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Front Page Titles (by Subject) SECTION IV.: END, OR FINAL CAUSE OF THE INSTITUTION—JUDGE AND CO.'S SINISTER INTEREST. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 6
SECTION IV.: END, OR FINAL CAUSE OF THE INSTITUTION—JUDGE AND CO.’S SINISTER INTEREST. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 6 [1843]Edition used:The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 6.
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- Errata—vol. VI. *
- An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence; For the Use of Non-lawyers As Well As Lawyers.
- Chapter I.: Title-page Justified.
- Chapter II.: Relation of Law to Happiness—of Procedure to the Main Body of the Law—of Evidence to Procedure.
- Chapter III.: Ends of Justice On the Occasion of Judicature. *
- Chapter IV.: Duties of the Legislator In Relation to Evidence.
- Chapter V.: Probative Force—whence Measured—how Increased—how Diminished.
- Chapter VI.: Degrees of Persuasion—thence of Probative Force—how Expressible.
- Chapter VII.: Causes of Trustworthiness and Untrustworthiness In Testimony—thence of Belief and Unbelief.
- Chapter VIII.: Of the Securities For Trustworthiness In Evidence.
- Chapter IX: False Securities For Trustworthiness In Evidence—oaths and Exclusions.
- Chapter X.: Of the Reception and Extraction of Evidence, Viz. With the Help of the Above Securities.
- Chapter XI.: Collection of Evidence—english Practice.
- Chapter XII.: Of Circumstantial Evidence.
- Chapter XIII.: Of Make-shift Evidence.
- Chapter XIV.: Of Preappointed Evidence.
- Chapter XV.: Difference Between Preappointed and Unpreappointed Evidence.
- Chapter XVI.: Preappointed Official Evidence.
- Chapter XVII.: Extempore Recordation, How Applicable to Legally Operative Facts At Large.
- Chapter XVIII.: Of Derivative, Including Transcriptious, Recordation, Wherein of Registration.
- Chapter XIX.: Exclusion of Evidence.—general Considerations.
- Chapter XX.: Exclusion Continued—causes For Which It Is Proper Or Not, According to Circumstances.
- Chapter XXI.: Exclusion Continued—causes For Which It Cannot Be Proper.
- Chapter XXII.: Exclusions By English and Other Laws—analytic and Synoptic Sketches.
- Chapter XXIII.: Safeguards Against Suspicious Evidence: Including Instructions Concerning the Weighing of Evidence.
- Chapter XXIV.: Authentication and Deauthentication, As Applied to Preappointed and Other Written Evidence.
- Chapter XXV.: Exclusion and Nullification Applied to Contractual Matter, In So Far As Writing Has Been Omitted to Be Employed In Giving Expression to It.
- Chapter XXVI.: Of the Exclusion and Nullification of Contractual Matter, Informally Though Scriptitiously Expressed, In a Transaction Which Has Been the Subject of Matter Formally Expressed.
- Chapter XXVII.: Imprisonment For Debt:—disguised Exclusion of Evidence Involved In It.
- Chapter XXVIII.: Of the Burthen of Proof: On Whom Shall It Lie?— (a Question Produced By Undue Exclusion of Evidence.)
- Chapter XXIX.: Evidence Considered In Its Relation to This Or That Fact In Particular—why Discarded From This Work.
- Chapter XXX.: Evidence In Relation to Particular Facts and Pleadings Under Technical Procldure.
- Chapter XXXI.: False Theory of Evidence (gilbert’s * )—its Foundation:—precedence Given to Written Before Unwritten.
- Chapter XXXII.: Liberalists and Rigorists—parties Belligerent In the Field of Jurisprudence, and In Particular of Evidence.
- Chapter XXXIII.: Conclusion.
- Appendix A.: Cautionary Instructions Respecting Evidence, For the Use of Judges.
- Chapter I.: Propriety of Cautionary Instructions, In Preference to Unbending Rules.
- Chapter II.: Considerations Proper to Be Borne In Mind In Judging of the Weight of Evidence.
- Chapter III.: Considerations Respecting the Effects of Interest In General Upon Evidence.
- Chapter IV.: Considerations Respecting the Effect of Pecuniary Interest Upon Evidence.
- Chapter V.: Situations.
- Chapter VI.: Makeshift Evidence.
- Chapter VII.: Scale of Trustworthiness.
- Chapter VIII.: Best Evidence, What?
- Chapter IX.: English Law Scale of Trustworthiness.
- Appendix B.: of Imprisonment For Debt.
- Section I.: Its Inaptitude As an Instrument of Compulsion.
- Section II.: Its Inaptitude, Applied As It Is As an Instrument of Punishment.
- Section III.: Its Needlessness Demonstrated By Experience.
- Section IV.: End, Or Final Cause of the Institution—judge and Co.’s Sinister Interest.
- Section V.: Means Employed—mendacity and Usurpation.
- Section VI.: Affidavit Previous to Arrest, Its Unfitness.
- Section VII.: Consequence of the Exclusion Thus Put Upon Evidence.
- Section VIII.: Advocates For the Abolition of Imprisonment For Debt—their Errors.
- Section IX.: Scotch Law—cessio Bonorum, Its Inadequacy.
- Section X.: Agenda—course Proper to Be Taken On the Occasion of Insolvency.
- Appendix C.: False Theory of Evidence—(gilbert’s.)
- Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice. From the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham, Bencher of Lincoln’s Inn.
- Preface.
- Prospective View.
- Book I.: —theoretic Grounds.
- Chapter I.: On Evidence In General.
- Chapter II.: Of Evidence Considered With Reference to a Legal Purpose; and of the Duties of the Legislator In Relation to Evidence.
- Chapter III.: Of Facts—the Subject-matter of Evidence.
- Chapter IV.: Of the Several Species Or Modifications of Evidence.
- Chapter V.: Of the Probative Force of Evidence.
- Chapter VI.: Degrees of Persuasion and Probative Force, How Measured.
- Chapter VII.: Of the Foundation Or Cause of Belief In Testimony.
- Chapter VIII.: Modes of Incorrectness In Testimony.
- Chapter IX.: General View of the Psychological Causes of Correctness and Completeness, With Their Contraries, Incorrectness and Incompleteness, In Testimony.
- Chapter X.: Of the Intellectual Causes of Correctness and Completeness In Testimony, With Their Opposites.
- Chapter XI.: Of the Moral Causes of Correctness and Completeness In Testimony, With Their Opposites.
- Chapter XII.: Ground of Persuasion In the Case of the Judge—can Decision On His Own Knowledge, Without Evidence From External Sources, Be Well Grounded?
- Book II.: —on the Securities For the Trustworthiness of Testimony.
- Chapter I.: Object of the Present Book.
- Chapter II.: Dangers to Be Guarded Against, In Regard to Testimony, By the Arrangements Suggested In This Book.
- Chapter III.: Internal and External Securities For the Trustworthiness of Testimony Enumerated.
- Chapter IV.: On the Internal Securities For Trustworthiness In Testimony.
- Chapter V.: Of Punishment, Considered As a Security For the Trustworthiness of Testimony.
- Chapter VI.: Of the Ceremony of an Oath, Considered As a Security For the Trustworthiness of Testimony.
- Chapter VII.: Of Shame, Considered As a Security For the Trustworthiness of Testimony.
- Chapter VIII.: Of Writing, Considered As a Security For the Trustworthiness of Testimony.
- Chapter IX.: Of Interrogation, Considered As a Security For the Trustworthiness of Testimony.
- Chapter X.: Of Publicity and Privacy, As Applied to Judicature In General, and to the Collection of the Evidence In Particular.
- Additional Notes to Books I. & II. Chiefly With Reference to Alterations Made In the Law Since the Date of the First Edition,— Viz. 1827.
- Book III.: Of the Extraction of Testimonial Evidence.
- Chapter I.: Of the Oral Mode of Interrogation.
- Chapter II.: Notes, Whether Consultable?
- Chapter III.: Of Suggestive Interrogation.
- Chapter IV.: Of Discreditive Interrogation.
- Chapter V.: Of the Demeanour of the Adverse Interrogator to the Witness, Considered In Respect of Vexation.
- Chapter VI.: Of the Notation and Recordation of Testimony.
- Chapter VII.: That the Evidence Should Be Collected By the Same Person By Whom the Decision Is to Be Pronounced.
- Chapter VIII.: Five Modes of Interrogation Compared.
- Chapter IX.: Epistolary Mode of Interrogation, In What Cases Applicable.
- Chapter X.: Epistolary Mode of Interrogation, How to Apply It to the Best Advantage.
- Chapter XI.: Helps to Recollection, How Far Compatible With Obstructions to Invention?
- Chapter XII.: Of Re-examination, Repetition, Or Recolement.
- Chapter XIII.: Of Spontaneous Or Uninterrogated Testimony.
- Chapter XIV.: General View of the Incongruities of English Law In Respect of the Extraction of Evidence.
- Chapter XV.: Mode of Extraction In English Common-law Procedure—its Incongruities.
- Chapter XVI.: Mode of Extraction In English Equity Procedure—its Incongruities.
- Chapter XVII.: Mode of Extraction In English Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Courts—its Incongruities.
- Chapter XVIII.: Incongruities of Roman Law In Respect of the Extraction of Evidence.
- Chapter XIX.: Of Confrontation Under the Roman Law.
- Chapter XX.: Recapitulation.
- Book IV.: Of Preappointed Evidence.
- Chapter I.: Of Preappointed Evidence In General.
- Chapter II.: Of Instruments of Contract In General.
- Chapter III.: Of the Enforcement of Formalities In the Case of Contracts.
- Chapter IV.: Formalities, What Proper, and In What Cases?
- Chapter V.: Of Wills, As Distinguished From Other Contracts.
- Chapter VI.: Of Preappointed Evidence, Considered As Applied to Laws.
- Chapter VII.: Of Public Offices At Large, Considered As Repositories and Sources of Preappointed Evidence. *
- Chapter VIII.: Of Official Evidence, As Furnished By Judicial Offices.
- Chapter IX.: Of Preappointed Evidence, Considered As Applied to Legally-operative Facts At Large.
- Chapter X.: Of the Registration of Genealogical Facts, Viz. Deaths, Births, and Marriages.
- Chapter XI.: Of Offices For Conservation of Transcripts of Contracts. *
- Chapter XII.: Of the Principle of Preappointed Evidence As Exemplified In the Case of Real Evidence (evidence From Things.)
SECTION IV.
END, OR FINAL CAUSE OF THE INSTITUTION—JUDGE AND CO.’S SINISTER INTEREST.
Benefit of trade—security of property in case of trade—are not, then, the real objects, or among the real objects, to the attainment of which the infliction as applied in this case has been directed.
What, then, has been the real object? In this, as in every other quarter of judge-made law, the advancement of the sinister interest of the makers:—the interest of the sceptre, the interest of the purse, and the interest of the pillow;—the increase of power to the judges,—the putting of money into the pocket of Judge and Co.—and the saving of trouble to the judges.
If within the same walls within which the blameless debtor lies stretched upon a bed of wretchedness, or without a bed lies stretched on the floor—the fraudulent debtor lead a life of ease and plenty—it is because it is the interest of judges, that he who comes thither with other men’s money in his pocket should lead that life. Whether it operate in the shape of fees received by his own hand;—whether it operate in the shape of patronage—that is, in other words, fees received by the hands of a nominee—the force and effect of sinister interest is still the same;—with only this difference, that, received by the hands of a nominee, the value of a mass of fees is sometimes, though not always, less when received by the patron through the hands of a nominee, than when received immediately into his own.
Under the name of rent, or under some other name, the comforts enjoyed in a jail by a dishonest debtor are bought with the money of the injured creditor—bought of the jailor: and it is generally by some judge that the jailor is stationed in this his profitable post.
The difference between the rate of mortality in the aggregate body of imprisoned debtors, and the rate of mortality among persons at liberty, would give the number of deaths of which, though not for the purposes of punishment, yet for other purposes, the judges with just reason may and ought to be considered as the authors:—viz. in the joint ratio of the facility with which, if such were their wish, the abuse might be done away, and of the advantage which in every shape they derive from the maintenance of it.
How slight, in comparison, would be the responsibility of an English Chief-Justice, if on the score of untimely death produced by imprisonment for debt, he had no more to answer for than Su-raja Dowla had for the mortality in the black hole!
People of England! when will you open your eyes?—how long will ye be the dupes of sophistry, hypocrisy, and masquerade?
The nature of things will not change itself for the accommodation of English judges. Without evidence, there never has been, never will be, never can be, any such thing as justice. Resolved never to hear evidence—they are resolved never to do justice.
Believe, Honourable Gentlemen—believe, noble and learned Lords—the subject swarms with difficulties: difficulties indeed but too mighty. But the seat and source of them,—where is it? In the nature of the case? Not there indeed: but in the nature of the men from whose hands, if from any, the remedy would have to come. In finding out what is most fitting to be done, in that there is little difficulty. The difficulty is in prevailing upon men, whose interest it is that it should not be done, to cause it to be done, or so much as endure to see it done.
“The House will pause”—“I am not prepared to say”—“Your Lordships will pause:” such are the set phrases in which it would be postponed. Prepared to say? When will you be prepared to sacrifice your interest?
Hear evidence—distinguish between right and wrong—distinguish between degrees of guilt—distinguish between guilt and innocence. Give yourselves at least the possibility of doing so:—No, not you indeed:—it is too much trouble. These are the duties that sit so heavy on you: these are the shapes, the very idea of labour in which is, even in prospect, so intolerable.
Distinguish between guilt and innocence? No: we are not used to it—we cannot bear it—the fatigue would be intolerable.
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