The Online Library of Liberty

A project of Liberty Fund, Inc.

• Errata—vol. III.
• Defence of Usury; Showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints On the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains; In Letters to a Friend.
• Letter I.: Introduction.
• Letter II.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Usury.
• Letter III.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Prodigality.
• Letter IV.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Indigence.
• Letter V.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Simplicity.
• Letter VI.: Mischiefs of the Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VII.: Efficacy of Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VIII.: Virtual Usury Allowed.
• Letter IX.: Blackstone Considered.
• Letter X.: Grounds of the Prejudices Against Usury.
• Letter XI.: Compound Interest.
• Letter XII.: Maintenance and Champerty.
• Letter XIII.: To Dr. Smith, On Projects In Arts, &c.
• A Manual of Political Economy: Now First Edited From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: Introduction. *
• Chapter II.: Analytical Survey of the Field of Political Economy.
• Chapter III.: Of Wealth.
• Chapter IV.: Of Population.
• Chapter V.: Of Finance.
• Chapter VI.: Operation of a Sinking Fund On the Production of Wealth.
• Chapter VII.: Noscenda.
• Observations On the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; Especially With a Reference to the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of July 1820.
• Preface.: Observations, &c.
• Section I.: Nature of the Prohibitory System.
• Section II.: Mischiefs of the Prohibitory System.
• Section III.: Causes of the Prohibitory System.
• A Plan For Saving All Trouble and Expense In the Transfer of Stock, and For Enabling the Proprietors to Receive Their Dividends Without Powers of Attorney, Or Attendance At the Bank of England, By the Conversion of Stock Into Note Annuities.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Plan For the Creation, Emission, Payment, and Eventual Extension, of a Proposed New Species of Government Paper, Under the Name of Annuity Notes.
• Chapter II.: Form of an Annuity Note. (see Table II.)
• Chapter III.: Comparison of the Proposed, With the Existing Government Securities, &c.
• Chapter IV.: Grounds of Expectation, In Regard to the Proposed Measure.
• Chapter V.: Financial Advantages.
• Chapter VI.: Advantage By Addition to National Capital.
• Chapter VII.: Advantage By Addition to Commercial Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Particular Interests Concerned.
• Chapter IX.: Rise of Prices—how to Obviate.
• Chapter X.: Reduction of Interest—proposed Mode Compared With Mr. Pelham’s.
• Chapter XI.: Moral Advantages.
• Chapter XII.: Constitutional Advantages.
• Chapter XIII.: Recapitulation and Conclusion.
• Appendix A.: Government Ought to Have the Monopoly of Paper Money, As Well As of Metallic Money.
• Appendix B.: Paper Money—causes Why Not Circulated By Government Without Interest, As Well As By Individuals.
• General View of a Complete Code of Laws.
• Chapter I.: General Division.
• Chapter II.: Relations Between the Laws Concerning Offences, Rights, Obligations, and Services.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between the Penal and Civil Code.
• Chapter IV.: Of Method.
• Chapter V.: Plan of the Penal Code.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Division of Offences.
• Chapter VIII. Titles of the Penal Code.
• Chapter IX.: First General Title of the Civil Code, * of Things.
• Chapter X.: Second General Title of the Civil Code. of Places.
• Chapter XI.: Third General Title of the Civil Code. of Times.
• Chapter XII.: Fourth General Title of the Civil Code. of Services.
• Chapter XIII.: Fifth General Title of the Civil Code. of Obligations.
• Chapter XIV.: Sixth General Title of the Civil Code. of Rights.
• Chapter XV.: Seventh General Title of the Civil Code. of Collative and Ablative Events.
• Chapter XVI.: Eighth General Title of the Civil Code. of Contracts.
• Chapter XVII.: Ninth General Title of the Civil Code. of the Domestic and Civil States.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tenth General Title of the Civil Code. of Persons Capable of Acquiring and of Contracting.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Particular Titles of the Civil Code.
• Chapter XX.: Of Elementary Political Powers.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Elementary Political Powers— Subject Continued.
• Chapter XXII.: Plan of the Political Code.
• Chapter XXIII.: Plan of the International Code.
• Chapter XXIV.: Plan of the Maritime Code.
• Chapter XXV.: Plan of the Military Code.
• Chapter XXVI.: Plan of the Ecclesiastical Code.
• Chapter XXVII.: Plan of Remuneratory Laws.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Of Political Economy.
• Chapter XXIX.: Plan of the Financial Code.
• Chapter XXX.: Plan of Procedure Code.
• Chapter XXXI.: Of the Integrality of the Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of Purity In the Composition of a Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Of the Style of the Laws.
• Chapter XXXIV.: Of the Interpretation, Conservation, and Improvement of a Code.
• Pannomial Fragments.
• Chapter I.: General Observations.
• Chapter II.: Consideranda.
• Chapter III.: Expositions.
• Chapter IV.: Axioms.
• Nomography; Or the Art of Inditing Laws: Now First Published From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: The Subject Stated.
• Chapter II.: Relations.
• Chapter III.: Proper End In View.
• Chapter IV.: Imperfections Primary.
• Chapter V.: Explanations Relative to the Imperfections of the Second Order.
• Chapter VI.: Of Remedies. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Language.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Perfections of Which the Legislative Style Is Susceptible.
• Chapter IX.: Of Forms of Enactment.
• Appendix. Logical Arrangements, Or Instruments of Invention and Discovery
• Equity Dispatch Court Proposal; Containing a Plan For the Speedy and Unexpensive Termination of the Suits Now Depending In Equity Courts. With the Form of a Petition, and Some Account of a Proposed Bill For That Purpose
• Section I.: Purpose Explained. Jeremy Bentham to the Honest and Afflicted Among Equity Suitors.
• Section II.: Equity Suitors’ Petition For Dispatch Court. to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, —
• Section III.: Dispatch Court Bill—some Account of It.
• Section IV.: Information Requisite From Petitioning Suitors.
• Equity Dispatch Court Bill: Being a Bill For the Institution of an Experimental Judicatory Under the Name of the Court of Dispatch, For Exemplifying In Practice the Manner In Which the Proposed Summary May Be Substituted to the So Called Regular Sy
• Editor’s Note.
• Preface.
• Preamble.
• Part I.—: Judiciary.
• Section I.: Judge Located, How.
• Section II.: Remuneration.
• Section III.: Registrar, &c.
• Section IV.: Eleemosynary Advocate.
• Section V.: Judges’, &c. Deputes.
• Section VI.: Judge’s Powers—exemptions—checks.
• Section VII.: Prehensors and Messengers.
• Section VIII.: Consignees; * Or Say, In-trust-holders.
• Section IX.: Grounds of Decision For the Dispatch Court Judge.
• Section X. ‡: Suits’ Comparative Suitableness; and Order of Cognizance.
• Section XI.: Auxiliary Judges and Accountants.
• Section XII.: Sittings, Times Of.
• Part II.—: Procedure.
• Section XIII.: Definitions. *
• Section XIV.: Examination of Solicitors.
• Section XV.: Initiatory Examination of Parties, &c.
• Section XVI.: Appropriate Intercourse, Constant and Universal, Secured.
• Section XVII.: Mutual Security For Forthcomingness of Persons and Things. ‡
• Section XVIII.: Evidence-procuring Money, How Provided.
• Section XIX.: Subsequential Evidence, How Elicited.
• Section XX.: Execution, How Performed.
• Section XXI.: Equity Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXII.: Dispatch Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXIII.: Eventual Retrotransference of a Suit to the Equity Court.
• Section XXIV.: Expense of the Court, How Provided For.
• Supplemental Sections:—
• Section I. Or XXV.: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
• Section II. Or XXVI.: Henceforward Dispatch Court.
• Schedules to the Bill.
• Plan of Parliamentary Reform, In the Form of a Catechism, With Reasons For Each Article: With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform.
• Introduction.
• Section I.: History of the Ensuing Tract—alarming State of the Country and the Constitution.
• Section II.: Most Prominent Present Grievance, Gareisoning France.
• Section III.: Causes of the Above and All Other Mischiefs:—particular Interests Monarchical and Aristocratical, Adverse to the Universal—their Ascendency.
• Section IV.: Sole Remedy In Principle—democratic Ascendency.
• Section V.: Remedy In Detail: Radical Parliamentary Reform: Elementary Arrangements In This Edition of It—their Necessity.
• Section VI.: Differences Between This and the Original Editions of Radical Reform.
• Section VII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage Further Considered.
• Section VIII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.
• Section IX.: Freedom of Suffrage Further Explained—seductive Influence—its Forms, Instruments, &c.
• Section X.: Bribery and Terrorism Compared.
• Section XI.: Purchase of Seats—in What Cases Mischievous—in What Beneficial.
• Section XII.: Secresy of Suffrage—its Importance Further Developed.
• Section XIII.: Exclusion of Placemen, &c. From the Right of Voting—mischievousness and Profligacy of the Opposite Arrangement.
• Section XIV.: Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.
• Section XV.: Representatives—impermanence of Their Situation—its Importance:—objections—their Groundlessness.
• Section XVI.: Moderate Reform—its Arrangements—their Inadequacy.
• Section XVII.: Trienniality Inadequate;—annuality Necessary.
• Section XVIII.: Interests Adverse to Adequate Reform—support Given By Them to Moderate, to the Exclusion of Radical: Tories—whigs—people’s Men.
• Catechism of Parliamentary Reform; Or, Outline of a Plan of Parliamentary Reform; In the Form of Question and Answer; With Reasons to Each Article.
• Section I.: Ends to Be Aimed At On the Occasion of Parliamentary Reform.
• Section II.: Means, Conducive Towards These Ends.
• Section III.: Means—their Uses, With Reference to Their Respective Ends.
• Section IV.: Means Conducive to Aptitude In Members: I. Placemen Not to Vote, Nor to Be Seated By Election.
• Section V.: Means, &c. Continued.—ii. Placemen Seated By the King, With Speech and Motion, Without Vote.
• Section VI.: Means, &c. Continued.—iii. Elections Frequent—annual.
• Section VII.: Means, &c. Continued.—iv. Speeches Authentically and Promptly Published.
• Section VIII.: Means, &c. Continued.—v. Attendance, Punctual and General, Secured.
• Section IX.: Inconveniences Incident to Elections, and Election Judicature.
• Section X.: Election Inconveniences—means For Their Removal.
• Section XI.: Collateral Advantages, Referable to the Situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.
• A Sketch of the Various Proposals For a Constitutional Reform In the Representation of the People, Introduced Into the Parliament of Great Britain, From 1770 to 1812.
• Radical Reform Bill, With Extracts From the Reasons.
• Preliminary Explanations.
• Title of the Proposed Act.
• Preamble.
• Section 1.—: Seats and Districts.
• Section 2.—: Electors, Who.
• Section 3.—: Eligible, Who.
• Section 4.—: Election Offices.
• Section 5.: Election Apparatus.
• Section 6.—: Promulgation of Recommendations In Favour of Proposed Members.
• Section 7.—: Voters’ Titles Pre-established.
• Section 8.—: Election, How.
• Section 9.: Election Districts and Polling Districts, How Marked Out.
• Section 10.—: Vote-making Habitations, How Defined.
• Section 11.—: Members’ Continuance.
• Section 12.—: Vacancies Supplied.
• Section 13.—: Security For the House Against Disturbance By Members. †
• Section 14.—: Indisposition of Speakers Obviated.
• Appendix, Including General Explanations.
• Radicalism Not Dangerous. Extracted From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham. *
• Part I.—: Introduction.
• Section I.: Radical Reform Bill Recapitulated.
• Section II.: Persuasion of the Dangerousness of Radicalism—cause of It, and of the Vituperative Expression Given to It.
• Section III.: Terms of the Accusation,—speeches From the Throne, 16 Th July and 21 St November 1819.
• Section IV.: The Accusation In General Terms—counter-averment.
• Section V.: Plan of This Defence.
• Part II.—: Deference From the General Nature of the Case.
• Section I.: Conditions Necessary to a Man’s Embarking In Such a Design.
• Section VII.: Concurrence In Any Other Extensive Plan of Spoliation Impossible.
• Section VIII.: Concurrence of Any Constituted Authorities Impossible.
• Section IX.: Accomplishment Impossible—design Impossible.
• Section X.: The Talked-of Spunge No Proof of the Design.
• Part III.—: Defence From Experience In the Case of the United States.
• Part IV.: Defence From Particular Experience In the Case of Ireland: Years 1777 Or 1778, to 1783.
• Section I.: Analogy Between This and the Previous Case.
• Section II.: Democratic Ascendency, How Produced.
• Section III.: Fruit of Democratic Ascendency a Golden Age.
• Section IV.: Coincidence of Its Characters With Those of Radicalism.
• Section VI.: Extinction of Democratic Ascendency and Reform—restoration of Monarchico-aristocratical Ascendency, and Its Consequences.
• Conclusion.

SECTION XI.

PURCHASE OF SEATS—IN WHAT CASES MISCHIEVOUS—IN WHAT BENEFICIAL.

In comparison of purely gratuitous,—nomination for what in law language is called valuable consideration—is it upon the whole a pernicious, a beneficial practice, or a matter of indifference?

Answer: In each instance, which of the three qualities belongs to it will, in this, as in all other cases, depend upon the manner in which the universal interest is affected by it.

In comparison of the person, who but for the sale would have been seated in the way of gratuitous nomination,—the course taken by the possessor by purchase, will it be more beneficial, less beneficial, or neither more nor less beneficial, to the public interest? In this question may be seen the answer to the last preceding one.

For this last question, from no other source can any answer be deduced than from the consideration of the quality and quantity of the effective influence exercised by the individual in question, in all shapes taken together, during his continuance in the seat.

Individuals being unknown, as to the quantity nothing can here be said. Quantity being supposed the same,—as to the quality, which depends on the direction taken by it, thus much, and thus much only, can be said,—viz. that for ascertaining it, in so far as it is capable of being ascertained, the only criterion which the nature of the case affords is,—the consideration of the situation occupied by him with reference to party. Tories, Whigs, People’s men, Neutrals—taking him during the whole of his career together, with which of all the several classes thus denominated, has he acted?

In the course of this inquiry, the persuasion which the author has all along found pressing upon his mind with irresistible force is—that, to the disposition, the Tories or King’s men add already not only the power, but the practice, of driving the country down headlong in the descent that terminates in the gulf of pure despotism:—that—such is the state of interests—the Whigs, whether in or out of office, are driving, and would continue to drive on in that same course; though in both situations with a degree of force and velocity more or less inferior to that which belongs to the nature of their naturally and almost constantly successful rivals:—that, if it be among the decrees of destiny, that in its way to that abyss the country shall at any point be stopped,—it can only be by the energy of the people, headed and led by the few people’s men by whom any place shall have been found in the House, reinforced by such of the Whigs, if any, in whose view, as the prospect of perdition comes nearer and nearer, the shares they respectively possess in the universal interest, may come to present itself as exceeding in value their respective shares in the particular and separate interests possessed by them in virtue of their connexion with the party to which they belong.

In this view of the matter—barring the application of the only remedy as above—the arrival of unmitigated despotism being, sooner or later, a result altogether certain,—the only effect of which, in this respect, the practice in question, or any other, can be productive, is that which respects the predicament of time: the causing it to take place a little sooner or a little later than it would otherwise.

Of the practice of venal, contrasted with that of gratuitous nominations, is the acceleration or the retardation of this catastrophe most likely to be the effect? I answer—the acceleration; and for these reasons:—

It being the property of money and money’s worth, when applied to the accomplishment of any object, to apply to the minds on which that accomplishment depends, a quantity of influencing force, over and above whatsoever would otherwise be acting on those same subjects in that same direction,—the effect of the venality, i. e. of the purchases made by means of it, will in this case be—to give to the party, whichsoever it be, by whom they are made, an accession of strength beyond what it would possess otherwise.

The accession of strength, whatever it be, which may be derivable from this source,—by which of the several denominations is it likely to be devived in the greatest quantity?—Answer: By the Tories:—by that party, headed as they are and supported by C—r-General and their interest and their affections identified with his.

As it is, the number of members belonging to this denomination,—not to speak of persons without doors—corruption-eaters, and corruption-hunters, and blind-custom-led men, and indifferentists taken together,—seems at present to be far greater than that of all the other denominations put together: and, as despotism advances,—and while this sentence is writing, it is advancing in seven-leagued boots,—the number will be receiving continual increase. Proportioned to their number will be the aggregate amount of the quantity of ready money in their hands, applicable to this convenient purpose: and,—quantity of money in hand the same—of him whose prospect of appropriate return is nearest, the biddings will naturally be higher than of him whose prospect is more distant.

Thus much as to the general tendency of the practice. But, from this general tendency, supposing it admitted, does any such proposition follow, as that to the character of a true people’s man it belongs to lay down to himself any such rule as that of abstaining from it? No, surely: but exactly the reverse. The greater the velocity of the disastrous descent, the more strenuous are the exertions by which it should be endeavoured to be retarded.

For my own part, had I some ten or twenty millions of money at my disposal,—I would, though to an opposite purpose, effect the very monopoly, the mischievousness of which, reference being made to the at present established practice, has just been represented as being in the direct ratio of the extent of it. Instead of buying land with the money for my own kindred, I would buy liberty with it for the people. With that money, not only should I buy up all the existing venal borough seats and county seats, as they came to market, but I should raise to the rank of venal ones many others which now are not so. With that money in hand, I could and would open honourable eyes, in sufficient abundance: I would enable them even to see—(oh the astonishing sight!)—that liberty is better than slavery, sincerity than imposture, good government than misrule, the absence of waste and corruption than the presence, dependence on the people than dependence on an essentially insatiable shark with his subsharks—the love and respect of the people, than their merited abhorrence.*

[* ]The pace at which, in virtue of such a series of antecedent impulses, they saw the chariot of the State descending towards the gulph, was not yet rapid enough to satisfy the impatience of the Phaëtons, from whom it receives its guidance. Behold one instance in which, on the spur of the occasion, to give redoubled energy to the indefatigable arm, the surtout of common decency was cast off, as being a needless incumbrance.

A bill for the more effectually preventing the sale of seats for money, and for promoting the monopoly thereof to the treasury,by the means of patronage:—such was the title moved for by Lord Folkestone for the act 49 Geo. III. c. 118. Out of 161, 28 voted for this amendment. (Cobbett’s Debates, June 13, 1809.) To denounce to the people, and in language so expressive, the true character, of this measure, required the generous boldness of a Lord Folkestone. To read this character in it, belongs to any man, to whom the words of it are not unreadable.

Would you form an adequate conception of the anxiety by which on this occasion that Honourable House was agitated? Read it in the anxiety expressed—not to say betrayed—by the right honourable gentleman who is the head of it. Bursting the bond of those delicacies, which, but six days before (June 1st,) had produced the well-considered and elaborate declaration, of the reluctance by which, down to that time, he had been restrained from “mixing in the debates,”—twice in one day—viz. on the 7th of that same month—did he stand up and insist, that the word express (that being the word employed for the grant of the licence included in the monopoly) should be inserted. Inserted?—and upon what grounds? On grounds to which the absence of all grounds would surely have been in so small degree an advantageous substitute.

In the determination of Honourable House to establish the monopoly at that time—in that determination which he was thus labouring to produce—he saw an earnest of their determination to abolish it as soon as the occasion should require: and, in an imagined rule of common law already punishing the practice with an adequate punishment in both cases, he saw a sufficient reason for adding a regulation of statute law for punishing it in the one, and for refusing to add it in the other, of those same cases.a

[* ]The pace at which, in virtue of such a series of antecedent impulses, they saw the chariot of the State descending towards the gulph, was not yet rapid enough to satisfy the impatience of the Phaëtons, from whom it receives its guidance. Behold one instance in which, on the spur of the occasion, to give redoubled energy to the indefatigable arm, the surtout of common decency was cast off, as being a needless incumbrance.

A bill for the more effectually preventing the sale of seats for money, and for promoting the monopoly thereof to the treasury,by the means of patronage:—such was the title moved for by Lord Folkestone for the act 49 Geo. III. c. 118. Out of 161, 28 voted for this amendment. (Cobbett’s Debates, June 13, 1809.) To denounce to the people, and in language so expressive, the true character, of this measure, required the generous boldness of a Lord Folkestone. To read this character in it, belongs to any man, to whom the words of it are not unreadable.

Would you form an adequate conception of the anxiety by which on this occasion that Honourable House was agitated? Read it in the anxiety expressed—not to say betrayed—by the right honourable gentleman who is the head of it. Bursting the bond of those delicacies, which, but six days before (June 1st,) had produced the well-considered and elaborate declaration, of the reluctance by which, down to that time, he had been restrained from “mixing in the debates,”—twice in one day—viz. on the 7th of that same month—did he stand up and insist, that the word express (that being the word employed for the grant of the licence included in the monopoly) should be inserted. Inserted?—and upon what grounds? On grounds to which the absence of all grounds would surely have been in so small degree an advantageous substitute.

In the determination of Honourable House to establish the monopoly at that time—in that determination which he was thus labouring to produce—he saw an earnest of their determination to abolish it as soon as the occasion should require: and, in an imagined rule of common law already punishing the practice with an adequate punishment in both cases, he saw a sufficient reason for adding a regulation of statute law for punishing it in the one, and for refusing to add it in the other, of those same cases.a

[a]Cobbett’s Debates, June 7, 1809, xiv. 926.—“The Speaker stated his wish on the first view to extend the provisions of this bill to the purchase of seats in parliament, as well by office as by money. The great rule was—to strike at the prominent and most flagrant points of offence. Amongst those, most certainly, was the proof of an express contract. These, he would state, always impressed him with the conviction, that this species of traffic, whether carried on by implied or express covenants, was an offence against the law of parliament, and, in his opinion, punishable as a misdemeanor at common law. It was fully within the power of the House to provide any future enactments against any future offences, which in the course of the operation of this measure might subsequently arise.”“Mr. Ponsonby, with considerable diffidence in his own opinion, when opposed to the very high authority of the Speaker, still contended that the insertion of the term “express,” in a declaratory act of parliament, conveyed the interpretation, that the penalty attached to express agreements, and that all of an indirect nature came not within its operation.”“The Speaker considered, that the resolutions of that House in 1779 bore fully upon a traffic carried on by an implied contract, and therefore he saw no reason to oppose the proposed clause, as now worded.”