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SECTION VII.: VIRTUAL UNIVERSALITY OF SUFFRAGE FURTHER CONSIDERED. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3 [1843]

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The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 3.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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SECTION VII.

VIRTUAL UNIVERSALITY OF SUFFRAGE FURTHER CONSIDERED.

Now as to universal suffrage. Subject to defalcation, each for special reason,—in all eyes but those to which tyranny is the only endurable form of government,—what principle can be more impregnable?

1. Who is there, that is not susceptible of discomfort and comfort—of pain and pleasure?

2. Of what is human happiness, felicity, well-being, welfare—call it what you please—composed, but comfort and absence of discomfort—pleasure and exemption from pain?*

3. The happiness and unhappiness of any one member of the community—high or low, rich or poor—what greater or less part is it of the universal happiness and unhappiness, than that of any other?

4. Who is there, by whom unhappiness is not avoided—happiness pursued?

5. Who is there, by whom unhappiness ought not to be avoided—happiness ought not to be pursued?

6. Who is there, that, in avoidance of unhappiness, and pursuit of happiness, has not a course of conduct to maintain—which, in some way or other, he does maintain,—throughout life?

7. Who is there, whose conduct does not in its course take, on each occasion, its direction from a judgment of the one kind or the other:—from a self-formed or a derivative one?

8. Who is there, whose conduct is never, on any occasion, directed by any other than a self-formed judgment? Who is there that, in relation to the most momentous of the private concerns of his life, does not frequently find himself under the obligation of taking for his guidance a judgment of the derivative kind?—a judgment of no firmer texture?

9. How many are there, in whose instance the part taken by a man, in relation to his own private affairs considered all together, is not of greater importance to himself (not to speak of the whole community,) than any part could be, which, in relation to the whole number of public affairs taken together, could, even under a system of universal suffrage, ever come under his cognizance?

20. In so far as between the interests of the subject-many, and those of the ruling few, any such relation as that of incompatibility has place,—suppose, on the part of the ruling few, the prevalent—or though it were the exclusive—possession of appropriate intellectual aptitude, suited to the nature of the case,—in what way or degree would the interest—would the welfare—of the subject-many be benefited, so long as in those ruling bosoms, instead of appropriate probity, the opposite, improbity, had place?†

Security—general security—against misrule—in this are we to behold the only use and advantage resulting to the community from the utmost amplitude of extent, which, subject to the necessary defalcations, can be given to the right of suffrage? Answer: The main use and advantage? Yes, but assuredly not the only one.

Another is—(for is it not?)—the extent given to the pleasure—the pleasure of power* —derivable from the exercise of it. By the first English monarch of the Stuart race, the pleasure of scratching where it itches was pronounced too great a pleasure for a subject. On the same principle, in the eyes of many an aristocrat of the present day, so will the pleasure, attached to the exercise of a power, so furiously and indignantly grasped by the monopolizing hand. Yes: in the eyes of the aristocrat. But so will it be in the eyes of a lover of his country, or of a lover of mankind?

So much for the comfort of the elector. Come now the social virtues,—probity—benevolence—beneficence,—considered as not being wholly without hope of finding place one day in the breast of the representative: in this breast, virtue; thence in both breasts, comfort, for its fruit.

A third use and advantage attendant on the maximization of the extent given to this right, will it not accordingly be to be found in the proportionable extent which will so naturally be given to the demand, and thence to the supply, of those precious virtues,—considered as exercisable by men of high, on the occasion of their intercourse with men of low degree? (See, on this head, the Plan itself.)

The art and habit of affording, in the shape suited to each occasion, in the general intercourse of life, pleasure,—in which is necessarily included the negative art and habit of avoiding to produce displeasure—courtesy, in a word—the word as well as the thing derived from court—in common account, the diffusion of virtue in this shape, has it not been regarded as a use and advantage attached to monarchy? Yes:—nor surely without reason. But, when for its head-quarters it has the palace, in what way does it propagate itself? To the level of the lowest ranks it descends not, but as it were by accident, by slow degrees, and through an indefinite number and variety of channels. But, in the case here in question, reaching the lowest level at one step, it fills the whole atmosphere of society with its balmy influence.

3. Third collateral use—security afforded against vice in all its shapes, and for virtue in all its shapes.

4. By the same tie by which in this case the candidate is restrained from giving the reins to misconduct in the particular shape above mentioned, viz. insolence towards individuals in the particular situation in question,—by this same tie, with more or less good effect, is he restrained from misconduct in all other shapes in general—public as well as private: by the same spur by which he is urged to the making of the comparatively small sacrifices, necessary to the attainment of the reputation of urbanity within the limited circle in question, by this same spur is he continually urged to the making of those greater sacrifices—those continually recurring and perseveringly reiterated sacrifices, by which, throughout the whole field of a man’s influence, in public as in private life, pre-eminence in virtue is attained:—sacrifices of smaller present to greater future interest; sacrifices of self-regarding to social interest; sacrifices of social interest on a less extensive to social interest on a more extensive scale.

III. Now as to defalcations.—So far as concerns extension, the main object being comprehension of all interests,—suppose the defalcation in question capable of having place without prejudice to that object, slight may be the advantage that will suffice to warrant it.

First comes the principle, by which (saving always the rightful supremacy of the universal-interest-comprehension principle,) intimation is given of the propriety of defalcation, considered as applied to the extent capable of being given to the right of suffrage. Call this, for shortness, the legitimate-defalcation principle.

Next come an exception or exceptions, that may be found to present themselves as proper to be made to the application of this principle.

This principle is—that if, in the instance of any class of persons, it be sufficiently clear, that they neither are, nor can be, in such a state of mind as to be, in a sufficient degree, endowed with the appropriate intellectual aptitude,—then so it is that, in the instance of such particular class of persons, a defalcation may be made: made, viz. without prejudice to anything that is useful in the interest-comprehension principle.

The consideration, by which the principle is itself suggested, and the application of it directed, is the regard due to the quality of appropriate intellectual aptitude. In the case of this or that class of persons, suppose it clear that no such aptitude can, in any degree sufficient for practice, be reasonably expected to be found,—what follows is—that, from the extent given to the right in question, a defalcation may be made, correspondent to the extent occupied in the field of population by this class: and thus, without prejudice to the extent given to the universal-interest-comprehension principle.

Take now a few examples:—

I. Minors. By the word minors is immediately brought to view one vast class of persons, to which, without prejudice to the interest-comprehension principle, the legitimate-defalcation principle promises to be found applicable.

On this occasion, for forming a limit to the extent to be given to this class, what is evident is—that with full assurance, an age may be taken, such as, that from the extent belonging to the dominion of the universal-interest-comprehension principle, no defalcation shall be made by the application of the legitimate-defalcation principle: and even let the age fixed upon for this purpose be supposed to be too early an age, still one great advantage remains untouched;—which is—that in its application to individuals, the defalcation is not permanent; not permanent, but temporary only, and the utmost duration of it limited. As to the age most proper to be fixed upon for this purpose,—in this may be seen a topic neither unsusceptible nor undeserving of a separate consideration: but, for anything like a full consideration of it, neither time nor space can be allowed here. Under British law, in relation to private concerns at large, viz. in respect of the sole and separate management of those concerns taken in the aggregate, one-and-twenty is the age at which the right commences. But at a much earlier age does this and that particular right commence: such as the right of making a last will; and, what is more to the purpose, the right of choosing a guardian. And note, that though the concerns here in question are, in respect of extent, the public and universal concerns, and the importance of them proportioned to that extent, yet, on the other hand—instead of being, as in the present case, integral,—the right here in question is but a minute fraction of the integral or entire right of choosing the fraction of a guardian, for the management of those great common concerns.

For what remains, see the next head.

II. Females. As to persons of this sex, the sex in which the half, more or less, of the whole species is contained—usually, if not constantly, have they on this occasion been passed over without notice: an omission which, under a Mahometan government, might have place with rather less prejudice to consistency than under a Christian one.

The great leading considerations above brought to view—viz. the universal-interest-comprehension principle, the quality of appropriate probity and appropriate intellectual aptitude—these guides to decision, if they apply not with propriety to both sexes, it seems not easy to say with what propriety they can be applicable to either.

As to the interest-comprehension principle,—a task which, to the purpose of making application of it on competent grounds, presents itself as indispensable, is—the taking a survey of the state of the laws, by which at present the share between the two sexes is determined.

Thereupon, a sort of preliminary question presents itself as likely enough to be put:—Suppose—for argument’s sake suppose—the result to be, that on this part of the field of law, due justice has not hitherto been done to the weaker sex: on this supposition, can any such expectation exist, as that in the formation of a plan in relation to suffrage, any better justice will be done? The answer is—that, barring the intervention of this or that special obstacle, there seems no sufficient reason why any such justice should be despaired of. For, upon a spurt, upon the spur of the occasion, even against the general bent of permanent interest,—are now and then seen to be made, such sacrifices as, under the permanent, and habitual, and tranquil operation of particular interest, are never seen to be made.

As to appropriate intellectual aptitude—in the case of monarchy—in the case of integral possession of supreme and all-comprehensive power—by no man, perhaps, unless it be by John Knox, has physical weakness been brought forward in the character of an objection to the practice of vesting political power in the softer sex: by no man, even in the case of the electoral function, where, as in the instance of the East India Direction, the active or self-acting, including the imperative power, is in the hands of an aristocracy: an aristocracy, itself in England subject to the mixed monarchy, but exercising the electoral function in relation to the sort of local monarchy, by which, under the guise of a council, under the presidence of a governor, in British India so many millions are ruled.*

Although, in all these several instances, the propriety of the arrangement were confessedly established,—yet in the case of the democratic species of election in question, the propriety of it could not be stated as presenting itself in any such character as that of a necessary consequence. As to anything approaching to a decided opinion,—anything of that sort—any attempt towards it—would in this place be altogether premature. Of the few observations here hazarded, what then, it may be asked, is the use? The use (I answer)—the design at least, is—to show in what way, and with a degree of attention suited to its importance, the subject is capable of being treated, in respect to principle: of two modes of treatment, which may be the more proper one—on the one hand, the mode here exemplified, or on the other, this or a horse-laugh, a sneer, an expression of scorn, or a common-place witticism, the reader will determine.†

III. Soldiers and Sailors. If of these classes mention must here be made, scarcely can it be for any other purpose than to show that they have not been out of mind. From participating in the exercise of this franchise, all those who are out on foreign service stand excluded by physical, by absolutely insurmountable obstacles: this being constantly and unavoidably the case with many, and incidentally with all,—those, in whose instance the bar is not applied by physical obstacles, need the less repine, should the necessity arise of excluding them by legal ones. Individually considered, no tenable objection could surely be opposed to the suffrage of any individual of this so extensive and eminently meritorious a class of public servants. But, collected in a mass, under the command of C—r-General and Co., they might, in any part of the country, or in many parts of the country at once, be set a-rolling like an avalanche, overwhelming, as they rolled, the settled population of (who can say how many?) electoral districts. Here is a mischief; but a mischief to which, by a few regulations, no less obvious than the mischief, there could be no difficulty in opposing an effectual bar.

To the above perfectly obvious grounds of defalcation, add, for consideration, this one more, which will perhaps be found not quite so obvious.

IV. Non-readers. For shortness, let this be the name of the class: also, for shortness, take the following compressed intimation of the ground of the thus proposed defalcation, with the political and moral institution attached to it, and of the mode proposed for fixing the termination of it. Principle, not at variance with the universal-interest-comprehension principle: duration of the exclusion—not only temporary, but, to an indefinite degree, capable of being shortened by the exertions of the individual excluded.—Proof of the cessation of the cause of exclusion, public: matter, taken for the subject of the proof,—in the first place, the law by which the elections in question shall, in the here supposed state of things, have been regulated; to which might be added (regard being had to matter and applicable space) this or that portion of other appropriate matter:—but for any such details the present is no place.

For the collateral effects, moral and intellectual—of such an institution, inquire of the National Society:—inquire of anybody—those excepted whose wish—(for, alas! some such are there not?) whose undissembled wish has been, to keep us of the swinish multitude—to keep us for ever in our state of swine.

Defeasible as it is at all times at the pleasure of the excluded party,—if by this exclusion the exercise of the right may, in the instance of some person of full age, be suspended,—in the instance of minors, might not, on proof given, as above, of possession obtained of appropriate intellectual aptitude—might not the acquisition of it be accelerated?

So much for defalcation, considered as applicable to the extent to be given to this franchise. Behold now a principle of exception, operating as a bar to a little swarm of other defalcations,—such as, but for this consideration, would, on grounds more or less cogent, be apt to present a call—some of them a peremptory call—for acceptance.

This principle is the simplification principle. On the ground of deficiency, in one or other, or both, of the elements of the appropriate aptitude in question—viz. appropriate probity and appropriate intellectual aptitude—various are the classes that might be proposed for exclusion: foreigners in amity, foreigners in enmity but at large, outlaws, convicts, vagrants, insolvents, bankrupts, lunatics—these may serve as examples.

O rare simplicity! handmaid of beauty, wisdom, virtue—of everything that is excellent!—Simplicity—applied to every subject to which, without preponderant inconvenience, it can be applied—simplicity, though but a sort of negative good, is not the less a good. To the exclusion of sensible (which are the only real) evils, may it without scruple be applied, where the only evils that can result from the application are but, as it were, nascent and insensible: evils, for example, which,—though if they existed in a certain quantity, they might, or even would, be felt,—yet, in the greatest quantity in question, cannot be felt;—evils, in a word, which,—though but for the operation of counter causes, they would or might be productive of actual sensible sufferance or loss of comfort,—yet, by the operation of such counter causes, will be prevented from carrying that capacity into act.

So much for principle; now for application. Even at the place of election, much more in a judicatory of appeal constituted for the purpose,—among the accompaniments of every such investigation are the intimately connected mischiefs, with which all judicature is so liable to be infested, viz. delay, vexation, and expense. In all these may be seen real and sensible—acutely sensible evils. But, in the case of a right, which, how important soever, when taken in its integrality, is to all really effective purposes, such as the establishment of laws, and the execution of measures of administration, itself but the fraction of a fraction,—suppose that by the exceptionable classes, all of them taken together—that is, by the admission given to them, be they ever so exceptionable, no sensible change for the worse can ever, in all human probability, be made in the conduct of public affairs;—the consequence is, that the supposed inconvenience is ideal and theoretical merely, not actual and practical.

The simplification principle, thus explained,—apply it to the question as between the extent indicated by the word householders, and the extent here marked out as designated by the words virtually-universal suffrage. In the plan itself, on the occasion of which the attention was confined to householders, an expedient may be seen proposed, having for its object the maximization of simplicity;—the minimization of the triple yoke of inconvenience—the trinoda necessitas—composed of delay, vexation, and expense, which, by nature in a certain proportion, by sinister art commonly in a much greater proportion, has been made to press upon the neck of so many sorts of public, but most intolerably of all upon the neck of almost all judicial, proceedings.

Look at what is said in Mr. Cobbett’s LETTER on this subject to Earl Grosvenor (Cobbett’s Register, February 22, 1817,) and, in respect of simplicity, and its consequences as above explained, judge whether, compared with the householder plan, even with the benefit of the above-proposed instrument of simplification, the virtually-universal plan has not the advantage.

In this same view, note a principle of precaution, having regard to relative time. The evidence, on the ground of which a claimant’s title to the franchise is provisionally to be allowed,—let it be—not of the oral, but, as proposed in the plan, of the written kind—a document, suppose a card—suppose a ticket—penned, and authenticated, and allowed, at a time anterior to that of the election. By this means all discussion is excluded from that time: in the instance of each voter, the operation of voting may, as in the case of holding up of hands, be instantaneous. Forgery and fraudulent personation are the only causes of deceit left possible: and, forasmuch as by small numbers no promise of effect would be afforded, while among large numbers, the larger the number the fuller the assurance of detection,—no probability can this possibility have for its accompaniment.

[* ]See Table of Springs of Action, by the Author, Vol. I. p. 195.

[† ]In respect of general utility and propriety, behold what were the sentiments of Sir William Jones, on the subject of virtual universality of suffrage: from the authorities to which he refers, judge whether, in the best of those old times, such was not the ancient usage: behold, moreover, how frivolous were the pretences on which were grounded the still-existing defalcations made in the time of Henry VI.

Works of Sir William Jones, by Lord Teignmouth, vol. viii. p. 507.—“Speech on the Reformation of Parliament, anno 1782, May 28.”—Speaking of the feudal system—“Narrow and base,” he says, “as it was, and confined exclusively to landed property,a it admitted the lowest freeholders to the due enjoyment of that inestimable right, without which it is a banter to call a man free, the right of voting in the choice of deputies to assist in making those laws which may affect not his property only, but his life, and, what is dearer, his liberty; and which are not laws, but tyrannous ordinances, if imposed on him without his suffrage, given in person or by deputation. This I conceive to have been the right of every freeholder, even by the feudal polity, from the earliest time; and the statute of Henry IV. I believe to have been merely declaratory: an act which passed in the seventh year of that prince, near four hundred years ago, ordains, that ‘all they who are present at the county court, as well suitors duly summoned for the same cause, as others, shall proceed to the election of their knights for the parliament.’ All suitors, you see, had the right, and all freeholders were suitors in the court, however low the value of their freeholds. Observe all along that one pound in those days was equal to ten at least in the present time.b Here, then, is a plain declaration, that minuteness of real property created no harsh suspicion of a dependent mind; for a harsh suspicion it is, and, by proving too much, proves nothing.” Thus far Sir William Jones. Behold now the words of the statute 7 Henry IV. c. 15. After reciting the grievous complaint of the Commons (in the French original communalté) “of the undue election of the knights of counties . . . . sometime made of affection of the sheriffs, and otherwise against the form of the writs, to the great slander of the counties, and hindrance [retardation] of the business of the commonalty in [of] the said county,”—it enacts, that, at the county court, after proclamation, “all they that be there present, as well suitors duly summoned for the same cause as others, shall attend to the election of the knights for the parliament, and then in the full county [court] they shall proceed to the election, freely and indifferently, notwithstanding any request or commandment to the contrary.”

And, a little after, it adds—“And in the writs of parliament to be made hereafter, this clause shall be put:—“Et electionem tuam in pleno comitatu tuo factam distincte et aperte sub sigillo tuo et sigillis corum qui electioni illi interfuerint nobis in Cancellaria nostra ad diem et locum in brevi contentos, certifices indilate.” Note that, without any distinction made, what is here required is—that the seals to be affixed shall be the seals of those—i. e. of all those—who shall have taken part in the election. Villeins,—composing still no inconsiderable part of the population, though it is impossible to say exactly what part, being (it may be supposed) plainly out of the question,—who were the persons thus admitted to the exercise of this franchise? Who but all who were not Villeins? With the exception of a class of persons happily no longer in existence, if this be not virtually universal suffrage—suffrage more extensive than in the case of the “householders,”—by Charles Fox and Mr. Grey (as will soon be seen) proposed to be admitted—by the said Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey, proposed not to be admitted—if this be not, what else can be?

Even as to Villeins,—were they, after all, really excluded? Look to the words: clearly not. Who were the persons by whom the elections were to be made? Suitors summoned as such, and they alone? No: but “all they that be there present.” Well, but (says somebody,) in the state of villeinage, no will of his own could any person be said to have. So much for surmise; and, but for particular inquiry, not an unnatural one. Well, as to the fact. Eight-and-twenty years before the time in question, viz. anno 1377, was passed the statute 1 R. II. of which c. 6—a chapter of considerable length—is in the old French—and, in the vulgate edition, not translated. From this statute it appears, that already, even at that time, villeinage was a condition very different from slavery. Rent did they pay: and though, instead of money, it was in the shape of services, yet these services were certain. In this statute, what is assumed as a general fact is—that they were able to pay a fine to the king, besides making satisfaction to their lords. The main offence imputed to them is—obtaining liberation from those services by forged deeds.

The existing copyholders are the posterity of the ancient villeins. Tenants—the villeins were—the copyholders are—so were they and are they styled—by copy of court roll. Deriving from the records of the court the title to the lands they occupied, what can be more natural, than that to that same court they should lie under an obligation—under which it included the liberty—of access and resort to it. But, supposing any of them present at any such court, how is it possible that they should not have been included in the assemblage designated as above by the word “others?”

Presently, in the “excessive” multitude of the persons resorting to those courts, we shall see a fact, and the only fact, employed in another reign, twenty-five years afterwards, as a pretence for limiting in those same courts the right of voting to those who possessed, in freehold, an estate equal in value to £40 a-year money of present time. But, unless copyholders be supposed to have, even at that time, made a part of it, where shall we find matter enough out of which to compose any such excessive multitude?

True it is, Blackstone (see his “Considerations on the Question concerning Copyholders,” &c. London, 1758, p. 7,) applies a limitation to the import of the word other; (it should be—the French is—autres, others:) confining it to suitors. For this surmise, however, no ground does he give: nor of any such or other limitation can I find any intimation given, in or by any word or words of the statute.—“Communalte du dit Countee,” says the old French. “Omnes illi qui electioni illi interfuerint,” says the Latin inclosed in it.

So much for the strong and prosperous reign of Henry the Fourth, in which virtually universal suffrage was then established. Comes now the weak and disastrous reign of his idiot grandson, under which, under the sort of pretences that will be seen, it was curtailed.

Statute 8 H. VI. c. 7.—“What sort of men shall be chosen, and who shall be chosen knights of the parliament.” Follows the vulgate translation: the original, which is in the old French, would fill up too much room here. Of the translation, except as here corrected, I have by examination assured myself of the correctness.

“Item, Whereas the elections of knights of shires to come to the parliaments of our Lord the King, in many counties of the realm of England, have now of late been made by very great, outrageous, and excessive number of people dwelling within the same counties of the realm of England, of the which, most part was of people of small substance, and, [or] of no value, [i. e. worth] whereof every [one] of them pretended a voice equivalent, as to such elections to be made, with the most worthy knights and esquires dwelling within the same counties, whereby manslaughters, riots, batteries, and divisions among the gentlemen and other people of the same counties, shall very likely rise and be, unless convenient and due remedy be provided in this behalf. (2.) Our Lord the King, considering the premises, hath provided, ordained, and stablished, by authority of this present parliament, that the knights of the shires, to be chosen within the said realm of England, to come to the parliaments of our Lord the King, hereafter to be holden, shall be chosen in every county of the realm of England, by people dwelling and resident in the same counties, whereof every one of them shall have free land or tenement to the value of forty shillings by the year at the least, above all charges.” . . . . .

As to the grounds. First, as to any supposed deficiency in respect of appropriate intellectual aptitude. Among those who, in the shape of landed property, had not so much as 40s. a-year of that day—going as far, say as £40 money of the present day—small indeed probably was the number of those who were able to read: how much larger among those who had their 40s. and more? Probably enough, very little. As for the “knights and esquires,” some few of them not improbably were in those days able to read: but by not one of them, most certainly, was any book to be found from which any information, tending to the increase of appropriate intellectual aptitude, could be extracted.

So much for intellectual aptitude: now as to freedom of suffrage. “Manslaughters,” &c.? . . . . What! at that time, in any one instance, had any of these mischiefs really taken place? No: no such thing is so much as pretended. What then? Oh, they will very likely take place, unless due remedy be provided. Aristocracy this—all over. But was ever pretence more plainly groundless? By the alteration of the value of money, the efficiency of the aristocratical principle has, in this part of the field of election, though no thanks to parliament, been somewhat diminished—extent of the right of suffrage somewhat increased. But—such, as will be seen, has been the influence of other causes—that from this extension no real advantage has resulted. See what in a following section will be said on the subject of vote-compelling and competition-excluding terrorism.

On the ground of general utility and propriety—behold, moreover, the sentiments of Charles Fox.—Woodfall’s Debates, anno 1797, p. 331.—“There is one position in which we shall all agree, that man has a right to be well governed. Now it is obvious, that no people can be satisfied with a government from the constituent parts of which they are excluded.”

In regard to universal suffrage, even under that unlimited name, we shall find him acceding to it, and advocating it upon principle: refuting it no otherwise than upon the ground of a supposed matter of fact, in relation to which it has been seen, and will further be seen, the truth is exactly opposite. Not adverting to the effect of secresy of suffrage, the notion on which he here grounds himself is—that in the case of non-housekeepers in general, freedom of suffrage is not to be looked for.

Antecedently to the above passage, behold what he says in page 327—“My opinion is, that the best plan of representation is that which shall bring into activity the greatest number of independent voters:” thereupon it is that immediately he goes on and says,—“and that that is defective which would bring forth those whose situation and condition takes from them the power of deliberation.” In this I heartily concur with him: but in the next section it will be seen to what this observation leads: an observation by which it may be seen (ib. p. 326) he was led to the disapprobation of giving any extension to the system of county representation.

A little earlier in the same page, “I have always,” (says he,) “deprecated universal suffrage, not so much on account of the confusion to which it would lead, but because I think that we should in reality lose the very object we desire to obtain:—it would in its nature embarrass and prevent the deliberative voice of the country from being heard.” Thus far Charles Fox: meaning by reason of the supposed want of freedom, as above. As to confusion,—upon any thing like the plan here proposed, all danger of this sort will be seen to be most completely excluded. Charles Fox sat for Westminster. In the Westminster election what confusion do we see? Yet, in the Westminster election, there remain in abundance natural causes of confusion, all which would, on the plan in question, be completely excluded.

So much as to what might be and would be. But now look at what actually has been. Anno 1807, Sir Francis Burdett was, for the first time, elected successor to Charles Fox. Since then, near ten years have elapsed, and in all that time no more confusion than if Westminster had been a pocket borough. See the History of the Westminster Representation from that time in Hone’s Reformist’s Register, No. 3: a most interesting picture of the state of purity and good order, into which election proceedings not only may be brought, but have been brought, and in it have already for ten years been continued, under a degree of extension so little short of that of universal suffrage.

In the same sentiments—both as to the general principle and the ill-grounded reason for putting it aside,—already had he spoken, and even still more explicitly, in the year 1793.

Almon’s Parl. Register, anno 1793, p. 497.—“His” (Fox’s) “objection to universal suffrage was not distrust of the decision of the majority, but because there was no practical mode of collecting such suffrage; and that by attempting it, what from the operation of hope on some, fear on others, and all the sinister means of influence, that would so certainly be exerted, fewer individual opinions would be collected than by an appeal to a limited number. Therefore, holding fast to the right of the majority to decide, and to the natural rights of man, as taught by the French, but much abused by their practice, he would resist universal suffrage.”

At that same time, Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey, though he did not approve of universal suffrage absolutely, approved of it,—yea, and moreover of annual parliaments,—comparatively, viz. in comparison of the existing system.

Woodfall’s Debates, anno 1793, p. 383.—“He” (Mr. Grey) “did not approve of the Duke of Richmond’s plan of reform, though he thought it better than the present system.” The Duke of Richmond’s plan? Well, what was it?—Suffrage universal, parliaments annual: this, but without secresy, and thence without liberty, of suffrage.

[* ]For the place of this pleasure in the list of pleasures, see Spring of Action Table, published at the same time with the present tract. (Vide Vol. I. p. 195.)

[* ]In the county of York, if my information be correct, may be found a borough, to which belong two seats, in relation to which the electoral function is virtually performed by a single person of the female sex.

[† ]Woodfall’s Reports, anno 1797, p. 327.—Charles Fox.—“I hope gentlemen will not smile if I endeavour—” After saying as above, he adds—“My opinion is, that the best plan of representation is that which shall bring into activity the greatest number of independent voters, and that that is defective which would bring forth those whose situation and condition takes from them power of deliberation. I can have no conception of that being a good plan of election, which should enable individuals to bring regiments to the poll. I hope gentlemen will not smile if I endeavour to illustrate my position by referring to the example of the other sex. In all the theories and projects of the most absurd speculation, it has never been suggested that it would be advisable to extend the elective suffrage to the female sex; and yet, justly respecting, as we must do, the mental powers, the acquirements, the discrimination, and the talents of the women of England, in the present improved state of society; knowing the opportunities which they have for acquiring knowledge; that they have interests as dear and as important as our own; it must be the genuine feeling of every gentleman who hears me, that all the superior classes of the female sex of England must be more capable of exercising the elective suffrage with deliberation and propriety, than the uninformed individuals of the lowest class of men, to whom the advocates of universal suffrage would extend it; and yet, why has it never been imagined that the right of election should be extended to women? Why but because, by the law of nations,a and perhapsb also by the law of nature,c that sex is dependent on ours; and because, therefore, their voices would be governed by the relation in which they stand in society. Therefore it is, sir, that with the exception of companies, in which the right of voting merely affects property, it has never been in the contemplation of the most absurd theorists to extend the elective franchise to the sex.”

[† ]In respect of general utility and propriety, behold what were the sentiments of Sir William Jones, on the subject of virtual universality of suffrage: from the authorities to which he refers, judge whether, in the best of those old times, such was not the ancient usage: behold, moreover, how frivolous were the pretences on which were grounded the still-existing defalcations made in the time of Henry VI.

Works of Sir William Jones, by Lord Teignmouth, vol. viii. p. 507.—“Speech on the Reformation of Parliament, anno 1782, May 28.”—Speaking of the feudal system—“Narrow and base,” he says, “as it was, and confined exclusively to landed property,a it admitted the lowest freeholders to the due enjoyment of that inestimable right, without which it is a banter to call a man free, the right of voting in the choice of deputies to assist in making those laws which may affect not his property only, but his life, and, what is dearer, his liberty; and which are not laws, but tyrannous ordinances, if imposed on him without his suffrage, given in person or by deputation. This I conceive to have been the right of every freeholder, even by the feudal polity, from the earliest time; and the statute of Henry IV. I believe to have been merely declaratory: an act which passed in the seventh year of that prince, near four hundred years ago, ordains, that ‘all they who are present at the county court, as well suitors duly summoned for the same cause, as others, shall proceed to the election of their knights for the parliament.’ All suitors, you see, had the right, and all freeholders were suitors in the court, however low the value of their freeholds. Observe all along that one pound in those days was equal to ten at least in the present time.b Here, then, is a plain declaration, that minuteness of real property created no harsh suspicion of a dependent mind; for a harsh suspicion it is, and, by proving too much, proves nothing.” Thus far Sir William Jones. Behold now the words of the statute 7 Henry IV. c. 15. After reciting the grievous complaint of the Commons (in the French original communalté) “of the undue election of the knights of counties . . . . sometime made of affection of the sheriffs, and otherwise against the form of the writs, to the great slander of the counties, and hindrance [retardation] of the business of the commonalty in [of] the said county,”—it enacts, that, at the county court, after proclamation, “all they that be there present, as well suitors duly summoned for the same cause as others, shall attend to the election of the knights for the parliament, and then in the full county [court] they shall proceed to the election, freely and indifferently, notwithstanding any request or commandment to the contrary.”

And, a little after, it adds—“And in the writs of parliament to be made hereafter, this clause shall be put:—“Et electionem tuam in pleno comitatu tuo factam distincte et aperte sub sigillo tuo et sigillis corum qui electioni illi interfuerint nobis in Cancellaria nostra ad diem et locum in brevi contentos, certifices indilate.” Note that, without any distinction made, what is here required is—that the seals to be affixed shall be the seals of those—i. e. of all those—who shall have taken part in the election. Villeins,—composing still no inconsiderable part of the population, though it is impossible to say exactly what part, being (it may be supposed) plainly out of the question,—who were the persons thus admitted to the exercise of this franchise? Who but all who were not Villeins? With the exception of a class of persons happily no longer in existence, if this be not virtually universal suffrage—suffrage more extensive than in the case of the “householders,”—by Charles Fox and Mr. Grey (as will soon be seen) proposed to be admitted—by the said Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey, proposed not to be admitted—if this be not, what else can be?

Even as to Villeins,—were they, after all, really excluded? Look to the words: clearly not. Who were the persons by whom the elections were to be made? Suitors summoned as such, and they alone? No: but “all they that be there present.” Well, but (says somebody,) in the state of villeinage, no will of his own could any person be said to have. So much for surmise; and, but for particular inquiry, not an unnatural one. Well, as to the fact. Eight-and-twenty years before the time in question, viz. anno 1377, was passed the statute 1 R. II. of which c. 6—a chapter of considerable length—is in the old French—and, in the vulgate edition, not translated. From this statute it appears, that already, even at that time, villeinage was a condition very different from slavery. Rent did they pay: and though, instead of money, it was in the shape of services, yet these services were certain. In this statute, what is assumed as a general fact is—that they were able to pay a fine to the king, besides making satisfaction to their lords. The main offence imputed to them is—obtaining liberation from those services by forged deeds.

The existing copyholders are the posterity of the ancient villeins. Tenants—the villeins were—the copyholders are—so were they and are they styled—by copy of court roll. Deriving from the records of the court the title to the lands they occupied, what can be more natural, than that to that same court they should lie under an obligation—under which it included the liberty—of access and resort to it. But, supposing any of them present at any such court, how is it possible that they should not have been included in the assemblage designated as above by the word “others?”

Presently, in the “excessive” multitude of the persons resorting to those courts, we shall see a fact, and the only fact, employed in another reign, twenty-five years afterwards, as a pretence for limiting in those same courts the right of voting to those who possessed, in freehold, an estate equal in value to £40 a-year money of present time. But, unless copyholders be supposed to have, even at that time, made a part of it, where shall we find matter enough out of which to compose any such excessive multitude?

True it is, Blackstone (see his “Considerations on the Question concerning Copyholders,” &c. London, 1758, p. 7,) applies a limitation to the import of the word other; (it should be—the French is—autres, others:) confining it to suitors. For this surmise, however, no ground does he give: nor of any such or other limitation can I find any intimation given, in or by any word or words of the statute.—“Communalte du dit Countee,” says the old French. “Omnes illi qui electioni illi interfuerint,” says the Latin inclosed in it.

So much for the strong and prosperous reign of Henry the Fourth, in which virtually universal suffrage was then established. Comes now the weak and disastrous reign of his idiot grandson, under which, under the sort of pretences that will be seen, it was curtailed.

Statute 8 H. VI. c. 7.—“What sort of men shall be chosen, and who shall be chosen knights of the parliament.” Follows the vulgate translation: the original, which is in the old French, would fill up too much room here. Of the translation, except as here corrected, I have by examination assured myself of the correctness.

“Item, Whereas the elections of knights of shires to come to the parliaments of our Lord the King, in many counties of the realm of England, have now of late been made by very great, outrageous, and excessive number of people dwelling within the same counties of the realm of England, of the which, most part was of people of small substance, and, [or] of no value, [i. e. worth] whereof every [one] of them pretended a voice equivalent, as to such elections to be made, with the most worthy knights and esquires dwelling within the same counties, whereby manslaughters, riots, batteries, and divisions among the gentlemen and other people of the same counties, shall very likely rise and be, unless convenient and due remedy be provided in this behalf. (2.) Our Lord the King, considering the premises, hath provided, ordained, and stablished, by authority of this present parliament, that the knights of the shires, to be chosen within the said realm of England, to come to the parliaments of our Lord the King, hereafter to be holden, shall be chosen in every county of the realm of England, by people dwelling and resident in the same counties, whereof every one of them shall have free land or tenement to the value of forty shillings by the year at the least, above all charges.” . . . . .

As to the grounds. First, as to any supposed deficiency in respect of appropriate intellectual aptitude. Among those who, in the shape of landed property, had not so much as 40s. a-year of that day—going as far, say as £40 money of the present day—small indeed probably was the number of those who were able to read: how much larger among those who had their 40s. and more? Probably enough, very little. As for the “knights and esquires,” some few of them not improbably were in those days able to read: but by not one of them, most certainly, was any book to be found from which any information, tending to the increase of appropriate intellectual aptitude, could be extracted.

So much for intellectual aptitude: now as to freedom of suffrage. “Manslaughters,” &c.? . . . . What! at that time, in any one instance, had any of these mischiefs really taken place? No: no such thing is so much as pretended. What then? Oh, they will very likely take place, unless due remedy be provided. Aristocracy this—all over. But was ever pretence more plainly groundless? By the alteration of the value of money, the efficiency of the aristocratical principle has, in this part of the field of election, though no thanks to parliament, been somewhat diminished—extent of the right of suffrage somewhat increased. But—such, as will be seen, has been the influence of other causes—that from this extension no real advantage has resulted. See what in a following section will be said on the subject of vote-compelling and competition-excluding terrorism.

On the ground of general utility and propriety—behold, moreover, the sentiments of Charles Fox.—Woodfall’s Debates, anno 1797, p. 331.—“There is one position in which we shall all agree, that man has a right to be well governed. Now it is obvious, that no people can be satisfied with a government from the constituent parts of which they are excluded.”

In regard to universal suffrage, even under that unlimited name, we shall find him acceding to it, and advocating it upon principle: refuting it no otherwise than upon the ground of a supposed matter of fact, in relation to which it has been seen, and will further be seen, the truth is exactly opposite. Not adverting to the effect of secresy of suffrage, the notion on which he here grounds himself is—that in the case of non-housekeepers in general, freedom of suffrage is not to be looked for.

Antecedently to the above passage, behold what he says in page 327—“My opinion is, that the best plan of representation is that which shall bring into activity the greatest number of independent voters:” thereupon it is that immediately he goes on and says,—“and that that is defective which would bring forth those whose situation and condition takes from them the power of deliberation.” In this I heartily concur with him: but in the next section it will be seen to what this observation leads: an observation by which it may be seen (ib. p. 326) he was led to the disapprobation of giving any extension to the system of county representation.

A little earlier in the same page, “I have always,” (says he,) “deprecated universal suffrage, not so much on account of the confusion to which it would lead, but because I think that we should in reality lose the very object we desire to obtain:—it would in its nature embarrass and prevent the deliberative voice of the country from being heard.” Thus far Charles Fox: meaning by reason of the supposed want of freedom, as above. As to confusion,—upon any thing like the plan here proposed, all danger of this sort will be seen to be most completely excluded. Charles Fox sat for Westminster. In the Westminster election what confusion do we see? Yet, in the Westminster election, there remain in abundance natural causes of confusion, all which would, on the plan in question, be completely excluded.

So much as to what might be and would be. But now look at what actually has been. Anno 1807, Sir Francis Burdett was, for the first time, elected successor to Charles Fox. Since then, near ten years have elapsed, and in all that time no more confusion than if Westminster had been a pocket borough. See the History of the Westminster Representation from that time in Hone’s Reformist’s Register, No. 3: a most interesting picture of the state of purity and good order, into which election proceedings not only may be brought, but have been brought, and in it have already for ten years been continued, under a degree of extension so little short of that of universal suffrage.

In the same sentiments—both as to the general principle and the ill-grounded reason for putting it aside,—already had he spoken, and even still more explicitly, in the year 1793.

Almon’s Parl. Register, anno 1793, p. 497.—“His” (Fox’s) “objection to universal suffrage was not distrust of the decision of the majority, but because there was no practical mode of collecting such suffrage; and that by attempting it, what from the operation of hope on some, fear on others, and all the sinister means of influence, that would so certainly be exerted, fewer individual opinions would be collected than by an appeal to a limited number. Therefore, holding fast to the right of the majority to decide, and to the natural rights of man, as taught by the French, but much abused by their practice, he would resist universal suffrage.”

At that same time, Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey, though he did not approve of universal suffrage absolutely, approved of it,—yea, and moreover of annual parliaments,—comparatively, viz. in comparison of the existing system.

Woodfall’s Debates, anno 1793, p. 383.—“He” (Mr. Grey) “did not approve of the Duke of Richmond’s plan of reform, though he thought it better than the present system.” The Duke of Richmond’s plan? Well, what was it?—Suffrage universal, parliaments annual: this, but without secresy, and thence without liberty, of suffrage.

[† ]Woodfall’s Reports, anno 1797, p. 327.—Charles Fox.—“I hope gentlemen will not smile if I endeavour—” After saying as above, he adds—“My opinion is, that the best plan of representation is that which shall bring into activity the greatest number of independent voters, and that that is defective which would bring forth those whose situation and condition takes from them power of deliberation. I can have no conception of that being a good plan of election, which should enable individuals to bring regiments to the poll. I hope gentlemen will not smile if I endeavour to illustrate my position by referring to the example of the other sex. In all the theories and projects of the most absurd speculation, it has never been suggested that it would be advisable to extend the elective suffrage to the female sex; and yet, justly respecting, as we must do, the mental powers, the acquirements, the discrimination, and the talents of the women of England, in the present improved state of society; knowing the opportunities which they have for acquiring knowledge; that they have interests as dear and as important as our own; it must be the genuine feeling of every gentleman who hears me, that all the superior classes of the female sex of England must be more capable of exercising the elective suffrage with deliberation and propriety, than the uninformed individuals of the lowest class of men, to whom the advocates of universal suffrage would extend it; and yet, why has it never been imagined that the right of election should be extended to women? Why but because, by the law of nations,a and perhapsb also by the law of nature,c that sex is dependent on ours; and because, therefore, their voices would be governed by the relation in which they stand in society. Therefore it is, sir, that with the exception of companies, in which the right of voting merely affects property, it has never been in the contemplation of the most absurd theorists to extend the elective franchise to the sex.”

[a]Reasons for doubting of the limitation will be seen below.

[b]If so, then to twenty at this present time, anno 1817.

[a]A law which has no existence.

[b]Perhaps.] A peremptory exclusion, by which one half of the species is excluded from that security for a regard to their interests, which in the case of the other half is pronounced indisputable. Ground of this exclusion—or at least a principal part of that ground—a perhaps!

[c]Law of nature—another non-entity. A too common phrase: in the present instance,—quere, what is at the bottom of it?