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SECTION I.: RADICAL REFORM BILL RECAPITULATED. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3 [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 3.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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SECTION I.

RADICAL REFORM BILL RECAPITULATED.

On the 6th of December last (1819,) was submitted to the consideration of the public, a tract entitled “Bentham’s Radical Reform Bill, with extracts from the reasons.” The tenor of this proposed Bill was preceded and introduced by “Preliminary Explanations,” in which the several features of Radical Reform were brought to view, with the uses and advantages which presented themselves as attached to each. Secrecy of suffrage—virtual universality of suffrage—practical equality of effect and value as between right and right of suffrage—with annuality of suffrage, are there given as the four elements of which the aggregate called Radical Reform is in my view of it composed.

Secrecy, as being the only security for genuineness of suffrage, is there stated as being of more importance than all the other elements put together.

Virtual universality was there proposed as being the only degree of extent which seemed either defensible on principle, or capable of affording any assured promise of giving universal satisfaction, or any near approach to it. In regard to extent, I for my part, if it depended on me, would gladly compound for householder suffrage; but I do not see how those who on this plan would be excluded from the right of suffrage, and also would perhaps constitute a majority of male adults, should be satisfied with such exclusion; and being myself unable to find what appears to me a reason in favour of it, I must leave the task to those who consider themselves able to accomplish it.

Absolute equality being physically impossible, if equality be at all regarded, practical equality must of necessity be substituted. Local convenience cannot but prescribe—and that through the whole country—a degree of departure more or less considerable. But to say that in any instance such departure should be prescribed by it as shall render the votes in the most populous district more than four times more numerous than the votes in the most thinly peopled district, seems altogether beyond the bounds of probability.

As compared with trienniality of suffrage, annuality did not present itself to me as being of that importance that should prevent me, on the supposition of its depending upon myself, from surrendering it, on condition of obtaining trienniality—with secrecy of suffrage, equality of suffrage, and householder suffrage; but if asked for a reason, I am no more able to give what appears to me a reason in favour of it in preference to annuality, than I am to give what appears to me a reason in favour of householder suffrage in preference to virtually universal suffrage.

On the ground of precedent and experience:—In favour of annuality, I see the ancient parliamentary practice in England, the existing practice in the governing body of the metropolis of the empire, and the practice in every one of the American United States: in every instance without alleged inconvenience in any shape. In support of trienniality, I see nothing but the epithet “moderate,” which those who adhere to it insist on bestowing on it. When proposed, it seems commonly to be proposed without the addition of either secrecy of suffrage, virtual universality of suffrage, or so much as practical equality of sufrage; and on these terms I see not any effect good or bad that can be produced by it, except the giving additional frequency to a contest of which the evils are undeniable—and which,—abstraction made of a faint chance of ulterior change,—produces not any the smallest change on the state of the representation, leaving uncorrected and unpalliated all the abuses and evils, the hope of eradicating which, presents the only possible use and demand for the system which it professes to give.

Against Radical Reform as above explained, unless the above-mentioned word moderate be regarded as a reason, I had for a long time been unable to discover any nearer approach to a reason, than a sort of language which in writing is to written reason, what bellowing or barking, or an inarticulate yell, is to reason in the form of spoken language.

On the Tory side of Honourable and Right Honourable House, and other honourable places, “subversion of all order,” and “subversion of the Constitution:” on the Whig side, “absurd, visionary, and senseless; wild and impracticable,” and so forth: and in the principal Whig newspapers, such is every now and then the agreement with the Tories, as to produce passages such as these:—“Senseless schemes of reform, which if realized, would plunge us into anarchy and confusion.”*

When from such pens as Earl Grey’s and Lord John Russell’s not in addition to argument, but in lieu of all argument—of all attempt at argument—nothing is to be found but a set of words in which, in addition to the assumption of the thing in dispute, nothing but an expression of passion is to be found, what inference more natural, not to say conclusive, than this, namely, that it was by the experienced inability of finding anything in the way of argument to adduce on that side, that that uneasiness had been produced which gave itself vent, and sought relief in words such as these? The pen, I say, and this not only in speaking of Lord John Russell, but of Earl Grey: the reasons which I have in view are those of his Lordship’s speech in 1810, and his Fox-Dinner Newcastle speech, [19th September] 1817. For nothing can be more evident than that, before or after the lips, it was from the pen of the noble Earl that the discourses which in these instances bear his name proceeded.

If it were required of me to give a model of inanity, I know not where a more finished model of that sort of composition, among so many as the public is daily favoured with, could be referred to. If intellectual could like physical gas be compressed within a given space, it should have had a place at length: but as this cannot be done, all that can be done here is to give reference to the place where it may be seen at full length, coupled with the intimation of the observations which the reader should have in view in reading it.

Thus much as to the footing on which the question of the usefulness of radical reform appears to have stood till lately. But of late the aversion to the proposed change in question has given itself vent in objections of a more determinate shape. In radical reform is viewed as an effect, of which with greater or less certainty it is viewed as pregnant,—a general destruction of property,—whether from a proposed scheme of equal division, supposed to be in the contemplation of reformists, or from, it is not exactly said what, other cause.

In this instance, it is true, as in every other, what is asserted is taken for granted,—assumed as certain without so much as an attempt to give a reason why it should be regarded in that light. Here, however, though without proof or attempt at proof, we have something determinate in the shape of an assertion. Here, for the first time, is a something presenting itself in what is called a tangible shape. Here is a something which in its nature is capable of being taken hold of, and taken hold of it shall accordingly be, that by its being sifted to the bottom the impartial reader, if peradventure any such person is to be found, may see what it is worth.

But (says somebody) a question that will naturally be presenting itself to the mind of a reader is, for whose use is it that this disquisition of yours is intended? To this question I will give a plain answer. The aggregate mass of hostile readers I divide for the purpose into the sincere and the insincere. By the sincere I mean all such persons as either by such reflection as they themselves have bestowed on the subject,—i. e. by a self-formed judgment, or by the assertion made by others, sincere or insincere,—i. e. by a derivative judgment derived from the authority of the opinion or supposed opinion of those others,—have been led to adopt the alarming apprehension. If there were not persons in no small number, to whom in my own opinion this description is truly applicable, these pages would not—could not—have had existence. The labour being on that supposition without hope, would on that same supposition have been without a motive—an effect without a cause.

As to the insincere, these are the opponents from adverse interest. These, the more perfectly they are in their own minds convinced that no answer capable of lessening the effect of it on the minds of the sincere can be given to it, the more thoroughly they will be confirmed in the determination to maintain the most perfect silence in relation to it—the most perfect silence—and when it is forced by accident upon their notice, to put it under, by some general expression of scorn and contempt, such as they are so perfectly in the habit of employing, and accordingly seeing accepted at the hands of those who by the same interest stand engaged to bestow on it the same reception.

[* ]Morning Chronicle, 22d November 1819.

[]See Cobbett’s Parl. Debates, XVII. 559 et seq.