The Online Library of Liberty

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• Errata—vol. III.
• Defence of Usury; Showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints On the Terms of Pecuniary Bargains; In Letters to a Friend.
• Letter I.: Introduction.
• Letter II.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Usury.
• Letter III.: Reasons For Restraint—prevention of Prodigality.
• Letter IV.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Indigence.
• Letter V.: Reasons For Restraint—protection of Simplicity.
• Letter VI.: Mischiefs of the Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VII.: Efficacy of Anti-usurious Laws.
• Letter VIII.: Virtual Usury Allowed.
• Letter IX.: Blackstone Considered.
• Letter X.: Grounds of the Prejudices Against Usury.
• Letter XI.: Compound Interest.
• Letter XII.: Maintenance and Champerty.
• Letter XIII.: To Dr. Smith, On Projects In Arts, &c.
• A Manual of Political Economy: Now First Edited From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: Introduction. *
• Chapter II.: Analytical Survey of the Field of Political Economy.
• Chapter III.: Of Wealth.
• Chapter IV.: Of Population.
• Chapter V.: Of Finance.
• Chapter VI.: Operation of a Sinking Fund On the Production of Wealth.
• Chapter VII.: Noscenda.
• Observations On the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; Especially With a Reference to the Decree of the Spanish Cortes of July 1820.
• Preface.: Observations, &c.
• Section I.: Nature of the Prohibitory System.
• Section II.: Mischiefs of the Prohibitory System.
• Section III.: Causes of the Prohibitory System.
• A Plan For Saving All Trouble and Expense In the Transfer of Stock, and For Enabling the Proprietors to Receive Their Dividends Without Powers of Attorney, Or Attendance At the Bank of England, By the Conversion of Stock Into Note Annuities.
• Introduction.
• Chapter I.: Plan For the Creation, Emission, Payment, and Eventual Extension, of a Proposed New Species of Government Paper, Under the Name of Annuity Notes.
• Chapter II.: Form of an Annuity Note. (see Table II.)
• Chapter III.: Comparison of the Proposed, With the Existing Government Securities, &c.
• Chapter IV.: Grounds of Expectation, In Regard to the Proposed Measure.
• Chapter V.: Financial Advantages.
• Chapter VI.: Advantage By Addition to National Capital.
• Chapter VII.: Advantage By Addition to Commercial Security.
• Chapter VIII.: Particular Interests Concerned.
• Chapter IX.: Rise of Prices—how to Obviate.
• Chapter X.: Reduction of Interest—proposed Mode Compared With Mr. Pelham’s.
• Chapter XI.: Moral Advantages.
• Chapter XII.: Constitutional Advantages.
• Chapter XIII.: Recapitulation and Conclusion.
• Appendix A.: Government Ought to Have the Monopoly of Paper Money, As Well As of Metallic Money.
• Appendix B.: Paper Money—causes Why Not Circulated By Government Without Interest, As Well As By Individuals.
• General View of a Complete Code of Laws.
• Chapter I.: General Division.
• Chapter II.: Relations Between the Laws Concerning Offences, Rights, Obligations, and Services.
• Chapter III.: Relation Between the Penal and Civil Code.
• Chapter IV.: Of Method.
• Chapter V.: Plan of the Penal Code.
• Chapter VI.: Of the Division of Offences.
• Chapter VIII. Titles of the Penal Code.
• Chapter IX.: First General Title of the Civil Code, * of Things.
• Chapter X.: Second General Title of the Civil Code. of Places.
• Chapter XI.: Third General Title of the Civil Code. of Times.
• Chapter XII.: Fourth General Title of the Civil Code. of Services.
• Chapter XIII.: Fifth General Title of the Civil Code. of Obligations.
• Chapter XIV.: Sixth General Title of the Civil Code. of Rights.
• Chapter XV.: Seventh General Title of the Civil Code. of Collative and Ablative Events.
• Chapter XVI.: Eighth General Title of the Civil Code. of Contracts.
• Chapter XVII.: Ninth General Title of the Civil Code. of the Domestic and Civil States.
• Chapter XVIII.: Tenth General Title of the Civil Code. of Persons Capable of Acquiring and of Contracting.
• Chapter XIX.: Of the Particular Titles of the Civil Code.
• Chapter XX.: Of Elementary Political Powers.
• Chapter XXI.: Of Elementary Political Powers— Subject Continued.
• Chapter XXII.: Plan of the Political Code.
• Chapter XXIII.: Plan of the International Code.
• Chapter XXIV.: Plan of the Maritime Code.
• Chapter XXV.: Plan of the Military Code.
• Chapter XXVI.: Plan of the Ecclesiastical Code.
• Chapter XXVII.: Plan of Remuneratory Laws.
• Chapter XXVIII.: Of Political Economy.
• Chapter XXIX.: Plan of the Financial Code.
• Chapter XXX.: Plan of Procedure Code.
• Chapter XXXI.: Of the Integrality of the Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXII.: Of Purity In the Composition of a Code of Laws.
• Chapter XXXIII.: Of the Style of the Laws.
• Chapter XXXIV.: Of the Interpretation, Conservation, and Improvement of a Code.
• Pannomial Fragments.
• Chapter I.: General Observations.
• Chapter II.: Consideranda.
• Chapter III.: Expositions.
• Chapter IV.: Axioms.
• Nomography; Or the Art of Inditing Laws: Now First Published From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham.
• Chapter I.: The Subject Stated.
• Chapter II.: Relations.
• Chapter III.: Proper End In View.
• Chapter IV.: Imperfections Primary.
• Chapter V.: Explanations Relative to the Imperfections of the Second Order.
• Chapter VI.: Of Remedies. *
• Chapter VII.: Of Language.
• Chapter VIII.: Of the Perfections of Which the Legislative Style Is Susceptible.
• Chapter IX.: Of Forms of Enactment.
• Appendix. Logical Arrangements, Or Instruments of Invention and Discovery
• Equity Dispatch Court Proposal; Containing a Plan For the Speedy and Unexpensive Termination of the Suits Now Depending In Equity Courts. With the Form of a Petition, and Some Account of a Proposed Bill For That Purpose
• Section I.: Purpose Explained. Jeremy Bentham to the Honest and Afflicted Among Equity Suitors.
• Section II.: Equity Suitors’ Petition For Dispatch Court. to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, —
• Section III.: Dispatch Court Bill—some Account of It.
• Section IV.: Information Requisite From Petitioning Suitors.
• Equity Dispatch Court Bill: Being a Bill For the Institution of an Experimental Judicatory Under the Name of the Court of Dispatch, For Exemplifying In Practice the Manner In Which the Proposed Summary May Be Substituted to the So Called Regular Sy
• Editor’s Note.
• Preface.
• Preamble.
• Part I.—: Judiciary.
• Section I.: Judge Located, How.
• Section II.: Remuneration.
• Section III.: Registrar, &c.
• Section IV.: Eleemosynary Advocate.
• Section V.: Judges’, &c. Deputes.
• Section VI.: Judge’s Powers—exemptions—checks.
• Section VII.: Prehensors and Messengers.
• Section VIII.: Consignees; * Or Say, In-trust-holders.
• Section IX.: Grounds of Decision For the Dispatch Court Judge.
• Section X. ‡: Suits’ Comparative Suitableness; and Order of Cognizance.
• Section XI.: Auxiliary Judges and Accountants.
• Section XII.: Sittings, Times Of.
• Part II.—: Procedure.
• Section XIII.: Definitions. *
• Section XIV.: Examination of Solicitors.
• Section XV.: Initiatory Examination of Parties, &c.
• Section XVI.: Appropriate Intercourse, Constant and Universal, Secured.
• Section XVII.: Mutual Security For Forthcomingness of Persons and Things. ‡
• Section XVIII.: Evidence-procuring Money, How Provided.
• Section XIX.: Subsequential Evidence, How Elicited.
• Section XX.: Execution, How Performed.
• Section XXI.: Equity Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXII.: Dispatch Court Costs, How Disposed Of.
• Section XXIII.: Eventual Retrotransference of a Suit to the Equity Court.
• Section XXIV.: Expense of the Court, How Provided For.
• Supplemental Sections:—
• Section I. Or XXV.: Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
• Section II. Or XXVI.: Henceforward Dispatch Court.
• Schedules to the Bill.
• Plan of Parliamentary Reform, In the Form of a Catechism, With Reasons For Each Article: With an Introduction, Showing the Necessity of Radical, and the Inadequacy of Moderate, Reform.
• Introduction.
• Section I.: History of the Ensuing Tract—alarming State of the Country and the Constitution.
• Section II.: Most Prominent Present Grievance, Gareisoning France.
• Section III.: Causes of the Above and All Other Mischiefs:—particular Interests Monarchical and Aristocratical, Adverse to the Universal—their Ascendency.
• Section IV.: Sole Remedy In Principle—democratic Ascendency.
• Section V.: Remedy In Detail: Radical Parliamentary Reform: Elementary Arrangements In This Edition of It—their Necessity.
• Section VI.: Differences Between This and the Original Editions of Radical Reform.
• Section VII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage Further Considered.
• Section VIII.: Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.
• Section IX.: Freedom of Suffrage Further Explained—seductive Influence—its Forms, Instruments, &c.
• Section X.: Bribery and Terrorism Compared.
• Section XI.: Purchase of Seats—in What Cases Mischievous—in What Beneficial.
• Section XII.: Secresy of Suffrage—its Importance Further Developed.
• Section XIII.: Exclusion of Placemen, &c. From the Right of Voting—mischievousness and Profligacy of the Opposite Arrangement.
• Section XIV.: Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.
• Section XV.: Representatives—impermanence of Their Situation—its Importance:—objections—their Groundlessness.
• Section XVI.: Moderate Reform—its Arrangements—their Inadequacy.
• Section XVII.: Trienniality Inadequate;—annuality Necessary.
• Section XVIII.: Interests Adverse to Adequate Reform—support Given By Them to Moderate, to the Exclusion of Radical: Tories—whigs—people’s Men.
• Catechism of Parliamentary Reform; Or, Outline of a Plan of Parliamentary Reform; In the Form of Question and Answer; With Reasons to Each Article.
• Section I.: Ends to Be Aimed At On the Occasion of Parliamentary Reform.
• Section II.: Means, Conducive Towards These Ends.
• Section III.: Means—their Uses, With Reference to Their Respective Ends.
• Section IV.: Means Conducive to Aptitude In Members: I. Placemen Not to Vote, Nor to Be Seated By Election.
• Section V.: Means, &c. Continued.—ii. Placemen Seated By the King, With Speech and Motion, Without Vote.
• Section VI.: Means, &c. Continued.—iii. Elections Frequent—annual.
• Section VII.: Means, &c. Continued.—iv. Speeches Authentically and Promptly Published.
• Section VIII.: Means, &c. Continued.—v. Attendance, Punctual and General, Secured.
• Section IX.: Inconveniences Incident to Elections, and Election Judicature.
• Section X.: Election Inconveniences—means For Their Removal.
• Section XI.: Collateral Advantages, Referable to the Situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.
• A Sketch of the Various Proposals For a Constitutional Reform In the Representation of the People, Introduced Into the Parliament of Great Britain, From 1770 to 1812.
• Radical Reform Bill, With Extracts From the Reasons.
• Preliminary Explanations.
• Title of the Proposed Act.
• Preamble.
• Section 1.—: Seats and Districts.
• Section 2.—: Electors, Who.
• Section 3.—: Eligible, Who.
• Section 4.—: Election Offices.
• Section 5.: Election Apparatus.
• Section 6.—: Promulgation of Recommendations In Favour of Proposed Members.
• Section 7.—: Voters’ Titles Pre-established.
• Section 8.—: Election, How.
• Section 9.: Election Districts and Polling Districts, How Marked Out.
• Section 10.—: Vote-making Habitations, How Defined.
• Section 11.—: Members’ Continuance.
• Section 12.—: Vacancies Supplied.
• Section 13.—: Security For the House Against Disturbance By Members. †
• Section 14.—: Indisposition of Speakers Obviated.
• Appendix, Including General Explanations.
• Radicalism Not Dangerous. Extracted From the Mss. of Jeremy Bentham. *
• Part I.—: Introduction.
• Section I.: Radical Reform Bill Recapitulated.
• Section II.: Persuasion of the Dangerousness of Radicalism—cause of It, and of the Vituperative Expression Given to It.
• Section III.: Terms of the Accusation,—speeches From the Throne, 16 Th July and 21 St November 1819.
• Section IV.: The Accusation In General Terms—counter-averment.
• Section V.: Plan of This Defence.
• Part II.—: Deference From the General Nature of the Case.
• Section I.: Conditions Necessary to a Man’s Embarking In Such a Design.
• Section VII.: Concurrence In Any Other Extensive Plan of Spoliation Impossible.
• Section VIII.: Concurrence of Any Constituted Authorities Impossible.
• Section IX.: Accomplishment Impossible—design Impossible.
• Section X.: The Talked-of Spunge No Proof of the Design.
• Part III.—: Defence From Experience In the Case of the United States.
• Part IV.: Defence From Particular Experience In the Case of Ireland: Years 1777 Or 1778, to 1783.
• Section I.: Analogy Between This and the Previous Case.
• Section II.: Democratic Ascendency, How Produced.
• Section III.: Fruit of Democratic Ascendency a Golden Age.
• Section IV.: Coincidence of Its Characters With Those of Radicalism.
• Section VI.: Extinction of Democratic Ascendency and Reform—restoration of Monarchico-aristocratical Ascendency, and Its Consequences.
• Conclusion.

SECTION V.

JUDGES’, &c. DEPUTES.

Enactive.

Art. 1. To obviate delay and failure of justice, the Judge will, within [NA] days after the day of his location, locate a Depute. By this substitute his seat will be occupied, at all times during which the Judge, his principal, is taking the benefit of the vacation days (as per Section XII. Sittings, times of,) or is by sickness rendered unfit for duty.

Art. 2. Power to his Majesty, at any time within [NA] days after such location, to dislocate such locatee: power, in that case, and with obligation, to the Judge, within [NA] days after such dislocation, to locate a fresh Depute, with like power of dislocation to his Majesty, as aforesaid; and so, toties quoties, until a Depute shall have been located, of whom it shall have pleased his Majesty to approve. So likewise, toties quoties, in case of self-dislocation, or say resignation, by such Depute.

Art. 3. To the end that such substitution of the Depute to his principal may never have place without sufficient cause,—of the non-attendance of the Judge by reason of sickness, the Registrar will on that same day give information; that is to say, by a bulletin, transmitted to each of the London daily newspapers, evening or morning, whichever shall be next published; on receipt of which, the Editor of each such newspaper shall, with all practicable dispatch, give insertion thereunto.

Art. 4. On the first day of his attendance, after non-attendance by reason of sickness,—the Judge will, at the commencement of the sitting, make open declaration thereof: and, of such declaration the Registrar will forthwith make entry on the minutes of the register-book.

Art. 5. If, at any part of the Judge’s vacation time, as above, it should happen to the Judge Depute to be non-attendant by reason of sickness, as above,—like notice of such sickness, and publication thereof, shall have place, as per art. 3: and, in this case, the Judge will be in attendance instead of his Depute, unless by distance from London, such attendance is rendered impracticable.

Art. 6. Power to the Judge, at any time, to dislocate or suspend his Depute, for special cause assigned: entry thereof will thereupon be made in the minutes; and copy of the instrument of dislocation delivered to the dislocatee. Power to the Judge, in this case, and with obligation, to locate a fresh Depute: obligation on the Judge, at the same time, his vacation time notwithstanding, to attend during [NA] days after such location, for the instruction of such his new Depute.

Art. 7. Responsible in damages will be the Judge, for any wrong, to any individual or body politic, or to the public at large, by any act, positive or negative, done by his Depute.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 7*.—i. Let it not be thought, that, by this obligation, any apt and competent person will be deterred from subjecting himself to this eventual damage. To serve their respective friends or connexions,—without remuneration, received or expected,—men of all descriptions are continually seen exposing themselves to this same risk; and this—even after, and in consequence of, proof of misconduct, in some determinate shape, in some individual instance, on the part of him for whom this risk is incurred: witness all instances of binding to good behaviour, by recognizance with co-obligors.

ii. In the present instance, slight will be the risk, valuable the compensation given for it:—slight the risk; for, from among all his acquaintance will the functionary have to select the object of his choice. Valuable, on the other hand, as will be seen, the compensation attached to this risk: valuable, notwithstanding the terms on which the Depute will have to serve. See this topic further pursued, below, art. 12*.

Enactive.

Art. 8. To no pecuniary remuneration in any shape, and in particular in the shape of fees, will be entitled any Judge-Depute located under this Act.

Instructional.

Art. 9. In addition to the power and dignity naturally and inseparably attached to his office,—a remuneration he will have, in the prospect of succeeding to the office, on the death or dislocation of his principal; and, consideration had of the peculiar experience obtained by him, and the relative aptitude evidenced by him, in and by the fulfilment of his duty, in respect of such his office,—his succession thereto will, in a manner, take place of course: saving always to his Majesty, his negative, as per Sect. I. art. 13, 14, 16.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 9*. As to service without pecuniary remuneration, it has place in some thousands of instances on the part of Justices of the Peace. True it is, that, on the part of those functionaries, the service is not obligatcry; and, on the free will of each one of them depends the time, and in good measure the place, in which it is performed. On the other hand, not having, unless by corruption, any pecuniary remuneration (with the exception of the small value in the shape of patronage in respect of the fees received by a Clerk,)—they have not any pecuniary remuneration, comparable in value to that which, as above, is in expectancy in the case of the Judge-Depute: and as to the obligation of duty,—in his case it extends not, for a certainty, beyond the small quantity of vacation time allowed to the principal. As to the casual addition by his sickness, it is what may never happen: for it is what, in experience, has in many instances never happened.

Art. 10. Power to the Registrar to locate a Depute, in like manner as to the Judge, as per art. 1.

Art. 11. Power to the Registrar to dislocate, and from time to time suspend, his Depute, in like manner as to the Judge, per art. 6.

Art. 12. Responsible will be the Registrar for any wrong done by his Depute; in the same manner as is the Judge by art. 7.

Ratiocinative.

Art. 12*. Of the deputation system, applied as it is in general, and, in particular, applied as it is to the offices here in question,—namely, that of the Judge, and that of the Registrar,—but more particularly that of the Judge,—beneficial effects, these:—

i. Operating as an efficient cause of the existence of appropriate aptitude in the functionary: appropriate aptitude, that is to say, in all its branches.

ii. Affording an experimental demonstration of that same existence.

iii. Affording an indication of the degree in which, in the instance of each candidate, it has place.

iv. In case of deficiency to any amount in respect of any of these requisites,—affording facility of dislocation, with the least possible commotion on the part of the public mind, and with the least possible hurt to the feelings of the individual.

v. Produced by the deputation system as here applied, may be seen to be these so desirable effects,—all of them in conjunction, each of them in a manner and degree as yet without example.

vi. As to appropriate aptitude on the part of the Depute:—appropriate aptitude in all points taken together, and more especially moral aptitude. At each period of his service, the state of his mind in respect of this quality will depend—partly on what it was on entrance into the situation, partly on subsequentially intervening circumstances: say partly on initial, or say original,—partly on subsequential, aptitude. But, as to initial aptitude, in a prodigious degree more effective is the security afforded in this case, than that which is afforded in the ordinary mode of patronage. In the present case, responsible in a pecuniary way is the principal for the good behaviour of his depute: not so, in the ordinary case, the patron for his protegé. Mark now in both cases the consequence. In the case of the Dispatch Court,—to the Judge thereof,—that is to say, to the Judge Principal,—the aptitude of this object of his choice—of this partner of his fortune—of this his occasional proxy, cannot possibly fail to be an object of attentive examination and sincere solicitude: while, in the ordinary case of a patron, no motive whatever, capable of making any approach to the degree of force adequate to the production of any such attention, has place.

vii. The risk thus incurred, as above already alluded to (art. 7*)—is it in the nature of the case that it should have any such effect as that of preventing a fit person from giving his acceptance to the trust? Not it, indeed: for, so says continual experience. So many instances, in which, in existing practice, one man joins in security for the good behaviour of another,—so many instances in which the demonstration is afforded. But, in this case, beyond comparison stronger is the inducement than in those. In those cases, on the part of the object of the confidence reposed, delinquency already manifested is an essentially concomitant circumstance: in those same cases, to set against, and afford compensation for, the risk, no benefit in any self-regarding shape has place: frequently, nothing in addition to the simple pleasure of sympathy, or say benevolence: while, in the present case, in compensation for a so much inferior risk, comes the benefit of rich patronage—the patronage of so high an office. And thus it is, that in so far as, in consequence of the good behaviour of the Depute in such his situation, he becomes eventually elevated by the competent authority to the rank of Principal,—the patronage of this important office is virtually, and, as it were, insensibly, transferred from an essentially unapt, into an essentially apt, class of hands: from hands indiscriminately occupied in the promotion of justice and injustice, to hands exclusively occupied in the promotion of justice.

viii. So much for initial appropriate aptitude: now as to subsequential.

ix or i. As to the moral branch.* Here may be seen each functionary’s interest brought into connexion and coincidence with his duty, by the closest ties. Neither by delay nor by expense, neither by being lavish of the time nor of the money of other men, will any one of these functionaries have profit to gain in any shape; while, by the care taken to expend of both those precious articles taken together no more than the smallest quantity that, consistently with rectitude of decision, can be expended, reputation will every one of them have to gain;—reputation, which in his situation is everything.

x. or ii. As to appropriate aptitude, intellectual and active. Here, by each one of these Dispatch Court Judge Deputes, with a degree of instructiveness proportioned to the number of the suits that have passed through his hands, will be a sort of apprenticeship served, preparatory to the subsequent mastership. An apprenticeship? and in what occupation?—not (as the unknown political satirist phrases it) “in the indiscriminate defence of right and wrong,” but in the pure and undeviating pursuit and support of right.

xi. or iii. As to manifestation of the existence of this aptitude and of the degree of it,—in the Dispatch Court, in full view of the assembled public, by every one of these Deputes, will demonstration be, each day, made: each such Dispatch Court Judge Depute will be a probationer, with reference to a permanent situation in one of the contemplated Local Judicatories.

xii. or iv. For the seeking, or the acceptance, of a situation thus circumstanced, what encouragement could present itself to any man, who is not inwardly conscious of a competent degree of appropriate aptitude, in all its several shapes, as above distinguished.

xiii. or v. On the other hand, suppose the Dispatch Court out of the question, and the Local Judicatories instituted, with what promise of appropriate aptitude would they be to be filled? What proof tolerably conclusive, what proof so much as faintly presumptive, would be to be found anywhere else?

xiv. or vi. The greater the number of these Deputes, whom, without lessening through want of experience the probability of rectitude of decision, means could be found for employing in the Dispatch Court,—the greater would be the benefit produced in both situations: in the Dispatch Court, and in the Local Judicatories likewise. In the Dispatch Court, by augmentation of the number of the suits to which the relief in respect of the delay and expense would be administered; in the Local Judicatories, by augmentation of the number of the Judicatories, for which Judges, endowed with the thus demonstrated degree of appropriate aptitude, would be help up to view and presented for choice.

vii. Nor is the name Depute an invention of the present day. Besides the kindred name of Deputy, employed in so many Government offices (and to an extent so much greater than could be wished)—the institution indicated by the name Depute is, in Scotland, exemplified in the case of divers judicial officers. Witness Sheriff-Deputes:* though, of the use made of it in the present instance, no more than a comparatively small part would be found exemplified in that instance.

Art. 13. In respect of the several offices of Judge, Registrar, and Short-hand Writer, with their respective Deputes,—for forms of location, dislocation, suspension and relocation, see Schedules No. IV. to VII.

[* ]Such being the mode of payment under the Dispatch Court summary system—confront with it now an exemplification of the Equity Court regular system, the place of which it is proposed to take. Look into the office of the sort of subordinate Judge styled a Master in Chancery: the Court of this Judge, such office may be styled—in so far as a closed closet can with propriety be styled—a Court; meaning a Court of Justice. Behold here the whole business carried on in a manner, than which the wit of man could not have devised any other more exquisitely well adapted to the sole real purpose—the purpose of raising the two conjunct quantities—factitious delay and official profit—to the highest possible pitch: judicial attendance paid for by the hour, each such hour separated from every other by an interval of days or weeks, no one of those hours composed of so many as sixty minutes; no one of them sure of being composed of so many as sixty moments; of these moments, a number more or less considerable employed—partly in discussing the news of the day, partly in gathering up the thread that had been broken, and refreshing the traces that had been obscured, by so many intervening heterogeneous businesses.

[* ]Sheriff-Deputes.] Note, the acting Depute is styled Sheriff-Depute Substitute; the acting Principal being styled Sheriff-Depute, and the official person styled a Sheriff, a sinecurist. Official person? Yes: but, having no function to perform, with what propriety can this, or any other sinecurist, be termed a functionary?