The Online Library of Liberty

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• Errata—vol. III.
• Defence of Usury; Showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints On the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains; In Letters to a Friend.
• Letter I.: Introduction.
• Letter II.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Usury.
• Letter III.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Prodigality.
• Letter IV.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Indigence.
• Letter V.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Simplicity.
• Letter VI.: Mischiefs of the Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VII.: Efficacy of Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VIII.: Virtual Usury Allowed.
• Letter IX.: Blackstone Considered.
• Letter X.: Grounds of the Prejudices Against Usury.
• Letter XI.: Compound Interest.
• Letter XII.: Maintenance and Champerty.
• Letter XIII.: To Dr. Smith, On Projects In Arts, &c.
• A Manual of Political Economy: Now First Edited From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: Introduction. *
• Chapter II.: Analytical Survey of the Field of Political Economy.
• Chapter III.: Of Wealth.
• Chapter IV.: Of Population.
• Chapter V.: Of Finance.
• Chapter VI.: Operation of a Sinking Fund On the Production of Wealth.
• Chapter VII.: Noscenda.
• Observations On the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; Especially With a Reference to the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of July 1820.
• Preface.: Observations, &c.
• Section I.: Nature of the Prohibitory System.
• Section II.: Mischiefs of the Prohibitory System.
• Section III.: Causes of the Prohibitory System.
• A Plan For Saving All Trouble and Expense In the Transfer of Stock, and For Enabling the Proprietors to Receive Their Dividends Without Powers of Attorney, Or Attendance At the Bank of England, By the Conversion of Stock Into Note Annuities.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Plan For the Creation, Emission, Payment, and Eventual Extension, of a Proposed New Species of Government Paper, Under the Name of Annuity Notes.
• Chapter II.: Form of an Annuity Note. (see Table II.)
• Chapter III.: Comparison of the Proposed, With the Existing Government Securities, &c.
• Chapter IV.: Grounds of Expectation, In Regard to the Proposed Measure.
• Chapter V.: Financial Advantages.
• Chapter VI.: Advantage By Addition to National Capital.
• Chapter VII.: Advantage By Addition to Commercial Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Particular Interests Concerned.
• Chapter IX.: Rise of Prices—how to Obviate.
• Chapter X.: Reduction of Interest—proposed Mode Compared With Mr. Pelham’s.
• Chapter XI.: Moral Advantages.
• Chapter XII.: Constitutional Advantages.
• Chapter XIII.: Recapitulation and Conclusion.
• Appendix A.: Government Ought to Have the Monopoly of Paper Money, As Well As of Metallic Money.
• Appendix B.: Paper Money—causes Why Not Circulated By Government Without Interest, As Well As By Individuals.
• General View of a Complete Code of Laws.
• Chapter I.: General Division.
• Chapter II.: Relations Between the Laws Concerning Offences, Rights, Obligations, and Services.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between the Penal and Civil Code.
• Chapter IV.: Of Method.
• Chapter V.: Plan of the Penal Code.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Division of Offences.
• Chapter VIII. Titles of the Penal Code.
• Chapter IX.: First General Title of the Civil Code, * of Things.
• Chapter X.: Second General Title of the Civil Code. of Places.
• Chapter XI.: Third General Title of the Civil Code. of Times.
• Chapter XII.: Fourth General Title of the Civil Code. of Services.
• Chapter XIII.: Fifth General Title of the Civil Code. of Obligations.
• Chapter XIV.: Sixth General Title of the Civil Code. of Rights.
• Chapter XV.: Seventh General Title of the Civil Code. of Collative and Ablative Events.
• Chapter XVI.: Eighth General Title of the Civil Code. of Contracts.
• Chapter XVII.: Ninth General Title of the Civil Code. of the Domestic and Civil States.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tenth General Title of the Civil Code. of Persons Capable of Acquiring and of Contracting.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Particular Titles of the Civil Code.
• Chapter XX.: Of Elementary Political Powers.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Elementary Political Powers— Subject Continued.
• Chapter XXII.: Plan of the Political Code.
• Chapter XXIII.: Plan of the International Code.
• Chapter XXIV.: Plan of the Maritime Code.
• Chapter XXV.: Plan of the Military Code.
• Chapter XXVI.: Plan of the Ecclesiastical Code.
• Chapter XXVII.: Plan of Remuneratory Laws.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Of Political Economy.
• Chapter XXIX.: Plan of the Financial Code.
• Chapter XXX.: Plan of Procedure Code.
• Chapter XXXI.: Of the Integrality of the Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of Purity In the Composition of a Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Of the Style of the Laws.
• Chapter XXXIV.: Of the Interpretation, Conservation, and Improvement of a Code.
• Pannomial Fragments.
• Chapter I.: General Observations.
• Chapter II.: Consideranda.
• Chapter III.: Expositions.
• Chapter IV.: Axioms.
• Nomography; Or the Art of Inditing Laws: Now First Published From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: The Subject Stated.
• Chapter II.: Relations.
• Chapter III.: Proper End In View.
• Chapter IV.: Imperfections Primary.
• Chapter V.: Explanations Relative to the Imperfections of the Second Order.
• Chapter VI.: Of Remedies. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Language.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Perfections of Which the Legislative Style Is Susceptible.
• Chapter IX.: Of Forms of Enactment.
• Appendix. Logical Arrangements, Or Instruments of Invention and Discovery
• Equity Dispatch Court Proposal; Containing a Plan For the Speedy and Unexpensive Termination of the Suits Now Depending In Equity Courts. With the Form of a Petition, and Some Account of a Proposed Bill For That Purpose
• Section I.: Purpose Explained. Jeremy Bentham to the Honest and Afflicted Among Equity Suitors.
• Section II.: Equity Suitors’ Petition For Dispatch Court. to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, —
• Section III.: Dispatch Court Bill—some Account of It.
• Section IV.: Information Requisite From Petitioning Suitors.
• Equity Dispatch Court Bill: Being a Bill For the Institution of an Experimental Judicatory Under the Name of the Court of Dispatch, For Exemplifying In Practice the Manner In Which the Proposed Summary May Be Substituted to the So Called Regular Sy
• Editor’s Note.
• Preface.
• Preamble.
• Part I.—: Judiciary.
• Section I.: Judge Located, How.
• Section II.: Remuneration.
• Section III.: Registrar, &c.
• Section IV.: Eleemosynary Advocate.
• Section V.: Judges’, &c. Deputes.
• Section VI.: Judge’s Powers—exemptions—checks.
• Section VII.: Prehensors and Messengers.
• Section VIII.: Consignees; * Or Say, In-trust-holders.
• Section IX.: Grounds of Decision For the Dispatch Court Judge.
• Section X. ‡: Suits’ Comparative Suitableness; and Order of Cognizance.
• Section XI.: Auxiliary Judges and Accountants.
• Section XII.: Sittings, Times Of.
• Part II.—: Procedure.
• Section XIII.: Definitions. *
• Section XIV.: Examination of Solicitors.
• Section XV.: Initiatory Examination of Parties, &c.
• Section XVI.: Appropriate Intercourse, Constant and Universal, Secured.
• Section XVII.: Mutual Security For Forthcomingness of Persons and Things. ‡
• Section XVIII.: Evidence-procuring Money, How Provided.
• Section XIX.: Subsequential Evidence, How Elicited.
• Section XX.: Execution, How Performed.
• Section XXI.: Equity Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXII.: Dispatch Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXIII.: Eventual Retrotransference of a Suit to the Equity Court.
• Section XXIV.: Expense of the Court, How Provided For.
• Supplemental Sections:—
• Section I. Or XXV.: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
• Section II. Or XXVI.: Henceforward Dispatch Court.
• Schedules to the Bill.
• Plan of Parliamentary Reform, In the Form of a Catechism, With Reasons For Each Article: With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform.
• Introduction.
• Section I.: History of the Ensuing Tract—alarming State of the Country and the Constitution.
• Section II.: Most Prominent Present Grievance, Gareisoning France.
• Section III.: Causes of the Above and All Other Mischiefs:—particular Interests Monarchical and Aristocratical, Adverse to the Universal—their Ascendency.
• Section IV.: Sole Remedy In Principle—democratic Ascendency.
• Section V.: Remedy In Detail: Radical Parliamentary Reform: Elementary Arrangements In This Edition of It—their Necessity.
• Section VI.: Differences Between This and the Original Editions of Radical Reform.
• Section VII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage Further Considered.
• Section VIII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.
• Section IX.: Freedom of Suffrage Further Explained—seductive Influence—its Forms, Instruments, &c.
• Section X.: Bribery and Terrorism Compared.
• Section XI.: Purchase of Seats—in What Cases Mischievous—in What Beneficial.
• Section XII.: Secresy of Suffrage—its Importance Further Developed.
• Section XIII.: Exclusion of Placemen, &c. From the Right of Voting—mischievousness and Profligacy of the Opposite Arrangement.
• Section XIV.: Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.
• Section XV.: Representatives—impermanence of Their Situation—its Importance:—objections—their Groundlessness.
• Section XVI.: Moderate Reform—its Arrangements—their Inadequacy.
• Section XVII.: Trienniality Inadequate;—annuality Necessary.
• Section XVIII.: Interests Adverse to Adequate Reform—support Given By Them to Moderate, to the Exclusion of Radical: Tories—whigs—people’s Men.
• Catechism of Parliamentary Reform; Or, Outline of a Plan of Parliamentary Reform; In the Form of Question and Answer; With Reasons to Each Article.
• Section I.: Ends to Be Aimed At On the Occasion of Parliamentary Reform.
• Section II.: Means, Conducive Towards These Ends.
• Section III.: Means—their Uses, With Reference to Their Respective Ends.
• Section IV.: Means Conducive to Aptitude In Members: I. Placemen Not to Vote, Nor to Be Seated By Election.
• Section V.: Means, &c. Continued.—ii. Placemen Seated By the King, With Speech and Motion, Without Vote.
• Section VI.: Means, &c. Continued.—iii. Elections Frequent—annual.
• Section VII.: Means, &c. Continued.—iv. Speeches Authentically and Promptly Published.
• Section VIII.: Means, &c. Continued.—v. Attendance, Punctual and General, Secured.
• Section IX.: Inconveniences Incident to Elections, and Election Judicature.
• Section X.: Election Inconveniences—means For Their Removal.
• Section XI.: Collateral Advantages, Referable to the Situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.
• A Sketch of the Various Proposals For a Constitutional Reform In the Representation of the People, Introduced Into the Parliament of Great Britain, From 1770 to 1812.
• Radical Reform Bill, With Extracts From the Reasons.
• Preliminary Explanations.
• Title of the Proposed Act.
• Preamble.
• Section 1.—: Seats and Districts.
• Section 2.—: Electors, Who.
• Section 3.—: Eligible, Who.
• Section 4.—: Election Offices.
• Section 5.: Election Apparatus.
• Section 6.—: Promulgation of Recommendations In Favour of Proposed Members.
• Section 7.—: Voters’ Titles Pre-established.
• Section 8.—: Election, How.
• Section 9.: Election Districts and Polling Districts, How Marked Out.
• Section 10.—: Vote-making Habitations, How Defined.
• Section 11.—: Members’ Continuance.
• Section 12.—: Vacancies Supplied.
• Section 13.—: Security For the House Against Disturbance By Members. †
• Section 14.—: Indisposition of Speakers Obviated.
• Appendix, Including General Explanations.
• Radicalism Not Dangerous. Extracted From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham. *
• Part I.—: Introduction.
• Section I.: Radical Reform Bill Recapitulated.
• Section II.: Persuasion of the Dangerousness of Radicalism—cause of It, and of the Vituperative Expression Given to It.
• Section III.: Terms of the Accusation,—speeches From the Throne, 16 Th July and 21 St November 1819.
• Section IV.: The Accusation In General Terms—counter-averment.
• Section V.: Plan of This Defence.
• Part II.—: Deference From the General Nature of the Case.
• Section I.: Conditions Necessary to a Man’s Embarking In Such a Design.
• Section VII.: Concurrence In Any Other Extensive Plan of Spoliation Impossible.
• Section VIII.: Concurrence of Any Constituted Authorities Impossible.
• Section IX.: Accomplishment Impossible—design Impossible.
• Section X.: The Talked-of Spunge No Proof of the Design.
• Part III.—: Defence From Experience In the Case of the United States.
• Part IV.: Defence From Particular Experience In the Case of Ireland: Years 1777 Or 1778, to 1783.
• Section I.: Analogy Between This and the Previous Case.
• Section II.: Democratic Ascendency, How Produced.
• Section III.: Fruit of Democratic Ascendency a Golden Age.
• Section IV.: Coincidence of Its Characters With Those of Radicalism.
• Section VI.: Extinction of Democratic Ascendency and Reform—restoration of Monarchico-aristocratical Ascendency, and Its Consequences.
• Conclusion.

SECTION III.

TERMS OF THE ACCUSATION,—SPEECHES FROM THE THRONE, 16^th JULY AND 21^st NOVEMBER 1819.

Thus stands the accusation, as far as could be collected from those vague generalities which have been so abundant, and in which alone the adversaries of radical reform have ever ventured to express themselves.

Looking with persevering anxiety for something in a tangible shape from some persons of the one party or the other who had a name, it was with no small satisfaction in this respect, with how much dismay soever on other accounts, that I found at last what I wanted, and in the place to which I should from the first have looked for it.

The charge, such as it is, will be found collected from two speeches from the throne: the one that of 13th July 1819; the other, that of 23d November 1819.

“Those whose projects, if successful,” says the July speech, “could only aggravate the evils which it is professed to remedy: and who, under pretence of reform, have really no other object than the subversion of our happy constitution.” To these persons “machinations” are imputed, and these machinations Lords and Gentlemen are immediately called upon, “in co-operation with the magistracy, to use their utmost endeavours, on return to their several counties, to defeat.”

On this occasion, by Lords and Gentlemen in their aggregate character, nothing is as yet called upon to be done—so far, so good. For, how great soever the evil, by the mere aim at producing it, unaccompanied with any probability of its being produced, no sufficient warrant for any coercive or otherwise burthensome measure could assuredly be afforded. Unhappily, this reserve did not long continue.

Here, as yet, on reform itself, neither in the radical shape, nor in any other, is any determinate imputation directly cast. It is only “on pretence of reform” that the “machinations” are alleged to have been carried on.

Is it then that by radical reform, supposing the “machinations” in question “successful,” the “subversion” in question would be produced? This is not directly said. But this is what is at any rate insinuated: and it is in the view of causing everybody to believe it, that this language is employed.

The object declared to be aimed at is—“the subversion of our happy constitution.” Of the evil in question, the alleged cause cannot therefore but be a design by which the constitution would be affected: and that by parliamentary reform in any shape, the constitution would in a certain way be affected, cannot be denied: and this was the only design on foot by which any such effect could be produced. By depredation and violent destruction of property, let evil to ever so vast an amount have been produced, the constitution would remain untouched.

Now as to the November speech:—and there, though never otherwise than in the way of allusion and insinuation, reform, radical reform, may be seen but too sufficiently designated. A ground is premised for the “measures” about to be proposed: “measures requisite for the counteraction and suppression of the system” alluded to. This ground is stated as constituted by “a spirit utterly hostile to the constitution of this kingdom, and aiming,* not only at the change† of those political institutions which have hitherto constituted the pride and security of this country, but at the subversion of the rights of property,‡ and of all order in society.”

Taking the two speeches together:—here then are two evil designs charged—charged on the same class of persons, namely all reformists—meaning, or at the least including, all radical reformists.

In the July speech, the design is the subversion of the constitution,—that design, and no other. In the November speech, it is “the subversion of the rights of property.” Of the design first charged, the description given has no determinate meaning. Accordingly, no mention would have been made of it, but for the intimate connexion between the speech by which this accusation is conveyed, and the other speech by which the other accusation is conveyed.

In defending the design of the radicals against the imputation that has been cast upon it, it seemed not sufficient to defend it against the imputation of a tendency to produce evil in the particular shape designated by the words, “the subversion of the rights of property.” For supposing that, although it were clear of that imputation, it were not clear of the imputation of preponderant evil in some other shape or shapes—on this supposition it would still remain indefensible.

To the denial of its tendency to produce evil in that particular shape, it therefore seemed necessary to prefix a denial of its tendency to produce preponderant evil in any shape. It has become necessary to add to the more particular counter-averment a more general one. But a counter-averment implies a correspondent original averment, to which it stands opposed. The original averment, then—where in this case shall we find it?—Answer: If anywhere, it must be in the abovequoted words—“aiming at the subversion of the constitution.”

Now this subversion, either it means nothing at all, or what it means amounts to this, namely, a preponderant mass of evil—a mass of evil presenting a net amount over and above whatsoever good in any shape will have been produced by the same cause. Yes, preponderant evil; for as to the being simply productive of evil, that cannot be matter of charge against any political measure whatsoever. Taken by itself, coercion in any shape, by whatsoever hand applied—whether any private hand, or the hand of Government itself—is evil. Government the most perfect that imagination itself could frame, would still be but a choice of evils.

If, then, the effect of the imputed design, supposing it carried into effect, were anything less than the production of preponderant evil, it would not constitute the matter of a charge. But this supposed preponderant evil, in what determinate shape are we to look for it? To this question, the charge has not furnished an answer. Yet in this charge, and in the other (that about property,) to which, it being less indeterminate, a determinate answer will be given—will be seen the sole ground of those disastrous laws, by which disaffection has been more abundantly propagated than by any of the writings which they are employed to repress.

Thus it is, that to do anything they please—to destroy any man, or any number of men they please, and in any manner they please—it costs those under whom we yet live, no more than a phrase with half-a-dozen words in it: and that this phrase should have anything belonging to it that can be called a meaning, is not necessary. In the present instance, so empty of meaning is the phrase, that with all the hapless labour, the bitter fruits of which have been seen, I have been reduced to find one for it—to make one for it in the way of inference.

Note—that for the general counter-averment there will be found more use than what might readily have been imagined. In the course of this defence, one argument will be seen by which the state of things aimed at by radical reform is cleared of the more particular charge of a tendency to produce preponderant evil, in the shape of the subversion of the rights of property; it will be seen cleared of the charge of a tendency to produce preponderant evil in any shape; and not only so, but it will be shown by experience to have been productive of effects, which the most determined opponents of radical reform will not deny to have been replete with preponderant good. This refers to the case of Ireland, of which mention will presently be made.

[* ]Aiming.] In this word may be seen the temper and disposition of the men by whom the means were proposed and concurred in. Except in so far as success is more or less probable, what need is there, and thence what ground is there, for new coercive laws, or so much as for punishment under the old? But vengeance was at heart, and discernment was blinded by it.

[† ]Change.] The political institutions, good and bad together, being like the laws of the Medes and Persians declared immutable, for the purpose of perpetuating the bad, and the imperfection of the good—hence the mere act of aiming at a change, be it ever so good, is denounced as a crime—as the crime of some, for which, lest vengeance should remain unsatiated, all are to be punished.

[‡ ]Aiming at the subversion of all order in society, being a phrase utterly void of meaning—a phrase designative of nothing but the state of the understanding and the passions, on the part of those by whom it is employed, is, in its nature, incapable of an answer, other than what is given by the mention thus made of it.