The Online Library of Liberty

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• Errata—vol. III.
• Defence of Usury; Showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints On the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains; In Letters to a Friend.
• Letter I.: Introduction.
• Letter II.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Usury.
• Letter III.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Prodigality.
• Letter IV.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Indigence.
• Letter V.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Simplicity.
• Letter VI.: Mischiefs of the Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VII.: Efficacy of Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VIII.: Virtual Usury Allowed.
• Letter IX.: Blackstone Considered.
• Letter X.: Grounds of the Prejudices Against Usury.
• Letter XI.: Compound Interest.
• Letter XII.: Maintenance and Champerty.
• Letter XIII.: To Dr. Smith, On Projects In Arts, &c.
• A Manual of Political Economy: Now First Edited From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: Introduction. *
• Chapter II.: Analytical Survey of the Field of Political Economy.
• Chapter III.: Of Wealth.
• Chapter IV.: Of Population.
• Chapter V.: Of Finance.
• Chapter VI.: Operation of a Sinking Fund On the Production of Wealth.
• Chapter VII.: Noscenda.
• Observations On the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; Especially With a Reference to the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of July 1820.
• Preface.: Observations, &c.
• Section I.: Nature of the Prohibitory System.
• Section II.: Mischiefs of the Prohibitory System.
• Section III.: Causes of the Prohibitory System.
• A Plan For Saving All Trouble and Expense In the Transfer of Stock, and For Enabling the Proprietors to Receive Their Dividends Without Powers of Attorney, Or Attendance At the Bank of England, By the Conversion of Stock Into Note Annuities.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Plan For the Creation, Emission, Payment, and Eventual Extension, of a Proposed New Species of Government Paper, Under the Name of Annuity Notes.
• Chapter II.: Form of an Annuity Note. (see Table II.)
• Chapter III.: Comparison of the Proposed, With the Existing Government Securities, &c.
• Chapter IV.: Grounds of Expectation, In Regard to the Proposed Measure.
• Chapter V.: Financial Advantages.
• Chapter VI.: Advantage By Addition to National Capital.
• Chapter VII.: Advantage By Addition to Commercial Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Particular Interests Concerned.
• Chapter IX.: Rise of Prices—how to Obviate.
• Chapter X.: Reduction of Interest—proposed Mode Compared With Mr. Pelham’s.
• Chapter XI.: Moral Advantages.
• Chapter XII.: Constitutional Advantages.
• Chapter XIII.: Recapitulation and Conclusion.
• Appendix A.: Government Ought to Have the Monopoly of Paper Money, As Well As of Metallic Money.
• Appendix B.: Paper Money—causes Why Not Circulated By Government Without Interest, As Well As By Individuals.
• General View of a Complete Code of Laws.
• Chapter I.: General Division.
• Chapter II.: Relations Between the Laws Concerning Offences, Rights, Obligations, and Services.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between the Penal and Civil Code.
• Chapter IV.: Of Method.
• Chapter V.: Plan of the Penal Code.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Division of Offences.
• Chapter VIII. Titles of the Penal Code.
• Chapter IX.: First General Title of the Civil Code, * of Things.
• Chapter X.: Second General Title of the Civil Code. of Places.
• Chapter XI.: Third General Title of the Civil Code. of Times.
• Chapter XII.: Fourth General Title of the Civil Code. of Services.
• Chapter XIII.: Fifth General Title of the Civil Code. of Obligations.
• Chapter XIV.: Sixth General Title of the Civil Code. of Rights.
• Chapter XV.: Seventh General Title of the Civil Code. of Collative and Ablative Events.
• Chapter XVI.: Eighth General Title of the Civil Code. of Contracts.
• Chapter XVII.: Ninth General Title of the Civil Code. of the Domestic and Civil States.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tenth General Title of the Civil Code. of Persons Capable of Acquiring and of Contracting.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Particular Titles of the Civil Code.
• Chapter XX.: Of Elementary Political Powers.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Elementary Political Powers— Subject Continued.
• Chapter XXII.: Plan of the Political Code.
• Chapter XXIII.: Plan of the International Code.
• Chapter XXIV.: Plan of the Maritime Code.
• Chapter XXV.: Plan of the Military Code.
• Chapter XXVI.: Plan of the Ecclesiastical Code.
• Chapter XXVII.: Plan of Remuneratory Laws.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Of Political Economy.
• Chapter XXIX.: Plan of the Financial Code.
• Chapter XXX.: Plan of Procedure Code.
• Chapter XXXI.: Of the Integrality of the Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of Purity In the Composition of a Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Of the Style of the Laws.
• Chapter XXXIV.: Of the Interpretation, Conservation, and Improvement of a Code.
• Pannomial Fragments.
• Chapter I.: General Observations.
• Chapter II.: Consideranda.
• Chapter III.: Expositions.
• Chapter IV.: Axioms.
• Nomography; Or the Art of Inditing Laws: Now First Published From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: The Subject Stated.
• Chapter II.: Relations.
• Chapter III.: Proper End In View.
• Chapter IV.: Imperfections Primary.
• Chapter V.: Explanations Relative to the Imperfections of the Second Order.
• Chapter VI.: Of Remedies. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Language.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Perfections of Which the Legislative Style Is Susceptible.
• Chapter IX.: Of Forms of Enactment.
• Appendix. Logical Arrangements, Or Instruments of Invention and Discovery
• Equity Dispatch Court Proposal; Containing a Plan For the Speedy and Unexpensive Termination of the Suits Now Depending In Equity Courts. With the Form of a Petition, and Some Account of a Proposed Bill For That Purpose
• Section I.: Purpose Explained. Jeremy Bentham to the Honest and Afflicted Among Equity Suitors.
• Section II.: Equity Suitors’ Petition For Dispatch Court. to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, —
• Section III.: Dispatch Court Bill—some Account of It.
• Section IV.: Information Requisite From Petitioning Suitors.
• Equity Dispatch Court Bill: Being a Bill For the Institution of an Experimental Judicatory Under the Name of the Court of Dispatch, For Exemplifying In Practice the Manner In Which the Proposed Summary May Be Substituted to the So Called Regular Sy
• Editor’s Note.
• Preface.
• Preamble.
• Part I.—: Judiciary.
• Section I.: Judge Located, How.
• Section II.: Remuneration.
• Section III.: Registrar, &c.
• Section IV.: Eleemosynary Advocate.
• Section V.: Judges’, &c. Deputes.
• Section VI.: Judge’s Powers—exemptions—checks.
• Section VII.: Prehensors and Messengers.
• Section VIII.: Consignees; * Or Say, In-trust-holders.
• Section IX.: Grounds of Decision For the Dispatch Court Judge.
• Section X. ‡: Suits’ Comparative Suitableness; and Order of Cognizance.
• Section XI.: Auxiliary Judges and Accountants.
• Section XII.: Sittings, Times Of.
• Part II.—: Procedure.
• Section XIII.: Definitions. *
• Section XIV.: Examination of Solicitors.
• Section XV.: Initiatory Examination of Parties, &c.
• Section XVI.: Appropriate Intercourse, Constant and Universal, Secured.
• Section XVII.: Mutual Security For Forthcomingness of Persons and Things. ‡
• Section XVIII.: Evidence-procuring Money, How Provided.
• Section XIX.: Subsequential Evidence, How Elicited.
• Section XX.: Execution, How Performed.
• Section XXI.: Equity Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXII.: Dispatch Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXIII.: Eventual Retrotransference of a Suit to the Equity Court.
• Section XXIV.: Expense of the Court, How Provided For.
• Supplemental Sections:—
• Section I. Or XXV.: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
• Section II. Or XXVI.: Henceforward Dispatch Court.
• Schedules to the Bill.
• Plan of Parliamentary Reform, In the Form of a Catechism, With Reasons For Each Article: With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform.
• Introduction.
• Section I.: History of the Ensuing Tract—alarming State of the Country and the Constitution.
• Section II.: Most Prominent Present Grievance, Gareisoning France.
• Section III.: Causes of the Above and All Other Mischiefs:—particular Interests Monarchical and Aristocratical, Adverse to the Universal—their Ascendency.
• Section IV.: Sole Remedy In Principle—democratic Ascendency.
• Section V.: Remedy In Detail: Radical Parliamentary Reform: Elementary Arrangements In This Edition of It—their Necessity.
• Section VI.: Differences Between This and the Original Editions of Radical Reform.
• Section VII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage Further Considered.
• Section VIII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.
• Section IX.: Freedom of Suffrage Further Explained—seductive Influence—its Forms, Instruments, &c.
• Section X.: Bribery and Terrorism Compared.
• Section XI.: Purchase of Seats—in What Cases Mischievous—in What Beneficial.
• Section XII.: Secresy of Suffrage—its Importance Further Developed.
• Section XIII.: Exclusion of Placemen, &c. From the Right of Voting—mischievousness and Profligacy of the Opposite Arrangement.
• Section XIV.: Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.
• Section XV.: Representatives—impermanence of Their Situation—its Importance:—objections—their Groundlessness.
• Section XVI.: Moderate Reform—its Arrangements—their Inadequacy.
• Section XVII.: Trienniality Inadequate;—annuality Necessary.
• Section XVIII.: Interests Adverse to Adequate Reform—support Given By Them to Moderate, to the Exclusion of Radical: Tories—whigs—people’s Men.
• Catechism of Parliamentary Reform; Or, Outline of a Plan of Parliamentary Reform; In the Form of Question and Answer; With Reasons to Each Article.
• Section I.: Ends to Be Aimed At On the Occasion of Parliamentary Reform.
• Section II.: Means, Conducive Towards These Ends.
• Section III.: Means—their Uses, With Reference to Their Respective Ends.
• Section IV.: Means Conducive to Aptitude In Members: I. Placemen Not to Vote, Nor to Be Seated By Election.
• Section V.: Means, &c. Continued.—ii. Placemen Seated By the King, With Speech and Motion, Without Vote.
• Section VI.: Means, &c. Continued.—iii. Elections Frequent—annual.
• Section VII.: Means, &c. Continued.—iv. Speeches Authentically and Promptly Published.
• Section VIII.: Means, &c. Continued.—v. Attendance, Punctual and General, Secured.
• Section IX.: Inconveniences Incident to Elections, and Election Judicature.
• Section X.: Election Inconveniences—means For Their Removal.
• Section XI.: Collateral Advantages, Referable to the Situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.
• A Sketch of the Various Proposals For a Constitutional Reform In the Representation of the People, Introduced Into the Parliament of Great Britain, From 1770 to 1812.
• Radical Reform Bill, With Extracts From the Reasons.
• Preliminary Explanations.
• Title of the Proposed Act.
• Preamble.
• Section 1.—: Seats and Districts.
• Section 2.—: Electors, Who.
• Section 3.—: Eligible, Who.
• Section 4.—: Election Offices.
• Section 5.: Election Apparatus.
• Section 6.—: Promulgation of Recommendations In Favour of Proposed Members.
• Section 7.—: Voters’ Titles Pre-established.
• Section 8.—: Election, How.
• Section 9.: Election Districts and Polling Districts, How Marked Out.
• Section 10.—: Vote-making Habitations, How Defined.
• Section 11.—: Members’ Continuance.
• Section 12.—: Vacancies Supplied.
• Section 13.—: Security For the House Against Disturbance By Members. †
• Section 14.—: Indisposition of Speakers Obviated.
• Appendix, Including General Explanations.
• Radicalism Not Dangerous. Extracted From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham. *
• Part I.—: Introduction.
• Section I.: Radical Reform Bill Recapitulated.
• Section II.: Persuasion of the Dangerousness of Radicalism—cause of It, and of the Vituperative Expression Given to It.
• Section III.: Terms of the Accusation,—speeches From the Throne, 16 Th July and 21 St November 1819.
• Section IV.: The Accusation In General Terms—counter-averment.
• Section V.: Plan of This Defence.
• Part II.—: Deference From the General Nature of the Case.
• Section I.: Conditions Necessary to a Man’s Embarking In Such a Design.
• Section VII.: Concurrence In Any Other Extensive Plan of Spoliation Impossible.
• Section VIII.: Concurrence of Any Constituted Authorities Impossible.
• Section IX.: Accomplishment Impossible—design Impossible.
• Section X.: The Talked-of Spunge No Proof of the Design.
• Part III.—: Defence From Experience In the Case of the United States.
• Part IV.: Defence From Particular Experience In the Case of Ireland: Years 1777 Or 1778, to 1783.
• Section I.: Analogy Between This and the Previous Case.
• Section II.: Democratic Ascendency, How Produced.
• Section III.: Fruit of Democratic Ascendency a Golden Age.
• Section IV.: Coincidence of Its Characters With Those of Radicalism.
• Section VI.: Extinction of Democratic Ascendency and Reform—restoration of Monarchico-aristocratical Ascendency, and Its Consequences.
• Conclusion.

SECTION IX.

GROUNDS OF DECISION FOR THE DISPATCH COURT JUDGE.

Instructional.—Expositive.

Art. 1. Of every suit, the subject-matter of contestation is either—1. Matter of law; 2. Matter of fact; or, 3. Both together.

Enactive.

Art. 2. So far as regards the matter of law, every decision of the Dispatch Court Judge will have for its ground the non-disappointment principle,—or say, the disappointment-minimizing, or expectation-fulfilling, principle.*

Instructional.—Expositive.

Art. 3. Correspondent to the disappointment-minimizing principle is the following rule, to which it makes reference. On every occasion, in so far as benefit in any shape is the subject-matter of dispute, the question being, to which of a number of parties the possession, present or future, in whole or in part, shall be adjudged,—the manner in which for that purpose disposition will be made of it, is that by which, among all the interessees taken together, least disappointment will be produced.†

Art. 4. For the purpose of determining, as to the arrangement in question, whether it would be in contrariety to the non-disappointment principle, the Judge will consider within himself, whether, if the case were his own, if that same arrangement took place, any such uneasy sensation as that expressed by the word disappointment would thereby have been produced in his breast.

Art. 5. For the purpose of determining, as between any two arrangements, which of them would be most, which least, conformable to the non-disappointment principle, the Judge will consider within himself, by which of the two the greatest, by which the least, pain of disappointment would be produced, as above, in his breast.

Art. 6. For the purpose of determining the several arrangements which the greatest-happiness principle requires to be established in the several parts of the field of law, various other subordinate principles will have to be employed. But this is the only one which by his own authority the Equity Dispatch Court Judge can, consistently with that same all-ruling and master principle, make application of; for the applications made of the several others respectively, fresh enactments will be requisite and necessary.

Enactive.—Instructional.

Art. 7. To no decision or rule in force, or supposed so to be, in any other judicatory, at the time when the question comes before him for decision,—to no practice or dictum of any such judicatory,—will the Dispatch Court Judge pay any regard. Referring to this article, he will reprimand and stop from proceeding in this course any person by whom in argument any such irrelevant and inapplicable matter shall have been introduced.*

Ratiocinative.

Art. 7*. Reasons, these:—

i. Be the arrangement what it may, by whomsoever it is declared to be contrary to every principle of justice, or contrary to the first principles of justice, or contrary to justice, it is thereby acknowledged to be unfit to have place.

ii. Next in importance to the rule which prescribes maximization of happiness on the part of interessees, is the rule which prescribes minimization of disappointment on their part.

iii. Conformable to the non-disappointment principle, any such rule or decision as above would be useless: unconformable, it would be maleficent.

iv. Consistent with one another are all arrangements rightly deduced from the non-disappointment principle: completely inconsistent with one another are many of the rules and decisions listened and conformed to by the existing Equity Courts.

v. Not more hostile to the rules and decisions of the existing Equity Courts can be any arrangements deduced from the non-disappointment principle, than are to one another many of the existing rules and decisions of those same Courts. Witness those pronounced on the subject of last wills.†

vi. Not worse nor otherwise dealt with will thus be the rules and decisions of the existing Equity Courts by the Equity Dispatch Court, than by those same Equity Courts, without any the least reserve, are those of the several Common-Law Courts and those of the several Ecclesiastical Courts throughout a great part of the extent of the field of jurisdiction occupied by these same Equity Courts. If it is, or ever was fit, that the rules of one Court should, by another Court established in a dark age, be overruled, why not by one established in a more enlightened as well as in a less enlightened age?

vii.Ex post facto arrangements, as well as contrary to the non-disappointment principle, are both those made by the existing Equity Courts, and all those that are grounded on the Judge-made and so-called unwritten law by the Common-Law Courts, and the Ecclesiastical-Law Courts, and Admiralty Courts: but most scandalously inconsistent with that exclusively defensible principle—the non-disappointment principle—are the rules and decisions of the existing Equity Courts; as well as with the profession included in the import of the term Equity: intimation being thereby meant to be conveyed of a better sort of justice.

viii. Contrary to acts of Parliament are various of the rules and decisions, application of which is made by the existing Equity Courts: witness those on the subject of the registration of deeds.

ix. Avowedly in contrariety to the enactments of the Legislature, may be seen rules and decisions of the Equity Courts: witness the instances brought to view in the tract intituled “Indications respecting Lord Eldon,” in the miscellany intituled “Official Aptitude Maximized—Expense Minimized.” (V. 348.)

x. By the exclusion put upon all mention of the rules and decisions of the existing Equity Courts, saved will be the prodigious quantity of time and expense employed in the reference to them in the existing practice.

Instructional.

Art. 8. Of interpretation in cases of doubt, applied to post-obituary dispositions,—principles applicable, these:—

i.Non-disappointment, or say disappointment-preventing or minimizing principle.

ii. Where and in so far as this principle has no application, the benefit-maximizing principle.

iii. When neither the disappointment-minimizing nor the benefit-maximizing principle are applicable, the lot-employing principle;—rather than by litiscontestation applying the money, part of it, to the use of lawyers in sheer waste: for example, in the scribbling of useless writings, or partly in travelling.

iv. In the first instance,—i. e. antecedently to application made of the benefit-maximizing principle, apply the lot-employing principle, as being the simplest in its operation, and saving the property from being wasted in the purchase of lawyers’ service, useless witnesses, and journeys of evidence-holders: this done, then the Judge will determine whether the inequalities of fortune on the part of co-claimants are sufficiently great to warrant the application of the benefit-maximizing principle.

v. In cases in which no one of the above-mentioned principles is applicable, give the matter in dispute to government for the benefit of the whole community.

vi. Determine to what degree of remoteness in relationship, expectation of post-obituary acquisition shall be considered as extending: and this in the two several cases of existence and non-existence of amicable intercourse betwixt the defunct and the living:

1. Means of simplification, or say simplicity-effecting arrangements, proposable as aplicable to post-obituary dispositions:—

i. Applying to the subject-matter of property—

Abolition of the distinction between real and personal property.

ii. Applying to the judicatories having cognizance of contestation in relation to those same subject-matters of property—

Abolition of all sorts of judicatories except one: giving to one and the same sort of judicatory (exceptions excepted) jurisdiction in all sorts of cases.

2. An example this, of the distribution capable of being made of the subject-matter of legal arrangements for the purpose of co-operation in codification.*

3. Note, in this point of view, that of post-obituary and introvival, or say intervival disposition, the subject-matter is or may be the same: namely (exceptions excepted,) the aggregate mass of the objects of general desire, including the matter of wealth in all its ramifications.

vii. Modes of division in cases in which no ground can be found for giving the subject-matter in question to one of two contending parties, to the exclusion of the other, these:—

1. Division into two equal shares,—the assumption being, that the right does belong either to the one or to the other beyond doubt, no third person having any ground of title to it.

2. Lot, without division;—according to the result of the lottery, the subject-matter going in totality either to the one or the other.

Of these two, the mode of division seems the preferable one. Ground of this opinion, this:—what cannot but be admitted is, that in the breast of each one of the two competitors, the pain of disappointment cannot fail to have place. On the other hand, what is supposed and assumed to be true is, that the sum of the pain in the case of division will not be so great as the sum of the pain in the case of non-division; and conversely, the sum of the pleasure produced in the case of division will be greater than the sum of the pain in case of non-division.†

[* ]Non-disappointment principle.] 1. By means of the non-disappointment principle,—by this means and no other, can any determinate import be annexed to the locution vested rights: take away from it this import, suppose this import not to belong to it, none remains. In case of a right being taken away from a man, if the attributive vested be attached to it, what is thereby meant to be asserted is—that the pain of disappointment thereby produced in his instance is greater than would be produced by the loss of that same right if the attributive vested were not with propriety applicable to it.

2. Where the idea in the mind, in so far as it is clear and determinate, is the idea of contrariety to the rule alluded to by the non-disappointment principle, two expressions commonly employed are—contrary to the first principles of justice, and contrary to every principle of justice. Considered in themselves, these expressions are, both of them, nonsense—mere nonsense. That which they concur in supposing is, that a list of principles and a corresponding list of rules, generally recognised as coming under that denomination, are in existence: whereas, no such lists are capable of being produced by any person by whom the existence of them is thus asserted.

[† ]Thus it is, that, throughout the whole of the Pannomion, or say all-comprehensive body of law, to which the presentproposed Bill belongs, the arrangement made is deduced from the consideration of the quantities of pain and pleasure likely to be produced by it,—or say, from its effects on the happiness of all persons interested, or (as the familiar phrase has it) on human feelings. Void of all claim to regard on the part of any rational mind is every subject-matter of consideration on any other ground than that of its influence on the feelings of some sensitive being.

Correspondent, on every occasion,—mutually connected, and fit to be kept in mind in conjunction, are the subject-matters of consideration following; that is to say—1. Ends in view; 2. Axioms of pathology; 3. Reasons; 4. Rules; 5. Principles:—together, they constitute the grounds of every proposed arrangement:—

1. By an end in view, is meant some portion of good, considered as endeavoured to be produced by the arrangement proposed:—of good, that is to say, possession of some pleasure, or exemption from some pain.

2. By an axiom of pathology, understand a proposition declarative of a connexion as having place between any event or state of things in the character of a cause, and pain or pleausre, or both, in the character of effects of that same cause.

3. By a reason, as applied to a proposed enactment, understand a proposition designed to give information, presenting to view some such connexion as being under consideration, which to the legislative draughtsman served as an inducement to propose the arrangement in question, and which he expects to have the effect of causing those to whose minds it presents itself, to regard that same arrangement with satisfaction.

4. By a rule, understand a proposition declarative of the manner in which the connexion has place between some such cause and the corresponding effect; or say, a statement made of a lot of happiness as likely to be produced by the course of conduct thereby recommended.

5. By the noun-substantive principle, with some attributive attached to it, allusion is made to the corresponding rule: and the number of words that would be employed, with the quantity of embarrassment that would be produced in the sentence by the insertion of the rule into it, are thereby saved.

[* ]In Constitutional Code, Ch. XII. Judiciary Collectively, § 20, Judges’ eventually-emendative function, provision is made for the continued amendment of the law, as often as the demand for alteration manifests itself, by the insertion of proposed enactments certified to Parliament by the Judge in terminis:—the insertion to be made by an appropriate functionary in course, unless stopped by motion made in one or other House of Parliament. Of the effect of this power, an experimental exhibition might by the Dispatch Court Judge be made.

[† ]When the property is to a certain degree considerable, any dishonest person in the situation of executor may, under the invitation given him by the existing system, make a sure profit. Of the whole number of claimants, if there be but some one whom he can procure to join with him in this scheme of iniquity, this claimant commences against the executor a Bill in Equity: whereupon the whole mass, how large soever, of the property, is during the continuance of the suit locked up in the hands of the executor, by whom the interest of it is put into his own pocket. This I have been assured by professional men, is a known and customary practice: in this case a sort of divorce has place, between the sinister interest in respect of delay and the sinister interest in respect of expense: by the delay, sinister interest is increased; by the expense, diminished.

[* ]The author appears, from a note, to have had in view other principles to come in between the above, but has left this portion uncompleted: reference being made to some other work on Legacies, as a source from which illustrations might be drawn.—Ed.

[† ]Foundations of property shaken! will of course be among the cries raised against the proposal of this same Equity Dispatch Court. Foundations shaken! as if that could be shaken which has no existence. Foundations shaken! instead of shaken, say rather established. Resting on the at-present-existing grimgribber, the pretended rule of action rests upon a quicksand with volcanoes under it. All-comprehensive rule, not detur digniori, but detur locupletiori.

Corruption regularly organized, established, universalized, unpunishable, irresistible,—the so-much-boasted purity.

No other machinery, good or bad, applicable to the purpose, being in existence, the Real Property Commissioners, in their Reports, while presenting to view the changes which in their view of the matter require to be made in the instruments employed in conveyancing business, mention the existing Equity Courts as the Judicatories by which execution and effect shall be given to the enactments proposed to be made for this purpose:—machinery which, under the load of expense and delay at present lying upon it, cannot be set to work by one out of perhaps a dozen, perhaps a score, of the sets of persons that have need of it.