Front Page Titles (by Subject) CHAPTER II.: RELATIONS. - The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3
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CHAPTER II.: RELATIONS. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 3.
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Relation of Nomography to the government of a private family.
By Nomography, as has just been observed, is understood the art and science by means of which, to the matter of law, expression may be given in such sort as to maximize its conduciveness to the ends, whatsoever they may be, which the legislator, whoever he may be, may have in view.
Of nomography, the subject-matter is matter of law—the matter of the laws which have place and are in force, or are destined to have place, in the political community in question.
Matter of law is the result of expression given to the will of a person, or set of persons, having power to produce pain on the part of the person or persons at whose hand compliance is thus called for with the will thus expressed.
On each occasion, the matter of law which is uttered, consists, and is composed of, either an entire law, or a portion of such matter, less or greater, than an entire law.
For understanding the nature of any portion of matter which is less or greater than that of an entire law, it will be necessary to understand what that portion of matter is, which is neither more nor less than the matter of an entire law.
An entire law may be defined, a command emaning immediately, or through the intervention of some subordinate authority, from the supreme authority of the state in the political community in question—the political community of which it is a law.
In the great and all-comprehensive family of a political state, a law is—that which a command is in a private family—a command directed by the head of that same family to the members of it, or any one or more of them.
But, to be productive of any of the effects intended by it, the law of the legislator requires an appendage, which, for the production of its effects, is never needed by the head of a private family. With reference to the law just mentioned, this appendage may be styled the subsidiary law: of this subsidiary law, the business and object consist in the presenting to the party or parties subject, inducement directed to the purpose of producing on their parts compliance with the principal law.
And here, then, we have existing on each occasion, in necessary connexion with one another, two distinct species of law; namely, 1. The principal, or say the direction-giving; 2. The subsidiary, or say the inducement-giving law.
These distinct species of laws are addressed to two different classes of persons:—the direction-giving law is addressed to the person or persons at whose hands compliance is constantly looked for in the first instance;—addressed always to a person, or set of persons other than the above, is the subsidiary, or say inducement-giving law.
This person, or set of persons, is different, according as the inducement employed by the lawgiver is of the nature of evil or of the nature of good.
If it be of the nature of evil, the inducement is styled punishment; and the sort of person to whom this subsidiary law is addressed is the judge: and the act which he is calculated to perform, in the event of non-compliance with the will expressed by the principal law, is an act of punishment—an act to which exercise is given by producing evil, or say pain, on the part of him by whom compliance with the will expressed by the principal law has failed to be made.
For giving effect to a command emaning from the head of a family, and addressed to the other members of it, one or more of them,—no subsidiary law, no inducement-giving law is necessary.* Why? Because in the bosom of a private family, no such functionary as a judge—no functionary distinct from the lawgiver, has place. Here in the head are necessarily connected the two, in themselves mutually distinguishable functions of the lawgiver and of the judge.
Of this difference another consequence is,—that in a private family no portion of the matter of law, no portion less than an entire law, no such thing as a fragment of a law, has place:—peculiar to the great family of the state is the existence of this fragmentitious matter, the conception of which will be seen to such a degree complex, and in so high a degree productive of difficulty and complexity.
Relation of Nomography to Logic.
The intellectual—the volitional—and the active;—into these three branches the whole texture of the human mind has, for some purposes, on some occasions, been considered as divided:† the intellectual including perception, knowledge, and judgment;—the volitional, designated by the one word will;—and the active, by which execution and effect is given, as far as depends on the individual, to the choice formed, or, so to speak, the laws enacted by the will.
For these two thousand years and more,‡ the branch of art and science which undertakes to give direction to the operations of the understanding, has been in existence; and logic, a name derived from the Greek, is the appellation by which it has been denominated.
In nomography, as the branch of art and science is itself new, the name of it cannot, it is manifest, be otherwise than new,—new the thing signified, new of course would be any and every oral sign employed for the signification of it.
In the field of art and science a vast space has been discovered, and this of nomography is the branch of art and science which has been invented for the filling of it up.
If to the operations of the understanding, by appropriate rules direction is capable of being given to advantage, with no less advantage may it be given to the operations of the will, and the expression and method given to these same operations.
By the light of analogy, the instructions which have been given on the subject of the logic of the understanding, may be found applicable, with more or less fitness, to the logic of the will.
In common to both branches of logic belongs that portion of matter, which in a work on the logic of the understanding, may be termed the tactical part; peculiar to the logic of the will is that part of the logic of the understanding which may be termed the argumentative, or say, the polemic part.
Relation of Nomography to the Pannomion, Matter and Form.
Matter and form—these two elements, or say elementary ingredients, enter into the composition of every law, and of every particle of matter that enters into the composition of a law, or of a portion of the matter of law.
Under the head of matter are comprehended the ideas to which expression is designed to be given,—the ideas, or say the things that require to be signified:—by the form, understand the signs by means of which these same things are signified—the words, and combinations of words, by which expression is given to those same ideas.
By a pannomion, understand the entire mass of the matter of law which in the country, or say, political state in question, has the force of law:—a mass by which, when that extent is given to it which it is capable of having, and ought to have, the whole field of law and legislation is comprehended, and the whole surface of it, as it were, covered.
To the head of nomography—a denomination by which title is given to the present work—belongs the consideration of what belongs to the form of a law, or of any portion of the matter of law, as above.
Expression and method—under one or other, or both together, of these denominations, may be ranked and included whatsoever consideration belongs to the form in which a portion of the matter of law is capable of being clothed.
By expression, understand the words and combinations of words, by the aggregate of the signs of which the matter of the law is signified.
By the method, understand the different groups, or say assemblages, in which these same signs are put together, and the order in which these same groups, and in each group the words of which it is composed, follow one another.
Relation of Nomography to proposal and petition.
Superiority—equality—inferiority:—between man and man, in the scale of power, these three are the degrees which have place. Addressed to an inferior, a discourse expressive of the will of his superior, possesses the character and effect of a law: addressed to a superior, a discourse expressive of the will of an inferior, presents itself in the character of a petition: addressed to an equal, a discourse expressive of the will of his equal, presents itself in the character of a proposal.
A requisition agrees with a law, in trusting to power for compliance with the will expressed by it:—it differs from a law, in that it emanes not immediately from the superior power in the state, nor even necessarily from any one of the constituted authorities: for compliance with the will expressed by it, however, it places its ultimate reliance on the supreme power in the state; forasmuch as on this supreme power it is that all other power depends for its existence.
A request differs from a petition no otherwise than that, in the case of the request, the place of the superior in the scale of power is not so high—the place of the inferior not so low—as in the case of the petition.
Altogether free from that complication which has place in the case of a law, are a proposal and petition. Why? Answer—Because in neither of these cases is there any place for that subsidiary law, the need of which has been brought to view in the case of a law: there is no punishment in the case—no reward in the case;—no functionary by whom eventually, to wit, in the case of non-compliance, the punishment—no functionary by whom eventually, to wit, in the case of compliance, the reward, is to be applied.
To proposals and petitions, no small quantity of the machinery applied by nomography to the matter of law will, however, be found applicable—the matter of discourse being the matter employed in all three cases. In pursuing our course in the field of nomography, occasion will be seen for bringing to view the imperfections by which the matter of discourse, when applied to the purpose of law and nomography, is liable to be deteriorated—the imperfections by which the will of the supreme legislator is, in a greater or less degree, liable to be frustrated,—and of the remedies which present themselves as applicable to these several imperfections. Of the same imperfections, the matter of discourse, when applied to the purpose of a proposal, will be found susceptible; and accordingly of the same remedies for these imperfections; and so in case of a petition.
But as, neither in the case of a proposal, nor in the case of a petition, either punishment or reward have any place; accordingly, in neither of these cases does any such importance attach, either to the imperfections, or to the remedies, as in the case of a law.
Relation of Nomography to private deontology.
Strictly speaking, not nomology and deontology, but the pannomion on the one hand, and an all-comprehensive system of deontology on the other part, are the objects between which the relation has place; for, in this respect, the matter of a treatise on deontology stands upon the same footing as the matter of a proposal and the matter of a petition, as above.
But the contents of the pannomion have their form as well as their matter,—and so have those of a treatise on deontology: and now, after the relation of nomography to so many kindred objects has been brought to view, this last presented itself as being necessary to conclude the list.
A portion of the matter of law gives existence to the inducements, or say motives, on which it depends for the obtaining compliance with the will signified and expressed by it; a treatise on deontology gives not existence to any such inducements: what it does—all that it does, is in each case to give intimation of those inducements which actually have place in the nature of man and things, for compliance with the will to which it gives expression.
[* ]Set the loaf on the table;—put coals on the fire;—open the window:—in these commands may be seen so many examples of the laws of which a private family is the scene;—and in seeing these laws, what will also be seen is the integrality of their character.
[† ]For the several distinguishable faculties perceptible in the mental frame, consult Chrestomathia.
[‡ ]On this subject the most ancient treatise which has reached the present time, is, under the name of Logic, to be found among the works attributed to the great philosopher Aristotle.