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Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow SECTION II.: PERSUASION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF RADICALISM—CAUSE OF IT, AND OF THE VITUPERATIVE EXPRESSION GIVEN TO IT. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3

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SECTION II.: PERSUASION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF RADICALISM—CAUSE OF IT, AND OF THE VITUPERATIVE EXPRESSION GIVEN TO IT. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3 [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 3.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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SECTION II.

PERSUASION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF RADICALISM—CAUSE OF IT, AND OF THE VITUPERATIVE EXPRESSION GIVEN TO IT.

That in a point of such vital importance,—a point in comparison with which all that are to be found in the whole field of politics are, separately taken, as nothing—because collectively they are all comprehended in it—the question in dispute should on one side, without any exception, be taken for granted—that in this case a proceeding which in every other case would be universally acknowledged to be contrary to reason, should have been so universally prosecuted, has at times struck me as perhaps the most extraordinary phenomenon that has ever yet presented itself to the intellectual world.

Be it more or less extraordinary, the solution of it may, I think, be found in the following considerations:—

Whatsoever be the subject to which it has ever happened to them to apply themselves, the weakest and the strongest are upon a par. If they take upon themselves to decide, their decisions are equally liable to be erroneous—erroneous to any degree of absurdity. Interest, with or without internal consciousness on the part of the individual, is in every case capable of producing this state of vacuity. When, the instant he veers to put his mind in such a direction as to view the object in question in a point of view in which it would produce in his mind an unpleasant sensation,—in such case, unless he finds himself under the pressure of an irresistible obligation, he turns from it of course.

Thus it is with thousands upon thousands in the present case. Looking at radical reform, a man sees nothing for himself or his friends to gain by it. On the contrary, he sees more or less that it seems to him he and they would lose by it. Why then should he give himself the trouble of fixing his eyes on that side? A mode much less unpleasant, and as it appears to him a sufficiently safe one, is to hear what his friends say on the subject, and to take his opinion on it from them. It is sufficiently safe; for among them he beholds those whose capacity of forming a right judgment on a question of this sort occupies the highest place in his eyes. It is not only a pleasant course, but it is the only one which he would not find intolerably irksome. By adopting the other course, he would not only have the pain of receiving disagreeable truths—truths, to himself—abstraction made of all other persons—personally disagreeable, but by doing so he would render himself disagreeable to his friends; he would perhaps lose the only society he has immediate access to—the society in which he beholds whatsoever he most values—the principal, if not the only object of his affection and respect.

As to inconvenience, either in entertaining or in deducing the opinion in question—of no such inconvenience does he expose himself to the smallest risk. No concern need he give himself on the subject: the opinion is ready found to his hands—the opinion and the sort of language—the only sort of language, that need be employed in the support of it. Wild and visionary—absurd, visionary, senseless, mischievous, destructive; by the leading hound in the pack the cry is commenced: the others have nothing to do but join in it. The principal singer has sung the solo part: the others in chorus have but to repeat it.

The course of a man’s conduct having been determined by his private interest, or at least by his opinion of his private interest, the language he employs is that which presents itself to him as best suited to the support of that private interest. If he can find nothing more promising, in speaking of any measure by which he regards his interest as being opposed, he deals with it like Earl Grey, and says it is absurd, visionary, and senseless—or like Lord John, and says it is wild and visionary. This done, other men on the same side, thinking that a man who speaks so well as Earl Grey does, would not, in a matter of such vital importance, speak so decidedly without due consideration, join with him and cry, “absurd, visionary, and senseless;” whereas, all the consideration ever bestowed upon the matter by the noble leader, was, how to excuse himself from adopting a measure, which, while it agreed so well with the public interest, agreed so ill with his private interest, and what form of words afforded the fairest promise of answering that purpose: and these were the words that happened to present themselves.

Not that, even if it were fit to be employed in other respects, I could, consistently with perfect truth, think myself warranted in retorting upon Earl Grey his word senseless, or deny that by Lord John the object of his vituperation was really regarded as impracticable.

Visionary indeed the plan would be, if in it were regarded the assumption that by a man situated as Earl Grey is, a plan so nearly in unison with the sentiments formerly professed by him could find support—could find anything better than the most strenuous opposition. Visionary indeed would be any expectation that could be entertained of its finding favour in his sight. Impracticable there need be no doubt of its being regarded by Lord John, since it was not natural that he should regard it as capable of being carried against that opposition, in his concurrence with which he was so fully determined.