Econlib

The Library

Other Sites

Front Page arrow Titles (by Subject) arrow SECTION X.: ELECTION INCONVENIENCES—MEANS FOR THEIR REMOVAL. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3

Return to Title Page for The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3

Search this Title:

Also in the Library:

Subject Area: Economics
Subject Area: Political Theory
Subject Area: Law

SECTION X.: ELECTION INCONVENIENCES—MEANS FOR THEIR REMOVAL. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3 [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 3.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

About Liberty Fund:

Liberty Fund, Inc. is a private, educational foundation established to encourage the study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.


SECTION X.

ELECTION INCONVENIENCES—MEANS FOR THEIR REMOVAL.

Question 35. In what way do the above-mentioned means promise to be conducive to the removal of the inconveniences attendant, as above, on elections and election-judicature?

Answer. As to expense,—by striking off at one stroke all expenses whatsoever; except such as are comparatively inconsiderable,—such as those incurred in the publication of advertisements by the candidates, and those incurred incidentally on the occasion of previous meetings.

To render this effect apparent, the slightest glance at the above-mentioned sources of expense will suffice.

1. Loss of time, idleness, drunkenness, and riots, have for their cause large concourses of people, with entertainments given to electors by candidates, or their friends. But any such large concourse of people will have no object: nor (votes being secret) will any man be at any such expense in giving entertainments, the receivers of which may, for aught he can know, be composed, in as large a proportion, of his adversaries, as of his friends.

2. The expense of conveyance and refreshment, in the case of distant voters, will be struck off altogether. For, there cannot be any pretence either for offering or receiving money on that score, when the utmost effect that could be expected from the longest journey may equally be produced by a paper put into the post.

3. As to lawyers, clerks, and other agents, neither on the occasion of the collecting the votes at the place of election, nor on any such occasion as that of an election-committee of the House, can there be any use or room for any such assistance. All that the returning officer will have to do, is—out of the boxes denominated from the several candidates, to count the number of voting-papers that have been put into each box: observing only whether the sum mentioned by the collector as received, be really in each instance either equal to, or greater than, the minimum required by the law to constitute a qualification.

As to vexations,—such as those from the obligation of serving on election judicatories, and from the delays attendant on such judicature,—there would be no such vexation, because there would be no such judicature: and there would be no such judicature, because there could be nothing to try:—unless, by possibility, and that without probability, any such offence should be committed, as, by the collector, a refusal to sign and deliver the duplicate receipt on the voting-paper;—or, by a postmaster, a suppression of a multitude of such papers at the post-office; or, by a returning officer, a false return,—respecting this or that one out of a small number of matters of fact, all of them simple, and in their nature either of themselves notorious, or easily made notorious.

For the purpose of punishment, prosecutions for any such offences would of course be left to the established dilatoriness of the technical mode of procedure pursued in the ordinary courts. But, for the purpose of applying an immediate parliamentary remedy to a false return, a single day’s sitting of a Grenville-Act committee of the House of Commons, would suffice.

Question 36. If, in the instance of each elector, the disposition made by him of his vote were thus to be placed altogether out of the reach of the public eye,—so that a vote may be refused to the most worthy, given to the most unworthy of all candidates, and that without danger, and consequently without fear of shame,—might there not be too much reason to apprehend, that considerations of a purely selfish nature would become generally predominant?

Answer. No: not to any such effect as that of seating a candidate really and generally deemed less worthy, to the exclusion of a candidate really and generally deemed more worthy: which effect is the only practical bad effect the case admits of.

If, indeed, matters were so circumstanced, that, by voting in favour of a candidate deemed by themselves comparatively unworthy,—or, to cut the matter short, in favour of any candidate whatsoever,—it were possible for the majority of the electors in any district to obtain, each of them for himself, any considerable private advantage, which, by the open mode of voting, he would be deterred from aiming at:—were this really the case, it were certainly too much to expect, that they should, the greater part of them, commonly forego any such advantage: and,—if such sacrifice of public interest to private were accordingly repeated in a considerable proportion of the whole number of electoral district,—the inconvenience to the public service might be found sensible and considerable.

But when, by the shortness of a man’s time in his seat, and the multitude of the persons, to each of whom, at the hazard of being betrayed by any one of them, and this without any tolerable assurance of his giving his vote in favour of the briber, the bribe would be to be offered,—when by all these means together, the obtainment of a seat by bribery is rendered, as it would be, to so unprecedented a degree improbable,—it does not seem possible to divine by what means a candidate, generally deemed the less worthy, should obtain an effectual preference, to the exclusion of one generally deemed the more worthy.

On the other hand, in the case of the open method hitherto in use, the effect of it is, on every occasion, to force electors,—and that in a number to which there are no limits,—to give their vote in favour of the less worthy, to the exclusion of the more worthy, candidate,—on pain of suffering, each of them, some personal inconvenience, to the magnitude of which there are no limits.

And this power,—which, by means of some such relation as those between landlord and tenant, between customer and dealer, between employer and person employed, in a word, between patron and dependent, men of overswaying opulence possess and exercise over men less favoured by the gifts of fortune,—this power of forcing men to vote against their consciences, has been termed “the legitimate influence of property,” and spoken of as that foundation-stone, by the removal of which, “the subversion of the constitution” would be effected.

If, in the event of his voting in favour of him who, in his estimation, is the less worthy candidate, in preference to him who in his opinion is the more worthy candidate, a man sees no prospect of advantage to himself, nor of disadvantage in the contrary event,—it seems not too much to hope and expect, that his vote will most commonly be in favour of that candidate who, in his opinion, is the more worthy candidate.

If conscience will not do this, it will do nothing. But assuredly, the less deeply men are led, or lead themselves, into temptation, the more likely they will be to be delivered, or to deliver themselves, from evil.

The less it is that the law expects from every man, the less it will expose itself to disappointment. Less than the disposition to do good,—so far as it is to be done by serving the public, in such cases, and in such cases only, in which it can be done without an atom of loss or other inconvenience to himself,—cannot surely from any man be expected.

Question 37. Any such mode of voting by a mixture of writing and printing,—is it not—in comparison of the good old mode of voting, practised by the wisdom of our ancestors, viz. voting by word of mouth—an innovation, and that a signal one?

Answer. In one point of view, it is an innovation—in another, not. Considered as an art in general use, the art of writing must,—to whatsoever purpose applied, and consequently when applied to any such purpose as this,—be acknowledged to be an innovation, and that a very signal one: then comes the art of printing, which, especially when considered as an art in general use, is a still more sweeping one. These arts being innovations, it cannot but be an innovation to apply them—whether to the purpose in question or to any other purpose. But if these be innovations, they will not, it is hoped, be placed in the class of mischievous ones.

On the other hand,—if in this, as in other matters, the wisdom of our ancestors be considered as consisting in the employing, for each purpose, at each point of time, the best and most convenient method in their time known and practicable,—there is not, in the mode of voting here proposed, any innovation at all, much less a mischievous one.

Our ancestors employed the most convenient mode practicable, in employing the word-of-mouth mode: we, their posterity, employ the most convenient mode practicable, in employing the written and printed mode.

Thus doing, we may therefore be said, and with truth, to take the wisdom of our ancestors for our guide.