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SECTION III: LEGISLATION—HOW FAR LAWFUL IN NEW SOUTH WALES. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 4 [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 4.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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SECTION III

LEGISLATION—HOW FAR LAWFUL IN NEW SOUTH WALES.

All this while, from the time of the first landing of the first expedition to the time at which the historiographer of the colony took his leave of it, that is, from January 1788 to September 1796, ordinances were issued by the governor, and, as it should seem, by his sole authority. Instructions were also from time to time received by him from his superiors here at home, and ordinances issued in consequence of, and therefore (it may be presumed) in conformity to, these instructions. And these ordinances are not, like the king’s proclamations in Great Britain, mere acts of monition, or other acts, grounded on pre-existing acts of the legislature, but original acts of legislation, forbidding, and thereby converting into “misbehaviours,” a variety of acts, such as, if performed “in this realm,” whether in England or in Scotland, would not have been “misbehaviours,” would not have belonged to the class of “misdemeanours,” or to any of those higher classes of delinquency (treason, misprision thereof, or felony,) specified as such in the act.

This assumption of power, how shall it be accounted for? On the part of the governor, there can be little difficulty. Whatsoever were given to him for law, by his superiors at the Council Board, or the Secretary of State’s office, would naturally enough, one may almost say unavoidably, be taken by this sea captain for law. By this sea captain: for such has been the profession and rank of every gentleman who has ever as yet been invested with this important office.

On the part of these authorities at home, some imagination or other must necessarily have been entertained about the right—either that a right to confer on the governor this power was actually existing in the authority thus assuming and exercising the power; or at least that of the existence of such right a belief would be entertained by the several parties interested—a belief which, though it were ill-grounded and erroneous, would, so long as it continued to be entertained by all parties, have the same effect as if well-grounded and correct.

On the first supposition, they went to work bona fide, believing that to be legal which was determined to be done. In the other case, conscious of the illegality of the course they were pursuing, they determined to persevere in it notwithstanding; perpetual fraud trusting for its success to perpetual and universal ignorance.

Of two such opposite conceptions, which, then, is it that, on the face of it, carries the strongest probability of having been entertained?

The first hardly, for what is there that can be found to countenance it? Legislative power exercised by an officer of the crown, for such a course of years, without authority from parliament! On what possible ground could any conception of the legality of such a system be seriously entertained?

I will make the best case for it in my power: I will ransack imagination for possible grounds.

That the supposition was, in the whole extent of it, without foundation, would indeed be evidently untrue. That there was and is a considerable stock of lawful power in the colony to work with, is palpable enough. That that power was of a nature to serve as a succedaneum, so far as it went, to a regular and expressly-constituted legislative power, must also be admitted: manifest enough, I accordingly admit, it is, that a power of legislating over certain persons, and in certain cases, was virtually among the contents of it. But, in addition to all such persons and cases, legislation (so the fact is) has been exercised there (as indeed it required to be exercised there) over abundance of other persons, and in abundance of other cases.

To show this, I will in the first place exhibit a short survey of the stock of the colony, live and dead, persons and things, thrown into classes with this view. It will then be easy enough, and with a degree of accuracy sufficient for the purpose, to go over them, and say of each, this stands subjected, or this does not stand subjected, to the powers of all-embracing legislation, that have been exercised in New South Wales, by the sole authority of the king’s governor of New South Wales.

In the course of a period of nine years and a half, comprised in the history given of the colony by its chief magistrate, the inhabitants, considered in respect of their subjection to any ordinances of the governor (or of any other person or persons pretending to the exercise of legislative authority there) may be distinguished into the classes following:—

  • 1.Officers and privates, in the land branch of the king’s military service, subject to orders, as such, under the mutiny act.
  • 2. Officers and privates in the naval branch of the king’s military service, subject to orders, as such, under the articles of war.
  • 3. Persons in the king’s service in a civil capacity: as such, not subject either to the articles of war or the mutiny act: such as chaplains, surgeons, superintendents, &c.
  • 4. Commanders and crews of British vessels in private service.
  • 5. Commanders and crews of foreign vessels.
  • 6. Convicts still in a state of legal bondage: the terms of punishment specified in their respective sentences being as yet unexpired. For distinction’s sake, they may be called convicts non-emancipated de jure, or, still more shortly, non-expirees. The reason of this distinction, and the nomenclature founded on it, will appear immediately.
  • 7.Wives, children, and other relatives, if any, of non-expirees.
  • 8.Expirees. Convicts emancipated de jure: de jure, in contradistinction to de facto. The distinction is altogether a necessary one: for, in point of fact, one of the characteristic features of the establishment, and crimes of its foundation, was—that those who by law ought without exception to have been free, were, and were to be, in a multitude of instances, retained in bondage.
  • 9. Wives and children, and other relatives, of expirees.
  • 10.Unblemished settlers: that is, all settlers not belonging to classes 6, 7, or 8, or any of the preceding classes. In this instance, and for this purpose, the term free settlers (the term employed elsewhere) would not serve: since, if law had been the standard, classes 7, 8, and 9 would have been as free as these.

1, 2. With reference to the two first of these ten classes (Army and Navy,) the right of legislation may pass without dispute. Conditions might be stated as requisite—limitations might be suggested—but the discussion would be superfluous. For the purpose of the argument, I suppose and admit proper measures to have been taken, and by the proper authority, to subject all persons of these two descriptions to the authority of the governor in that behalf.

3. Over persons of the third class (servants of the crown in civil capacities,) supposing power to be given to the governor to dismiss them from their respective situations, this power operates of course as a means of influence, tending to produce a disposition towards a general submission to his will, howsoever signified. Setting aside this means of influence, their condition is noways different from that of class 10th, unblemished settlers.

4. With reference to commanders and crews of British vessels, the right might also be admitted, for the purpose of the argument:—though, in this instance, it appears liable to particular objections, which will be mentioned presently.

5. With respect to the commanders and crews of foreign vessels, the right shall, for the same purpose, pass unquestioned.

6. With respect to non-expirees (convicts still in a state of legal bondage,) their legal subjection to the governor, and consequently to all such orders as a master in England has it in his power to issue to an indented servant, may be pronounced unimpeachable: I mean, supposing the course directed in that behalf by the act to have been pursued;* and supposing the civil branches of the law of England, or of Scotland, or of both together, or of Great Britain, to have grown up in New South Wales, like so many weeds, without having been ever planted there: of which more will be said presently. That the spirit of the old transportation system, which it is the professed object of the act to continue, cannot have been conformed to, I have already had occasion to explain in another place. But, if the words of the act have been pursued, in the manner that will also be stated, I see nothing to hinder the power of the governor from having been rendered unimpeachable in relation to this class: always assuming the fulfilment of the unfulfillable conditions just mentioned.

7. 8. 9. 10. Over expiree convicts, their wives, children, and other dependent relatives—over the wives, children, and other dependent relatives, even of convicts themselves in a state of legal bondage—over unblemished settlers—the governor neither had, nor could have had, nor without fresh authority from parliament can ever have, any more power (I speak always of legal power) than I have.

Over any stores entrusted to his care, the governor, in his quality of agent to his Majesty, the legal proprietor of those stores, will have had the same legal power as any other proprietor anywhere. These stores being in a large proportion among the necessaries of life, from the proprietorship of these means of subsistence, must of course result a proportionable degree of influence.

But influence—natural influence—is one thing: legal power is another. To the production of an effect by influence, consent is necessary: special consent precedently given to each act, by the production of which the influence has fulfilled its purpose: to the production of the same effect by power, no such consent is necessary. Were the governor to say to this or to that man, being a man not in bondage to him—“Do such or such a piece of work, or you shall have no bread served out to you to-day—an order thus sanctioned may be admitted to be legal, though without any previous authority given by parliament for the issuing of it. But if, addressing himself to the same man, and speaking of the same piece of work, the governor were in like manner to say (as he has so often done)—“Do this, or you shall be whipped”—here would be an ordinance illegal and void.

The same thing may be said of any general ordinance addressed to all persons without distinction, with or without any special sanction annexed to it, and whatever may have been the utility or even necessity of it: so far as the persons bound, or otherwise affected by it in point of interest, are persons subjected by any special legal commission, to orders from the governor, so far, and as to those persons, it is good and legal. Beyond this, and as to all other persons, the same ordinance is illegal and void. As for example: orders that no persons shall, for such a time, go beyond such and such bounds: orders that no man shall build, or begin to build, a vessel of a size beyond such and such dimensions.§

I take for granted (always for the purpose of the argument,) that whatever power of legislation could be given by the crown, to anybody, to be exercised in this colony, has all along been given by the crown to the several successive governors. All this notwithstanding—all this being admitted—what I maintain is, that, no such authority having been given to the crown, in the only act in question,* by the legislature, it was no more in the power of the crown to confer any such power of legislation (except the limited, and not so denominated, but only virtual powers of legislation above excepted) on the governor, or any other person or persons, than in mine.

[* ]24 Geo. III. sess. 2, c. 56, § 1, 13: which it may have been till of late; but could not have been in the case of the ship Glatton, which, having sailed in September or October, with about 400 convicts, without any legal power for consigning them to bondage, gave occasion for the act passed in December, by which legality has been intended to be given (and therefore I conclude, without having yet seen it, was given) to the transaction, by an ex post facto law. [Not given: see Preface.]

[]Letters to Lord Pelham. Letter I. p. 190.

[]II. Collins, 286, 295.

[§ ]I. Collins, 159, 488; II. 33.

[* ]27 Geo. III. c. 2.