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ESSAY 4: Is Heresy a Punishable Crime? - Christian Thomasius, Essays on Church, State, and Politics [2007]Edition used:Essays on Church, State, and Politics, edited, translated, and with an Introduction by Ian Hunter, Thomas Ahnert, and Frank Grunert (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007).
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ESSAY 4Is Heresy a Punishable Crime?JULY 14, 16971 Conversation between a (so-called) Orthodox Believer and a ChristianIOrthodoxMy dear Christian, I find you always over the books.2 What are you studying, since I see the works of jurists and theologians spread all around you? ChristianMy dear Orthodox, your arrival is timely, as you can help me with my work. You know what kind of strife rages among the theologians of our church, today worse than ever. You know how in these controversies it is typical that both parties declare each other heretics, or at least one party declares the other to be such. You know that more than once on such occasions those who seem suspect to others have been dragged before the courts, where they were dealt with according to inquisitorial process. Nonetheless, since occasionally judgments and opinions are handed down by our colleges or by individual jurists, the matter seemed to deserve the effort of a somewhat more exact consideration. For I do not know how it has transpired that certain opinions concerning the crime of heresy, commonly accepted even among Protestant jurists, have already appeared suspect to me for some time. Furthermore, (as others have already remarked), just as in matrimonial cases before Protestant courts many things occur that are redolent of papalism, stemming from the doctrine that marriage is a sacrament, so it seems to me that the doctrines we observe in cases concerning heresy, and which form the basis of our decisions and advice, deviate utterly from the sound teaching of the Gospels. And I must say that the more I peruse the books our [Lutheran] jurisconsults have written about heresy, and compare them with those written on the subject by our theologians, the more I am confirmed in my opinion. But, Orthodox, you will be best able to dispel this worry; for you have dedicated yourself longer than I to the study of law and, before commencing this, had studied theology for several years. So, then, tell me what you think about this. OrthodoxGladly! Neither will this be too difficult for me, for our [Lutherans] have already been reproached by the papalists several times, as if our teaching regarding the punishment of heresy agreed with theirs. Our theologians and jurists have responded to this accusation splendidly, however, showing that there is a great difference between our standpoint and the papalists’. ChristianWhat kind of difference then? OrthodoxSo far as I recall, the papalists generally declare that heretics may be compelled to believe and, as people who have committed a dreadful crime, punished with death. Our people, though, wish to compel no one to believe, nor to pronounce capital punishment on anyone for heresy. In fact, they seldom go further than excommunication or banishment, unless the crime of heresy is accompanied by sedition or blasphemy. Now I cannot see what is wrong with this teaching, but think to the contrary that it is quite clear, and in good accord with the principles of jurisprudence. ChristianYes, it is just as you have said. And I myself have read in many authors about just such a difference between the papalist and Protestant teaching. Only, this difference does not satisfy me. For it seems to me that the Protestants also papalize in this, in that they cannot clearly say what kind of thing heresy is; that they regard heresy as a punishable crime; that they reject religious coercion with one hand while defending it with the other, in that they think heretics should be punished with excommunication or exile; that they cloud the doctrine regarding sedition and blasphemy in such a way that they can wreak their animus against all heretics with the sword, just as dreadfully as the papalists; and that they have thus quite carelessly introduced evidently papalist doctrines regarding heresy into their juristic commentaries or theological systems. And so that you do not think I am just prattling, I could show you all of these things solely from Benedict Carpzov’s text of criminal law, which I have in front of me.3 But I would rather discuss each and every matter with you in an orderly way. OrthodoxI am happy with this. Only mind that you prove everything that you claim. IIChristianThere is no need for you to worry about that. It is much more important that we reach agreement regarding the sources from which we will prove our opinions. OrthodoxIn juristic matters, from where else would we draw our sources than received laws, namely, from the law of Justinian, canon law, imperial resolutions, and from the common consensus of the church fathers, the theologians, and jurists? ChristianI think you must be joking. For since I have said that the jurists papalize in this matter—that is, that their doctrines are contrary to divine law and Christ’s teachings—anyone could see that no human laws would be suitable, least of all the law of Justinian and canon law. For the latter papalizes not just a little, but is wholly and solely papalist. The former is stuck so full of anti-Christian doctrine, however, that in a special treatise called the Roman-Catholic Jurist, a papalist jurist, Cornelius à Rynthelen used the Law of Justinian to decide in favor of the papalists, each and every controversial question over which Protestants and papalists disagree.4 Further, considering I have said that the common doctrines papalize, it would be ridiculous if someone wanted to use the common consensus of the scholars against me; for here the question is not whether the scholars agree in common, but whether their agreement is right. OrthodoxNevertheless, you should not reject the testimony of the church fathers out of hand, especially the testimony of Augustine, who (it seems to me) deals with this doctrine in a very reasonable way, and is everywhere highly esteemed in all three religions of the Holy Roman Empire.5 ChristianIn fact I honor the fathers of the early church, yet their authority will never be so great with me that it can turn wrong into right or vice versa. I am happy to allow, though, that their texts should be introduced insofar as they are based on weighty reasons. Against those who stand on the authority of the church fathers, however, one may introduce other texts of other church fathers (if one wants to). OrthodoxBut what do you think about Augustine? ChristianEven if I had no other reason, his authority is suspect for me on account of the fact that, as you say, he is regarded so highly by all the religions recognized in the Empire. OrthodoxI do not understand what you mean. Speak more clearly. ChristianIf I recall correctly, a teacher of the church, Hieronymous, once said: The whole world has surely become Arian. I will not be wrong if I say, the whole world has surely become Augustinian, and has long ceased to be Christian. One can see from the history of Jansenism how much the papalists have squabbled among themselves on account of the authority of Augustine.6 Even Luther, as he had been an Augustinian, occasionally makes too much of Augustine, giving him excessive praise, and taking much from Augustine’s Platonizing or paganizing theology which he should rather have taken from the purer springs of Israel. It is no wonder then that today our [Lutheran] theologians and jurists esteem his authority and his books more highly than is proper. I do not know exactly how much the Reformed [Calvinists] commonly hold with him. Yet I think that what I have said could easily be applied to them too, particularly as Augustine teaches at length about particular grace [predestination] in his disputation against Pelagius. OrthodoxThat is as may be, but one must not on this account speak contemptuously of the great Augustine, or flatly reject his authority. ChristianBut I do not speak contemptuously of him. I say myself that Augustine was a great man. He was a great disputant, a great orator, a great philosopher, a great statesman, and—adding these elements together in the way of the world—a great theologian. I say further that he possessed kingly and heroic virtues. I am concerned, though, that in his writings he has not conducted himself as a great Christian. For on every page he reveals his passions of love or hate. One finds no trace of apostolic humility or fortitude, but everything smacks of proud words that excite and please the flesh. Yet perhaps we can speak of this another time, especially as we have another reason why we cannot accept Augustine as a judge or witness in this controversy. OrthodoxWhy then? ChristianAugustine is heir to the common flaw of the human race, namely: when another wrongs us we easily see what is right and remind them of fairness. As soon as we have the opportunity for revenge, though, we allow ourselves to be blinded, doing wrong under the appearance of right and, forgetting fairness, seek to hide such wicked things from others under the guise of fairness. When the Donatists raged against the orthodox, Augustine splendidly opposed this, teaching them how poorly it sat with Christianity if someone were coerced into religion.7 But once the orthodox found an emperor who agreed with them, Augustine changed his tune, defending the doctrine that one may compel heretics to believe, even if he did so under a great show of compassion and fairness. And because Augustine contradicts himself so often in this matter, he has given the scholars reason enough to disagree over his exact views regarding the doctrine of the persecution of heretics. So the parties on both sides call on Augustine. To defend the coercion of heretics, for example, he is invoked by Bellarmine,a Franciscus Burchard,b Hierotheus Boranowsky,c and several others.8 Conversely, their opponents, Antonius Benbellona,a Samuel Pomarius,b and our people have occasionally used his testimony to defend freedom of conscience against the papalists, and to moderate and reconcile contrary opinions, even if often more sophistically than from reason.9 Jean le Clercc and Philipp van Limborchd have complained about Augustine’s hard judgment against heretics, which yet Pierre Poirete has endeavored to defend and to explain in a different way—although I have said elsewherea that I regard their interpretation as the more plausible.10 OrthodoxI hear nothing but the names of heterodox authors and, as I have often said, it does not please me that you read these people. You should read the writings of our orthodox teachers more closely, and not set these aside out of idle curiosity and read people of other sects. ChristianI have learned to test everything and keep what is good.11 I have learned that a Christian must live among sects, just as he must live in the world, but need not form a sect. I live in the sect to which I was born, and follow its ceremonies to the degree that I can with a good conscience. For this reason, though, I do not dislike people who adhere to a different sect. Neither do I dislike the people of my own sect. But I seek the truth from all or, rather, examine them all in accordance with the rule of wisdom which I find in Holy Scripture, allowing no one to confound me as to my own faith. So, in the matter we are speaking of, I have also turned to writers belonging to the sect in which I live. A theologian in Ulm, Elias Veielius—in fact a Lutheran theologian whom you regard as orthodox—has written a Theological Disquisition on Augustine’s Opinion regarding Whether Heretics may be Compelled to Believe.12 This author agrees that Augustine’s initial opinion that one should tolerate heretics—in accord with Holy Scripture too—has altered in his last writings. Although, like others, he offers as an excuse that Augustine nonetheless did not defend the killing of heretics, and that the Donatists had no reason to complain about Augustine’s somewhat harsh position. But in my view this scarcely touches the issue. Meanwhile this author admits that: Augustine occasionally fashions ineffective weapons from the texts of the Bible, and the scholars find in fact that Augustine is an orator but not an acute disputant. And that in this example, according to Grotius, it appears that we judge in one way when we look into something dispassionately, but in another way when the question of action cuts this short, which is why second thoughts are not always the wiser ones.a With this explanation, I have shown why in the present matter I must exercise caution with Augustine’s authority in particular. OrthodoxNow, because you can abide neither human laws nor the testimony of the scholars, I must ask, what kind of grounds will you accept as a basis for proof? ChristianNone other than the eternal and universal grounds, namely, divine revelation and sound reason. OrthodoxBut this would be to commit a metabasis.13 We are jurists and you want to discuss a juristic question. Something proved from divine revelation or Holy Scripture belongs to theology; something proved via reason belongs to philosophy. ChristianI don’t know what kind of jurisprudence you have studied. My jurisprudence is grounded in divine laws, likewise in human laws that are in agreement with reason.14 If you have a jurisprudence that is removed from divine revelation and reason, then you should take care that all reasonable people do not regard it as godless and unreasonable. IIIOrthodoxEnough of this! I think that the common doctrine on the crime of heresy has sufficient basis in Scripture and reason. If you think otherwise, then tell us what has made you dubious. ChristianAll right, I want to proceed neither as a sophist nor as an orator, but shall set out my key doubts in clear questions, as a good friend. In my view, where it is not false, the opinion that heresy is a punishable crime is surely uncertain. You say it is agreed that heresy is a punishable crime. Do you think, though, that we can dispute properly if we do not know what kind of thing heresy is, or if we do not agree in our conception of a heretic? OrthodoxCertainly not. For heresy is not a thing that can be grasped with the senses, but must be conceived and understood in thought. ChristianIf you think heresy is a punishable crime then say what kind of thing heresy is. For I have doubts about this and am sure that I do not rightly understand what a heretic and heresy might be, and that you and those like you, who regard heresy as a punishable crime, know just as little as I do. OrthodoxYou are confusing things which are clearly difficult with those that are impossible. For although Augustine had already said in his day that it is a difficult thing to define a heretic, yet it is not impossible even if it is difficult, but, according to the proverb, beautiful once the difficulty is overcome. ChristianAll right then, so offer a definition. Is someone a heretic who it is decided deviates even in the slightest thing from the judgment and path of the universal (or Catholic) religion? OrthodoxNo. For Wissenbacha has already observed that this definition is uncertain and false.15 Following the opinion of Augustine, not all errors are heresy, in that for an error to be heresy it must be accompanied above all by obstinacy.b ChristianBut this definition is from the laws of Justinian,c and you can see even from this example that one may depart from Justinian Law in this matter. Ultimately, things can be as they may for Augustine, for, regardless of what he might have said, this definition would be obscure and uncertain, as the nature of the universal religion or universal way is likewise obscure and uncertain. And you know full well that the papalists always like to insult us with this definition,d in that they claim for themselves the pseudotitle of Catholic on the basis of long-lasting possession. What do you think then of the definition given in canon law, where someone is a hereticawho introduces or accepts false and novel opinions, for the sake of temporal benefit, principally from ambition and the desire for glory? OrthodoxThis is even more vague and false, because philosophical, medical, or juristic errors do not make a heretic, only errors in faith; although, perhaps this can be understood from the cited canon. ChristianI will not press you on this at the moment, otherwise I could easily show that ultimately all heresy arises from nothing other than the pretext of an error in philosophy.16 OrthodoxI could in fact grant you this with regard to the papalists, for they make scholastic philosophy into the foundation of their theology. But we can let this go for the moment. ChristianYet this is even true according to the views of the Protestants. But enough of this. I now ask: Is heresy thus an error in faith? OrthodoxOne must add a little more to that: Heresy is an obstinate error in the foundations of faith by a person who is or was a member of the church.17 For in this, papalist, Lutheran, and Reformed teachers, theologians as well as jurists, for the most part agree with each other.a Here, everything is quite clear. For when I say that heresy is an intellectual error, then I have distinguished it from punishable crimes which arise from the will, such as murder, adultery, and so on. Through the word obstinacy, flagrant heretics are distinguished from the weaker and more innocent ones, who are not so bad, and who are not so much the seducers as the seduced. Through the words error in faith, a heretic will be distinguished from those who err in philosophy and other sciences. Through the words error in the foundations of faith one can distinguish a heretic from those who err in articles which do not belong to the foundations of faith, who should be regarded as schismatics rather than heretics. Finally, through the fact that a heretic is a member of the church, heresy is distinguished from paganism, the Mohammedan faith, and Judaism. Now that all the words in the definition of heresy have been distinguished from those related to them, I do not see how you could object to anything in this definition. IVChristianWe will soon see. For if one wants to present a thing clearly, it is not enough to dress it up in so many words just as obscure, or even more obscure, than the thing one wants to explain. Rather, it is necessary that one has in mind clear and certain notions of each and every word in the definition. It seems to me, though, that for all of the words you have presented, just as many obscure or dubious or false things lie beneath them. I do not want to insist on anything concerning the word church, since this term, if any, is subject to a multifarious obscurity, and you will perhaps argue to Judgment Day about the signs of the true church. Not to mention that here your orthodoxy departs from the rule of Holy Scripture in several regards. This is partly because, instead of interpreting the word church as a society of the faithful, orthodoxy—together with anti-Christian doctors and the papalizing laws of Justiniana —applies this term to bricks and mortar or church buildings. But it is also because orthodoxy joins the papalists in seeking the unity of the true church—invisible and scattered across the whole world—in a visible assembly.18 Finally, it is because orthodoxy has imported into your theological systems the following doctrine taken from the papalists: the whole assembly of the true church is visible, the individual persons of the faithful, however, are invisible—which is self-contradictory and conflicts with the doctrine of the relation of the universal and the particular. But enough about this, because at least the word church in this definition provides me with some sense of the difference between a heretic and a Jew etc. Now tell me what you mean, though, by the foundations of faith? Because by using this phrase you say that a heretic will be distinguished from a schismatic; although here again doubts arise as to whether this is a correct distinction, in that some scholars interpret the phrase in one way, others quite differently.b OrthodoxThe clarification of this matter belongs to the theologians, who dispute much over the fundamental articles of faith. ChristianYou are certainly right that they dispute over this; in fact they will dispute about it forever. And that is just as I have said: you would not know what heresy is because you do not know what the foundations of faith are, about which there is no end of different opinions among the orthodox. For when one of them deems an article of faith to be a basic article, then others will not agree with him about this. No fixed number of articles of faith has been settled, and in their systems the doctors themselves lay down sometimes this, sometimes that, now more, now fewer. Neither would it help were one to say that the articles belonging to the foundations of faith are all those included in the creeds, in that our [Lutheran] theologians deem that several of the basic articles are given expressly in the Augsburg Confession,19 while others are there only implicitly.a This depends on time and place. Further, often the basic articles alter between different persons. For a long time Flacius was held to be a heretic; that is, as someone erring in a basic article.20 He was publicly denounced as a Manichaean; that is, as the worst heresiarch. Today, after his death, when his disciples have quite died out, and after the hate and self-interest of his opponents have changed a little, most speak of him more mildly, and count him only among the schismatics; that is, they declare that his doctrine of original sin does not overturn the foundations of faith. In defending Christ’s thousand-year empire, the ancient teachers of the church were certainly not deemed heretics. In fact they were counted among the holy martyrs, as they still are today, which is a sign that this opinion of the fathers is not held to be erroneous, let alone contrary to the foundations of faith; for it would be senseless and mutually contradictory for someone to be a heretic and yet also a martyr. Those who teach Chiliasm21 today though—and in fact to the shame of their adversaries—will be proclaimed heretics by many of our people. We deem the papalists and they deem us to be heretics. And yet many people hold such papalists as Tauler, Thomas à Kempis, Saint Theresa, and others to be holy, and not in fact without reason (although doubtless, if not in all their statements then certainly in many, they held the errors of papalist teaching to be true, contrary to the Augsburg Confession).22 How can it make sense, though, for someone to be holy and yet a heretic? There are many among our Lutherans who have held that the conflict between us and the papalists and Reformed is such that an accommodation could easily be reached between the parties—or at least that they could tolerate each other—because this division does not upset the foundations of faith. Yet others are so vehemently opposed to them that they have branded them with the hateful name of syncretists, and have produced many harsh texts against them, as heretics who have committed dreadful errors against the foundations of faith.23 But these last [the syncretists] are now once more acknowledged as brothers in Christ, and no longer as heretics, even though they have not changed their earlier opinion regarding the reconciliation of faiths one iota, but simply because they have united with their former opponents in a new act of damnation against a third party. Further, regardless of the difference between fundamental and nonfundamental articles, anyone who is not wholly subject to the prejudice of authority can easily see nonetheless that there is a great difference between our conflicts with the papalists, and the conflicts we have with the Reformed. Yet it is known that a great many of our [Lutherans] who wish to appear supremely orthodox have a different view, and currently argue the case that it is better to be papalist than Calvinist in entire books. From this vague and uncertain standpoint regarding the fundamental articles of faith there has arisen an absurd state of affairs, whereby several controversies have arisen among the theologians, such that tradesmen or laypersons possessing a little wit could easily understand that the conflict does not concern the Christian faith, much less matters pertaining to the foundations of faith. Regardless of this, one of the warring parties, keener than the others to persecute other people under the guise of godly zeal, makes use of innocent talk or talk pertaining only to philosophical matters in order to fabricate heresy, by appealing to the consequences of consequences. This [fabricated heresy] is repugnant to the articles of faith agreed on as fundamental by the majority, even though the other party vainly protests that an injustice has been done to them and that such consequences do not follow. So much has this wicked habit gained the upper hand, that it could scarcely have been controlled through severe edicts from the prince. OrthodoxThe things you have spoken of are so evident that they arouse some doubt in me, since I have not thought about them until now. Yet, in order not be hasty, I will consider these things somewhat more exactly on another occasion. The theologians with whom I will consult will know how to answer your scruples. ChristianThere will never be a shortage of answers. But if you should hear an answer that is to the point, impartial, and free of passion and bitterness, then all to the good, and do let me know of it. For until now the circumstances of the thing have not allowed me to think other than that the passions of the clergy have caused if not all, then the majority of heresies. And that the most courteous of the clergy called their adversaries schismatics, a name less hated today. The rest, however, being oafishly proud and having little intercourse with civilized people, decry it as a heresy if someone disagrees with them, their teachers, or their good friends in the slightest thing. OrthodoxDo you hold then that there is simply no foundation of faith, but that everything touching faith is uncertain? ChristianFar be it that you should think this of me. The doctors may well lack certainty, but that does not mean we do. There is indeed a foundation of faith, there are fundamental articles that will be easily found if we do not bind ourselves to the prejudice of authority, but look for this in the teacher of all teachers, the Holy Scriptures. OrthodoxI would very much like to hear your opinion about this. ChristianThat would not be well suited to our plan. For I have begun a discourse with you so that I could learn something from you. But if you want to hear about my creed, then I say: The foundation of faith is love of God and one’s neighbor, and disdain of oneself.24 Now all errors that contradict this attack the foundation of my faith, but the other errors—especially those regarding the mysteries of the divine being—do not concern the foundation of my faith and that of other Christian and Protestant people. If on the basis of my view one were to say what a heretic is, then I fear that many of the most orthodox—by which I mean all those who tie saving faith to formulas and creeds—would have to be inscribed in the list of heretics. OrthodoxAnd I fear that your opinion would not find much applause among our Lutherans, since what you regard as the foundation and origin of faith, they count as the fruits of faith, or would otherwise oppose something similar to it. ChristianThey can say what they like. I am always ready to offer a justification for my faith. For the moment I will only ask you, where does the chicken come from? OrthodoxWhat have we to do with the chicken? This question does not touch our issue. Doubtless the chicken comes from the egg. ChristianYou say this, strangely and implausibly: the egg is really a fruit of the chicken. OrthodoxNow I see where you are going with this, but listen to me: It does not work if one attempts to prove something by deriving it from a quite different thing. ChristianYet I prove nothing from that, except for showing that your proof and faulty distinction are false. But let that be sufficient, for, as I said, my plan is not to dispute about the foundations of faith with you. I am much more concerned to proceed with my objections against your definition of heresy. OrthodoxIt seems to me that what you have already put forward is not to be made light of. Have you then still more to object against this? VChristianIn fact I still have much to say against it. You have said heresy is an error in the foundations of faith. Now tell me, what is faith ? For I do not know this either. OrthodoxIt grieves me that you do not understand the principles and rudiments of Christianity or the Catechism. Did you not learn the definition of faith in school, from Hutter’s Compendium?25 ChristianNaturally I learned it, if by this you mean learning by rote something that I do not comprehend, and believing to be true something I do not understand because great and famous people deem it to be true. I can say by heart what our people teach in their creeds regarding the things required for faith, occasionally in opposition to the papalist definition of faith. I can easily understand that the papalist conception of faith is an error. Yet I still do not understand clearly and sufficiently the conception of faith taught by our Lutherans, because it seems to me that this conception is not always coherent, and our Lutherans are not constant and unanimous in this conception. As someone who takes his salvation seriously (as any Christian properly should), it annoys me when reading our Lutheran texts to find that Hutter’s Compendium—which is supposed to set out the basics for tender minds—contradicts itself in innumerable places. In other words, Hutter’s own German translation—which he claims to have prepared with great diligence and at princely command—often completely alters the meaning of the Latin compendium. Not only this, but in the confessional books [Libris symbolicis] the Latin text agrees poorly with the German text. For example, in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession26 when justifying faith is spoken of in the chapter on justification, following the Latin text the words run thus:aThe faith that makes one righteous is not a mere historical knowledge, but is an acceptance of the divine promise, in which forgiveness of sins and justification are offered gratuitously, for Christ’s sake.27 The German version though runs somewhat more fully, as follows: The faith that makes one pious and righteous before God is not only that I know the history of how Christ was born, suffered, and so on, but is the certainty, or the certain strong trust in the heart, where I hold God’s promise for certain and true with my whole heart, through which is offered to me, by means of Christ and without any merit on my part, forgiveness of sin, grace, and all holiness.a OrthodoxBut it seems to me that as far as the meaning is concerned there is no difference here, or it is a slight difference indeed. ChristianBut there is a great difference between them. The expressions “to have faith in someone” and “to believe someone” have two wholly different meanings. On the one hand, faith and belief are taken to be an intellectual act, which assumes an inward certainty or acceptance of our thoughts in the brain. This is the kind of faith parties in a lawsuit are looking for from the judge, as we see in the whole title of the Pandects, on the faithfulness (or certitude) of the instruments [de fide instrumentorum].28 On the other hand, the word faith signifies a trust in the will, which is an affect of the heart arising only from love; for it is impossible for me to trust a man or his promise unless I love him. Intellectual faith differs little from historical faith, and is in no way a saving faith because even devils could have it. It is necessary, therefore, that saving faith be a trust or confidence of the will, and not a mere intellectual assent. Now one can see that the German text of the [Apology of] the Augsburg Confession speaks of the trust of the will in the heart, for there we find these words: the strong trust in the heart, where I with my whole heart, and so on. The Latin text, though, speaks of the intellect, of assenting to God’s promise. Not a word is said regarding the heart. OrthodoxFor this reason, following the rule of a generous interpretation, one must emend the Latin text from the German exemplar, understanding the meaning of assent as if it signifies a trust, even though this meaning reads somewhat harshly and strange. For it is well known that if something absurd follows from the exact understanding of a word, then one must understand it in an inexact or foreign sense. ChristianI would gladly agree with you, if only Hutter’s Compendium allowed this explanation; if only the Apology did not make it dubious; if only the common erroneous principles of pagan philosophy, still generally accepted by our orthodoxy, were not opposed to this explanation; if, finally, the whole religious system of our orthodoxy were not so strongly opposed to it. OrthodoxDescribe this a little more clearly. ChristianAt locus 12, question 15 of the Compendium, in the Latin text (for again the German translation does not agree here), Hutter explains the trust of faith in terms of the conviction in conscience [conscientia,Gewissen] of a thing’s certainty. According to the common doctrine of our universities, however, conscience pertains to the intellect and not to the will. Yet, trust of the will is either a kind of love or, as mentioned, arises from love and does not precede it. In the Apology, however, faith is set apart from love, and it is said that love follows from faith.a But this can be true only of intellectual faith, when one accepts the common doctrine according to which the intellect is supposed to rectify the will. This pestilential error—that the intellect can rectify the will—common to all of the pagan philosophers, arises from the fact they sought the essence of God in speculative thought, rather than in love. As a result, they also looked for the essence of man in his mind rather than his heart. Thus they said that their philosophy, which taught that men became like God, consisted in the doctrine of the purification of the intellect, in the discovery of truths, and in the mind’s ideal contemplation of the essences of things. Further, they awarded the office of councillor to the intellect, and the office of king to the will, fabricating other similarly absurd fables which, so far as I know, rule everywhere and in all three religions of the Holy Roman Empire, and from which arose, amongst other things, the false precept that intellectual faith awakes love in the heart. Yet anyone who carefully considers the nature of man sees without doubt that all corruption and all improvement of the intellect arise from the will and its affects, so that the concept of truth in the intellect of itself never produces anything good in the will. I have often had to wonder how we could be so stupid. The verse from the poets is preached in front of us everyday: Video meliora proboque, that is, I see the good and approve it (in the intellect); deteriora sequor, that is, yet I follow the bad (in the will).29 Nevertheless, they want to persuade us that thinking and intellectual assent to the truth rectify the will. Further, we can see that for our [Lutheran] orthodoxy, saving faith ultimately resolves into intellectual faith, when we consider, amongst other things, the following: Theologians hardly ever quarrel with each other regarding the things one should do, or the things of the will, but over concepts in the intellect, which they call things one must believe, as opposed to things that one should do. And the Greek words orthodoxia and heterodoxia—which one calls Rechtgläubigkeit [orthodoxy] and Falschgläubigkeit [heterodoxy] in German, even if this does not properly express the Greek words—are derived from the word for opinion. An opinion, though, is not a thing of the will, but of the intellect. And yet they present these opinions, this intellectual faith, and this creed as if they were damning or saving. According to the Athanasian Creed: any man who wants to be saved must above all things hold to [teneat] the universal faith, and whoever does not preserve [servaverit] this faith entire and inviolate must without doubt be eternally lost. Even here it looks as if the words tenere and servare (to hold) were words pertaining to the will. Under these words, though, the whole Creed teaches nothing about matters of the will, but only about mysteries pertaining to the intellect, which are not in the heart but in the mind. And then, in the sentence Who wants to become blessed must therefore believe in the Trinity etc., the Creed explains the words tenere and servare (to hold) through the words to know [sentire,wissen], to believe [credere,glauben], and acknowledge [confiteri,bekennen]. Further, our [Lutherans] often use saving faith and saving doctrine synonymously. But doctrine is a thing of the intellect and doctrine cannot save. Judas did not change doctrine, remaining orthodox, and was damned nonetheless. So we have a saving work that damns, making it something of a wooden poker. Additionally, in accordance with the usual expressions and practice, repentance and conversion, which are both works of the will, have become intellectual objects for our orthodoxy. In fact, they are often not even intellectual objects but mere sounds without meaning. When someone from the papalist, Judaic, or Turkish religion comes across to us, he is called a convert. Yet he changes his life not in the least, altering only the formulas and creed on his lips. Often such people do not even understand the grammatical meaning of the words they learn by heart (and here I speak from personal experience). Yet some are not ashamed to thank God from the public pulpit that they have converted an infidel or heretic to the saving faith. I could introduce much more of this if I did not have to move on. I take it, though, that I have already said enough to show that those who claim that heresy is a punishable crime do not know what faith is, which yet remains a part of their definition of heresy. Nor is it possible to derive a genuine concept of faith, consistent with the Holy Scriptures, from their writings, or from common doctrine and practice. OrthodoxThe more I reflect on the things you have spoken of, the more confused I become, and I will not rest until my doubts have been resolved by a learned theologian. VIChristianThat is your choice. Now we want to discuss the word obstinacy, which you have likewise included in your definition of heresy. This obstinacy is otherwise called a malice impervious to all admonition.a But here again it is very difficult to comprehend exactly what is to be understood by obstinacy. In fact, it is well known that our Lutherans distinguish between formal and material heretics, or, between the seducers and the seduced, describing the former but not the latter as obstinate people, and regarding them as heretics properly so called.b It is well known that papalist law first paved the way for this distinction.c But it is also well known that some among the papalists were not happy with this distinction, wishing to declare all heretics to be obstinate people—the seduced as well as the seducers.d Our theologians themselves admit that it is difficult to judge the obstinacy of heretics, and that one can not always tell with certainty whether a heretic defends an error from willful obstinacy or from human weakness, as a result of persuasion by others or from ancient custom.e It is easy to see, however, that whether someone is seducer or seduced has little to do with obstinacy. For an erring and seducing teacher need not be obstinate, just as a seduced learner can be obstinate enough. Moreover, obstinacy need not always contain malice. Setting aside that here we are not talking about an obstinacy of the will, or a deliberate opposition to things one should do, but about an obstinacy in matters of the intellect, so this obstinacy regarding intellectual matters can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, it signifies a shortcoming of the intellect if someone can put forward nothing against the truth, yet will not change his opinion, refusing intellectual assent to the truth because of the prejudice of authority. On the other hand, obstinacy signifies a maliciousness of the will if someone is convinced of the truth of a thing in his intellect, yet refuses to acknowledge this recognized truth, instead teaching falsely and contrary to his conscience. We are not concerned here with the first meaning—as just illuminated through that which we have introduced from our theologians—which thus cannot be properly called obstinacy. As for the second meaning, such obstinacy is rarely to be found, for in human nature it is quite impossible that someone should speak about matters of the intellect other than he intends, unless he acts from fear of torment. It is well known that among a thousand heretics, most of them—even doctors—err in good faith. It is thus a slander when the papalists say that our theologians teach contrary to their conscience. Likewise, we must ascribe it to lack of contact with our adversaries, or to lack of travel, when our people want to persuade us, as perhaps they have persuaded themselves, that the papalists, together with the Reformed theologians or teachers of other sects, are ordinarily obstinate and convinced in their conscience of the falseness of their doctrines. Further, the judicial way of convincing heretics, which presupposes their obstinacy, is typically very uncertain, if not to be wholly repudiated. To convince does not mean to arouse fear in a man through a legal action, or to force him to acknowledge the truth of something through judicial authority. Rather, it means to show him his error in a friendly way, with proper proofs, or through a spiritual power and virtue, mediated by a discourse or clear questions. This is how Christ and his apostles refuted their adversaries. But the Anti-Christ30 raged against dissenters with imprisonment, murder, and banishment; with judicial authority; with majority votes; and with confiscation of their books. And this is called convincing or enlightening the erring! Heretics are exiled, or banned from the halls of disputation, or, if they are allowed in, are prevented from opposing and disputing. Thus one disputes against the absent, or against those who may not speak. And this is called convincing! One might wish that this papalist way of convincing did not also reign among the Protestants. I would gladly keep quiet about this if the very stones did not cry out, and if common public practice did not testify to this. VIIOrthodoxI would not have thought that the definition of heresy could be subject to so many doubts. Yet now we will be finished with it. ChristianNo, there is still something to consider regarding the word error. I know full well what an error is, but I do not know what an error regarding the divine mysteries might be. An error is a deviation from the truth. Truth is an agreement of the understanding with a thing. God is an infinite being. That which is infinite cannot be comprehended by a finite intellect (neither wholly nor in part, or if comprehended in part gives rise not to knowledge but only to an opinion or mere negative concepts). One cannot conceive of an infinite being other than through analogies drawn from finite things; indeed, not even through such analogies properly speaking, in that these possess nothing that is similar to it. A conception through analogy is not a conception properly speaking. And a conception in an improper sense is not a true conception. On account of this, one cannot say precisely what an infinite being is; nor, therefore, can one show that a particular positive concept of an infinite being is erroneous. Now, most disputes with heretics are over the question: What is the infinite being? I say again: there is no judge who could decide the error here, because a man cannot be a judge in this matter, as our Lutherans prove long-windedly against the papalists. I know full well that our [theologians] call on Scripture, but I wish that they could clarify this doctrine such that we laypeople could understand it. The book of Holy Scripture is caught in the middle. There are conflicts, for example, between the doctors of our sect and the Calvinists, likewise the Socinians, Quakers, Anabaptists, and so on. Each party calls on Scripture, using it to prove their opinion about this. One party explains Scripture in this way, another in that. Both parties claim that their interpretation is the meaning of the Holy Ghost. Now, who is the judge in this matter? OrthodoxOther texts—that is, parallel loci—explicate Scripture with Scripture, and show that the adversary’s explication contradicts the true meaning provided by the analogies of faith [analogiae fidei].31 ChristianBut the adversary says the same thing about us; and just like us they have parallel Scriptural texts and the so-called analogy of faith. Now, who is judge? OrthodoxBut their explication is not right, while ours is. ChristianSo I am told that the explication of the Scripture should be the judge. But the explication is human. And so you see how much papalizing occurs among the Protestants. The Bible is only a pretext, while the commentary or gloss is turned into the norm or judge of Scripture itself. Calling on the analogies of faith is typically a cloak for ignorance. It contradicts the duty of a good disputant to deny the conclusion [to a sound argument]. Invoking the analogies of faith, however, often amounts to denial of the conclusion, even if this is hidden under another name. The adversary presents a proof, compelling a response. The respondent concedes the major premise and the minor premise is correct. Then the respondent claims that the adversary’s conclusion is contrary to the analogies of faith; that is, even if his conclusion were true, it cannot be reconciled with principles to which the respondent already adheres. For this reason, he begins to preach about his principles and the analogies of faith, and the respondent becomes an opponent. I will leave it for others to judge whether this agrees with the rules of good disputation and of proper inquiry into the truth. OrthodoxI had not imagined that you would say such things to me, which, even if they do not persuade me, at least influence me and give rise to doubt. I am concerned, though, that those who defend the common doctrine will denounce you as a wicked heretic. ChristianBy the grace of God I am already hardened to such honorifics and, on the other hand, wish these people well. Yet to please you I will read something from Salvian, who was a pious religious teacher and lover of heretics, but no heretic-monger.32 He writes thus: With the barbarian peoples, the statutes of their magistrates and their ancient doctrines were regarded as law; they are people who know what is being taught to them. They are heretics, but they do not know it. In fact, they are heretics for us, but not for themselves. For they consider themselves so orthodox that they apply the name heretic to us. What we now regard them as, they regard us as. We are certain that they dishonor the Son of God because they say that the Son is not as great as God the Father. They, however, think that we dishonor God the Father, because we believe the Father and Son are equal to each other. The truth is with us, but they imagine it is with them. The honor of God is with us, but they think that God’s honor is what they believe. They are undutiful, but for them this is the highest religious duty. They are impious, but hold just this to be the true piety. They err on this account, but they err in good faith, not from hate but from love of God, in that they believe that they honor and love God. Although they do not have proper faith, yet they hold this to be the perfect love of God. What they will suffer on Judgment Day on account of the errors of their false doctrines, no one can know except the judge. In the meantime, I think God will be patient with them, because he sees that although they do not believe correctly, they err with pious intentions; especially because he is aware that they do what they do not know, whereas we do not do what we believe. And thus they sin through the fault of their magistrates, while our people sin through their own fault; they unwittingly, we knowingly; they do what they take to be right, we, on the other hand, do that which we know to be wrong. And for this reason, from his just judgment God bears them his divine patience, but chastises us with punishments. For ignorance can be forgiven to some degree, while contempt has no hope of grace.a OrthodoxIt seems to me that Salvian’s words beautifully explain the things you have briefly advanced regarding obstinacy and the judgment of error. After this, though, hopefully your criticism of the definition of heresy is concluded, so that we can turn to other things you have mentioned above: namely, that our Lutherans papalize when they deem heresy to be a punishable crime. VIIIChristianIf there were no other way, then I could still use the proof that it appears to be a cruel tyranny to treat as the wickedest criminals people whose crime cannot be proved, in fact because you have no clear and certain conception of this crime. And certainly, if the truth be told, I do not know what the patrons of the common doctrine could properly bring against this proof. I will not dwell on this, however, but will show from other nearer reasons that heresy is not a punishable crime. OrthodoxI cannot wait to hear, mainly because you yourself said that you would use no other foundations than Scripture and reason. But do you not know that Holy Scripture itself regards heresy as a work of the flesh, including it with such other gross vices as adultery, whoring, idolatry, sorcery, murder, drunkenness, and the like?b ChristianIt is good that you have reminded me. For I would have forgotten the most needful remarks against the definition of heresy, without which we could expect little that is solid or clear from the discussion of this question. Those who defend the common doctrine are in the habit of continually calling on texts from the Bible, as is the wont of all those who err. Even if, as we shall soon see, the texts of Scripture are of absolutely no use to dissenters, and even assuming that the word heresy in the Holy Scriptures has the same sense as today, and which you have given in your definition. Nonetheless, it will do much to clarify discussion of the present controversial question if we exactly investigate whether the word heresy is used with the same sense in the Scriptures as it is usually given in orthodoxy. OrthodoxBut who would have any doubt about this? For, so far as I remember, all writers on the doctrine of heresy draw their arguments from Holy Scripture. ChristianI doubt that very much, and neither am I perturbed by your proof from common usage. For I have found that common usage has twisted the most important words of Holy Scripture to the profane usage of pagan philosophy. I will give just one example. You know that in the common usage, wisdom,understanding,knowledge, and the like occur among the intellectual virtues. And certainly someone would be laughed at—as if he did not understand the rudiments of philosophy—if he looked for these virtues in the will, or suggested that they were tightly bound to moral virtues. Meanwhile, I will be able to show you clearly on another occasion that Holy Scripture distinguishes its wisdom, its understanding, and its knowledge from the knowledge of this world—which it regards as false knowledge [gnosis pseudonymos]a —in this way: Scripture thinks of the virtues as arising from the heart, and as flowing from love and leading to love; gnosis, though, which is in the intellect and arises from its activity, puffs man up, so that he is led to a knowledge which is a false knowledge and thus should not be called knowledge at all.b OrthodoxWe can speak about that another time. In order to return to our path, do you want to say that the word heresy in the Holy Scriptures is occasionally understood in a positive sense? ChristianI would not be so foolish, for it is commonly said and no one can deny that the word heresy is often included among the vices in the Scriptures. Hence, although there are things which could be added concerning this indifferent meaning, I will dwell on it no longer. OrthodoxOn what basis do you think, then, that the meaning introduced in the churches deviates from that of Scripture? ChristianI will tell you; but you answer me yourself: Today, following the common usage, is there not a difference between heresy and schism? OrthodoxOf course, and in fact we have already spoken of this difference. ChristianBut in Scripture the words schism and heresy were used with the same meaning. For when Paul the apostle admonished the Corinthians that there were disagreements in their holy assemblies, he named these disagreements from the Greek sometimes schismata, sometimes haereses.a And Luther himself used such words in German as mostly agree with the Greek, in that he rendered the word schismata as Spaltungen [divisions], haereses though as Rotten [factions]. For those who create schisms normally seek adherents who hold with them or with the others. Further, where the apostle Judeb according to your interpretation speaks of heresy—although he does not use this word and calls heretics by another synonymous term tous apodiorizontas33 —Luther has nicely conveyed the meaning with the same clear words: those who form factions. Erasmus has rendered it, those who segregate themselves (qui segregant).34 In the Scriptures, therefore, the words schismatics, heretics, and those who segregate themselves are used synonymously. OrthodoxBut even if I accept this, I still cannot see how the Scriptures differ from the meaning of heresy used by the churches because, according to the common meaning, heretics create schisms, stir up unrest, and separate themselves from others. I don’t see how your remarks are supposed to help upset my opinion that even in accordance with Scriptural tradition heresy is counted as a punishable crime. ChristianBe patient a little. We must first clarify the synonyms of heresy, so that we can the more clearly show that Scripture does not speak of heresy such as you define it. For the heresy that you speak of as a punishable crime is an error in the intellect. But when Scripture speaks of heresy, it never speaks of an error in the intellect, but always of a vice of the will. And the text of the apostle [Paul] that you introduced earlier, I can thus use against you. All works of the flesh about which Paul warns the Galatians are vices of the will, some punishable crimes, others frailties damaging to the reputation among good men. Now, in the middle of these he also places heresies. It would be quite absurd, though, if someone wanted to place an intellectual error in the middle of punishable crimes, even if one wanted to claim that errors concern works of the flesh, which is very difficult to sustain. Further, when in the above-cited passage Paul admonishes the Corinthians that there were schisms among them and heresies in their holy assemblies, the whole text shows that he is not speaking about controversies over the articles of faith—as we would say today—but that the schisms and heresies arise from bad morals, which led to segregation in the practice of the Eucharist. Jude, though, explains particularly clearly who are the apodiorizontas, those who segregate themselves, namely: poreuómenoi tàs heauton epithymías ton asebeion,a or, in Luther’s German, those who turn to godless ways following their own lusts. Given that, to the best of my recollection, apart from the cited texts the word heresy (or haeresis) does not appear in the New Testament, it is clear that Scripture does not use the word heresy for intellectual error. With regard to your definition of heresy, this means that the heresy of which Scripture speaks, and heresy as the church understands it, are, to speak precisely, wholly and completely different from each other. OrthodoxNo doubt what you have said has its point. Yet perhaps one could object against it that one is asking not how the term heresy is used (in the abstract), but how the word heretic is used (concretely); for it is quite usual that words deriving from other words often change the meaning of these words that they derive from. ChristianI will let this go, even if the text from the Epistle of Jude speaks of a heretic in the concrete. OrthodoxBut not with such express words as Paul when he admonishes Titus to avoid heretical men,a a text which our people have been wont to use many times in the doctrine of the punishable crime of heresy. ChristianFine. But this text too is apparently on my side. For Paul himself describes a heretical man as someone who is wicked and sins, kai hamartánei. Yet a sin, hamarteía, is not an intellectual error but an act of the will. OrthodoxBut one must also take note here of what precedes this in the text. Now, prior to this he was speaking of legal questions and of the trouble and strife over genealogy. This shows that Paul speaks of someone who errs in intellectual controversies over religion. ChristianWhat is this supposed to prove? First, it is doubtful whether the admonition to avoid a heretical man continues the preceding admonition that one should renounce foolish questions, or whether it begins a new point. Second, regarding the things that you call religious controversies, how can the apostle refer to these as foolish, useless, and vain questions? Which yet he does. Why does he not immediately characterize the [heretical] man as one who errs, rather than as fractious and a disturber of the peace? Which yet he does. I fear, therefore, that if the apostle speaks of heretics in the preceding verses, your orthodoxy profits little by it. OrthodoxWhy, truly? ChristianBecause then someone who errs in debates and controversies, while remaining peaceable, would not be a heretic. Yet someone would be a heretic who starts controversies, who cavils, rails, and quarrels over them, who damns dissenters, and who pretends that certain questions—mostly useless and vain but often also foolish and impious—are controversial questions pertaining to saving faith. OrthodoxI see clearly where you are going with this. But in this way the names would be dreadfully confused. For those we call orthodox would be heretics, and a heretic-monger would himself be a heretic. ChristianWhat is that to me? There could be no greater confusion than that which I have spoken of above, where you have converted the faith of the heart into a thing of the intellect. Common orthodoxy not the Holy Scripture is the cause of this confusion. Not to mention that someone can well be a heretic and a heretic-monger at the same time. For just as love and toleration of dissenters is an unmistakable characteristic of a true Christian, so in my theology the heretic is a heretic-monger and a man full of hatred for dissenters; just as in my system, it is not the heresy of which you speak, but heretic-mongering that is a crime worthy of punishment. It is wholly agreeable to this position that the heretics whom the apostle Jude calls tous apodiorízontas should be referred to by Luther as those who form factions; which is the same as if he had said, who make heretics. But more about this another time perhaps. Now, without further digression, I will proceed to show that heresy is not a punishable crime. IXOrthodoxI have already waited a long time. So present the argument for your view, because I cannot guess it. ChristianNo guesses are required. Rather, one must be amazed at our blindness that through prejudice of authority we have allowed ourselves to be persuaded of things which are contrary to the basic principles of jurisprudence and moral philosophy. I will say it in a few words: Heresy is not a punishable crime because it is an error. You laugh at me. You will soon stop smiling though. Answer me if you will: What is a punishable crime? OrthodoxIt is a shameful deed against the criminal laws. ChristianThen can something be a punishable crime if no evil intent accompanies it? OrthodoxNormally evil intent is required, yet sometimes blame itself is enough; that is, if the deed is manifest. For we have negligent homicide [homicidium culposum]. ChristianPerhaps we can leave this exception, in that all culpable offenses [delicto culposo] appear to be accompanied by a dolus (or maliciousness), or at least to be preceded by it. But I will also let this pass. So, an evil intent or at least blame will nonetheless be required. OrthodoxOf course. ChristianYou have laughed at my proof, so now answer me these questions. Given that error is a shortcoming of the intellect, and heresy is an intellectual error, so I ask: Is then a shameful deed (i.e., crime) the predicate of a deliberate act? Is it thus possible to give a law to the intellect? Is evil intent a quality of the intellect or of the will? Are not error and evil intent forever opposed to each other? Is guilt not from negligence? Is negligence not a shortcoming in the will? Now you see, for each question asked you must provide me with an answer, and each answer will show that heresy is not a punishable crime. OrthodoxYou overwhelm me with questions, and I have heard that it is dangerous to dispute by posing questions. But because it pleases you thus, first answer me this. Did you not say earlier, against the common viewpoint, that it is the will which either corrupts or improves the intellect? ChristianIt is dangerous (as you say) to argue by posing questions, but only to the erring and the sophists. The lover of truth answers gladly, so I will honestly answer your question. I have said, and continue to say this, mainly because, apart from other texts of the Bible, my opinion is wonderfully confirmed by Paul’s saying in which he warns the Corinthians that the intellect of the pagans is darkened through the blindness of their hearts.a But what follows from this? OrthodoxWe will soon see. First answer me this. Does not the error of heresy also arise from the corruption of the will? Why are you reflecting so long on your answer? Now I have captured you. ChristianI do not hesitate inwardly—as if I doubted my opinion and the proof of its truth—but because your question contains the fallacy of [combining] several different questions. OrthodoxHow so? It is a simple question that speaks of a single thing and says this unambiguously. You reproach me with this in vain. I say again that you should answer. ChristianWe will soon see that I am not blaming you in vain. And what if I answered the question in the affirmative? What would follow from that? OrthodoxAnswer me categorically, yes or no, and we will see soon enough. ChristianBut I cannot answer categorically so long as your question hides a fallacy of several different questions. In the meantime, you can take my response as if I had answered categorically. But what if anything follows from this? OrthodoxI will soon show you what this anything is. For I have caught you so that you cannot give me the slip. If all errors, and thus also the error of heresy arise from corruption of the will, yet punishable crimes are works of the corrupted will, then heresy will also be such a work and, consequently, a punishable crime. And this is what was to be shown. ChristianYou have trapped me so well that there are several ways out of your snare. For you have made as many false moves as there are words you have uttered. OrthodoxHow can that be possible when everything I have said is clearly demonstrated? ChristianYou will soon see. First, when I said that your question contained a fallacy drawn from several questions, this is what I meant: You asked whether the error of heresy arises from the corrupted will. Then, just as in the well-known example, a false conclusion follows from several questions when it is asked: Has Titius returned the horns? Has he stopped stealing? Here it will be understood that Titius has had the horns and that he must have stolen them, even if these questions contain only one subject and one predicate. So too in your question certain things are implied, namely: that heresy is an error, or that it is certain that heresy is an error. Now, I have shown above not only that heresy proper, as spoken of in Scripture, is not an error, but also that with regard to heresy as it is described by the clergy, one cannot know with clarity and certainty whether it includes an error or not. For there is nowhere to be found a judge who could show the error in it, manifestly and to the full satisfaction of the adversaries. Further, it is well known that this deceptive way of arguing that you use is very common. It happens when, through questions or otherwise, something is elicited from the adversary, such that through consequences or the consequence of consequences that are usually sophistical, the adversary is imputed something which he has never thought, and the battle is won without being fought. Christ and the apostles did not do this when refuting their adversaries, for they persevered with questions until the adversaries fell silent. Why did you not continue with your questions? For you would have seen that this conclusion would never have followed from my answer. OrthodoxWhy not? I will attempt it. You have declared that the error of heresy arises from the corrupted will. Do you deny then that a punishable crime is a work of the corrupted will? ChristianWho would deny that? OrthodoxNow, then, is heresy not also a work of the corrupted will? ChristianIt is and is not. OrthodoxWhat does that mean? ChristianWhen you push someone and he falls, fracturing a limb, is this fracture your work or that of the one who has fallen? OrthodoxIt is my work indirectly and, in an immediate way, it is also the work of the one who falls. It is primarily my work and secondarily a work of the fallen one. It is morally my work and physically that of the one who has fallen. ChristianSimilarly, as something whose primary and moral cause is the will, common heresy is an indirect work of the will. Immediately, though, in a secondary and physical sense, the working of the intellect is the cause of heresy. Now, go on! OrthodoxThis distinction will not help you, but is in fact against you. For one should punish heresy as a punishable crime all the more severely if, as you hold, the will is its primary and moral cause. ChristianBut your phrase all the more severely sits badly here. OrthodoxYou are being a sophist. You have acknowledged that heresy is a work of the will and that all punishable crimes belong to works of the will. Yet you will not acknowledge that heresy is a punishable crime? ChristianI refuse to acknowledge it because not all works of the will are crimes. Your fallacy consists in the fact that, while you wanted to convince me, you confused two different things with each other; firstly, that crimes are works of the will, which is true; secondly, that works of the will are crimes, which is evidently false if one understands by this immoral workings of the will. For naturally there is a great difference between vice and crime. Crime is inseparable from punishment. But, as you know yourself, there are also many vices of the will that are subject to no human punishment (which is what we are speaking of here). For this reason, no one will be punished for thinking. Further, even if they are expressed in external actions, to the degree that these do no great harm to the commonwealth, we do not punish the flaws which are shared by the whole human race and could never be eliminated, such as envy, ambition, greed, and licentiousness. Now, if no one is to be punished for thinking of crime, so it will be even less the case that someone can be punished for thinking erroneously. OrthodoxBut I can turn this around and say: Because there are crimes of such enormity that even thinking them is punishable—for example, in the crime of violation of majesty [crimen laesae Maiestatis]—so someone can be justly punished on account of his erroneous thoughts in the case of heresy; for by this divine majesty is violated, which is a much worse crime than the violation of human majesty. ChristianThe proof will not work, because it draws on completely different things. The jurists have already shown in several places that the division of the crime of violation of majesty into the violation of divine and human majesty is an ambiguous distinction, and the crime of violating divine majesty is actually not a punishable crime. For something will only be called a punishable crime in relation to human laws and punishments. God has not commanded worldly kings to protect his divine majesty. And just as this is spiritually violated, so the violator will be spiritually punished. But the authorities punish nobody spiritually. OrthodoxSo do you seriously mean that heresy is not a punishable crime? ChristianWhy should I not mean this when there are so many reasons for seriously intending it? Neither is this viewpoint so novel that others have not remarked on it, even if such remarks have not been purged of the prejudice of the common error with proper care. From among all the Lutheran theologians I will introduce only Samuel Pomarius who opposed the disguised papalist Hierotheus Boranowsky.35 Boranowsky alleges that heresy is a crime of the greatest enormity. It belongs with thievery, murder, sacrilege, whoring, and adultery. It is a worse crime than counterfeiting. It joins blasphemy, sedition, violation of majesty, is worse than apostasy and idolatry, and so on.a Pomarius has shown extensively that this teaching, which presumes that heresy is actually a punishable crime, is against the light of Scripture and the light of nature,36 and also against the theologians and jurists.b There he also prudently responded to the slanderers who would perhaps wish to accuse him of being a lover and defender of heresy, which is a defense I will put to use for myself. XOrthodoxThese and similar authors will be of little help to your position. For they teach that heresy may also be subject to human punishment, even if not by death. In denying that heresy is a punishable crime though, you, as I understand it, claim heresy should be exempt from all human punishment. ChristianYes, that is my view. But I do not rely on these authors, and I introduce them only in order to show that there is nothing new in saying that heresy is not a punishable crime. At the same time, I have warned that these same authors do not proceed carefully enough in this matter, but import falsities. They accept, for example, that heretics can well be subject to human punishments—namely, removal from public office, monetary fines, exile, and imprisonment—which unfortunately is the common viewpoint of our [Lutheran] teachers.c For what could be more improper and inconsistent than to teach that heresy is not a punishable crime, yet that it must be punished by human coercion? Could an author be more self-contradictory than when he argues at length against the papalists, adducing many proofs, that nobody should be coerced into religion; that conscience must be free; that the faith and conversion of heretics is a gift of God; that coercion of conscience results in nothing but making hypocrites and always occasioning disturbances of civil peace; and similar things (as is normally argued by our Lutherans, Pomarius in particular)? Yet such an author concludes nothing more from this than that heretics should not be killed, but can otherwise be punished as one sees fit. But these reasons apply to every sort of punishment, because all punishment is a form of coercion. OrthodoxIf I am right, however, Pomarius denies this, in these words: Such things (the excommunication and exiling of heretics) are not means of religious coercion. Neither does Carpzov, who is highly opposed to the coercion of faith and conscience, treat them as such. Rather, they are a necessary Christian protection, ecclesiastic discipline, and political duty.a ChristianI know it and regret it. It is as if something advanced against the papacy by such zealots were infallible, and as if there could not be zealotry accompanied by stupidity. To deny that exile and such like are means of coercion is to deny that they are punishments. It would be no more impudent were the papalists to claim that the execution of heretics is not a coercive measure. Pomarius himself elsewhere calls these things a severe external means of coercion,b thereby contradicting himself. OrthodoxBut through such mild punishments our people do not intend to compel heretics to the faith, only to the means of faith.c ChristianThey themselves do not know what they intend. For, on the other hand, they also say that compelling the means of faith should not be used against heretics, but only against the people of their own religion.d They can understand this any way they please, for it is purely papaliste and quite pitiful. Even in a dream, could they imagine a compulsion to the means of a thing that is not at the same time also a compulsion to the end of the thing, or to the thing itself? They themselves say that the means are present on account of the end, and are subservient to the end. A compulsion to the means is therefore also a compulsion to the end. What would they say if the papalists excused themselves by saying that they used the fear of death not to force heretics to change their religion or to believe, but only to the means [of faith], such as hearing the mass and similar? Has not this same cloak for heretic-mongering been used to mask the cruel religious coercion of the Calvinists in France, or could it not be so used? OrthodoxYet surely you will at least accept the excommunication of heretics as a spiritual punishment. ChristianI do not accept it as such. OrthodoxBut I see no reason. You yourself acknowledge that heresy is still a spiritual vice. Therefore you will not oppose spiritual punishment. ChristianI well recall commendation of the Christian’s spiritual shield, but never of spiritual punishment, which God has reserved to himself. Moreover, how can excommunication be a spiritual punishment when, for all that, it is used to execute secular sanctions? For example, loss of office, public infamy, continual fear of death at the hands of the rabid mob whipped up by unceasing imprecations and public curses, and so on. Like all other associations, a Christian association is permitted to forbid membership to someone who will not conform his conduct to its mores. This is no punishment, however, because all associations may do this, and it does not give rise to infamy. But, as it is commonly practiced, excommunication is, if not wholly, then at least three-quarters papalist and anti-Christian. OrthodoxBeware that you do not blaspheme. For how can that be anti-Christian which Christ himself commands or at least permits? And how can that be papalist which Paul has made use of? ChristianBut, my dear friend, please tell me where Christ has permitted this excommunication to his church. OrthodoxEverybody knows this. Do you not know that Christ says if your brother trespasses against you, and will not heed the church, then he should be regarded as a heathen and a publican?a ChristianI know this well. But what follows from it? OrthodoxNamely, that one should regard him as excommunicated, or as someone to be excommunicated. ChristianI do not believe my ears! At the time when Christ spoke this, was there a society of Christians? Did the Christians excommunicate the heathens then? Did Christ approve of blind and godless Jewish excommunication? OrthodoxYou are piling up a heap of scruples, which is giving me pause. Nonetheless, this is still the common explanation. ChristianBut I have warned you from the beginning and throughout, there are also common errors. OrthodoxHow do you understand the words of Christ then? What does he mean by talking about regarding a brother as heathen or publican? ChristianI believe that Christ would want it to be possible, if the matter were sufficiently grave, for such a person to be brought before a pagan magistrate like a heathen and publican, without having to fear scandal and the violation of Christian patience. Neither does this explanation seem too difficult or far-fetched if one juxtaposes Christ’s teaching with Paul’s admonition to the Corinthians, that they should not arraign a brother before a pagan judge.b , 37 OrthodoxYet you cannot deny to me that Paul wished to excommunicate a person guilty of incest.a For he scolded the Corinthians that they had not done this themselves. ChristianI see nothing more here than that Paul wanted the Corinthians to declare that this person should remain outside their holy assembly. If it goes no further than the right which attaches to all associations in common, this declaration is neither an excommunication nor a punishment. OrthodoxYes, but something a little different lies behind this, because Paul also consigns him to Satan, which is a formula still used in excommunication by the churches. ChristianHow pitiful to be consigned through a formula! Do you mean then that Paul, or someone acting for him, has pronounced in a public assembly the horrendous damning incantation of excommunication, in which the excommunicant is consigned body and soul to the devil? This is very far removed from the piety and charity of the apostle. Further, the text itself is against this, for it speaks of the corruption of the flesh and the salvation of the spirit. Even though he was absent, I think that through the power of Christ, Paul caused the body of the incestuous person to be afflicted with a severe illness by Satan, similar to the way in which Job’s body was thus consigned to Satan. And perhaps the papalists or papalizing clerical excommunicators imitate Paul in this consignment, if they have that power of Christ. If they do not have this power, though, they should not be surprised if the laity begin to despise their brutish incantations and fulminations. OrthodoxNonetheless, there are to hand other texts from the Holy Scriptures which appear to confirm ecclesiastical excommunication. ChristianI am also fully aware of these,b for here someone is always copying them from someone else. But these [texts] are not important enough for us to lose time over, in that they are even more distorted than those which we have already discussed, and can be readily answered using that which I have already briefly laid out. XIOrthodoxThere is still another answer that occurs to me, which might save the common position. Heretics will not be punished on account of intellectual shortcomings or error. Neither can the authorities compel their subjects to change religion through threat of punishment. They can prohibit heretics from spreading discordant beliefs among the people, and scandalizing the church, by attaching a punishment if heretics act against this, which is in accordance not only with canon law but also with civil.a The prince can properly do this, because the deed that he forbids is a work of the will, at the disposal of human judgment, and is thus subject to human governance. As a result, this position is grounded in the laws, in reason, and in the writings of the scholars, for Ziegler has written about this in exactly these terms.b ChristianIt is to be regretted that this pious and highly learned jurisconsult let these words slip, which he without doubt borrowed from the standard Lutheran doctrine, failing to note their inadequacy because he was intent on other things. As for matters concerning canon and civil law, I have begged from the beginning to be spared this. Nor can refuge be found in the cited texts of civil and canon law, where it is certain that heresy is regarded as a punishable crime according to both kinds of law. Only this reason [i.e., the spreading of discordant beliefs] remains, therefore, which at first glance seems so attractive that I also shared this opinion for a long time. After more exactly considering the issue, however, I have decided that there is no substance to it, and that beneath this mask lies only a tyrannical coercion of conscience. My reasons are as follows. First, we have already noted in the preceding that a requirement of a punishable crime is that it be an act of the will. Not all acts of the will are punishable crimes, though, or become crimes through their restraint, or are subject to authority of the legislator. This is to say nothing of the widely noted view that such virtues as gentleness, generosity, gratitude, and the like—which are closer to love than to strict right—are by nature so composed that they lose this character and forfeit all grace, as soon as they are touched by the command of human law or the compulsion of punishments. Acts compelled by law thus lose their esteem as gentle, liberal, gracious, and so on. Already in his time, in his book De beneficiis, Seneca had shown comprehensively that nobody could be sued on account of ingratitude.38 OrthodoxI see where you are going with this. But to teach and propagate error has nothing in common with the examples you have introduced, for it appears to concern the regulation of actions subject to human law, to which your examples have little relevance. ChristianI was still not ready with my discourse, but only wanted to show through an example that even if something is an act of the will, it does not follow from this that it may be legally prohibited by man. For there are also other acts of will which are subject to no law, which appear at first glance to be matters of free human choice, but on closer examination are things that happen necessarily. [These are] things regarding which a man has no free will, and are thus so composed that a contrary action will be regarded as morally impossible. Among these I place someone expressing the religion which he himself holds to be true; that is, someone spreading his religion. For, if we carefully consider human nature, we discover that it is possible for someone to keep quiet in a certain place, for a certain time, about a known truth, especially one that has been trusted to him in confidence. It is impossible, however, for him to keep quiet about this perpetually, especially when he imagines that this is a truth beneficial to the human race, and as such commanded by God, so that one should tell other people about it. It is even more impossible that a person would conceal such truth from those asking after it and who appear to ask in good faith. However, most impossible of all is when someone asks after this and a person speaks otherwise than what he means in his heart, and that he should pretend that this opinion is his own which he yet regards as false in his heart. OrthodoxI already understand what you intend by this. Yet the principles of moral philosophy lead me to entertain a great doubt against your doctrine. For, given that you accept that one can conceal or hide the truth for a certain time or in a certain place, this is not a physical impossibility but would be a so-called moral impossibility. But the blessed Pufendorf has already taught that a moral impossibility does not prevent an action being subject to the laws, as long as no physical impossibility is involved.a And he explains this with a splendid example: It is impossible that all men should agree to hand down a lie to the following generation, although it is not impossible that a single man might do this. Similarly, it is impossible that a republic should be so happy that all the people would refrain from lying; it is not impossible though that someone or other should refrain from lying. For this reason, one can properly frame laws against lying, and liars can be punished. So, even if it is morally impossible that all men could keep quiet about what they regard as the truth, yet this is not impossible for an individual person. On this account, individual persons can be prohibited from testifying and commanded to stay silent. ChristianThat does not follow. For I have said that it is also impossible for individual persons to be quiet all the time, which means that your conclusion should be: it would be unjust if a continual silence were imposed on them. For moral and physical impossibility converge here, as I have already proved from the common nature of the human race. So I can invert that which you have put forward by saying: Just as it is not possible to make a law that the truth should be spoken at all times by all men, so it can much less be commanded by law that one should conceal the truth. Various authors have already observed, and I have already remarked above, that those weaknesses common to the whole human race, and which do no great harm in the commonwealth, are not subject to punitive laws. For this reason, it is not feasible—at least not without bringing ruin to the whole human race—to wish to impose severe, even capital punishments on greed, ambition, envy, and similar vices, even if they break out in minor deeds. Neither will minor lies that bring no harm to the commonwealth ever be punished. If for this reason some vices themselves cannot be punished, how then can truthfulness be coerced by law, or one be prevented from speaking about that which one regards as true, when this is to be esteemed more as a virtue than a vice? OrthodoxBut here you are forgetting your own limiting condition: that those things cannot be punished which do no particular harm to the commonwealth and its general peace and calm. The propagation of an erroneous and false religion causes grave harm to the commonwealth, however; for through this the citizens are deprived of their eternal salvation. ChristianThis common objection assumes that guardianship of his subjects’ eternal salvation is a matter for the prince; yet I have shown elsewhere that the prince finds himself in a quite different situation.39 It is the prince’s business to oversee external security, which is not harmed even if a false doctrine is published. OrthodoxBut this is always harmed by that which occasions disorder. ChristianYet various writers have shown that it is not those who profess their faith that cause disorder, but those who wish to repress such profession with force—in a word, the heretic-mongers not the heretics. OrthodoxHow can this be, though, when the heretics themselves also become heretic-mongers and will not tolerate the true religion? ChristianThat is not relevant to the present question. For I do not intend that the dissenters should be permitted to spread their doctrines with violence or injury to others. Nor would I concede them a public exercise of their religion equal to that of the country’s primary religion. Neither do I wish them to be permitted to stage public disputations and challenges. I only wish them to be left free to follow their confession and to worship in private, such that their friendly gatherings and ordinary conversations about religion should not be denounced as conventicles and as a design against the laws. I see that this is also the opinion of the celebrated Johann Christoph Becmann,40 who argues in his disputation On the Right of Subjects in Religious Matters that subjects professing a different religion to that of the country’s prince should be permitted not only to believe what they take to be right and true, but also that they should be able to discuss their religion.a I mention these words of agreement to show that my viewpoint is not new, even if it is against the common opinion. OrthodoxShortly before you said that the common opinion prohibiting the spreading of errors is nothing more than a mask for tyranny of conscience. I want you to explain this more clearly. ChristianGladly. Consider the consequences when, in accordance with this opinion, dissenters would be permitted to believe what they profess but would be prohibited from propagating this doctrine. Then, one such supposed heretic speaks to one of his co-believers about religion while just one subject of the country’s ruling religion is standing by. Or, consider the case where in an ordinary conversation with subjects of the other religion he talks modestly about his religion, which is naturally wont to occur—perhaps from a common human impulse to persuade others of that which we believe to be true, or from the desire to defend his religion from the objections and consequences attributed to it by others. [In such cases], he will be immediately denounced as a lawbreaker and, on the pretext that only an external act of the will and not his faith is to be prohibited, he will be punished all the more severely at the instigation of the heretic-mongering clerics. Those who know the world will doubtless have already observed that such heretics—even if they are taciturn by nature—are set up by papalist or papalizing clerics in such a way that they can instruct a cunning fellow from the country’s ruling religion, who approaches the heretic and, insinuating himself as a friend, confidentially presents some dubious questions, pretending to vacillate in his own religion and to be interested in hearing the truth of the other’s confession. Who here could restrain himself from opening his heart to such a spy in trust, rejoicing in his recognition of the truth, encouraging him to continue with his plan, and even loaning him books for his better instruction? After he has achieved this the spy will report to his cleric, and this cleric to the prince. Now the decent pious heretic, who is probably a more loyal subject than both his accusers, will be condemned to severe punishment, accused of a great crime, namely, obdurate disobedience. OrthodoxYes, this happens just as you say. But because the crux of the opposed viewpoints lies in this, I would like you to prove your view not only from reason but also from the Holy Scriptures. ChristianI am put in mind of the trial of the apostles at the hands of the Pharisees, which is described in the Acts of the Apostles.a The religion of the Pharisees was dominant in the country, at least with regard to the Christian religion, so that the Christian religion taught by the apostles was deemed heretical. It annoyed the priests that the apostles taught the people, not that they believed this religion personally. So they put them in prison, taking from them in fact not their freedom to believe what they liked, but prohibiting them only from propagating their doctrines. Because the apostles would not obey, the priests put them in prison again, and when the angel had freed them and they were arraigned again, the priests accused them not on account of an intellectual act, but for an act of the will: namely, that they had taught the people in the name of Jesus in contravention of the senate’s prohibition. Under this pretext they would have been killed as rebels, if the priests had not been moved by Gamaliel’s admonishment to substitute the milder judgment of birching for the harsher one. Now, consider whether one egg is more like another than the proceedings of the Pharisees are to the proceedings flowing from [today’s] common doctrine that heretics are to be punished not for their heretical belief, but for spreading it. OrthodoxI hold though that there is a very great difference between the two. For the apostle’s religion was the true religion, but the other case concerns heretics. ChristianBut I have said above that there is no civil judge on this earth who can decide which of the parties is right or not. And as the above-cited words of Salvian confirm, even heretics believe in good faith, and all sects claim for their own side the saying of the apostle: One must obey God (in professing faith) rather than manb (in concealing it). XIIOrthodoxThere is still one opinion of our [Lutherans] remaining with regard to the crime of heresy: namely, that heretics who are also blasphemers or rebels may still be executed, not in fact as heretics, but as blasphemers and rebels.a I believe that there is no reason to reject this opinion, for it is established law that the seditious and blasphemous must be executed, or [at least] can be executed without injustice. ChristianI have nothing to say regarding the punishment of sedition. But with regard to the punishment of blasphemy there is much to be said, in that there is just as much doubt surrounding the common definition of blasphemy as surrounds the definition of heresy. For holy people once might well have cursed God in their travails, and it is against all reason that one should extend the crime of blasphemy to those who had no intention of cursing God, but thought they were acting rightly, even if they were in grave error. If that is accepted then, following the common doctrine, but against the common principles of jurisprudence, many kinds of blasphemy would be found which, without exception, occur in good faith and without malice. But the doctrine of blasphemy needs its own investigation. For the moment, though, I will refrain from that discussion, and will just say this as a word to the wise: that these limitations41 in accordance with the common doctrine and practice [of heresy prosecutions] are nothing more than a new cloak for the tyranny over conscience. The point of the exercise is to provide a pretext, even for our [Lutheran] papacy, to rage against all heretics as blasphemers and rebels. [Indeed, the less astute of the papalists clearly assert that all heretics are blasphemers and rebelsb ],42 even though it is well known that under the pretext that they were tainted with dreadful vices, preeminently blasphemy and sedition, the first Christians were cruelly martyred, about which the blessed Kortholt has written a scholarly treatise.43 Who can tell the whole story of how often our [Lutherans] were accused of blasphemy by the papalists, or the Calvinists by our [Lutheran] heretic-mongers?a In fact, a moment ago you yourself accused me of blasphemy. In the papalists’ legal proceedings against our people, the crime of violation of majesty is often alleged against them, as if they suspected the country’s prince of bidding them do something unjust and contrary to conscience.b I must ask you just one question: Which of the two do you think is the rebel or disturber of public peace? The one who tyrannizes over another’s conscience, or the one who modestly defends himself against this? OrthodoxThe first, without doubt. ChristianBut you are mistaken, my friend. The second is a disturber of the peace. OrthodoxSure! Like the lamb in the fable who disturbed the water for the wolf waiting above. Perhaps you are joking. ChristianUnfortunately I am not joking, for this was taught in all seriousness by our leading doctors. Do you know the book? OrthodoxWhy would I not know it? It is the Formula of Concord. ChristianHow does it read then, here in the preface? OrthodoxThus: they can be called turbulent and quarrelsome people who will adhere to no form of pure doctrine.c I had not considered this nor remarked on it before. ChristianNow one sees what effect the prejudice of human authority has. But now I have other business, and I must close and thank you for a friendly conversation. Should something occur to you, or should another present you with something that might answer my objections, would you be so good as to communicate this to me. Were this to prove my errors, then I would be the first to publicly recant and condemn them. OrthodoxI will gladly do that. Take care. Summary of This Dissertation
[1. ]This date records the presentation of the Latin disputation An haeresis sit crimen? (Is heresy a crime?). The disputation was delivered by one of Thomasius’s doctoral students, Johannes Christoph Rube, under Thomasius’s direction, forming part of a series of such disputations in which Thomasius campaigned to make religiously based offenses immune from judicial and political punishment. It provoked immediate and hostile responses from representatives of Lutheran orthodoxy, including the Rostock theologian, J. Fecht, and, even more problematically, two members of the theological faculty at Thomasius’s own university: the professor of theology, Justus Joachim Breithaupt, and his junior colleague Gustav Philipp Mörl, later a preacher in Nürnberg. But it was not only the orthodox who were opposed. G. W. Leibniz, usually regarded as one of the founders of the Aufklärung, wrote a hostile review in 1698. Leibniz rejected Thomasius’s arguments for relegating theological doctrine in favor of inner piety, arguing instead that such doctrine was itself necessary to purify the will and that in negligently adopting false doctrine heretics were responsible for their own corruption, therefore deserving of punishment. (See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Sur Thomasius, Utrum haeresis sit crimen,” in G. W. Leibniz: Textes Inédits, ed. Gaston Grua [Paris, 1948], 210–12.) The German version of Thomasius’s disputation appeared in his Auserlesene deutsche Schriften in 1705, under the title Ob Ketzerey ein strafbares Verbrechen sey? (Whether heresy be a punishable crime?), which is the version principally used for this first English translation. [2. ]The stilted third-person address between the two dialogue partners (“I find him always over the books”) has been rendered in the standard second-person form (“I find you always over the books”). [3. ]Benedict Carpzov (1595–1666) was the most famous Saxon jurist of the seventeenth century. A tireless glossator, Carpzov worked on systematizing customary Saxon law, organizing the reception of civil and canon law, and commenting on public law. He was an orthodox Lutheran strongly opposed to heresy and witchcraft and contributed to Lutheran church law through his membership of the Dresden Superior Consistory. Here Thomasius is probably referring to Carpzov’s codification of Saxon criminal law, the Practica nova imperialis saxonica rerum criminalium (New imperial Saxon practice of criminal law) (Wittenberg, 1635). [4. ]Cornelius à Rynthelen, Iurista romano-catholicus: id est, iuridica romanae catholicae fidei confessio (The Roman-Catholic jurist: that is, the juridical confession of Roman Catholic faith) (Hemmerden, 1618). [5. ]Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Catholicism, which were recognized as legitimate public bodies in imperial law under the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. [6. ]Jansenism was a dissenting movement within the French Catholic church, inspired by the writings of Cornelius Jansen (1585–1638), bishop of Ypres, but during the seventeenth century the movement was centered in the famous abbey of PortRoyal, where it was protected by the powerful Arnauld family. Jansen wrote commentaries on Augustine, developing “rigorist” doctrines stressing the absolute difference between sinners and those in a state of grace, and viewing grace in a semi-Calvinist way as something reserved for an elect chosen by God. These doctrines were declared heretical by Pope Innocent X in 1653, but the independence of the Gallican church, together with the movement’s support among the French nobility, meant that it remained a significant force throughout the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth. [7. ]The Donatists, named after their leader, Bishop Donatus of Carthage, were a fiercely independent faction of African Christendom during the fourth century. Augustine fought a long pamphlet war to subordinate them to the emerging Catholic Church. [a. ]Bellarmine, de Laicis, bk. 3, ch. 21ff. [Robert Bellarmine, De laicis sive secularibus (Of the laity or secular members). This is part of a larger work by Bellarmine De ecclesiae militantis membris (On the members of the church militant) published in various editions, one of which appeared in Jena in 1629, edited and with a commentary by the Lutheran theologian Johann Gerhard.] [b. ]Franc. Burchardt, Von der Freystellung, pt. 2, chap. 16, pp. 181ff.; chap. 17, p. 188; further, chap. 20, p. 203, and elsewhere. [Francis Burchard (Andreas Erstenberger), De autonomia. Das ist, von Freystellung mehrerley Religion und Glauben (On autonomy. That is, on allowing several religions and faiths) (Munich, 1586).] [c. ]At several places in his Gerechtfertiger Gewissens-Zwang. [Hierothei Boranowsky, Gerechtfertiger Gewissens-Zwang oder Erweiß daß man die Ketzer zum wahren Glauben zwingen könne und solle (Justified compulsion of conscience, or, proof that heretics can and should be compelled to true faith) (Neyss, 1673).] [8. ]Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621), a Jesuit and cardinal, was a leading Catholic controversialist and tireless defender of papal authority. Francis Burchard (d. 1592) was the pseudonym adopted by Andreas Erstenberger, Catholic privy secretary to the imperial court, for the publication of his most famous work, De autonomia. Das ist, von Freystellung mehrerley Religion und Glauben (On autonomy. That is, on allowing several religions and faiths) (Munich, 1586). In this work, Erstenberger argued against the toleration of Protestantism in the German Empire, insisting that the Peace of Augsburg (1555) was a plot by “satanic” Lutherans and proponents of state reason against the Catholic church. Hierotheus Boranowsky (1624–77) was a pseudonym of Johannes Scheffler, a Polish-born Catholic convert, who also published works under the names of Angelus Silesius, Bonamicus, and Christianus Conscientiosus. He was a prolific and vehement anti-Protestant polemicist, arguing that rulers could make legitimate use of coercion in seeking to re-Catholicize their territories. [a. ]In Suscitabulo pro Principibus, pt. 1, chap. 4, p. 48; pt. 2, chap. 14, p. 137. [Anthony Benbellona (Bartholomew Gericke), Ung resveille Matin Sive Tempestivum suscitabulum pro principibus (An alarum or timely rousing on behalf of princes) (Servestae, 1602).] [b. ]At various places in his ungerechten Gewissens-Zwang. [Samuel Pomarius, Bewiesener ungerechtester Gewissens-Zwang: entgegen gesetzet Hierothei Boranowsky Gerechtfertigtem Gewissens-Zwange (Demonstrably unjustified compulsion of conscience: against Hierotheus Boranowsky’s Justified Compulsion of Conscience) (Wittenberg, 1674).] [9. ]Antonius Benbellona was one of the pseudonyms used by the Lutheran controversialist Bartholomew Gericke (b. 1557). Samuel Pomarius (1628–83), also known as Samuel Baumgarten, was a Lutheran theologian and church superintendent in Salzwedel whose anti-Calvinist polemics drew the ire of Frederick William I of Brandenburg. [c. ]Defense des Sentimens sur l’Histoire Critique, lett. 14, pp. 366ff. [Jean le Clerc, Défense des Sentimens de quelques Théologiens de Hollande sur L’Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament. Contre La Reponse Du Prieur de Bolleville (Defense of the sentiments of some Dutch theologians regarding the Critical History of the Old Testament. Against the response of the Prior of Bolleville) (Amsterdam, 1686).] [d. ]Hist. Inquis., bk. 1, chap. 6. [Philipp van Limborch, Historia inquisitionis hispanicae cum libro Sententiarum Inquisitionis Tholosanae ab a.c. 1307 ad 1323 (History of the Spanish Inquisition together with the book of sentences of the Toulouse Inquisition 1307–1323) (Amsterdam, 1692).] [e. ]Apol. ad. Libros de erudit. solida &c., append. 5, pp. 457ff. [Pierre Poiret, De eruditione solida, superficiaria, et falsa (On solid, superficial and false erudition) (Amsterdam, 1692).] [a. ]In the dissertation de scriptis Poireti. ristian Thomasius, Christiani Thomasii, JCTI Dissertatio Ad Petri Poiret Libros De Eruditione Solida, &c. (The jurist Christian Thomasius’s dissertation on Pierre Poiret’s book On Solid Erudition, etc.) (Frankfurt, 1694).] [10. ]Jean le Clerc (1657–1736) was a Swiss Arminian theologian and biblical scholar. Le Clerc had preached in France and England before finally settling in the Netherlands, where he identified with the cause of the Remonstrants, or moderate Calvinists. Philipp van Limborch (1633–1712), too, was a Remonstrant pastor and Arminian theologian in the Netherlands. He was a friend of John Locke’s and the author of numerous books on theological controversies and the history of religion. His Historia Inquisitionis (History of the Inquisition) was published in 1692 and translated into English by Samuel Chandler in 1731. Pierre Poiret (1646–1719) was a French-born mystical theologian who had initially followed Descartes but then developed his mystical doctrines under the influence of Antoinette Bourignon, whose lifelong disciple he became. Despite this, his scholarship and his moderate teachings were widely admired by Thomasius, Bayle, and Le Clerc, among others. Poiret’s De eruditione solida, superficiara et falsa (On solid, superficial, and false erudition) (1692) drew a critical but respectful response from Thomasius. [11. ]This was the catchcry of the eclectic philosophers with whom Thomasius identified. Eclecticism had an antischolastic intellectual ethos, and its objective was to obviate sectarian commitment to a particular philosophical or theological tradition by encouraging selective use of different schools of thought. [12. ]Elias Veiel, Disquisitio Theologica de Sententia S. Augustini (Theological disquistion on Saint Augustine’s opinion) (Ulm, 1689). Veiel (1635–1706) was an orthodox Lutheran theologian who taught at the Ulm higher gymnasium. [a. ]See [Veiel], Dissertation, pp. 44–45 [Elias Veiel, Disquisitio Theologica de Sententia S. Augustini (Theological discourse on the opinion of Saint Augustine) (Ulm, 1680)]; see Dommaireinus à Dissingau, von der Autonomia, c. 11, pp. 216ff. [Dommarein von Dissingau, Kurtze Information und Anleitung, von der Autonomia, zu Erleuterung des Hochberümbten Tractats (Brief information and instruction on the Autonomia, for the explanation of this most famous tract) (Christligen, 1610).] [13. ]Metabasis: to prove or assert something in one discipline by improperly using another. [14. ]This is something about which Thomasius changed his mind. The view alluded to here, according to which jurisprudence could incorporate “divine positive law” or biblical commandments so far as these were interpreted by jurists, was the one outlined in his Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae (Institutes of divine jurisprudence) of 1688. But he had abandoned this view by the time he published his Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium (Foundations of the law of nature and nations) in 1705, arguing instead that all laws could be derived from a rational reflection on the rules required to maintain inner and outer peace. [a. ]Ad Cod. tit. de haeret. init. [Code of Justinian, “On Heretics,” beginning.] [15. ]Johann Jakcob Wissenbach (1607–65) was the author of numerous works intended to expose errors and contradictions in Justinian and canon law. [b. ]C. dixit 29, qu. 3. [Canon Law, canon 29, question 3.] [c. ]l. 2, C, de haeret. [Code of Justinian, lex 2, “On Heretics.”] [d. ]See Cornelius à Rynthelen, Jurist. Rom. Cathol., §70, p. 154. [Cornelius à Rynthelen, Iurista romano-catholicus: id est, iuridica romanae catholicae fidei confessio (The Roman-Catholic jurist: that is, the juridical confession of Roman Catholic faith) (Hemmerden, 1618).] [a. ]C. Haereticus, 28. c. 24, q. 3. [Canon Law, “Heretic,” canon 28, causa 24, qu. 3. The footnote marker, missing from the German text, has been restored following the Latin.] [16. ]This is an allusion to Thomasius’s standard argument that faith as such cannot be erroneous, as it is a matter of the will and heart, making no claims to falsifiable knowledge. Only faith contaminated by philosophical explication can be a matter of correct knowledge, leading to charges of error and thence to persecution. [17. ]This was the cardinal early modern juristic definition of heresy, introduced into the legal codes of Protestant states from canon law, much to Thomasius’s displeasure. [a. ]Farin. p. 8, qu. crim. 178, §1 [Prospero Farinacci; possibly a reference to vol. 8 of his Opera omina, the Tractatus de haeresi (Treatise on heresy) (Frankfurt, 1686)]; Carpzov, qu. crim. 44, n. 4 [Benedict Carpzov, Practica nova imperialis saxonica rerum criminalium (New imperial Saxon practice of criminal law) (Frankfurt, 1635), question 44, §4]; Ziegler on Lancellotti p. 939 [Caspar Ziegler, Jus Canonicum, Notis & Animadversionibus Academicis ad Joh. Pauli Lancelotti . . . Institutiones enucleatum (Canon law, explained with academic notes and comments on the institutes of John Paul Lancelotti) (Wittenberg, 1669)]; Voet, Dissertationes selectae, disp. 4, de error. & haeres., p. 723 [Gisbert Voetius, (possibly his) Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, part 4 (Select theological disputations, part 4) (Utrecht, 1667)]; Limborch, Historia inquisitionis, bk. 3, chap. 1, p. 175. [a. ]t. t. C. de SS. Eccles. [Code of Justinian, “On the Most Sacred Churches.”] [18. ]Although the separation of the invisible from the visible church was standard in Protestant theology, Thomasius uses the distinction to attack Lutheran orthodoxy. In treating true Christians as permanently scattered and unknowable by any outward signs, Thomasius separates Christianity as an inner moral condition from the church as a public institution. This not only strikes a theological blow against the notion of heresy—by undermining the notion of a visible religious community from which heretics deviate—but also permits the political secularization of the public church by separating it from the invisible community of the faithful and treating it as an assembly of citizens rather than of Christians. [b. ]Lancellotti in Ziegler, pp. 938ff.; Limborch, bk. 3, chap. 7, p. 199; Pomarius, in Ungerechten Gewissens-Zwang, pt. I, p. 199. [19. ]The Augsburg Confession, intended to state and distinguish the Protestant articles of faith, was presented to Emperor Charles V on behalf of the Protestant princes and cities in January 1530. By the end of the sixteenth century it had been somewhat superseded by the stricter formulations of the Formula of Concord (1577), at least in the eyes of orthodox Lutherans, who thus began to reinterpret the Augsburg Confession, giving rise to the kind of disputes mentioned here by Thomasius. [a. ]See Grübel’s appendix to Dedeken’s Consilia theologica, p. 8. [Georg Dedeken, Thesauri consiliorum et decisionum,volumen primum, ecclesiastica continens (Treasury of opinions and decisions, volume 1, containing ecclesiastical matters) (Hamburg, 1623). Republished with an appendix by Christian Grübel in 1671.] [20. ]Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520–75) was a noted Lutheran theologian who had been associated with Luther and Melanchthon at Wittenberg. Flacius participated in several controversies surrounding the demarcation of Lutheran orthodoxy and became notorious for holding the doctrine that original sin inheres in man’s being or substance. [21. ]The doctrine that Christ will return in bodily form and rule over the earth for a thousand years; hence, too, millenialism. [22. ]Johann Tauler (1300–1361), a member of the Dominican order at Strasburg, was a leading mystical theologian and preacher. The author of the famous Imitation of Christ, Thomas à Kempis (1379/80–1471), was a monk among the Canons Regular of Windesheim, where he cultivated an ascetic and mystical style of Christian life modeled on the imagined simplicity of life of the early Christians. Theresa of Ávila (1515–82), a Spanish nun in the Carmelite order, was also an ascetic mystic. Her works on the contemplative life played an important role in spreading the devotional fervor associated with the Counter-Reformation. [23. ]The foremost Lutheran exponent of (so-called) syncretism was Georg Calixt (1586–1656), professor of theology at the University of Helmstedt. Calixt argued for reconciliation between Lutheranism and Calvinism by downplaying the significance of doctrine and stressing the importance of living a shared Christian life. He was opposed by orthodox Lutherans, especially by Abraham Calov (1612–86) of Wittenberg, who sought to have Calixt’s teachings proscribed as heresy. [24. ]In reducing the Christian religion to these three elementary principles, Thomasius sought to consign the mass of theological doctrine to the domain of adiaphora, or matters of indifference, thereby removing the basis for doctrinal conflict and heresy allegations, and giving the prince the right to resolve doctrinal conflicts, to the extent that these might affect civil peace. [25. ]Leonhard Hutter (1563–1616) was a leading orthodox Lutheran theologian at the University of Wittenberg who specialized in anti-Calvinist polemics. In 1610 he published the Compendium locorum theologicorum (Compendium of theological topics), which became a basic text for teaching the Lutheran articles of faith, being frequently republished during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. [26. ]After a series of Catholic attacks on the publication of the Augsburg Confession in 1530, a defense or Apology was prepared the following year, under the direction of Luther’s lieutenant, Philipp Melanchthon. [a. ]Formula of Concord, p. 68. [In fact this refers to the Apology of the Augsburg Confession (1531) in the Book of Concord, which also contains the Formula of Concord (1577).] [27. ]A standard modern English translation of this passage runs thus: “The faith that justifies, however, is no mere historical knowledge, but the firm acceptance of God’s offer promising forgiveness of sins and justification.” Theodore G. Tappert, ed. and trans., The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Philadelphia, 1959), 114. Note that the emphasis on the gratuitousness of God’s gift of grace is missing from this modern version. [a. ]Ibid., under the heading “What Is Justifying Faith?” the verse “thus regarding proper Christian faith.” [28. ]Thomasius is referring to section 22.4 of the first part of Justinian’s Digest (also known as the Pandects), De fide instrumentorum et amissione eorum (On the certitude of the instruments and their loss), stipulating the trustworthiness of legal and ecclesiastical documents as instruments giving effect to testimony, covenants, and similar. [a. ]See, Formula of Concord, p. 74. [That is, Apology of the Augsburg Confession.] [29. ]Ovid, The Metamorphoses, bk. vii, 20–21. [a. ]Ziegler on Lancelottus, p. 939. [b. ]Pomarius, in the foreword to Unrechten Gewissens-Zwang, p. 6. [c. ]C. dixit Apost. 29. C. 24. qu. 3. [Canon Law, canon 29, causa. 24, question 3.] [d. ]Boranowsky in Pomarius, as above, p. 499. [e. ]Wittenberg Theological Faculty, Gründlichen Beweiß wieder der Rinteler Syncretistische Neuerung, pp. 60, 61 [Wittenberg Theological Faculty, Gründtlicher Beweiß daß die Calvinische Irthumb den Grund des Glaubens betreffen und der Seligkeit nachtheilig seyn: Dabey auch angeführet welcher Gestalt Christliche Einigkeit zu stifften, und der Rinteler Syncretistischer Neuerung zugleich begegnet wird (Thorough proof that Calvinistic errors concern the foundation of faith and are harmful to salvation. With this it is also shown in which form Christian unity should be grounded and, at the same time, the Rinteln syncretistic innovation is countered) (Wittenberg, 1664)]; Pomarius, as above, p. 155. [30. ]The pope. [31. ]This refers to a hermeneutic doctrine and practice in which disputed biblical passages were interpreted via their analogy or agreement with other passages whose meaning was not contested. [32. ]Salvian was a fifth-century Gallo-Roman writer who contrasted the decayed virtues of Christian Rome with the sturdy virtue of such barbarian peoples as the Saxons, Franks, Goths, and Vandals. [a. ]Salvianus, de Gubern. Dei, bk. 5, pp. 162ff. See also similar texts of Arnobius and Lactantius in the notes of Rittershusio on Salvianus. [Salvianus of Massilia, De Gubernatione Dei, (On the providence of God) (Geneva, 1600). Thomasius is referring to the notes in Konrad Ritterhausen’s edition of Salvianus’s Opera, published in Altdorf in 1611.] [b. ]Galatians IV, 19. [In fact, Galatians 5:19–20.] [a. ]I Timothy VI, 20. [b. ]I Corinthians VIII, 1–2. [a. ]I Corinthians XI, 18–19. [b. ]Jude I, 19. [33. ]Those who set themselves apart. [34. ]The King James translation renders Jude 19 thus: “These be they who separate themselves, sensual, having not the Spirit.” [a. ]Jude I, 19. [In fact, Jude 1:18.] [a. ]Titus III, 10. [a. ]Ephesians IV, 18. [35. ]See note 8 in this chapter. [a. ]Hierotheus Boranowsky, Gerechtfertigen Gewissens-Zwang, chap. 2, pp. 156ff. [36. ]That is, reason. [b. ]Pomarius, Unrechtigen Gewissens-Zwang, chap. 2, pp. 177ff. [c. ]Carpzov, Practica nova imperialis saxonica rerum criminalium, qu. 44, n. 30, 31; Tarnovius, in Dedeken’s Consiliorum, pt. 2, fol. 93; Pomarius, as above, pp. 185, 311, 326, and pt. 2, pp. 417ff. [a. ]Pomarius, pt. 2, p. 418. [b. ]Pomarius, pt. 1, p. 519. [c. ]Pomarius, pt. 1, p. 264, and pt. 2, p. 443. [d. ]Pomarius. [e. ]See ibid., p. 443; Boranowsky, chap. 10, p. 495; Pomarius, pt. 1, p. 269. [a. ]Matthew XVIII, 17. [b. ]I Corinthians VI, 1ff. [37. ]This paragraph is not immediately clear. Thomasius’s argument is that someone whose conduct leads to their exclusion from the Christian community is no longer a “brother,” may be treated as a “heathen,” and can thus be dealt with by the civil magistrate in cases subject to secular law. This enables him to reconcile Christ’s admonition with Paul’s insistence that a “brother” should not be brought before the civil authorities. Lying behind this somewhat forced exegesis is Thomasius’s attempt to separate religious admonition from civil punishment. [a. ]I Corinthians V, 2ff. [b. ]Galatians V, 12; I Timothy I, 20; Romans XVI, 17; II John X, 11. See Pomarius, pt. 1, p. 420, from Gerhard. [a. ]c. resecandae, 16, C. 24, qu. 3 [Canon Law, canon “resecandae” 16, chap. 24, qu. 3]; L. 1. C. De SS. Eccles. [Code of Justinian, On the Most Sacred Churches, law 1]. [b. ]See Lancellottus, bk. 4, tit. 4, §2, p. 941. [Ziegler, Notis et animadversionibus academicis ad Joh. Pauli Lancelotti.] [38. ]For an English translation, see Seneca, “On Favours,” in Moral and Political Essays, ed. and trans. J. M. Cooper and J. F. Procopé (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 181–308. [a. ]Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium (On the law of nature and nations), bk. I, chap. 5, §8. [39. ]Here, Thomasius is probably referring to his treatises on Das Recht evangelischer Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten (The right of Protestant princes in theological conflicts) of 1696, and Vom Recht evangelischer Fürsten in Mitteldingen oder Kirchenzeremonien (The right of Protestant princes regarding indifferent matters or adiaphora) of 1695 (see chapter 2 of this volume). In these works, Thomasius argues that the prince’s rights and powers extend to all matters capable of threatening social peace, while denying that they have anything to do with his subjects’ inner morality or salvation. [40. ]Johann Christoph Becmann (1641–1717) was a Calvinist political theologian at the university of Frankfurt an der Oder. His Dissertatio de jure subditorum circa sacra (Dissertation on the right of subjects in religious matters) of 1689 argues for toleration in terms of the subjects’ basic rights in relation to the power of the state. In this regard Becmann differed from Thomasius, who relied on theological arguments regarding the inward and noncredal character of faith, and politico-juridical arguments regarding the incapacity of such faith to disturb social peace. Subjective rights play no significant role in Thomasius’s arguments for toleration. [a. ]See Becmann, Dissertatio de jure subditorum circa sacra (Dissertation on the right of subjects in religious matters), chap. 3, §§11ff. [a. ]Acts IV & V. [b. ]Acts V, 29. [a. ]Ziegler on Lancellottus, pp. 791 & 941; Carpzov, Practica nova imperialis saxonica rerum criminalium, qu. 44, n. 41ff.; Chemnitz, Exam. Concil. Trident, pt. 2, p. 93 [Martin Chemnitz, Examinis Concilii Tridentini (Examination of the Council of Trent) (Frankfurt am Main, 1615)]; Pomarius, Ungerechten Gewissens-Zwang, pt. 1, pp. 8, 24, 162, 165. [41. ]That is, limiting the punishment of heresy to cases also involving blasphemy and sedition. [b. ]Pomarius, pt. 1, pp. 8, 24, 162, 165. [42. ]The section in square brackets is missing from the German version. [43. ]Probably a reference to Christian Kortholt, De persecutionibus ecclesiae primaevae sub imperatoribus ethnicis (On the persecution of the early church under the pagan emperors) (Kiel, 1689). [a. ]See, amongst others, Council of Wittenberg, pt. 1, fol. 246. [b. ]Pomarius, pt. 1, p. 81. [c. ]Formula of Concord, preface, halfway to the end. |

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