The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Errata—vol. III.
• Defence of Usury; Showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints On the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains; In Letters to a Friend.
• Letter I.: Introduction.
• Letter II.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Usury.
• Letter III.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Prodigality.
• Letter IV.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Indigence.
• Letter V.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Simplicity.
• Letter VI.: Mischiefs of the Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VII.: Efficacy of Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VIII.: Virtual Usury Allowed.
• Letter IX.: Blackstone Considered.
• Letter X.: Grounds of the Prejudices Against Usury.
• Letter XI.: Compound Interest.
• Letter XII.: Maintenance and Champerty.
• Letter XIII.: To Dr. Smith, On Projects In Arts, &c.
• A Manual of Political Economy: Now First Edited From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: Introduction. *
• Chapter II.: Analytical Survey of the Field of Political Economy.
• Chapter III.: Of Wealth.
• Chapter IV.: Of Population.
• Chapter V.: Of Finance.
• Chapter VI.: Operation of a Sinking Fund On the Production of Wealth.
• Chapter VII.: Noscenda.
• Observations On the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; Especially With a Reference to the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of July 1820.
• Preface.: Observations, &c.
• Section I.: Nature of the Prohibitory System.
• Section II.: Mischiefs of the Prohibitory System.
• Section III.: Causes of the Prohibitory System.
• A Plan For Saving All Trouble and Expense In the Transfer of Stock, and For Enabling the Proprietors to Receive Their Dividends Without Powers of Attorney, Or Attendance At the Bank of England, By the Conversion of Stock Into Note Annuities.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Plan For the Creation, Emission, Payment, and Eventual Extension, of a Proposed New Species of Government Paper, Under the Name of Annuity Notes.
• Chapter II.: Form of an Annuity Note. (see Table II.)
• Chapter III.: Comparison of the Proposed, With the Existing Government Securities, &c.
• Chapter IV.: Grounds of Expectation, In Regard to the Proposed Measure.
• Chapter V.: Financial Advantages.
• Chapter VI.: Advantage By Addition to National Capital.
• Chapter VII.: Advantage By Addition to Commercial Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Particular Interests Concerned.
• Chapter IX.: Rise of Prices—how to Obviate.
• Chapter X.: Reduction of Interest—proposed Mode Compared With Mr. Pelham’s.
• Chapter XI.: Moral Advantages.
• Chapter XII.: Constitutional Advantages.
• Chapter XIII.: Recapitulation and Conclusion.
• Appendix A.: Government Ought to Have the Monopoly of Paper Money, As Well As of Metallic Money.
• Appendix B.: Paper Money—causes Why Not Circulated By Government Without Interest, As Well As By Individuals.
• General View of a Complete Code of Laws.
• Chapter I.: General Division.
• Chapter II.: Relations Between the Laws Concerning Offences, Rights, Obligations, and Services.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between the Penal and Civil Code.
• Chapter IV.: Of Method.
• Chapter V.: Plan of the Penal Code.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Division of Offences.
• Chapter VIII. Titles of the Penal Code.
• Chapter IX.: First General Title of the Civil Code, * of Things.
• Chapter X.: Second General Title of the Civil Code. of Places.
• Chapter XI.: Third General Title of the Civil Code. of Times.
• Chapter XII.: Fourth General Title of the Civil Code. of Services.
• Chapter XIII.: Fifth General Title of the Civil Code. of Obligations.
• Chapter XIV.: Sixth General Title of the Civil Code. of Rights.
• Chapter XV.: Seventh General Title of the Civil Code. of Collative and Ablative Events.
• Chapter XVI.: Eighth General Title of the Civil Code. of Contracts.
• Chapter XVII.: Ninth General Title of the Civil Code. of the Domestic and Civil States.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tenth General Title of the Civil Code. of Persons Capable of Acquiring and of Contracting.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Particular Titles of the Civil Code.
• Chapter XX.: Of Elementary Political Powers.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Elementary Political Powers— Subject Continued.
• Chapter XXII.: Plan of the Political Code.
• Chapter XXIII.: Plan of the International Code.
• Chapter XXIV.: Plan of the Maritime Code.
• Chapter XXV.: Plan of the Military Code.
• Chapter XXVI.: Plan of the Ecclesiastical Code.
• Chapter XXVII.: Plan of Remuneratory Laws.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Of Political Economy.
• Chapter XXIX.: Plan of the Financial Code.
• Chapter XXX.: Plan of Procedure Code.
• Chapter XXXI.: Of the Integrality of the Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of Purity In the Composition of a Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Of the Style of the Laws.
• Chapter XXXIV.: Of the Interpretation, Conservation, and Improvement of a Code.
• Pannomial Fragments.
• Chapter I.: General Observations.
• Chapter II.: Consideranda.
• Chapter III.: Expositions.
• Chapter IV.: Axioms.
• Nomography; Or the Art of Inditing Laws: Now First Published From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: The Subject Stated.
• Chapter II.: Relations.
• Chapter III.: Proper End In View.
• Chapter IV.: Imperfections Primary.
• Chapter V.: Explanations Relative to the Imperfections of the Second Order.
• Chapter VI.: Of Remedies. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Language.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Perfections of Which the Legislative Style Is Susceptible.
• Chapter IX.: Of Forms of Enactment.
• Appendix. Logical Arrangements, Or Instruments of Invention and Discovery
• Equity Dispatch Court Proposal; Containing a Plan For the Speedy and Unexpensive Termination of the Suits Now Depending In Equity Courts. With the Form of a Petition, and Some Account of a Proposed Bill For That Purpose
• Section I.: Purpose Explained. Jeremy Bentham to the Honest and Afflicted Among Equity Suitors.
• Section II.: Equity Suitors’ Petition For Dispatch Court. to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, —
• Section III.: Dispatch Court Bill—some Account of It.
• Section IV.: Information Requisite From Petitioning Suitors.
• Equity Dispatch Court Bill: Being a Bill For the Institution of an Experimental Judicatory Under the Name of the Court of Dispatch, For Exemplifying In Practice the Manner In Which the Proposed Summary May Be Substituted to the So Called Regular Sy
• Editor’s Note.
• Preface.
• Preamble.
• Part I.—: Judiciary.
• Section I.: Judge Located, How.
• Section II.: Remuneration.
• Section III.: Registrar, &c.
• Section IV.: Eleemosynary Advocate.
• Section V.: Judges’, &c. Deputes.
• Section VI.: Judge’s Powers—exemptions—checks.
• Section VII.: Prehensors and Messengers.
• Section VIII.: Consignees; * Or Say, In-trust-holders.
• Section IX.: Grounds of Decision For the Dispatch Court Judge.
• Section X. ‡: Suits’ Comparative Suitableness; and Order of Cognizance.
• Section XI.: Auxiliary Judges and Accountants.
• Section XII.: Sittings, Times Of.
• Part II.—: Procedure.
• Section XIII.: Definitions. *
• Section XIV.: Examination of Solicitors.
• Section XV.: Initiatory Examination of Parties, &c.
• Section XVI.: Appropriate Intercourse, Constant and Universal, Secured.
• Section XVII.: Mutual Security For Forthcomingness of Persons and Things. ‡
• Section XVIII.: Evidence-procuring Money, How Provided.
• Section XIX.: Subsequential Evidence, How Elicited.
• Section XX.: Execution, How Performed.
• Section XXI.: Equity Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXII.: Dispatch Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXIII.: Eventual Retrotransference of a Suit to the Equity Court.
• Section XXIV.: Expense of the Court, How Provided For.
• Supplemental Sections:—
• Section I. Or XXV.: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
• Section II. Or XXVI.: Henceforward Dispatch Court.
• Schedules to the Bill.
• Plan of Parliamentary Reform, In the Form of a Catechism, With Reasons For Each Article: With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform.
• Introduction.
• Section I.: History of the Ensuing Tract—alarming State of the Country and the Constitution.
• Section II.: Most Prominent Present Grievance, Gareisoning France.
• Section III.: Causes of the Above and All Other Mischiefs:—particular Interests Monarchical and Aristocratical, Adverse to the Universal—their Ascendency.
• Section IV.: Sole Remedy In Principle—democratic Ascendency.
• Section V.: Remedy In Detail: Radical Parliamentary Reform: Elementary Arrangements In This Edition of It—their Necessity.
• Section VI.: Differences Between This and the Original Editions of Radical Reform.
• Section VII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage Further Considered.
• Section VIII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.
• Section IX.: Freedom of Suffrage Further Explained—seductive Influence—its Forms, Instruments, &c.
• Section X.: Bribery and Terrorism Compared.
• Section XI.: Purchase of Seats—in What Cases Mischievous—in What Beneficial.
• Section XII.: Secresy of Suffrage—its Importance Further Developed.
• Section XIII.: Exclusion of Placemen, &c. From the Right of Voting—mischievousness and Profligacy of the Opposite Arrangement.
• Section XIV.: Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.
• Section XV.: Representatives—impermanence of Their Situation—its Importance:—objections—their Groundlessness.
• Section XVI.: Moderate Reform—its Arrangements—their Inadequacy.
• Section XVII.: Trienniality Inadequate;—annuality Necessary.
• Section XVIII.: Interests Adverse to Adequate Reform—support Given By Them to Moderate, to the Exclusion of Radical: Tories—whigs—people’s Men.
• Catechism of Parliamentary Reform; Or, Outline of a Plan of Parliamentary Reform; In the Form of Question and Answer; With Reasons to Each Article.
• Section I.: Ends to Be Aimed At On the Occasion of Parliamentary Reform.
• Section II.: Means, Conducive Towards These Ends.
• Section III.: Means—their Uses, With Reference to Their Respective Ends.
• Section IV.: Means Conducive to Aptitude In Members: I. Placemen Not to Vote, Nor to Be Seated By Election.
• Section V.: Means, &c. Continued.—ii. Placemen Seated By the King, With Speech and Motion, Without Vote.
• Section VI.: Means, &c. Continued.—iii. Elections Frequent—annual.
• Section VII.: Means, &c. Continued.—iv. Speeches Authentically and Promptly Published.
• Section VIII.: Means, &c. Continued.—v. Attendance, Punctual and General, Secured.
• Section IX.: Inconveniences Incident to Elections, and Election Judicature.
• Section X.: Election Inconveniences—means For Their Removal.
• Section XI.: Collateral Advantages, Referable to the Situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.
• A Sketch of the Various Proposals For a Constitutional Reform In the Representation of the People, Introduced Into the Parliament of Great Britain, From 1770 to 1812.
• Radical Reform Bill, With Extracts From the Reasons.
• Preliminary Explanations.
• Title of the Proposed Act.
• Preamble.
• Section 1.—: Seats and Districts.
• Section 2.—: Electors, Who.
• Section 3.—: Eligible, Who.
• Section 4.—: Election Offices.
• Section 5.: Election Apparatus.
• Section 6.—: Promulgation of Recommendations In Favour of Proposed Members.
• Section 7.—: Voters’ Titles Pre-established.
• Section 8.—: Election, How.
• Section 9.: Election Districts and Polling Districts, How Marked Out.
• Section 10.—: Vote-making Habitations, How Defined.
• Section 11.—: Members’ Continuance.
• Section 12.—: Vacancies Supplied.
• Section 13.—: Security For the House Against Disturbance By Members. †
• Section 14.—: Indisposition of Speakers Obviated.
• Appendix, Including General Explanations.
• Radicalism Not Dangerous. Extracted From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham. *
• Part I.—: Introduction.
• Section I.: Radical Reform Bill Recapitulated.
• Section II.: Persuasion of the Dangerousness of Radicalism—cause of It, and of the Vituperative Expression Given to It.
• Section III.: Terms of the Accusation,—speeches From the Throne, 16 Th July and 21 St November 1819.
• Section IV.: The Accusation In General Terms—counter-averment.
• Section V.: Plan of This Defence.
• Part II.—: Deference From the General Nature of the Case.
• Section I.: Conditions Necessary to a Man’s Embarking In Such a Design.
• Section VII.: Concurrence In Any Other Extensive Plan of Spoliation Impossible.
• Section VIII.: Concurrence of Any Constituted Authorities Impossible.
• Section IX.: Accomplishment Impossible—design Impossible.
• Section X.: The Talked-of Spunge No Proof of the Design.
• Part III.—: Defence From Experience In the Case of the United States.
• Part IV.: Defence From Particular Experience In the Case of Ireland: Years 1777 Or 1778, to 1783.
• Section I.: Analogy Between This and the Previous Case.
• Section II.: Democratic Ascendency, How Produced.
• Section III.: Fruit of Democratic Ascendency a Golden Age.
• Section IV.: Coincidence of Its Characters With Those of Radicalism.
• Section VI.: Extinction of Democratic Ascendency and Reform—restoration of Monarchico-aristocratical Ascendency, and Its Consequences.
• Conclusion.

SECTION XII.

SECRESY OF SUFFRAGE—ITS IMPORTANCE FURTHER DEVELOPED.

In the situation of Election voters,—in the character of a security for freedom of suffrage, and against spuriousness of suffrage, not only the utility but to a great extent the necessity of secresy,—in the character of a security against all seductive influence operating from without, whether in the shape of terrorism or in the shape of bribery (that is, in every shape whatever, gratitude of the purely social kind excepted,) its necessity—in a preceding section (Section V.) and in the Plan itself, all these tutelary properties have been brought to view.

Turn back to Section X.—behold once more the troop of dependents driven to the poll-booth, with stewards in front and rear, to prevent desertion. By the protecting veil of secresy, suppose now the direction given to the voter completely hidden—hidden from all tyrant eyes—say, would any such trouble ever be given to stewards? By terror may a man be driven to the place of election,—true:—but, under the shield of secresy, it is not by terror that, when he is there, the direction given to his vote can be determined.

But, in this same case, secresy, as it excludes terrorism, so does it exclude bribery: for, though by gratitude and sympathy alone what may happen is—that a bribe shall in this case be productive of the desired effect,—yet such is the feebleness of the chance, as to exclude (it should seem) all probability—all practical probability, and thence all adequate expectation—of effecting by this means the desired purpose. Where the engagement is of such a nature, that the act of contracting it is a transgression against the laws of morality and political probity, who is there that can fail to acknowledge that the fulfilling of that same engagement is—not an atonement for that first sin, but a repetition of it? If this doctrine be just and true,—nay, whether it be so or not,—in a case such as that in question, endeavours to instil this antidote into the mind to which, in the way in question, the matter of corruption has been applied, seem little in danger of being either deficient or ineffectual.

Now, suppose universal suffrage established, or suffrage to such an extent as not to exclude paupers. Let but the direction given to the vote be completely unknown to all but him who gives it,—a pauper—having no prospect of gain in the event of his giving it in favour of the less fit candidate—nor of loss in the event of his giving it in favour of the more fit candidate,—would, if the delivery of his vote seemed to him worth the trouble—would naturally, if in his own conception unable to form a judgment of his own—would, of course, among such persons as he beheld within his reach—look out for those whose reputation, in respect of the joint qualities of appropriate probity and appropriate intellectual aptitude, stood highest,—from them endeavour to learn which of all the proposed candidates was, in their opinion, the fittest—and give his vote accordingly. Such would be the case under the system of secresy. How would it be under the system of publicity? His subsistence—his very existence—depends upon the pleasure of the local magistracy: his vote would be as absolutely at their command, as the voting ticket at the command of the hand by which it is dropped into the box. Think of the proportion borne by those who already are in a state of pauperism, to those who are not yet fallen into that disastrous state. This vast part of the democracy would be completely in the hands of the removable nominees of the crown. Yes:—in the hands of titled country terrorists, and corruption-eating and corruption-hunting court divines, ready to join hand in hand with hubble-bubble city corruptionists, for the protection of a commissioned associate, in the habit of exercising to his own use, on condition of exercising other arts to the use of court and treasury, the “useful” art of “poisoning,” so long as it were upon such and such alone of his Majesty’s subjects as it should please them to consign to contempt and torment by the appellation of “ale-drinkers.”

And thus, by the new instrumentality of universality of suffrage, if unprotected by the necessary shield of secresy—thus, without commotion or drop of blood shed, the constitution would be changed; changed from its present state, of an impure but not yet to a certainty altogether unpurifiable mixture, into a pure and ever unamendable despotism.

In correspondent obedience to one of those solemn ordinances, which have been so often passed for show,—with the exception of the metropolis, at which it is kept collected in greatest quantity,—all military force is, at all parliamentary election times, ordered at a distance from the place: as if for a troop of dragoons, by whose sabres the mask would be so effectually cut off, and by any the smallest movement of which, in this line of parliamentary service, the whole country, if by anything it could be, would be thrown into a flame,—as if for any such instruments of terror there could be any the slightest demand, when, without the stirring so much as of a finger or a tongue, the object can be and is so effectually accomplished by the invisible and motionless spectre of terrorism. Thus are gnats strained at, that camels may be swallowed.

Such being the state of things, by what strange accident—by what strange delusion—can it be, that, in the situation in which so vast a proportion of the whole body of the people are held down by the indissoluble bonds of civilized society,—the necessity of secresy in the character of a shield to freedom, in the character of a security against spuriousness of suffrage—at any rate under the joint yoke of monarchy and aristocracy,—can have been made to conceal itself from any eye? In such a case, how is it that a man can avoid seeing, that by publicity terror is armed, by secresy disarmed?

A man ought—every man ought—to sacrifice in every case—to sacrifice in this case in particular—his own personal interest to the universal interest. Good:—there we have an antecedent. Ergo, so he will: there we have the consequent. Well: if in the consequent there be any truth, here are we already in Utopia: no need of penal laws; no, nor so much as of sermons.

Call a man names—hard to any degree of hardness—slave, coward, or if there be anything harder,—by any such insult will he in any degree be disposed to practise the self-denying lesson, thus preached to him by a censor, who himself is all the while sitting upon velvet?

On this occasion, as on any other,—if, in any imaginable way, without determinate and preponderant mischief, means can be found for reconciling private with public interest, and thus saving both from sacrifice,—can any valid reason be given why such means should not be employed?

Suppose that, by any such expression of scorn, ninety-nine men out of a hundred, or though it were but one out of the hundred, could thus be engaged to devote themselves to ruin,—to ruin, or though it were but any the slightest inconvenience,—how is it that, while the useful and desired effect might as completely and surely be produced without inconvenience in any shape,—how is it that by any such discipline the sum of happiness would be increased?

This shield, without which all pretence to freedom is imposture,—in what sort of situation could any objection to the use of it have found either origin or acceptance? Only in one or other of these two: the one is—that of a man who—his whole dependence being in terrorism, in bribery, or in a mixture of both—beheld in the freedom secured by secresy a bar to his designs; the other, that of a man to whom—that same situation exempting him from all such sensation as that of fear on any such score—no idea of any such sensation had ever presented itself as likely to have place, among the multitude whom he saw at his feet; or, if it had, had never otherwise presented itself than as a matter of indifference.

In conversation even, and that a confidential one, with a man now no more, ballot being mentioned by me as a causa sine qua non of freedom, he made wry faces, muttered out the word nasty, and turned off the discourse. He was a patron of seats; his votes wavering: he was a great landholder; and not the most popular among landholders.

“Cowardly dogs!” said an expert swimmer, who having crossed a deep river at his ease, looked back and beheld his companions, some of whom could swim, lingering on the other side—“cowardly dogs! are not ye ashamed of yourselves?”

As to any supposed difficulty with regard to the accomplishment of the purpose, altogether groundless would be any objection on that score. With notorious and undisputed constancy is the effect accomplished, for example, at the India House.* In the sort of situation here in question, should any inconvenience be found to attend the mode there employed, others might and would be devised in plenty, every one of them exempt from inconvenience.

No: not in the invention of a mode by which the purpose shall be accomplished,—but in the devising of a mode by which—to remotely situated as well as to conniving eyes—the purpose shall be made to appear to be intended and accomplished, while in effect as well as design the opposite purpose is accomplished,—in this lay the only difficulty. Turn now to Honourable House, and in that seat of self-proclaimed honour, behold this difficulty, after having, during a course of ages, been constantly surmounted, at last by miracle rendered for ever unsurmountable. Turn to Morning Chronicle debates, and therein you may see, that on the 6th of February 1817,—the time of Honourable House having already for a whole hour been occupied in the organization of a ballot for a committee of secresy,—up, from the opposite side of the house, starts Mr. Brougham, and with the exception of one out of one-and-twenty, reads the names of the members, the choice of whom was to be the result of all this secresy.

Comes the next day (7th February 1817,) and, in speaking of the ballot, the noble lord at whose motion this time-consuming process has been carrying on, admits it to be open to the insinuations “that had been conveyed;” “still, however,” says the report, “he did not think that the House would join . . . . . in reprobating a practice established by the usage of ages.” Of no imposture which, for the delusion of the public, Honourable House had been in use to practise—of no such imposture would even the most public detection afford to Honourable House any inducement strong enough to engage honourable gentlemen to cease practising it. In and to Honourable House itself, such is the portraiture given of the said Honourable House by a noble lord, who, at that same moment, is seen occupied in the giving direction to it, and the intimacy of whose acquaintance with its true character could not without injustice and folly be contested.

Not the less pertinaciously maintaining by argument the excellence of this “usage of ages,”—even the principle of universal suffrage (“it had been contended,” he observed, “by many”) would not be productive of a fair representation of the people without it. True: but between the many and the one there was one difference: the ballot thus advocated by the many was a real one: the ballot advocated by the one was a sham one. “High,” in the tone of scorn and sarcasm, was the epithet thereupon given to the “authority,” by which the use of the instrument of freedom is thereupon stated as recommended: “high,” as who should say contemptible. Now if contempt there must be, where will be the fittest object for it to be found?—in the titled would-be impostor, who knowing a practice to be a sham, attempts to pass it off as genuine,—or the untitled good man and true, who holds up to view as sham that which he sees to be sham, and as genuine that which he sees to be genuine?

For illustration,—the effect of ballot, as applied to other situations, presents some claim to notice. Whatsoever be the situation, and the ultimate effect,—the effect which secresy has for its proximate result is—the enabling the voter to give effect to his own will, to the exclusion of every other. This being true in every case,—in the situation of a public trustee, consider it in the character of a security for appropriate probity:—a security for the faithful execution of his trust. In this situation, whatsoever be the nature of this public trust, and of the public interest, for the support of which the trust has been instituted,—in so far as, in his own view of it, his own individual interest coincides with such public interest, secresy is the mode and the only mode, that affords an adequate assurance of the fulfilment of the intended purpose. On the other hand, when (the situation in which he is acting being here likewise that of the holder of a public trust) the danger is—that, in his own view of it, the tendency of his individual interest is, on the point in question, opposite to the public interest—to that public interest for which he is in trust,—insomuch that he thereby stands exposed to the temptation of sacrificing such public to his own private interest,—in any such situation, the greater the publicity is that is given to his proceedings, the stronger is the check, such as it is, the tendency of which is to restrain him from joining in such sacrifice: consequently, on the other hand, the more entire and assured the secresy,—the stronger the temptation, and the greater the facility afforded to such sacrifice.*

Now transfer in idea the ballot to Honourable House—adjourned (suppose) to Utopia, for the purpose of so ordering matters that on this one occasion the practice of Honourable House shall not be tainted with imposture. Suppose at the same time a member, in whose instance dependence and independence preserve (both of them) the customary relations: independent as towards the swine who dare to style themselves his constituents, he is dependent constitutionally dependent—as towards the Emanuel of Judge Blackstone. First, let the case be one, in which,—whether in his individual capacity merely, or in his capacity of partner in the universal interest, or in both capacities together,—he would, in his own view of the matter, be a sufferer by the proposed measure if carried; say a bad or needless tax:—at the same time, were he to oppose it, he would, from the resentment of the said Emanuel, in his own view of the matter be in danger of becoming a sufferer to a greater amount: in this case, secresy will in his instance operate—and that with indisputable effect—as a shield to appropriate probity. Now, let the case be one in which, in the same capacities, and in the same eyes as before, he would be a gainer: say that of any one of the swarm of bills for the extirpation of English liberties—any bill, in a word, for the fastening, in a manner still more excruciating if possible, the joint yoke of monarchy and aristocracy upon the neck of the swinish multitude: in this case, instead of being a shield to appropriate probity, secresy would be a shield to the opposite improbity.

[* ]Yet, by Charles Fox, as hath been seen, could the supposed impracticability of uniting freedom with universality of suffrage be urged in the character of an objection—and that, though the only one, a conclusive one—against the giving any such extent to the right of suffrage!

[* ]In this case, what may perhaps be observed is—that, under the check thus applied, the will to which he gives effect is not his own will, any more than under the check applied by individual terrorism. True: but here, though it is not his own will, it is the only proper will; which is still better. To give effect to that will, the effectuation of which is in the highest degree subservient to the public interest in question—this is the only ultimate end: in relation to this ultimate end, the giving effect to his own private and individual will, as governed by his own private and individual interest, or supposed interest, is but a means. Be the means what it may, that which the public service, in respect of the public interest in question, requires, is, that when the means in question, i. e. that which is proposed in the character of a means, is really subservient to the end, then it should be employed—when it is not thus subservient, then it should not be employed.