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Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow SECTION VII.: NULLITY OF GOVERNOR'S ORDINANCES. FOR WANT OF A COURT TO TRY OFFENCES AGAINST THEM. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 4

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SECTION VII.: NULLITY OF GOVERNOR’S ORDINANCES. FOR WANT OF A COURT TO TRY OFFENCES AGAINST THEM. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 4 [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 4.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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SECTION VII.

NULLITY OF GOVERNOR’S ORDINANCES. FOR WANT OF A COURT TO TRY OFFENCES AGAINST THEM.

One imagination more, for a last effort. With or without a declaration to that effect by the king’s governor, the laws of England, (let it be said,) such as they exist at present, and such of them as are applicable to the state of things in the new colony, transport themselves in one great mass into New South Wales. After them, transport themselves, as they came out, all subsequently manufactured masses of law, common as well as statute, such of them as are so applicable, and in as far as they are so applicable, each in an air balloon of its own making, without any body to send them out, or make it possible for them to be known when they are arrived. Moreover, along with the first great mass, transports itself in like manner the right of establishing courts of justice for the trial of all offences against all such masses of English-made law, present and future, as they come in; under the single condition, that the mode of procedure in such courts, in each sort of case, shall not be different from the mode of procedure in the same sort of case pursued in England. Why these conditions?—for this reason. The circumstance that rendered the authority of parliament necessary for the legalization of the sort of court which it has actually been employed in legalizing, is—that that court not calling in the assistance of a jury, though the cases are jury cases, the mode of proceeding under it is not according to the law of England. Being, therefore, the sort of court which the king’s agent with all his powers had not quite power enough to make, thence came the necessity of sending it out, ready-made by the king, in pursuance of powers obtained from Parliament for the making it.

Unfounded this, a great part of it at least, in principle or in fact. But even if all the dreams in it were truths, the government of New South Wales would not, in point of legality, be one jot the better for them. These courts, made after the English pattern, serve for the trial of offences against English-made laws:—allowed; but the offences, for the trial of which proper courts are wanted, are not offences against English-made laws. By what courts, then, in New South Wales are these non-English offences to be tried? Not by these supposed New South Wales made courts, since, by the supposition, it is only for the trial of English-made offences that they can be made to serve. Not by the grand court, the establishment of which was the sole business of the statute: for it is to the trial of English-made offences that that court, by the express words of the statute, stands confined:—the court, when “convened,” is to be “for the trial and punishment of all such outrages and misbehaviours, as, if committed within this realm, would be deemed and taken, according to the laws of this realm, to be treason or misprision thereof, felony or misdemeanour;”—not all “outrages and misbehaviours” without exception, but such alone as would be “misdemeanours” and so forth, “if committed within this realm.

The governor (suppose) issues an ordinance (such as, it will be seen, he has issued in abundance,) prohibiting an act, which would not have been either “misdemeanour” or “misbehaviour,” “if committed within this realm.”* Admit then, that it is really in the power of the crown to communicate to the governor, in his individual capacity (the power he has so often exercised,) the complete power of legislation. Power of legislation alone being thus communicated to him, power of judicature (except in the case of acts that would be offences “if committed in this realm,”) not being given to him or anybody, what would he be the better for it? He has power to create the offence, but neither he nor anybody else has any power to punish or try the offender for it, when committed. The governor, by his proclamations, has power to enact new laws. Be it so. But has he likewise powers to create Star Chambers—to punish such as shall fail of obeying those proclamations? Where is the court to try any such offence? The court created under the statute? By the statute itself it stands precluded (as hath just been seen) from meddling with them. A court of King’s Bench, or any other court to be erected by the governor under his instructions?—those instructions which are to be to this colony, what charters have been to all other colonies? Nor that neither. Power or no power—instructions or no instructions—thus much seems clear enough—that, down to the time of Mr. Collins’s quitting the colony in September 1796, no such court (no court other than what has been called there a civil court, in addition to the court for the erection of which special power is given by the statutes) had ever in fact been holden. A court to be composed of the governor alone, for the trying of offences created by the governor alone? If so, here then we have the very quintessence of despotism; too rank, one should have thought, even for the meridian of New South Wales. It is Star-chamber out Star-chamberized: legislature and judicature confounded and lodged together, both in one and the same hand.

Is it true, then, that even such a court—a court thus arbitrary—might have been created, and that without any powers from Parliament? If so, then (as far at least as “misdemeanours” are concerned,) there was no need of Parliament, for the establishment of the less arbitrary sort of court, therein established and described:—a court composed of “the judge-advocate . . . . . together with six officers of his Majesty’s forces by sea or land;” the governor not sitting among them indeed; though, being the person to “convene” the court, he possesses (as it was evidently intended he should possess) the power of choosing, on each occasion, such members for it, as, on that occasion, he thinks, himself most sure of. The conclusion is then—that in spite of all suppositions, whatever ordinances he enacts and executes, are on a double ground illegal: first, because there is no law for enacting them; and again, because there is no law for executing them.

So much for law. In fact, in what set of cases the governor makes use of this court, and in what cases he does without it, or whether any precise line is drawn between them, is more than on the face of the documents (I mean the judge-advocate’s printed journal) I should expect to be able to pronounce. As far as I have yet seen, I should suppose no certain line: but, in each individual case, if it seems of importance enough, the court is convened: if not, whatever be the offence—English made, or colony made—the governor does what he pleases with it, without troubling anybody else, unless it be the man who is to give the lashes, or to “pull the house down,* &c. as the case may be.

[* ]Obliged to copy from the act the words, “this realm,” it is impossible to avoid noticing, to what a degree even the scanty scrap of power undertaken to be created by it, is torn in tatters by these two words:—a proof how little of the mind of the legislature was bestowed upon this business, and how slight any inference that can be drawn from what was actually done by it, to what was intended or in contemplation to be done. “This realm”—what realm? against the law of what realm must an act be an offence, triable under the court so constituted? Against the law of England? of Scotland? or of Great Britain, i. e. of both together?—If an act, being an offence—not against any law passed since the Union, but only against the law of England, as it stood before the Union;—if such an act be an offence triable in this court, so must an act which, though not an offence against the English law, is an offence against the Scottish law. To point out the confusion, is the only thing to the present purpose: to attempt to clear it up would take a volume.

Injuries purely civil, might, for aught I know, be “misbehaviours,” but are they “misdemeanours?” I mean in the legal sense of the word, according to the law of England. Take for example acts purely negative. Non-payment of debts: non-performance of contracts, &c. &c. Blackstone, at least, is as decided as possible in the negative. [B. IV. ch. 1.] And how stands this matter under the law of Scotland?

England, I take for granted—England alone—was looked to as the standard of everything that was to be done: into Scotland, not so much as the mind of our legislators had ever travelled.

Offences, involving, in the description of them, denominations common or proper—names of places, persons, and things—things real, things incorporeal, i. e. fictitious—such as offices, &c. &c., may not improbably be found to be incommissible (i. e. acts, though of like tendency, may not be offences, or not punishable) in territories where such places, persons, things, &c. are not to be found. Even in England, Burn speaks of English laws rendered in this way inexecutable:—instancing those “which appoint an offender to be whipped by the common hangman—where perhaps there is no such officer.” [Burn’s Justice, Conclusion.] Instances are innumerable: I give this as most likely to be familiar. Offences punishable in England by an ecclesiastical court only—are they “misdemeanours” in New South Wales?

Points like these might be started, enough to fill a volume: all unresolved, and many unresolvable. The whole act is but a vast mine of nullities and jeofails. Found a colony out of an act like this? Build a house as well out of a load or two of brick-bats.

[* ]Collins, II.