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SECTION VIII.: KING’S LAW-SERVANTS NOT INFALLIBLE. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 4 [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 4.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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SECTION VIII.

KING’S LAW-SERVANTS NOT INFALLIBLE.

But, (says somebody) do you consider, Sir, by what authority all these acts, thus charged by you with illegality, were done? It is not the minister alone, and his subordinates, that are implicated. This is not mere treasury business. The acts have not only the king’s name and signature to them, but the sanction of the whole council-board, with the opinions of this and that and t’other great dignitary of the law included in it.

My answer is—all this makes little difference. It goes no farther than to show, that, as for a certainty a surprise was put upon parliament, so probably enough a surprise was also put upon the council-board: upon the council-board, including the legal learning and legal authority belonging to it. On putting the dry question of law—“Has not the crown, without special powers from parliament, powers to organize a constitution for a new colony?” the answer, judging from the supposed precedents of the American colonies, may, not very improbably, have been in the affirmative:—especially if given on slight consideration, as it naturally enough might be, in a case where no opposition was apprehended.

But, surprise or no surprise, God be thanked, it is not in the power of the king’s counsellors to inflict upon a single Briton an atom of punishment of their own creation, much less to inflict illegal punishment upon Britons by thousands, and to make ex post facto penal laws by dozens, in repugnancy to so many laws of parliament, including Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights. Let the sanctions lent to the measures be what they may—by whatever pretences—and from whatever names obtained—wholesale oppression was the object of it, wholesale oppression has been the result.

What does appear in point of fact, and from very high authority, is—that in matters of colonial legislation, there has been a time, and even since the accession of his present Majesty—when his Majesty’s law-advisers in this behalf have not been altogether masters of this part of their business: so at least, in the court of King’s Bench, in the famous Granada case—the great and only adjudged case since the foundation of the first colony, that has any bearing upon this point—(Lord Mansfield being spokesman)—was the opinion of the judges.* “The inattention of the king’s servants” (speaking of his Majesty’s law-servants) is the circumstance to which, as the sole cause, the dispute then on the carpet is ascribed by that discerning judge. The power of legislation, as exercised in that colony, in the way of taxation, on the 20th of July 1764, by the king alone, without the concurrence of any other authority—either that of parliament here, or that of an assembly of the colony there—exercised on the ground of its being a conquered colony—is there supposed, though but arguendo, to have been in itself indisputable. But, before that day, to wit, on the 7th October 1763, these his Majesty’s careless servants, not knowing, or not minding what they were about, had so managed as to divest him of it: and it was after having so done, that, forgetting what they had done, they picked it up again, and in the name of their royal masters exercised it as above: “inverting,” says Lord Mansfield, “the order in which the instruments should have passed, and been notoriously published, the last act” was, under their management, “contradictory to, and in violation of the first:” and this is the “inattention” spoken of. Here, then, was an occasion on which, according to Lord Mansfield and the rest of the judges in the King’s Bench, his Majesty’s law-servants did not know what they were about: and this occasion was—the same as that now in question—that of the making or mending a constitution for a colony. This was in 1763 and 1764: and, forasmuch as a mistake of this sort was actually made, and by his Majesty’s law-advisers, I think I may venture, from the demonstrated error of that prior time, to infer the possibility of an error on the like subject, on the part of the same description of persons, in 1786 and 1787. The arguments ab auctoritate and ab impossibili being thus cleared away, the other arguments may without much rashness be trusted to their own strength.

[]I mean legal power, and under the constitution, while it stands: If indeed it falls, and despotism rises in the place of it, then indeed such power as that in question exists at any time, without difficulty: and è converso, if such power exists, the constitution is at an end, and despotism stands in the place of it.

[* ]Campbell, v. Hall, Cowper’s Reports 1783.