd says, that it is for Kings, and not Bishops, ἀνάγκη κρατεὶν, to rule imperiously, or by human Force and Compulsion.3 And<481> in another Place,4We have no Power given us to restrain Men from sinning by the Authority of a Sentence, that is such an Authority as includes the Right of executing the Sentence like a Sovereign, or by Force, or of taking away5 any human Right. And he says, that a Bishop discharges the Duty of his Function, not by Constraint but by Persuasion. Now from what has been said, it is evident that Bishops,6 as such, can exercise no human Dominion.7 St. Jerome comparing a King and a Bishop together, says, that the one presides over Men whether they will or no; but the other has none but voluntary Subjects.

4. Whether Christian Kings can make War against those who reject the Christian Religion, by Way of Punishment, has, as far as is requisite to our Purpose, been already discussed in a formere Chapter concerning Punishments.

XV.Nor a Desire of accomplishing Prophecies without a Commission from GOD.XV. I will here give another Caution, and it will be somewhat necessary too, because, by comparing Things present with Things past, I foresee a great Mischief like to ensue, if not guarded against. The Caution is this, that1the Hopes we conceive from the Explication of some Divine Prophecies, can be no just Cause for our declaring War. For besides that2 there can no certain Interpretation be made of such Prophecies as are not yet accomplished, without Inspiration, the Times of<482> the Accomplishment of those Things that are ever so certain may be unknown to us. Nor does the Prediction at all, unless there be along with it an express Command of GOD, give any Right, since GOD often permits his Predictions to be brought to pass by wicked Men, or by wicked Actions.

XVI.Nor a Debt not due in Strictness of Justice but by some other Way.XVI. This we are also to understand, that if a Man owes another any Thing, not in Strictness of Justice but by some other Virtue, suppose Liberality, Gratitude, Compassion, or Charity, he cannot be sued for it in any Court of Judicature, neither can War be made upon him on that Account; for to either of these it is not sufficient, that that which is demanded ought for some moral Reason to be performed, but besides it is requisite we should have some Right to it, such a Right as both divine1 and human Laws do sometimes give us to those Things which are due by other Virtues; and when that is so, there arises a new Obligation which belongs to Justice. But when this is wanting, the War on that Account is unjust, as was that of the2Romans against the King of Cyprus, for his Ingratitude. For he3 who has done a Kindness, has no Right to demand a return of his Favour: For if so, it would be a Bargain and not a Kindness.

XVII.The Distinction between a War whose Cause is unjust, and that which is faulty in some other Respects; and the different Effects of both.XVII. 1. We are also toa take Notice, that it often comes to pass, that tho’ there be a just Cause for War, yet some Fault may accompany the Action from the Disposition of the Agent, as when something else, not of itself unlawful, does more powerfully incite us, than the Right we have to do it, as1 the desire of Glory, for Instance, or some Advantage either private or publick that is expected to accrue to us from the War, considered distinctly from the justifying Reason of it, or when some unlawful Passion arises in us, as the taking a Satisfaction in another’s suffering, without regard to any Good. Thus Aristides2 tells us, that the Phocians were deservedly destroyed, but that King Philip did very ill in so doing, because he put them to the Sword, not for Religion, as he pretended, but on account of enlarging his Dominions.

2. There is one, and that a very antient Reason for making War, (saysbSallust) and that is an insatiable desire of Empire, and Riches. In Tacitus;cGold and Wealth were ever the chief Motives for War. And in the Tragedy you have:

• dRash Anger and Gain’s impious Frenzy
• Have broke the Alliance off.

Whereunto we may refer that of St. Austin:eA Pleasure in doing Mischief, or in Revenge, a restless and implacable Spirit, a Spirit of Rebellion, the Lust of Dominion, and such like are justly culpable in all Wars. But tho’ these Things are criminal, yet when the War is grounded on a justifiable Reason, they do not render it Unjust, and therefore there is no Obligation to make Restitutionf for Damages sustained by such a War.<483>

[a ]Chap. 1. § 1. of this Book.

[1 ]This Distinction is made also by Plutarch, in his Galba; and Dion, in the Affairs of Caesar and Pompey; and by Polybius, where he treats of the Roman War against the Illyrians, Excerpt. Legat. CXXVI. We may call the justifying Reasons the Pretext, and the Motives the Cause of the War, as Suetonius does, where he speaks of Julius Caesar, This was his Pretext indeed for a Civil War; but all the World are of Opinion, that the Causes were something else.Thucydides in some Places distinguishes between Πρόϕασιν the Pretence, and Τὸ ἀληθὲς, the Truth, as in the Athenians Descent upon Sicily, where the Pretence was to assist the People of Egesta, but the Truth and Reality was their Desire of seizing upon Sicily for themselves. Hermocrates, in an Harangue of his, speaking of the Athenians, calls that the Colour, this the Intent. You have both these Passages in Thucydides’s sixth Book. And Appian, in his Mithridatic uses the Word Προϕάσεων: and in his Civilian, Lib. VI. where he treats of the Peace between Octavius and Sextus Pompeius being broken, he says, that the concealed Reasons were quite different from those that were declared. Agathias, in his fifth Book, what others term Πρόϕασιν calls Σκη̂ψην καὶ προκάλυμμα, Fiction and Disguise, to which he opposes αἰτίαν, In Hist. Hunn. Zamergan. Add to this what we said above, in Chap. I. § 1. of this Book. Procopius, Persic. II. says, that It is but Folly to be reserved when the Action is directed by Justice, and attended with Advantage.Grotius.

One may perceive at first Sight, that the last Passage from Procopius is not to the Purpose, for the Question here is not concerning Freedom of Speech. I cannot comprehend how our Author found any Thing in it that could relate to the Subject of this Note, nor how he came to change the Sense of the Historian; for the Passage he had, probably, in View, at least there is nothing elsewhere that has any Resemblance to the present Subject, in the two Books of the War against the Persians, is, at the Close of the Speech made by the Embassadors of the Lazians, to Chosroez King of Persia, to intreat him to receive their Nation into his Alliance and Protection against the Romans. After having set forth all the Reasons that were capable of shewing the Justice of their Demand, they represent the Advantages that Chosroez himself would have in complying with it; and conclude, that it is no more than prudent to accept offers, Which Justice precedes, and Advantage accompanies. Lib. II. Cap. XV.

[b ]For Instance, l. 37. c. 54. n. 13.

[2. ]See what is said in the preceding Chapter, § 8. Note 2.

[3. ]In the famous Retreat of the ten thousand Greeks, of which that Philosopher and great Captain has writ the History.

[4. ]See his Life in Cornelius Nepos, Cap. III. and in Polybius, Lib. III. Cap. VI.

[c ]Lib. 3. c. 6, 7, 8, 9.

[5. ]Lib. I. (Cap. XXIII. See also Cap. LVI. and LXVIII.) In his fifth Book, where he treats of the War between the Argives and the Epidaurians, he calls αἰτία, what he had a little before called Πρόϕασις. In the same Manner (as we have observed in the first Chapter of this Book) the Greek Word Ἀρχαὶ, and the Latin Word Principia, and such others as are made Use of to express the Origin of a War, are equivocal. The Writers of the Constantinopolitan History often use the Word Πατροκλος, to signify what others call Pretext, Πρόϕασις, and that in Allusion to the History of Achilles, who took Occasion from the Death of Patroclus to resume his Arms, which he had before renounced. Grotius.

[6. ]Quanquam pugnavimus, &c.Livy, Lib. VII. Cap. XXX. Numb. 12.

[7. ]Our Author by not attending to the Construction of the Terms, attributes to King Antiochus, what the Latin Historian says of the Boeotians: In Boeotiam ipse [Antiochus]——— habentem ——— revera per multa jam secula publicè privatimque labante egregiâ quondam disciplina gentis, & multorum eo statu, qui diuturnus esse sine mutatione rerum non posset. Lib. XXXVI. Cap. VI. Num. 1, 2. Boecler has exactly copied this Error, in a Dissertation, intitled De Clarigatione & Manifestis, Vol. II. p. 1212. where he expresses himself in the same Manner as our Author, tho’ he does not mention him.

[8. ]As the Place where the Philosopher makes that Reflection is not named here, Gronovius seems to doubt whether it be really his. But I shall give the Passage; from which it will appear also, that that learned Man was mistaken, in imagining our Author spoke of Octavius, or Augustus Caesar, whereas the Passage relates to Julius Caesar. Διὸ καὶ Κικέρων ἐν τοɩ̂ς ϕιλιππικοɩ̂ς, &c. In Vit. Marc. Anton. p. 918. C. D. Vol. I. Edit. Wech. The Passage in the Philippicks, of which Plutarch speaks, and wherein it is said, that Antony was the Cause of the Civil, as Hellen had been of the Trojan, War, is in the II. Philippick. Cap. XXII. Our Author cites here, in a Note, some Verses of Lucan, wherein that Poet says on the same Subject, that the ill Treatment of the Tribunes of the People, Q. Cassius and Mark Antony, finally determined Caesar, who was before irresolute, Fortune supplying him thereby with Pretexts to justify the War wherein he engaged himself.

• Ecce faces belli, dubiaeque in proelia menti
• Urgentes addunt stimulos, cunctasque pudoris
• Rumpunt fata moras: justos Fortuna laborat
• Esse ducis motus, & causas invenit armis.
• Pharsal. Lib. I. ver. 262, &c seq.

[1 ]Periculorum propter ipsa avidi. Our Author reports the Sense rather than the Words, in this Place; for he had probably in View the Passage concerning Cornelius Fuscus. Non tam praemiis periculorum, quam ipsis periculis, laetus. Hist. Lib. II. Cap. LXXXVI. Num. 7. But Tacitus says elsewhere, only periculorum avidi, Lib. III. Cap. XLI. Num. 4. and Lib. V. Cap. XIX. Num. 5. I find in Seneca an Expression implying the very same Thing, Pereclitamur periculi causâ. Quaest. Nat. Lib. V. Cap. XVIII. p. 778. Edit. Var. Elzevir.

[2. ]Ammianus Marcellinus says of the Alani, that they love Dangers and War, as much as pacifick Persons do Repose and Tranquillity, Utque hominibus quietis & placidis otium est voluptabile, ita illos pericula juvant & bella. Lib. XXXI. (Cap. II. p. 672. Edit. Vales. Gron.) Grotius.

[3. ]Θηριότης (Ethic. Nicomed. Lib. VII. Cap. I.) Grotius.

[4. ]Possumus dicere, non esse hanc crudelitatem, sed feritatem cui, voluptati saevitia est, &c. De Clementia, Lib. II. Cap. IV. He says elsewhere, speaking of Apollodorus and Phalaris, two most inhuman Tyrants, who delighted in shedding human Blood, without any Reason for it, that they could not be said to have acted purely and simply from Passion, but that what they did was the Effect of a brutal Ferocity: Hi qui vulgo saeviunt, & sanguine humano gaudent, &c. De Ira, Lib. II. Cap. V. Grotius.

[a ]Eth. Nic. l. 10. c. 7. p. 138. tom. 2. Edit. Paris.

[b ]Orat. 37.

[1 ]Sed enim & bonarum possessor, &c. Digest. Lib. V. Tit. III. De haereditatis petitione, Leg. XI. in fin. & XII. XIII. init. Such was the War of the Heruli against the Lombards, undertaken without Pretext. Πόλεμος ἀπροϕάσις, (as Procopius stiles it, De bello Gotthic. Lib. II. Cap. XIV.) Grotius.

[a ]Rhet. l. 1. c. 3.

[2. ]Romanis quaerentibus, & quid in Etruria rei Gallis esset? Quum illi se in armis jus ferre, & omnia fortium virorum esse, ferociter dicerent, &c.Livy, Lib. V. Cap. XXXVI. Num. 5.

[3. ]

• Ductoremque feram, cui nunc pro foedere, proque
• Justitiâ est, Ensis ———
• De bello Punic. II. Lib. XI. ver. 183, 184.

[4. ]Our Author had, probably, in View what the Emperor Valentinian says in a Letter to Theodorick, as Jornandes relates, Qui [Attila] causas praelii non requirit, sed quidquid commiserit, hoc putat esse legitimum. De Goth. orig. & reb. gestis, Cap. XXXVI. Edit. Vulcan.

[5. ]It is a Passage in one of Seneca’s Tragedies,

• ——— Quaeritur belli exitus,
• Non causa ———
• Hercul. Fur. v. 407, 408.

[6. ]This is the Sense our Author gives to a Verse of Lucan which he uses here, without saying whose it is. But Caesar, whom the Poet introduces speaking in this Manner to his Soldiers, means, that the Gods would shew whose Cause was good, by making the Victory turn to that Side; so that the Application is not very just. The Original is

• Haec, fato quae teste probet, quis justius arma
• Sumserit, haec acies victum factura nocentum est.
• Pharsal. Lib. VII. ver. 259, 260.

In the same Manner a Roman Herald, declaring War against the Samnites, said, that the Gods who preside in War, would judge which of the two Nations had broken the Treaties. Dionysius Halicarnassensis, Excerpt. Legat. p. 705. Edit. Oxon.

[7. ]These are Tacitus’s Words, and are cited before, in the Preliminary Discourse, § 3. Note 2.

[8. ]Inferre bella finitimis, &c. De civitat. Dei. Lib. IV. Cap. VI. in fin.

[b ]Lib. 2. c. 3.

[9. ]Sed ea animi elatio, &c. De Offic. Lib. I. (Cap. XIX.) Agathias treats those as insolent and abandoned, who, from the Love of Gain, or unreasonable Enmity, Possess themselves of other People’s Land, without any just Subject of Complaint against them, Lib. II. (Cap. I.) Menander, Protector, gives us a remarkable Instance of this, in the Person of Bagan, Chagan (or Prince) of the Avari, who broke the Treaties he had made with the Romans, without so much as seeking any false Pretext to colour the Rupture. (Cap. XXI. Of the Embassies of Justinian, Justin, and Tiberius.) Grotius.

[10. ](Paraph. Ethic. Nicom. Lib. IV. Cap. II. p. 202.) Philo the Jew, speaking also of Tyrants and ambitious Persons, excellently observes, that when they have the Power in their own Hands, and can assure themselves of Impunity, they plunder whole Cities, and commit the greatest Robberies, under the specious Name of Government. In Decalog. (p. 763. C. D.) This agrees perfectly well with the Passages of Seneca, Quintus Curtius, Justin, and S. Austin, cited above, Chap. I. § 1. of this Book. Grotius.

[1 ]The Historian says this of Hannibal, who sought Pretexts to quarrel with the Neighbours of Saguntum, Quibus, quum adesset idem, qui litis erat sator, nec certamen juris, sed vim quaeri, adpareret, &c. Lib. XXI. Cap. VI. Num. 2.

[2. ]In Vit. Pyrrhi, p. 389. E. Vol. I. Edit. Wech.

[3. ]See Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. VIII. Chap. VI. § 4, 5.

[a ]Ch. 1. § 17. of this Book.

[b ]Zonar. tom. 2. ubi de bell. Maced. 1.

[1 ]Pausanias, cited in the Margin by our Author, says, that Lysimachus was for preventing Demetrius, whom he knew to be as ambitious as his Father, Lib. I. Cap. X. p. 9. Edit. Graec. Wech. But we find immediately after, that Lysimachus took his Pretext from the Perfidy of Demetrius to Alexander, the Son of Cassander, whom he assassinated, that he might reign in his Stead in Macedonia. The Romans also alledged other Reasons in Justification of their War against Philip; which, however, were not much better. See the Specimen Jurisprud. Hist. of Mr. Buddeus, § 101. The Conjecture of Gronovius in this Place, in accusing our Author of having taken one Thing for another, has no Foundation. For our Author does not mean, that those Wars were undertaken to hinder a Neighbour from building a Fortress upon the Frontiers; that was said only by Way of Instance of what gives Umbrage; and it suffices, that those Wars had, either for their End or Pretext, the Prevention of an Evil apprehended from another. Now this is what Zonaras, cited in the Margin, expressly says of the War of the Romans against Philip. So that our Author had not in View what Livy says Lib. XXXII. Cap. XXXVII. Num. 3. as Gronovius supposes.

[2. ]Populus [Chauci] inter Germanos nobilissimus, &c. German. Cap. XXXV. Num. 4, 5, 6.

[1 ]The commodious Situation of a Place, and its being proper to cover a Prince’s Frontiers, are not lawful Causes for seizing it by Force of Arms. This is an instance alledged by the late Mr. Vitriarius, Instit. Jur. Nat. & Gent. Lib. II. Cap. XXII. § 3.

[1 ]See above, Chap. II. of this Book, § 21.

[2. ]If we follow Apollodorus, this Example is ill applied. For, according to him, Eurytus, King of Oechalia, had promised his Daughter Iole in Marriage to him who could outshoot him and his Sons. Hercules presented himself, and having won the Prize proposed, Eurytus refused to let him have it: So that here was a Breach of Faith, for which Hercules had a Right to do himself Justice by Arms. Biblioth. Lib. II. Cap. VI. § 1. But our Author has followed Diodorus Siculus, who does not mention the Promise, and only says, that Hercules demanded Iole in Marriage, Lib. IV. Cap. XXXI.

[3. ]Our Author has, no Doubt, taken this from Justin. That Epitomiser says, that Jancyres (a Name very differently expressed by Authors) I say, that Jancyres, Idantyres, or Indathyrses, having refused to give his Daughter in Marriage to Darius, the latter declared War against him upon that Account. Huic Darius Rex Persarum ——— quum filiae ejus nuptias non obtinuisset, bellum intulit. Lib. II. Cap. V. Num. 9. I perceive however, that Albericus Gentilis, whose Work our Author had before him, when he composed his own; relates this Example on the Authority of Jornandes, Hist. Gotth. (Cap. X.) and of Paulus Orosius, Lib. II. Cap. VIII. See the Treatise of that Civilian often cited, De jure Belli, Lib. I. Cap. XX. p. 158.

[4. ]And Antoninus Caracalla, against Artabanus, King of the Parthians. See Xiphilinus, (Epit. Dion. p. 356. Edit. H. Steph.) Grotius.

[1 ]Eadem semper causa Germanis, &c. Hist. Lib. IV. Cap. LXXIII. Num. 6.

[a ]Franc. Victor. de Indis, Relect. 1. n. 31.

[a ]Idem, de bello, n. 5, 6, 7, 8. & l. 2. n. 18.

[b ]Ch. 3. § 6. of this Book.

[1 ]Φύσει πολέμιοι. See Plato, De Republica, (Lib. V. p. 470. C. Vol. II. Edit. Steph.) Aristotle, Politic. (Lib. I. Cap. II.) Euripides, in Hecub. [or rather Iphigen. in Aulid. ver. 1400, 1401.] Livy, Lib. XXXI. (Cap. XXIX. Num. 15.) Isocrates, Orat. Panathen. (p. 267. Edit. Hen. Steph.) Grotius.

See above, Chap. XX. § 40. Note 10, and 11.

[c ]Ch. 20. § 40. of this Book.

[1 ]See the fourth Council of Toledo, and what we have said above in Chap. IV. § 14. of this Book. Grotius.

[2. ]See Pufendorf, B. III. Chap. II. § 8. Law of Nature and Nations.

[3. ]Albutius, & philosophatus est; dixit, &c.Seneca, Controvers. Lib. III. Cont. XXI.

[4. ]He does not say this of his own Head, but relates it as the Opinion of others, who believed that all Slavery is contrary to Nature, and consequently unjust. Politic. Lib. I. Cap. III.

[a ]Franc. Victor. de Indis, n. 24. Ayala. de jure belli, l. 1. c. 2. n. 29.

[1 ]Mr. Barbeyrac adds, And Idiots, (les Insensez) because, says he, it is highly probable, that the Printers skipt over & amentium, from the Resemblance of the Word infantium which preceded. In § 10. our Author joins together Infants and Madmen.

[a ]See Covar. in Cap. peccatum. part 2. § 9. n. 5.

[b ]Ad Leg. 24. Dig. De captiv. & postlim. &c.

[1 ]

[c ]See also the Council of Calcedon, Act. 11. and 12.

[2. ]As Athanasius does also, in his Letters Ad Solitarios, and that was scarce the sixth Part of the then known World. Grotius.

The same Father says, Rome is the capital City of Romania. Vol. I. p. 832. C. Edit. Colon. seu Lips. 1686.

[3. ]Philo the Jew says, that the Countries between the Euphrates and the Rhine may be properly called the Earth, or habitable World. De Legat. ad Cajum. (p. 993. D. E.) Grotius.

[d ]Luke ii. 1.

[4. ]Orbem jam totum victor Romanus habebat.Petron. Satyr. Cap. CXIX.

[5. ]The Word Earth, tho’ the Particle all be added to it, must be restrained to that Country the Discourse is of. St. Jerom. Grotius.

See the late Mr. Reland’s Palestine, Lib. I. Cap. V.

[6. ]Consult the Geograph. Sac. of the last cited Author, Lib. I. Cap. X.

[e ]See Joseph. de bello Jud. l. 3. c. 4.

[7. ]The Authorities of the Antients upon this Head may be found in the same Part of Mr. Reland’s Work.

[8. ]In the second Book of Dante Aligheri, De Monarchia, printed at Basil in the Year 1559, by John Oporin.

[f ]See Aristot. Politic. l. 7. c. 4.

[g ]Sylvest. verbo Bellum, p. 1. n. 21. Covar. ubi supra.

[9. ]Spain, for Instance: Upon which see Gomez, in § Fuerat, Num. 5. De Actionibus.Panormitan, in Cap. Venerabilem, Col. 9. De Electione.Jason, in Leg. I. Cod. De Summa Trin. Col. 2. Menochius, Consil. II. Num. 102. Cardinal Tuschus, Practic. Concl. CCCXLV. § Rex Hispan.Du Moulin, Cons. Paris. Num. 20. Princ.Chassaneus, De gloria Mundi, Part. V. Considerat. XXVIII. Azorus, Institut. Moral. Lib. II. Cap. V. p. 2. Grotius.

[a ]See Franc. Victor. De Indis, Relict. 1. n. 21, &c. Ayala, l. 1. c. 11. n. 29.

[1 ]Compare with this the Treatise of our Author, De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra. Cap. IV.

[b ]John xviii. 36. See Petr. Damian, l. 4. epist. 9. and Bernard. epist. 220.

[c ]As Tostatus admirably explains it, on Matt. ix.

[2. ]Audite erga Judaei & Gentes, &c. In Joann. XVIII. 36. (Tractat. CXV.) St. Hillarius Arelatensis says, For CHRIST did not come to invade another’s Glory, but to bestow his own: Not to seize on an earthly, but to confer an heavenly, Kingdom. Non enim ad hoc venerat CHRISTUS ut alienam invaderet gloriam, sed ut suam donaret; non ut regnum terrestre praeriperet, sed ut coeleste conferret. Grotius.

[d ]In Act. Apost. hom. 3. In Epist. ad Tit. 1. to Thess. hom. 4.

[3. ]His Words are in his second Book, De Sacerdotibus, Μάλιστα μὲν ον̂̔ν τοɩ̂ς χριστιανοɩ̂ς, &c. It is by no Means allowable for Christians to reform Offenders by Force and Violence. The secular Judges indeed, when they get Malefactors under their Jurisdiction, exercise a large Power over them, and make them, whether they will or no, amend their Manners: But as for us, we are to better People by Persuasion, and not by Compulsion. The Laws give us no such Authority to restrain Criminals; nor, if they did, could we put it in Execution, because GOD does not crown those who by Necessity abstain from their Vices, but who do it out of Choice: And therefore, there is a great Deal of Art and Industry to be used by us, that they who labour under such Distempers may voluntarily apply themselves to the Clergy for a Cure. And presently after, οὐ γὰρ ἐλκύσαι, &c. For we must not drag him by Force, nor necessitate him by Fear. And upon Ephes. iv. εἰς διδασκαλίαν, &c. Our Business is to teach and instruct; not to command and govern, but to persuade and advise: Now he who offers his Advice, says what he pleases, he does not compel his Hearer, but leaves him to his own Liberty and Discretion, of following his Advice or not. St. Ambrose, Lib. I. De Cain & Abel, Cap. IV. The Priest indeed tells the Man his Duty, but he exercises no Power and Authority over him. This is cited, C. Verbum. De poenitent. Distinct. I. Grotius.

Our Author has treated this Subject more at large in his Treatise De Imperio Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra. Cap. III. and IV.

[4. ]See the Passages cited by our Author in the Margin, and in his Treatise, De Jure Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra, (Cap. IV. § 7.)

[5. ]For it belongs to Princes and not to the Church, to determine about Fiefs. C. Novit. de Judiciis, de Feudis, de Possessionibus. C. Causam quae inter qui Filii sint legitimi. For Kings allow no Superior in Temporals. C. per venerabilem, as before, Christ would have Christian Emperors be beholden to the Clergy for what regards an eternal Life, and the Clergy to make Use of the Emperor’s Laws in what concerns their temporal Affairs, that so our spiritual Proceedings might have no clashing and interfering with those that are carnal, and that he who is engaged in the Service of GOD might not be involved in secular Matters. C. quoniam distinct. x. and c. cum ad verum distinct. xcvi. Not foreign to this is what we laid down in the last Section of these cond Chapter of the first Book, from the eighty second Apostolical Canon, and several other Passages there both in the Text and Notes upon that Subject. Grotius.

[6. ]Our Author intimates by this that if Ecclesiasticks, have any coactive Power, as they hold it from the Laws and the Sovereign, when they exercise it, they do not act as Ministers of the Gospel; they assume, if I may say so, another Personage, and become in that Regard Seculars. See again here our Author’s Treatise, De Jure Summarum Potestatum circa Sacra. Cap. VIII. and IX.

[7. ]Ut regi, sic Episcopo, &c. Epistol. and Heliodor. De Epitaphio Nepotian. (Vol. I. p. 25. B. Edit. Froben.) In a Letter of one that was Captain of the Emperor’s Life-Guard, to the Bishop, it is said, Let the Bishop instruct so as the Judge may find no Cause to punish: Episcopus doceat, ne judex possit invenire quod puniat.Cassiodor. Var. XI. 3. The Emperor Frederick Barbarossa says, in a Poem, speaking of the Pope: Let him govern his Church, and make spiritual Regulations; but let him leave Empire and Civil Authority to us:

• Ecclesiam regat ille suam, divinaque jura,
• Temperet: imperium nobis fascesque relinquat.

Gunther. Ligurin. When William, Bishop of Roschild, refused Sueno, King of Denmark, who was excommunicated, entrance into his Church, by opposing his Crosier against him, and the King’s Officers upon that laid their Hands on their Swords, he did as a Bishop ought to do, and offered them his Neck. See what we have said upon this, B. I. Chap. IV. § 5. Grotius.

[e ]Chap. 20. § 48. & seqq.

[1 ]See, concerning a Person named Theodore, in the Emperor Gratian’s Time. Zosimus, (Lib. IV. Cap. XIII. Edit. Cellar.) And Ammianus Marcellinus, (Lib. XXIX. Cap. I.) and in Relation to John of Cappadocia,Procopius, Persic. Lib. II. (Cap. XXX.) See also Leunclavius, Hist. Turc. Lib. XVIII. Grotius.

We may add here what the celebrated Mr. Schulting says upon the Receptae Sententiae of Paulus the Civilian, Lib. V. Tit. XXI. § 1. Jurisprud. Ante-Justin, p.502.

[2. ]For the Books of the Prophets are closed up and sealed till the Time of the End, so that they cannot be understood, Dan. xii. 4, 8, 9. St. Jerome upon Daniel. If the Prophet heard and did not understand, what will they do who presume to declare what is contained in that sealed Book; a Book involved in numerous Obscurities till the Time of its Consummation?Procopius, Goth. Cap. II. Τω̂ν γὰρ Σιβύλλης, &c. I think it impossible for any Man to find out the Meaning of the Sibyls Oracles before the Event. And presently, ταύτη τε ἀδύνατα, &c. It is impossible for any Man living to understand the Sibylline Oracles before their Accomplishment; for it is Time alone, which upon the Arrival of the Affair itself, and the Conclusion of what is predicted, can exactly tell what the Verse intended.Gregoras, Lib. V. ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ, &c. But as other Predictions are very difficultly guessed at and expounded, because they have a thousand Intricacies and various Explications till their actual Expiration, so this Oracle too deceived many, and even the Emperor Andronicus himself till his Decease, as it shall be related by and by. But when he was dead and gone, the Oracle discovered itself. Have a Care then you who are Divines, that you be not too bold this Way: And do you who are Politicians have a Care, that you be not imposed on by such presumptuous Theologists. There is a Passage very well worth your viewing in Thuanus, Lib. LXXIX. at the Year 1583. about one Jacobus Brocardus.Grotius.

[1 ]See Pufendorf, B. III. Chap. III. § 4. Of the Law of Nature and Nations.

[2. ]Our Author cites Nobody: But he has here in View, what Strabo says of Ptolomy the last King of Cyprus, who was deprived of his Kingdom by the Romans, for his ill Conduct and Ingratitude to his Benefactors. Geogr. Lib. XIV. in fin. p. 1004. A. Edit Amstel. (684. Edit. Paris.) But this War had still more unjust Causes, as well with Regard to P. Clodius, who brought the Roman People into it; as to the Roman People themselves. See Cicero, Orat. pro Sext. Cap. XXVI. Florus, Lib. III. Cap. IX. Dion Cassius XXXVIII. p. 86, 87. Edit. Steph.Appianus Alexandrinus, De Bell. Civil. Lib. II. p. 728. Edit. Amstel. (441. H. Steph.) Ammianus Marcellinus, Lib. XIV. Cap. VIII. in fin. Edit. Vales. Gron.

[3. ]See Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, B. III. Chap. III. § 17.

[a ]Franc. Victor. De Jure Belli, Num. 2.

[1 ]Which Vice insinuates itself the most, under the Appearance of Virtue. But as St. Austin well observes, it is much better to suffer as the greatest Coward, than to acquire Glory by such an use of Arms: Satius est cujuslibet inertiae poenas luere, quam illorum armorum gloriam quaerere. De Civit. Dei. Lib. III. Cap. XIV. See the Passage of Agathias cited above, § 3. (Note 3.) Grotius.

But in the Passage referred to here, as well as in the other of St. Austin, the Question relates to Wars unjust in themselves.

[2. ]Orat. II. De Societate, Vol. II. p. 256, 257.

[b ]Epist Mithr. ad Arsacen, Frag. Lib. 4. § 3.

[c ]Hist. Lib. 4. Cap. 74. n. 7.

[d ]Senec. Hipp. V. 540, 541.

[e ]Contra Faust. l. 22. c. 74.

[f ]Covar. in C. peccatum, Part 2. § 9. n. 2. Cajetan. 2. 2 Quaest. 40. Art 1. Sylvest. verb. Bellum, n. 2. Summa Ang. verb. Bellum, n. 5. Summ. Ros. ib. n. 3. & 8. Thom. Aquin. 2. 2 Qu. 66. Art. 8.