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• Errata—vol. III.
• Defence of Usury; Showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints On the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains; In Letters to a Friend.
• Letter I.: Introduction.
• Letter II.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Usury.
• Letter III.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Prodigality.
• Letter IV.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Indigence.
• Letter V.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Simplicity.
• Letter VI.: Mischiefs of the Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VII.: Efficacy of Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VIII.: Virtual Usury Allowed.
• Letter IX.: Blackstone Considered.
• Letter X.: Grounds of the Prejudices Against Usury.
• Letter XI.: Compound Interest.
• Letter XII.: Maintenance and Champerty.
• Letter XIII.: To Dr. Smith, On Projects In Arts, &c.
• A Manual of Political Economy: Now First Edited From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: Introduction. *
• Chapter II.: Analytical Survey of the Field of Political Economy.
• Chapter III.: Of Wealth.
• Chapter IV.: Of Population.
• Chapter V.: Of Finance.
• Chapter VI.: Operation of a Sinking Fund On the Production of Wealth.
• Chapter VII.: Noscenda.
• Observations On the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; Especially With a Reference to the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of July 1820.
• Preface.: Observations, &c.
• Section I.: Nature of the Prohibitory System.
• Section II.: Mischiefs of the Prohibitory System.
• Section III.: Causes of the Prohibitory System.
• A Plan For Saving All Trouble and Expense In the Transfer of Stock, and For Enabling the Proprietors to Receive Their Dividends Without Powers of Attorney, Or Attendance At the Bank of England, By the Conversion of Stock Into Note Annuities.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Plan For the Creation, Emission, Payment, and Eventual Extension, of a Proposed New Species of Government Paper, Under the Name of Annuity Notes.
• Chapter II.: Form of an Annuity Note. (see Table II.)
• Chapter III.: Comparison of the Proposed, With the Existing Government Securities, &c.
• Chapter IV.: Grounds of Expectation, In Regard to the Proposed Measure.
• Chapter V.: Financial Advantages.
• Chapter VI.: Advantage By Addition to National Capital.
• Chapter VII.: Advantage By Addition to Commercial Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Particular Interests Concerned.
• Chapter IX.: Rise of Prices—how to Obviate.
• Chapter X.: Reduction of Interest—proposed Mode Compared With Mr. Pelham’s.
• Chapter XI.: Moral Advantages.
• Chapter XII.: Constitutional Advantages.
• Chapter XIII.: Recapitulation and Conclusion.
• Appendix A.: Government Ought to Have the Monopoly of Paper Money, As Well As of Metallic Money.
• Appendix B.: Paper Money—causes Why Not Circulated By Government Without Interest, As Well As By Individuals.
• General View of a Complete Code of Laws.
• Chapter I.: General Division.
• Chapter II.: Relations Between the Laws Concerning Offences, Rights, Obligations, and Services.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between the Penal and Civil Code.
• Chapter IV.: Of Method.
• Chapter V.: Plan of the Penal Code.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Division of Offences.
• Chapter VIII. Titles of the Penal Code.
• Chapter IX.: First General Title of the Civil Code, * of Things.
• Chapter X.: Second General Title of the Civil Code. of Places.
• Chapter XI.: Third General Title of the Civil Code. of Times.
• Chapter XII.: Fourth General Title of the Civil Code. of Services.
• Chapter XIII.: Fifth General Title of the Civil Code. of Obligations.
• Chapter XIV.: Sixth General Title of the Civil Code. of Rights.
• Chapter XV.: Seventh General Title of the Civil Code. of Collative and Ablative Events.
• Chapter XVI.: Eighth General Title of the Civil Code. of Contracts.
• Chapter XVII.: Ninth General Title of the Civil Code. of the Domestic and Civil States.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tenth General Title of the Civil Code. of Persons Capable of Acquiring and of Contracting.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Particular Titles of the Civil Code.
• Chapter XX.: Of Elementary Political Powers.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Elementary Political Powers— Subject Continued.
• Chapter XXII.: Plan of the Political Code.
• Chapter XXIII.: Plan of the International Code.
• Chapter XXIV.: Plan of the Maritime Code.
• Chapter XXV.: Plan of the Military Code.
• Chapter XXVI.: Plan of the Ecclesiastical Code.
• Chapter XXVII.: Plan of Remuneratory Laws.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Of Political Economy.
• Chapter XXIX.: Plan of the Financial Code.
• Chapter XXX.: Plan of Procedure Code.
• Chapter XXXI.: Of the Integrality of the Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of Purity In the Composition of a Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Of the Style of the Laws.
• Chapter XXXIV.: Of the Interpretation, Conservation, and Improvement of a Code.
• Pannomial Fragments.
• Chapter I.: General Observations.
• Chapter II.: Consideranda.
• Chapter III.: Expositions.
• Chapter IV.: Axioms.
• Nomography; Or the Art of Inditing Laws: Now First Published From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: The Subject Stated.
• Chapter II.: Relations.
• Chapter III.: Proper End In View.
• Chapter IV.: Imperfections Primary.
• Chapter V.: Explanations Relative to the Imperfections of the Second Order.
• Chapter VI.: Of Remedies. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Language.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Perfections of Which the Legislative Style Is Susceptible.
• Chapter IX.: Of Forms of Enactment.
• Appendix. Logical Arrangements, Or Instruments of Invention and Discovery
• Equity Dispatch Court Proposal; Containing a Plan For the Speedy and Unexpensive Termination of the Suits Now Depending In Equity Courts. With the Form of a Petition, and Some Account of a Proposed Bill For That Purpose
• Section I.: Purpose Explained. Jeremy Bentham to the Honest and Afflicted Among Equity Suitors.
• Section II.: Equity Suitors’ Petition For Dispatch Court. to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, —
• Section III.: Dispatch Court Bill—some Account of It.
• Section IV.: Information Requisite From Petitioning Suitors.
• Equity Dispatch Court Bill: Being a Bill For the Institution of an Experimental Judicatory Under the Name of the Court of Dispatch, For Exemplifying In Practice the Manner In Which the Proposed Summary May Be Substituted to the So Called Regular Sy
• Editor’s Note.
• Preface.
• Preamble.
• Part I.—: Judiciary.
• Section I.: Judge Located, How.
• Section II.: Remuneration.
• Section III.: Registrar, &c.
• Section IV.: Eleemosynary Advocate.
• Section V.: Judges’, &c. Deputes.
• Section VI.: Judge’s Powers—exemptions—checks.
• Section VII.: Prehensors and Messengers.
• Section VIII.: Consignees; * Or Say, In-trust-holders.
• Section IX.: Grounds of Decision For the Dispatch Court Judge.
• Section X. ‡: Suits’ Comparative Suitableness; and Order of Cognizance.
• Section XI.: Auxiliary Judges and Accountants.
• Section XII.: Sittings, Times Of.
• Part II.—: Procedure.
• Section XIII.: Definitions. *
• Section XIV.: Examination of Solicitors.
• Section XV.: Initiatory Examination of Parties, &c.
• Section XVI.: Appropriate Intercourse, Constant and Universal, Secured.
• Section XVII.: Mutual Security For Forthcomingness of Persons and Things. ‡
• Section XVIII.: Evidence-procuring Money, How Provided.
• Section XIX.: Subsequential Evidence, How Elicited.
• Section XX.: Execution, How Performed.
• Section XXI.: Equity Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXII.: Dispatch Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXIII.: Eventual Retrotransference of a Suit to the Equity Court.
• Section XXIV.: Expense of the Court, How Provided For.
• Supplemental Sections:—
• Section I. Or XXV.: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
• Section II. Or XXVI.: Henceforward Dispatch Court.
• Schedules to the Bill.
• Plan of Parliamentary Reform, In the Form of a Catechism, With Reasons For Each Article: With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform.
• Introduction.
• Section I.: History of the Ensuing Tract—alarming State of the Country and the Constitution.
• Section II.: Most Prominent Present Grievance, Gareisoning France.
• Section III.: Causes of the Above and All Other Mischiefs:—particular Interests Monarchical and Aristocratical, Adverse to the Universal—their Ascendency.
• Section IV.: Sole Remedy In Principle—democratic Ascendency.
• Section V.: Remedy In Detail: Radical Parliamentary Reform: Elementary Arrangements In This Edition of It—their Necessity.
• Section VI.: Differences Between This and the Original Editions of Radical Reform.
• Section VII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage Further Considered.
• Section VIII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.
• Section IX.: Freedom of Suffrage Further Explained—seductive Influence—its Forms, Instruments, &c.
• Section X.: Bribery and Terrorism Compared.
• Section XI.: Purchase of Seats—in What Cases Mischievous—in What Beneficial.
• Section XII.: Secresy of Suffrage—its Importance Further Developed.
• Section XIII.: Exclusion of Placemen, &c. From the Right of Voting—mischievousness and Profligacy of the Opposite Arrangement.
• Section XIV.: Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.
• Section XV.: Representatives—impermanence of Their Situation—its Importance:—objections—their Groundlessness.
• Section XVI.: Moderate Reform—its Arrangements—their Inadequacy.
• Section XVII.: Trienniality Inadequate;—annuality Necessary.
• Section XVIII.: Interests Adverse to Adequate Reform—support Given By Them to Moderate, to the Exclusion of Radical: Tories—whigs—people’s Men.
• Catechism of Parliamentary Reform; Or, Outline of a Plan of Parliamentary Reform; In the Form of Question and Answer; With Reasons to Each Article.
• Section I.: Ends to Be Aimed At On the Occasion of Parliamentary Reform.
• Section II.: Means, Conducive Towards These Ends.
• Section III.: Means—their Uses, With Reference to Their Respective Ends.
• Section IV.: Means Conducive to Aptitude In Members: I. Placemen Not to Vote, Nor to Be Seated By Election.
• Section V.: Means, &c. Continued.—ii. Placemen Seated By the King, With Speech and Motion, Without Vote.
• Section VI.: Means, &c. Continued.—iii. Elections Frequent—annual.
• Section VII.: Means, &c. Continued.—iv. Speeches Authentically and Promptly Published.
• Section VIII.: Means, &c. Continued.—v. Attendance, Punctual and General, Secured.
• Section IX.: Inconveniences Incident to Elections, and Election Judicature.
• Section X.: Election Inconveniences—means For Their Removal.
• Section XI.: Collateral Advantages, Referable to the Situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.
• A Sketch of the Various Proposals For a Constitutional Reform In the Representation of the People, Introduced Into the Parliament of Great Britain, From 1770 to 1812.
• Radical Reform Bill, With Extracts From the Reasons.
• Preliminary Explanations.
• Title of the Proposed Act.
• Preamble.
• Section 1.—: Seats and Districts.
• Section 2.—: Electors, Who.
• Section 3.—: Eligible, Who.
• Section 4.—: Election Offices.
• Section 5.: Election Apparatus.
• Section 6.—: Promulgation of Recommendations In Favour of Proposed Members.
• Section 7.—: Voters’ Titles Pre-established.
• Section 8.—: Election, How.
• Section 9.: Election Districts and Polling Districts, How Marked Out.
• Section 10.—: Vote-making Habitations, How Defined.
• Section 11.—: Members’ Continuance.
• Section 12.—: Vacancies Supplied.
• Section 13.—: Security For the House Against Disturbance By Members. †
• Section 14.—: Indisposition of Speakers Obviated.
• Appendix, Including General Explanations.
• Radicalism Not Dangerous. Extracted From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham. *
• Part I.—: Introduction.
• Section I.: Radical Reform Bill Recapitulated.
• Section II.: Persuasion of the Dangerousness of Radicalism—cause of It, and of the Vituperative Expression Given to It.
• Section III.: Terms of the Accusation,—speeches From the Throne, 16 Th July and 21 St November 1819.
• Section IV.: The Accusation In General Terms—counter-averment.
• Section V.: Plan of This Defence.
• Part II.—: Deference From the General Nature of the Case.
• Section I.: Conditions Necessary to a Man’s Embarking In Such a Design.
• Section VII.: Concurrence In Any Other Extensive Plan of Spoliation Impossible.
• Section VIII.: Concurrence of Any Constituted Authorities Impossible.
• Section IX.: Accomplishment Impossible—design Impossible.
• Section X.: The Talked-of Spunge No Proof of the Design.
• Part III.—: Defence From Experience In the Case of the United States.
• Part IV.: Defence From Particular Experience In the Case of Ireland: Years 1777 Or 1778, to 1783.
• Section I.: Analogy Between This and the Previous Case.
• Section II.: Democratic Ascendency, How Produced.
• Section III.: Fruit of Democratic Ascendency a Golden Age.
• Section IV.: Coincidence of Its Characters With Those of Radicalism.
• Section VI.: Extinction of Democratic Ascendency and Reform—restoration of Monarchico-aristocratical Ascendency, and Its Consequences.
• Conclusion.

APPENDIX, INCLUDING GENERAL EXPLANATIONS.

On the present occasion, it was thought better not to incumber the text of the proposed bill with any considerable portion of the matter, which, on the supposition of its being completed, would have been to be inserted in this place. The text of this part may eventually be added, together with the reasons at large.†

Of the particulars which, in this place, there will be occasion to bring to view, the use, if any, will not be confined within the limits of the present bill: it may be seen extending itself over the whole field of legislation.

To an Appendix, on this as on other occasions, are proposed to be referred five distinguishable sorts of matter:—1. Fixation; 2. Exposition, or Explanation (including Definition;) 3. Enumeration; 4. Abbreviation; 5. Forms of Instruments. For designation, these names will, it is hoped, be found to serve. Exemplifications, as well as explanations, now follow.

1. Fixation. Instances there are, in which senses more than one being plainly enough brought to view by the word or phrase in question, doubts may have place, in which of them it was meant that they should be understood. Of the operation termed fixation, the function in these cases is—to indicate, according to the occasion, some one of those senses to the exclusion of the rest.

Take, for example, the word day.

1. On some occasions it is employed to mean a determinate portion of the time occupied by a revolution of the earth round the sun.

2. On other occasions, it is employed to mean no more than a portion of that time; namely, that portion, as far as it can be distinguished, during which the light of the sun is visible: in this latter case, the meaning is expressed without ambiguity by the words day-time, the day-time.

3. When a portion of time is spoken of, as the time within which a certain operation is required, forbidden, or permitted, to be performed,—and, for the designation of it, the word days, in the plural, preceded by the name of the number, is employed,—as for instance, five days, or ten days,—thence is liable to arise a question, whether, in the portion of time thus designated, are to be considered as included so many days, each of them entire; or whether the intention will be satisfied if the first only, or the last only, or both the first and the last, are respectively but the portion of a day. It is on these occasions, that in common usage the words inclusive and exclusive come to be employed in conjunction with the word days. Fuller explanation cannot be given without more space than can be spared here.

For the removal of the ambiguity thus brought to view, in several parts of the present bill, an appropriate fixation would need to be made. Of this case, the passages in which the word days is preceded by a blank space, afford so many instances.

4. In the instance of the word days, taken as above in the plural, a particular demand is created by the institution of the Sabbath. On the occasion in question, in the number of days mentioned, shall the Sabbath day, where it happens to form one of them, be reckoned, and considered as included, or shall the number intended be understood to be that same number, over and above the Sabbath-day? The answer will depend on the nature of the occasion. If what is regarded as work be to be done in the intervals, the intervening Sabbath-day or Sabbath-days must be considered as added to the number: otherwise not.

II. Exposition or explanation, including definition. The demand for fixation has place, in so far as, by the word in question, more senses than one are, all of them, more or less distinctly brought to view. What in this case is necessary is—to decide between them, by fixing upon some one of them to the exclusion of the rest. The demand for exposition or explanation has place, in so far as, were it not for the operation thus denominated, it might happen that no object at all might present itself as clearly designated. Fixation has for its purpose, the removal of ambiguity: explanation, the clearing up of obscurity. Between the import of the words as thus explained, the separation will not always be very distinct: especially since, by the same word, on the same occasion, a demand for both operations may be presented: and although by the operation which happens to have been performed, no more than one of them may have been the direct object, the other, it may happen, has been accomplished.

Synonymous, or nearly so, to explanation, is exposition.

Of exposition there are several modes. For the complete enumeration and explanation of them, more room would be requisite than can be afforded in this place.

A mode commonly employed, or at least intended and supposed* to be employed, is that styled definition. By definition seems commonly to be understood, the exhibition of some word of more extensive signification, within the signification of which, that of the word in question is included,—accompanied with the designation of some circumstance, whereby the object designated by it stands distinguished from all others that are in use to be designated by that more extensive appellative.

III. Enumeration. Of this word the import is sufficiently clear: it neither requires, nor admits of, fixation or explanation.

On the occasion in question, enumeration may have for its subjects either species or individuals. Of species or modes of operation, instances are afforded by the present bill. They will be found in the ensuing example of exposition, as applied to the words disturbance and annoyance, which may be seen in black-LETTER in the text of Section 13, Security, &c. against disturbance, &c.

Of the species contained under the given name of offices, an enumeration is proposed by the present bill, namely, in Section 3, Eligible who, as constituting another portion of matter proper for the Appendix.*

IV. Abbreviation. To the result designated by this word, the operations designated by the three foregoing words—fixation, explanation, enumeration—may, any of them, be rendered subservient. For these several instruments of perspicuity, let the word, for which they are respectively in demand, present itself, in the body of law in question, ever so many times,—the demand for the sort of elucidation respectively afforded by them may present itself that same number of times.

At the same time, if every time the principal word came to be employed, the adjunct or adjuncts, such as have been deemed necessary as above, were to be attached to it at full length, there is no saying to what enormity of extent the bulk of the body of law would thus be swelled. Happily, to the production of the effect required, no such full-length repetitions are necessary. If, to the principal word in question, the adjunct or adjuncts deemed necessary are but annexed the first time it comes to be employed, every succeeding time the word is employed, the purpose of them may in great measure be answered, by a bare notice given of their existence.

For a memento of this sort, the typographic art affords an instrument as simple as it is efficient—an appropriate type: and if, throughout the whole tenor of the work, this type be not applied to any other use than this, any sort of type may serve.

In the text of the present bill may be seen an example. In Section 13, Security, &c. against disturbance, &c., to the words disturbance and annoyance, an elucidation, the tenor of which will be seen presently, is proposed to be applied in the Appendix. Of the aid thus provided for sincere conception, and the check for sinister application, notice is afforded by the type called black-letter, in which they are printed.

Thus, and without prejudice to certainty, may the operation of abbreviation be performed, upon a mass of law, by means of the above-described instruments of elucidation—any or all of them.

But it may also be performed without any of them. Examples may be seen in the Introduction to “Burn’s Justice.” Of the two parts contained in that Introduction, the first has for its title—“Certain abbreviations made use of in this work.” Of these instances of abbreviations (23 in number) the first is in these words:—“1. The word justice is always to be understood to mean justice of the peace, when not otherwise expressed.” In this case, to the principal word justice is added (we see) an adjunct: and the abbreviation consists in the constant omission of this adjunct. With few if any exceptions, in the other twenty-two instances, the instrument of abbreviation employed is the same; namely, omission of an adjunct: notice of the omission, once for all, having thus been given.

Of the abbreviation thus afforded, the utility cannot but have been felt by thousands and tens of thousands. But that from the above-mentioned instrument—an appropriate type—the service so rendered could not but have received no small increase, will be no less manifest. For, among so many readers of that useful and masterly performance, scarcely perhaps has there been one, to whose mind the notice so given once for all at the commencement of the work, has, in all its parts, been at all times present. By an appropriate type, it would, on each occasion, have been revived. By the appropriate type, true it is, that the particular nature of the adjunct omitted would not have been expressed. But a notice which, on every occasion, would have thus been given, is—that to the word or phrase in question, an elucidation would be found provided, in some shape or other: and in what particular shape, is a point which the nature of the context would not often leave exposed to doubt.

Abbreviation is not the only useful purpose to which the separation thus proposed between text and authoritative comment is capable of being made subservient. Another is—the saving from the imputation of frivolousness, or even of ridiculousness, this or that matter of detail, the insertion of which may, by an attentive consideration of the subject, have been represented to the draughtsmen as indispensable. In a case of this sort, if he declines employing the expedient, his work will be liable to find itself in a dilemma, from which it will not be easy for him to disengage it without injury to it. If he omits the obnoxious matter altogether, he leaves the door open to wilful misrepresentation, to misapplication, and arbitrary rule: if he inserts it, he gives disgust to the thoughtless many, to whom the sensation of the moment is everything, the future nothing:—and who either cannot or will not see, that by those who have the power, misrepresentation, wherever, in addition to a motive, any the slightest pretext can be found for it, will be sure to be practised? At the same time, by the addition which it cannot but make to the bulk of the mass of law, the subordinate species of matter, if not detached from that to which it is subordinate, will, in proportion to its bulk, contribute to render the whole mass to such a degree incomprehensible, that while inefficient as a protection, it will be efficient only as a snare.

True it is, that whether interwoven with the main body or detached from it, the matter of elucidation will not the less be the legislator’s work. But in the main body it would present itself to all readers and on all occasions: in the appendix, it would as it were withdraw itself from the attention of readers in general, reserving itself to be consulted only by this or that particular class of readers, and by them only eventually, in case that by this or that event a call for their applying their attention to it should be made: and, in this case, as the occasion will place the importance of the explanation in its true light, it will thus be saved from the imputation of frivolousness.

5. Forms of instruments. Of this species of matter, the form of a vote-making certificate in Section 2, and the form of a recommendatory certificate in Section 3, afford so many examples. For matter of this sort, the appendix has just been spoken of as being, generally speaking, a proper place. That it would have been such in the present instance will scarcely appear disputable. But, on the present occasion, so paramount was the importance of these two instruments—so much of the whole plan do they give intimation of—that though the appendix could scarcely be denied to be a proper place, the main body of the proposed Act would, it was thought, be deemed the more proper place.

When the destination of this receptacle—the appendix—is thus settled and determined, the structure of the work of which it forms a part will in some sort be to be directed by it. To the appendix may be referred whatsoever matters appear capable of being thus disposed of, consistently with the grand object; namely, the implanting and keeping at all times, in the mind of the subject-citizen, such part of the rule of action—such part and such only—as, according to his situation in life, he may have need of for his guidance at all times: reserving for other parts those particulars which it will not be necessary for him to form any detailed conception of, till a particular state of things, calling for application to be made to that part of the law, has taken place. Thus, whatever concerns this or that species of contract, a man cannot have any need to trouble himself with, till either he has entered into a contract of that sort, or has in contemplation the entering into it, or has need to enter into it. But this refers to another division of the entire body of the law; namely, the division into the general code and the collection of particular codes: the general code containing those parts of the rule of action which all persons have need to be informed of; the particular codes, those parts only which so many particular classes of persons have respectively need to be informed of.

As in the present proposed Act, so in any other Act, and in the whole body of the law, if any such work were anywhere to come into existence, here then would be two distinguishable parts—main body and appendix. In the appendix would be included the elucidations, the abbreviations, and the forms of instruments. To this part might also be consigned the rationale, or collection of reasons, supposing provision made of an instrument of elucidation and justification at once so useful and so difficult to frame. I say the rationale; for to this place it might be posted off, except in so far, as in this or that instance, for the more immediate perception of this or that reason, it were thought fit either to interweave it with the body of the article to which it belonged (a mode frequently pursued in an act of parliament, and pursued in several places of the present bill,) or, in the form of a note, to subjoin it, in the margin, at the bottom of the text.*

Taken together, main body and appendix would be the entire Code. Separated from the appendix, the main body would be a sort of abridgment of the entire Code. Sanctioned by the same hand as that from which the appendix received its sanction, the abridgment thus made would be an authoritative one.

Here follows the portion of expository matter proposed to be inserted in the appendix, for the exposition of the words disturbance and annoyance in Section 13 of the text.

[Disturbance—Annoyance.]—Art. I. To this purpose, it matters not in what shape, and by what means, the annoyance be produced, it among its effects be that of causing disturbance to the proceedings of the House.

Art. II. It matters not to what sense, or what faculty, the annoyance has been applied: as for example—

1. To the sense of hearing; by noise, whereby Members are prevented from hearing anything spoken or read: for instance, by untimely vociferation, by stamping or scraping with the feet, or even by coughing or blowing of the nose, if performed, not through necessity, but for this or any other forbidden purpose.

2. To the sense of sight; for example, by preventing any Member or Members from having the Speaker of the House in view, or the Speaker from having any other Member in view; or by repairing to the House, with the visible marks or other symptoms of any noisome disease.

3. To the sense of smell; by uncleanliness in any shape.

4. To health in general; by a Member repairing to the House at a time when he is labouring under any infectious disease.

5. By personal injury in any shape, done, or attempted, or intended, or proposed to be done to any Member, or any officer of the House, or to any other person present.

6. To the tranquillity of the assembly, by words or deportment threatening personal injury in any shape,—to be done, whether to the whole assembly present, or to any particular Member or other person present. Here ends the explanation.

In the particular case here exemplified, supposing that, as here, in the designation of the proposed ground for exclusion, words such as “annoyance” and “disturbance” (the words employed in the Bill) were employed, I durst not, without very particular exposition, such as that here proposed to be given, depend upon them as sufficient to secure the exclusion of sinister interpretation: in particular, on the part of Honourable House, even under any constitution that would be given to it. In the reign of Charles the Second it was, that Honourable House concurred in an act (18 C. II. c. 2, § 1,) declaring the importation of cattle into England from Ireland “a nuisance,” and punishing it as a crime Were it not for the check, applied by specifications such as the above,—with less violent torture of words might the House, at any time, have applied that term of reproach to the act of any Member, who, rendered obnoxious to noble lords and honourable gentlemen by attachment to the cause of the people, had by some trifling indecorum in language or deportment, afforded a pretence. Not many years ago, a Member, whose language had long been sufficiently indecorous, was stopped in the very act of offering violence to the person of the Speaker. Being on the right side in politics, and violent on that side—his transgression was regarded with the indulgence that might have been expected. But had Horne Tooke been the man—Horne Tooke, for dread of whom, after the House had for so many ages continued open to clergymen without inconvenience or complaint, an exclusion was put upon the whole order in the lump—mercy might not quite so readily have taken the place of justice.

RADICALISM NOT DANGEROUS.

EXTRACTED FROM THE MSS. OF JEREMY BENTHAM.*

[† ]The matter thus indicated was never published by the author. It will appear in this collection, if found in a sufficient state of preparation.—Ed.

[* ]Why say “intended and supposed,” as if the thing intended on an occasion of this sort ever failed of being done? To this question something of an answer may here be expected. By logicians, when speaking of a definition, is commonly meant, as of course, the mode termed in Latin definitio per genus et differentiam: definition, afforded by the indication of a more extensive collection of objects, to which the object in question belongs—some genus (as the phrase is) of which it is a species,—together with the indication of some peculiar character or quality by which it stands distinguished from all other objects included in that same collection—from all other species of that same genus: and this form is that which, when what is considered as a definition is given, is the form constantly intended and supposed to be given to it.

Now then, by him who undertakes to give a definition in this form, what is necessarily, howsoever tacitly, assumed, is—that there exists in the language a word, serving as the name of a genus of things, within which the species of things indicated by the word he thus undertakes to define, is comprehended. But words there are, and in no small abundance, of which definitions of this sort are frequently undertaken to be given—or which are supposed to be as clearly and generally understood as if definitions in this form could be and had been given of them—but for which, all this while, no such more extensive denomination is afforded by this or any other language: and among them, words which, in law and politics, are in continual use, and upon the signification of which, questions of prime and practical importance are continually turning. Take, for instance, the words right, power, obligation. Now, in the way in question—namely, by indication of so many superior genuses of things, of which these words respectively designate so many species—it is not possible to define these words. No one of these three words can you thus define. The word man (for example) you can thus define: you may do so, by saying that he is an animal, and then stating a quality by which he is distinguishable from other animals. Here, then, is a word you can and do thus define. Why? Because, comprehending in its import that of this same word man, stands that same word animal, by which is accordingly designated a genus, of which man is a species. So likewise in regard to operations: for example, that of contracting, in the civil branch of the field of law; and that of stealing, in the penal branch of that same thorny field. Contracting is one species of operation; stealing is another. But this you cannot say in the instance of right, or power, or obligation; for a right is not a species of anything: a power is not a species of anything: an obligation is not a species of anything.

The objects, of which the words man, animal, substance, are names, are extensive sorts or kinds of real entities: the objects, of which the words right, power, obligation, are names, are not sorts or kinds of any real entities: the objects, of which they are sorts or kinds, are but so many fictitious entities.a

[* ]Note that, in the particular case here in question, namely, that of offices, &c. of a certain description, considered as having the effect of excluding the possessor from a seat in the House—it is not altogether clear that any enumeration of them would, to the purpose in question, be absolutely necessary; definition with exemplification might perhaps suffice. On the other hand, what is certain is—that without definition or explanation—without words of general description—enumeration, in a case such as this, would not suffice: Why? Because if enumeration were the only mode of designation employed, sinister ingenuity could not fail to set itself to work: under different names it would pour in objects on which it would bestow the desirable quality, free from the undesirable one; instead of offices, it would attach the emolument to functions—to situations—to trusts—to posts—to anything; and thus the purpose of the law would be evaded. To establish distinctions where there are no differences, is among the endeavours and the performances—not only of crown lawyers, but of every member of that profession, of which insincerity and artifice are not so much the confessed as the professed attributes.

[* ]In its application to the penal branch of law, this mode stands exemplified in the first of those works of the Author’s on legislation, which were edited in French by Mr. Dumont. In this way a quantity of letter-press, not larger than what has been seen contained in an almanack, might supply a man with as large a quantity of legal information as he would have need to carry in his head, with the addition of appropriate indication, sufficient to enable him upon occasion to present to his mind, in time for use, whatever was not contained in it.

In every such abridgment, it being as truly the work of the legislator as the work at large of which it is an abridgment, every man would of course behold a rule of action, on which he could repose an equally safe confidence.

I cannot let this occasion pass without observing, that an abridgment thus made is the only sort of abridgment on which any such confidence can be placed. On the part of any uncommissioned abridger, no degree of ability can have any such effect as that of giving to his work a just title to any such confidence. In the original, suppose imperfections in any abundance; in the abridgment, none. The greater the number of these imperfections, the more delusive and dangerous to trust to will the abridgment be. For it is from what the original is, not from what it ought to have been, that the interpretation put upon it by the judge will be deduced: unless indeed it should happen to suit his private views to interpret it according to what it ought to have been. For wherever, through the medium of that which is, that which ought to have been, and is not, is discernible, the judge is upon velvet: with hands decorated with sham chains, he decides this way or that way, whichever he find most agreeable and convenient.

[* ]This tract is now published for the first time. The dates on the MSS. from which it is extracted, cover the period from November 1819 to the middle of April 1820.

[* ]Why say “intended and supposed,” as if the thing intended on an occasion of this sort ever failed of being done? To this question something of an answer may here be expected. By logicians, when speaking of a definition, is commonly meant, as of course, the mode termed in Latin definitio per genus et differentiam: definition, afforded by the indication of a more extensive collection of objects, to which the object in question belongs—some genus (as the phrase is) of which it is a species,—together with the indication of some peculiar character or quality by which it stands distinguished from all other objects included in that same collection—from all other species of that same genus: and this form is that which, when what is considered as a definition is given, is the form constantly intended and supposed to be given to it.

Now then, by him who undertakes to give a definition in this form, what is necessarily, howsoever tacitly, assumed, is—that there exists in the language a word, serving as the name of a genus of things, within which the species of things indicated by the word he thus undertakes to define, is comprehended. But words there are, and in no small abundance, of which definitions of this sort are frequently undertaken to be given—or which are supposed to be as clearly and generally understood as if definitions in this form could be and had been given of them—but for which, all this while, no such more extensive denomination is afforded by this or any other language: and among them, words which, in law and politics, are in continual use, and upon the signification of which, questions of prime and practical importance are continually turning. Take, for instance, the words right, power, obligation. Now, in the way in question—namely, by indication of so many superior genuses of things, of which these words respectively designate so many species—it is not possible to define these words. No one of these three words can you thus define. The word man (for example) you can thus define: you may do so, by saying that he is an animal, and then stating a quality by which he is distinguishable from other animals. Here, then, is a word you can and do thus define. Why? Because, comprehending in its import that of this same word man, stands that same word animal, by which is accordingly designated a genus, of which man is a species. So likewise in regard to operations: for example, that of contracting, in the civil branch of the field of law; and that of stealing, in the penal branch of that same thorny field. Contracting is one species of operation; stealing is another. But this you cannot say in the instance of right, or power, or obligation; for a right is not a species of anything: a power is not a species of anything: an obligation is not a species of anything.

The objects, of which the words man, animal, substance, are names, are extensive sorts or kinds of real entities: the objects, of which the words right, power, obligation, are names, are not sorts or kinds of any real entities: the objects, of which they are sorts or kinds, are but so many fictitious entities.a

[a]For expounding or explaining the import of any one of these names of fictitious entities, the nature of the case affords but one resource; and that is, the finding some class of real entities, which is more or less clearly in view as often as, to the name of a class of fictitious entities, any clear idea stands annexed,—and thereupon framing two propositions; one, in which the name of the fictitious entity is the leading term; the other, in which the name of a corresponding class, either of real entities, or of operations or other motions of real entities, is the leading term:—this last so ordered, that, by being seen to express the same import, it shall explain and make clear the import of the first. This mode of exposition has been termed paraphrasis—paraphrase: giving phrase for phrase.It is for want of observation made of this distinction, that all attempts to define words of the description in question, such as right, power, and obligation, have proved abortive. Of a regular and comprehensive body of law, framed in subservience to what are or ought to be the ends of law, a set of appropriate expositions for words of this description would be an indispensable accompaniment; but, for any such work, this is no proper place.In a work entitled “A Fragment on Government,” published by the Author in 1776 [see Vol. I.] without a name, and long since out of print, indication was, for the first time, given of the utter impossibility of doing that which, in such numbers, men have been continually supposing themselves to have done. Instead of a superior genus, what on this occasion has been brought forward has been some term or other bearing in its import such a resemblance to the term in question, as to be capable of being, on some occasions, with little or no impropriety, employed instead of it. A right is a power—or a power is a right—and so forth; shifting off the task of definition, backward and forward, from one word to another; shifting it off thus at each attempt, and never performing it.But, though a right is not itself a species of anything, right has divers species, perfectly and clearly distinguishable; namely, by means of the benefits which they respectively confer, and the sanctions by which they are respectively created: and for each of these species a separate exposition would be found requisite.Give us our rights, say the thousands and the millions. Give us our rights, they say, and they do well to say so. Yet, of all who say so, not one perhaps can say, not one perhaps ever conceived clearly, what it is he thus calls for—what sort of a thing a right is.