The Online Library of Liberty

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• Errata—vol. III.
• Defence of Usury; Showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints On the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains; In Letters to a Friend.
• Letter I.: Introduction.
• Letter II.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Usury.
• Letter III.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Prodigality.
• Letter IV.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Indigence.
• Letter V.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Simplicity.
• Letter VI.: Mischiefs of the Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VII.: Efficacy of Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VIII.: Virtual Usury Allowed.
• Letter IX.: Blackstone Considered.
• Letter X.: Grounds of the Prejudices Against Usury.
• Letter XI.: Compound Interest.
• Letter XII.: Maintenance and Champerty.
• Letter XIII.: To Dr. Smith, On Projects In Arts, &c.
• A Manual of Political Economy: Now First Edited From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: Introduction. *
• Chapter II.: Analytical Survey of the Field of Political Economy.
• Chapter III.: Of Wealth.
• Chapter IV.: Of Population.
• Chapter V.: Of Finance.
• Chapter VI.: Operation of a Sinking Fund On the Production of Wealth.
• Chapter VII.: Noscenda.
• Observations On the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; Especially With a Reference to the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of July 1820.
• Preface.: Observations, &c.
• Section I.: Nature of the Prohibitory System.
• Section II.: Mischiefs of the Prohibitory System.
• Section III.: Causes of the Prohibitory System.
• A Plan For Saving All Trouble and Expense In the Transfer of Stock, and For Enabling the Proprietors to Receive Their Dividends Without Powers of Attorney, Or Attendance At the Bank of England, By the Conversion of Stock Into Note Annuities.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Plan For the Creation, Emission, Payment, and Eventual Extension, of a Proposed New Species of Government Paper, Under the Name of Annuity Notes.
• Chapter II.: Form of an Annuity Note. (see Table II.)
• Chapter III.: Comparison of the Proposed, With the Existing Government Securities, &c.
• Chapter IV.: Grounds of Expectation, In Regard to the Proposed Measure.
• Chapter V.: Financial Advantages.
• Chapter VI.: Advantage By Addition to National Capital.
• Chapter VII.: Advantage By Addition to Commercial Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Particular Interests Concerned.
• Chapter IX.: Rise of Prices—how to Obviate.
• Chapter X.: Reduction of Interest—proposed Mode Compared With Mr. Pelham’s.
• Chapter XI.: Moral Advantages.
• Chapter XII.: Constitutional Advantages.
• Chapter XIII.: Recapitulation and Conclusion.
• Appendix A.: Government Ought to Have the Monopoly of Paper Money, As Well As of Metallic Money.
• Appendix B.: Paper Money—causes Why Not Circulated By Government Without Interest, As Well As By Individuals.
• General View of a Complete Code of Laws.
• Chapter I.: General Division.
• Chapter II.: Relations Between the Laws Concerning Offences, Rights, Obligations, and Services.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between the Penal and Civil Code.
• Chapter IV.: Of Method.
• Chapter V.: Plan of the Penal Code.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Division of Offences.
• Chapter VIII. Titles of the Penal Code.
• Chapter IX.: First General Title of the Civil Code, * of Things.
• Chapter X.: Second General Title of the Civil Code. of Places.
• Chapter XI.: Third General Title of the Civil Code. of Times.
• Chapter XII.: Fourth General Title of the Civil Code. of Services.
• Chapter XIII.: Fifth General Title of the Civil Code. of Obligations.
• Chapter XIV.: Sixth General Title of the Civil Code. of Rights.
• Chapter XV.: Seventh General Title of the Civil Code. of Collative and Ablative Events.
• Chapter XVI.: Eighth General Title of the Civil Code. of Contracts.
• Chapter XVII.: Ninth General Title of the Civil Code. of the Domestic and Civil States.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tenth General Title of the Civil Code. of Persons Capable of Acquiring and of Contracting.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Particular Titles of the Civil Code.
• Chapter XX.: Of Elementary Political Powers.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Elementary Political Powers— Subject Continued.
• Chapter XXII.: Plan of the Political Code.
• Chapter XXIII.: Plan of the International Code.
• Chapter XXIV.: Plan of the Maritime Code.
• Chapter XXV.: Plan of the Military Code.
• Chapter XXVI.: Plan of the Ecclesiastical Code.
• Chapter XXVII.: Plan of Remuneratory Laws.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Of Political Economy.
• Chapter XXIX.: Plan of the Financial Code.
• Chapter XXX.: Plan of Procedure Code.
• Chapter XXXI.: Of the Integrality of the Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of Purity In the Composition of a Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Of the Style of the Laws.
• Chapter XXXIV.: Of the Interpretation, Conservation, and Improvement of a Code.
• Pannomial Fragments.
• Chapter I.: General Observations.
• Chapter II.: Consideranda.
• Chapter III.: Expositions.
• Chapter IV.: Axioms.
• Nomography; Or the Art of Inditing Laws: Now First Published From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: The Subject Stated.
• Chapter II.: Relations.
• Chapter III.: Proper End In View.
• Chapter IV.: Imperfections Primary.
• Chapter V.: Explanations Relative to the Imperfections of the Second Order.
• Chapter VI.: Of Remedies. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Language.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Perfections of Which the Legislative Style Is Susceptible.
• Chapter IX.: Of Forms of Enactment.
• Appendix. Logical Arrangements, Or Instruments of Invention and Discovery
• Equity Dispatch Court Proposal; Containing a Plan For the Speedy and Unexpensive Termination of the Suits Now Depending In Equity Courts. With the Form of a Petition, and Some Account of a Proposed Bill For That Purpose
• Section I.: Purpose Explained. Jeremy Bentham to the Honest and Afflicted Among Equity Suitors.
• Section II.: Equity Suitors’ Petition For Dispatch Court. to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, —
• Section III.: Dispatch Court Bill—some Account of It.
• Section IV.: Information Requisite From Petitioning Suitors.
• Equity Dispatch Court Bill: Being a Bill For the Institution of an Experimental Judicatory Under the Name of the Court of Dispatch, For Exemplifying In Practice the Manner In Which the Proposed Summary May Be Substituted to the So Called Regular Sy
• Editor’s Note.
• Preface.
• Preamble.
• Part I.—: Judiciary.
• Section I.: Judge Located, How.
• Section II.: Remuneration.
• Section III.: Registrar, &c.
• Section IV.: Eleemosynary Advocate.
• Section V.: Judges’, &c. Deputes.
• Section VI.: Judge’s Powers—exemptions—checks.
• Section VII.: Prehensors and Messengers.
• Section VIII.: Consignees; * Or Say, In-trust-holders.
• Section IX.: Grounds of Decision For the Dispatch Court Judge.
• Section X. ‡: Suits’ Comparative Suitableness; and Order of Cognizance.
• Section XI.: Auxiliary Judges and Accountants.
• Section XII.: Sittings, Times Of.
• Part II.—: Procedure.
• Section XIII.: Definitions. *
• Section XIV.: Examination of Solicitors.
• Section XV.: Initiatory Examination of Parties, &c.
• Section XVI.: Appropriate Intercourse, Constant and Universal, Secured.
• Section XVII.: Mutual Security For Forthcomingness of Persons and Things. ‡
• Section XVIII.: Evidence-procuring Money, How Provided.
• Section XIX.: Subsequential Evidence, How Elicited.
• Section XX.: Execution, How Performed.
• Section XXI.: Equity Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXII.: Dispatch Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXIII.: Eventual Retrotransference of a Suit to the Equity Court.
• Section XXIV.: Expense of the Court, How Provided For.
• Supplemental Sections:—
• Section I. Or XXV.: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
• Section II. Or XXVI.: Henceforward Dispatch Court.
• Schedules to the Bill.
• Plan of Parliamentary Reform, In the Form of a Catechism, With Reasons For Each Article: With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform.
• Introduction.
• Section I.: History of the Ensuing Tract—alarming State of the Country and the Constitution.
• Section II.: Most Prominent Present Grievance, Gareisoning France.
• Section III.: Causes of the Above and All Other Mischiefs:—particular Interests Monarchical and Aristocratical, Adverse to the Universal—their Ascendency.
• Section IV.: Sole Remedy In Principle—democratic Ascendency.
• Section V.: Remedy In Detail: Radical Parliamentary Reform: Elementary Arrangements In This Edition of It—their Necessity.
• Section VI.: Differences Between This and the Original Editions of Radical Reform.
• Section VII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage Further Considered.
• Section VIII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.
• Section IX.: Freedom of Suffrage Further Explained—seductive Influence—its Forms, Instruments, &c.
• Section X.: Bribery and Terrorism Compared.
• Section XI.: Purchase of Seats—in What Cases Mischievous—in What Beneficial.
• Section XII.: Secresy of Suffrage—its Importance Further Developed.
• Section XIII.: Exclusion of Placemen, &c. From the Right of Voting—mischievousness and Profligacy of the Opposite Arrangement.
• Section XIV.: Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.
• Section XV.: Representatives—impermanence of Their Situation—its Importance:—objections—their Groundlessness.
• Section XVI.: Moderate Reform—its Arrangements—their Inadequacy.
• Section XVII.: Trienniality Inadequate;—annuality Necessary.
• Section XVIII.: Interests Adverse to Adequate Reform—support Given By Them to Moderate, to the Exclusion of Radical: Tories—whigs—people’s Men.
• Catechism of Parliamentary Reform; Or, Outline of a Plan of Parliamentary Reform; In the Form of Question and Answer; With Reasons to Each Article.
• Section I.: Ends to Be Aimed At On the Occasion of Parliamentary Reform.
• Section II.: Means, Conducive Towards These Ends.
• Section III.: Means—their Uses, With Reference to Their Respective Ends.
• Section IV.: Means Conducive to Aptitude In Members: I. Placemen Not to Vote, Nor to Be Seated By Election.
• Section V.: Means, &c. Continued.—ii. Placemen Seated By the King, With Speech and Motion, Without Vote.
• Section VI.: Means, &c. Continued.—iii. Elections Frequent—annual.
• Section VII.: Means, &c. Continued.—iv. Speeches Authentically and Promptly Published.
• Section VIII.: Means, &c. Continued.—v. Attendance, Punctual and General, Secured.
• Section IX.: Inconveniences Incident to Elections, and Election Judicature.
• Section X.: Election Inconveniences—means For Their Removal.
• Section XI.: Collateral Advantages, Referable to the Situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.
• A Sketch of the Various Proposals For a Constitutional Reform In the Representation of the People, Introduced Into the Parliament of Great Britain, From 1770 to 1812.
• Radical Reform Bill, With Extracts From the Reasons.
• Preliminary Explanations.
• Title of the Proposed Act.
• Preamble.
• Section 1.—: Seats and Districts.
• Section 2.—: Electors, Who.
• Section 3.—: Eligible, Who.
• Section 4.—: Election Offices.
• Section 5.: Election Apparatus.
• Section 6.—: Promulgation of Recommendations In Favour of Proposed Members.
• Section 7.—: Voters’ Titles Pre-established.
• Section 8.—: Election, How.
• Section 9.: Election Districts and Polling Districts, How Marked Out.
• Section 10.—: Vote-making Habitations, How Defined.
• Section 11.—: Members’ Continuance.
• Section 12.—: Vacancies Supplied.
• Section 13.—: Security For the House Against Disturbance By Members. †
• Section 14.—: Indisposition of Speakers Obviated.
• Appendix, Including General Explanations.
• Radicalism Not Dangerous. Extracted From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham. *
• Part I.—: Introduction.
• Section I.: Radical Reform Bill Recapitulated.
• Section II.: Persuasion of the Dangerousness of Radicalism—cause of It, and of the Vituperative Expression Given to It.
• Section III.: Terms of the Accusation,—speeches From the Throne, 16 Th July and 21 St November 1819.
• Section IV.: The Accusation In General Terms—counter-averment.
• Section V.: Plan of This Defence.
• Part II.—: Deference From the General Nature of the Case.
• Section I.: Conditions Necessary to a Man’s Embarking In Such a Design.
• Section VII.: Concurrence In Any Other Extensive Plan of Spoliation Impossible.
• Section VIII.: Concurrence of Any Constituted Authorities Impossible.
• Section IX.: Accomplishment Impossible—design Impossible.
• Section X.: The Talked-of Spunge No Proof of the Design.
• Part III.—: Defence From Experience In the Case of the United States.
• Part IV.: Defence From Particular Experience In the Case of Ireland: Years 1777 Or 1778, to 1783.
• Section I.: Analogy Between This and the Previous Case.
• Section II.: Democratic Ascendency, How Produced.
• Section III.: Fruit of Democratic Ascendency a Golden Age.
• Section IV.: Coincidence of Its Characters With Those of Radicalism.
• Section VI.: Extinction of Democratic Ascendency and Reform—restoration of Monarchico-aristocratical Ascendency, and Its Consequences.
• Conclusion.

Section 3.—

Eligible, who.

Art. I. For the filling of a seat in the Commons House, a man may be proposed, either with or without his own concurrence.

If with his own concurrence, he is a candidate.

In either case, he is a proposed member.

Art. II. To qualify a man to be so elected, two requisites are necessary:

1. A recommendatory certificate, otherwise styled a certificate of appropriate aptitude, as per Article III.

2. Payment, by him or to his behoof, of coin made of a certain sum of money, under the name of indemnification money, towards the defraying of the election expenses.

The sum appointed is [one hundred and twenty pounds.]

Art. III. Here follows the form of such a Certificate of appropriate aptitude:—

“District of [NA], [year, month, and day.]

“1. We the undersigned do hereby recommend A. C. [here describe his condition in life and abode] as a person fit to serve as a representative of the people of Great Britain and Ireland, in the Commons House.

“2. In our consciences we sincerely believe, that in all the several points of appropriate aptitude taken together, viz. appropriate probity, appropriate intellectual aptitude, and appropriate active talent,† he is either more fit than, or at least as fit as, any other person, who being willing to serve, can entertain any reasonable expectation of being elected in and for this district.

“3. For any thing that we know or believe to the contrary, he would if elected, be willing to serve.”

N. B. 1. To render this certificate valid, the concurrence of six recommenders is necessary.

Any number of names greater than twelve is not admissible.

All, if any, that follow the twelve first written, are to be struck out by the officer to whom the instrument is delivered.

N. B. 2. Each recommender must, for one year at least, ending with the day of his signature, have been an inhabitant within the election district.

So, at the end of his signature, he must declare.

N. B. 3. Of this certificate there must be three copies, all signed by the several recommenders.

Of these copies, one may be taken back by the person who delivered them.

The two others remain for that time in the office.

The following are the names, conditions in life, and abodes of the recommenders, in their several handwritings:—

[NA].

Art. IV. [NA] days before the day for the delivery of a definitive recommendatory certificate, proposed recommendatory certificates, in favour of the same proposed Member, may be delivered in by so many sets of recommenders, in any number.

If more than one are delivered, the person so recommended, or his authorized agent, may, by writing his own name, or the first letters thereof, at the end of each name, select out of them the requisite number of names: and the persons, whose names they are, are the co-certifiers in the definitive recommendatory certificate.

If no such selection be made, the proposed certificate first delivered in, is the definitive certificate.

For this purpose, entry of the day, month, hour, and minute of delivery, shall be made by the clerk, on the face of the instrument.

So also, in the books of the office, in the journal of that day.

Art. V. [NA] days before the election day, the several definitive recommendatory certificates shall have been delivered in at the district election office: after that time, unless for remedy to neglect, wilful or casual, at the office, no such certificate shall be received.

At the time of the delivery of the certificate, the indemnification money shall be paid.

A receipt, dated and signed by the clerk, shall be given as well for the money, as for the certificate.*

[† ]This degree of particularity promises, it is believed, to be of considerable use, by fixing the attention of the persons in question to these several points of appropriate aptitude, and thereby taking the chance of preventing men, by fear of shame, from giving their recommendation to a person eminently and notoriously deficient in any one of these points, or manifestly inferior to a rival candidate in all of them taken together. Lower than this mark in the scale of particularity it might not be easy to descend, without giving advantage to this or that particular party, and thus giving to this instrument the effect of a test act. Tyranny and corruption, under the mask of religion, might, for example, introduce orthodoxy, and thus keep the most conscientious characters out of the House, and force the poison of insincerity into the mouths and hearts of others.

The oaths and other engagements with which the statute-book swarms, are, with few if any exceptions, a great deal worse than useless. Either they have this exclusionary effect, or by their emptiness and looseness they afford, to those who have taken them, the pretence of acting under a sense of obligation, while no such sense is in their hearts. Hear a judge talk of his oath! What is that oath? A piece of old woman’s tattle, that is never seen by anybody, means nothing, and has nothing in it that can have any tendency to bind anybody. O yes: one thing it has; and that is—a promise never to take a money fee of anybody. But this he breaks, in the face of day, and most days of his life. And thus it is, that in the teeth of Magna Charta, he denies justice to all but the rich, and makes them pay him for it.

[* ]For the reason why all other disqualifications would here be useless, see those which apply to the case of electors in Section 2.

As to females, the disqualification stands upon grounds quite different in the two cases.

In the situation of member, mischievous, no less than obvious, would be the absurdity of an intermixture betwixt sex and sex.

Not so in the situation of elector: inconvenience there might be upon the whole, absurdity there would be none.

Nor even would there be any novelty in it. In the India House, among the self-elected representatives of sixty millions of Hindoos, are females in any number: ballot is the mode of voting: ballot, with the form of secresy, and as little as any one pleases of the effect.

Everywhere have females possessed the whole power of a despot; everywhere but in France, without objection. Talk of giving them as here the smallest fraction of a fraction of such a power, scorn without reason is all the answer you receive. From custom comes prejudice. No gnat too minute to be strained out by it: no camel too great to be swallowed.

As to corruption, this being the disorder which the here proposed arrangements are employed to combat, this part of the remedy, it must be confessed, is not altogether co-extensive with the disease. Of this imperfection the existence will soon be seen, and at the same time, why it is impossible that perfection should take its place.

The objects of general desire—money, power, factitious dignity, and so forth, compose the matter, by which, in the hands of monarch or minister, corruption, applied to the breast of a representative of the people, or that of an elector, does its work.

The desires and passions, in and by which it operates, are hope and fear: hope of obtaining the desirable object, or fear of losing it.

So far as depends upon the influence of hope, so long as the minister or the monarch has anything to give, it is impossible for any disqualifying enactment to guard the probity of the representative. At the next election, or even immediately upon acceptance, he loses (suppose) his seat. Good: but before this, he has secured something which is of more value in his eyes.

If, instead of obtaining it for himself, he obtains it for some person for whom he would otherwise have had to make provision at his own expense, he may indeed, if so his constituents please, lose his seat at the next election. But, in this case, he cannot be made to lose it sooner: for, a provision, causing one person to suffer in this way, for the transgression of another over whom he had no controul, would be too manifestly repugnant to justice to be endurable.

It may thus be seen, that, against corruption, in so far as it operates only by hope, good government has no means of contending, but the reducing to the lowest amount possible the sources of that hope: annulling, for example, all future grants of peerages, baronetcies, ribbons, and sinecures: especially all sacred sinecures, in comparison of which the profane are but as a drop in the bucket: anti-christian sinecures, the very acceptance of which has more of blasphemy in it than many an act which has been styled such, against that religion, on pretence of supporting which they are accepted.

Against the influence of fear in this case—fear of losing the good thing which is in hand—the sort of disqualifying enactment in question has more power. The loss is certain: and when, in the two cases, not only the object is the same, but the certainty—in the one case of losing it, in the other case of gaining it—is the same, fear is beyond comparison more powerful than hope:—assurance of eventually losing a thousand a-year, which a man has in hand, will be seen by every one to be a much more powerful stimulant than any hope of gaining as much can be. It may be so in an infinite degree; since there is no chance so small as not to be capable of giving rise and support to hope; and a chance of acquiring the greatest quantity of wealth that was ever possessed by man, may be so small as to be worth next to nothing.

As to the wording—office, commission, contract, and pension, are the words employed on this occasion, as being familiar to every ear. The more proper expression would be some general one, under which the particular articles are comprised. For example—source of emolument; meaning source of emolument held at the pleasure of the Crown: and, where the import of it has been fixed, once for all, by an exposition inserted in the appendix to the statute, and in the text marked as such by a particular type—a type employed for all words and phrases thus expounded—it should thenceforward be employed without mention of any of the details included in it. (See p. 595.) But, for expounding it, the only effectual course would be to give a complete list of all the several sources of emolument to which the disqualification was meant to apply.

As to the grounds for disqualification, they are in this case three:—

1. Guarding the probity of the public trustee, as far as possible, against all temptation to betray his trust:

2. Preventing a man from sitting in judgment in one character, upon acts of his own done in another character; and thus, in case of delinquency, being judge in his own cause:

3. Preventing him from bestowing, on any public function of less importance, any part of that time, the whole of which would not be too great for this highest of all trusts, if executed with that degree of assiduity, which by the extent and importance of it, it demands.

Were the first of those grounds the only one, some offices there are—the office of justice of the peace, for example—which need not be considered as constituting a disqualification. Not so, when the third of these grounds comes to be considered. Under any system, under which the situation of representative of the people were considered as a source of obligation, if the magistrate and the representative were the same person, the magistrate could not act without robbing the representative.

Under the existing mode of sham representation, of no European despot is the power so perfectly disencumbered of all sense of public obligation, as is that of the occupant of a seat, belonging to a rotten borough, or to a county held under the yoke of election terrorism: and this is one short reason for a reform, and that a radical one. So far as depends upon law, despotism is at the bottom, limited government only on the surface. In Spain, the despot is one: in England, he is legion: and legion is composed not only of Tories but of Whigs. For an as yet uncontested demonstration of this utter absence of all sense of obligation, see Parliamentary Reform Catechism, Introduction, § 14, on Non-attendance.

Opportune occurrence.—“Votes” of Honourable House, 26th November 1819. “Jovis, 25° die Novembris 1819. The House met, and forty members not being present at four o’clock, Mr. Speaker adjourned the house.” N.B. The day before, met for crushing the small remaining fragments of English liberties, 381: professing to oppose it, a few sincerely, 150: together, out of the whole 658 members, 531 attended. Such are the men, who, as representatives, call not only for obedience, but confidence. Obedience, it is not in my power to withhold: confidence, it is no more in my power to give to them, than to the beloved Ferdinand.

As to judicial corruption, all great placemen being thus not only each man a judge in his own cause, but knit, by community of sinister interest, in a league with the majority of the others,—impunity—universal impunity—has been the constant and notorious result.

Among the members of this league are the highest judges: no illusion, therefore, was ever more complete, than that which trumpets forth the purity of English judges. No set of men is there, whose interest, as far as depends upon law, has been rendered more hostile to their duty. Impunity, coupled with superior profit, are the principal features by which they are distinguished from the most corrupt that can be found anywhere else. The only obstacle that prevents an English judge from being less corrupt than a Spanish, a Russian, or a Turkish judge, is the liberty of the press: and as far as judge-made law, called common law, is anything, there is no liberty of the press but what is contrary to law; and without violation of law, may be crushed at any time.

Note, that no disqualification of this sort could have its effect, but in proportion as the fact of acceptance werenotorious. The arrangements necessary to secure such notoriety would enter too much into detail to be inserted here. The principal is—that as soon as an appointment is accepted, the instrument of appointment, or a sufficient extract from it, shall be communicated to the house through the Speaker, and to the public through the Government newspaper. This, too, of necessity in all cases, as now by custom it is in some: and that, on failure of such communication, the appointment shall be void; void, that is to say, in such sort as to render the delinquent himself a sufferer by his usurpation; but not so as to extend the suffering to any persons who are unconscious of it.

Supposing a list of disqualifying sources of emolument, made out by authority as above,—a Member on taking his seat should, with this list in his hand, have to declare to this effect—I am not in possession of any article in this list: to which might, perhaps, be to be added—nor in expectation.