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CHAPTER XVI.: EIGHTH GENERAL TITLE OF THE CIVIL CODE. Of Contracts. - Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3 [1843]

Edition used:

The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843). 11 vols. Vol. 3.

Part of: The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols.

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CHAPTER XVI.

EIGHTH GENERAL TITLE OF THE CIVIL CODE.

Of Contracts.

Section 1.

Contracts are acts of collation or investment—conventions—laws more or less ephemeral, proposed by individuals, and adopted by the sovereign, provided they are valid. To what ought he to grant the seal of his authority? I answer, to all. For no private contracts would be made, except with a view to reciprocal advantage, and they cannot be restrained, without in the same proportion injuring the happiness of individuals. Entire liberty for contracts,—such would be the general rule. If there be any to which this sanction should be refused, it will always be for some particular reason. The reasons for declaring certain contracts invalid or unlawful, ought to be drawn from the nature of the contracts themselves, inasmuch as they are contrary to the public interest;—or to the interest of a third party, or to that of the contracting parties.

The exceptions should be indicated under a separate head. It would be proper that a catalogue of the contracts to which the law either absolutely or conditionally refuses its sanction, should be found in the code itself.

The law ought to act with openness: when it grants its sanction to a contract, it ought not to withdraw it secretly on account of conditions not avowed as such.

To enhance the cost of procedure, is to violate the promise it has made to sanction contracts. It is to render justice inaccessible to the poor, that is, to those who have most need of it. This is a truth none can deny, but which few have had the courage to avow.

I have employed the word contract or transaction, to express indistinctly an act of investment—an agreement or a collection—a mixture of agreements founded upon a single occasion.

This being understood, obligations may be distinguished into original and adjective. I call those original, of which express mention is made in the contract itself: I call those adjective, which the law thinks proper to add to the first. The first turn upon events which the contracting parties have foreseen; the others upon events which they could not foresee.*

It is thus that in every country the law has supplied the short-sightedness of individuals, by doing for them what they would have done for themselves, if their imagination had anticipated the march of nature.

The enlightened legislator, recognising these factitious obligations as being the work of his hands, will give them his support upon true and simple reasons, drawn from the principle of utility. Lawyers have founded these obligations upon fictions; that is to say, upon facts which never existed. Where there has been no convention, there they suppose that there have been one, two, a thousand; they have the effrontery or the folly to ascribe wishes to you which they avow you never had: and this what is called reasoning among them.

To decompose a certain contract—to show one by one all the pieces of which it is formed—to exhibit the collection of obligations included in this contract,—this is a species of mechanism hitherto unknown.

It is not only upon the author of the fundamental convention that the law imposes these adjective obligations; it imposes them also upon other persons, in consequence of certain connexions which they have with the principal person. It is thus that obligations pass to heirs, and sometimes to creditors. Why? Because their respective rights only extend to the net value of the goods of their principal.

An article which is in my custody is lost: ought I to be responsible? It is a case which divides itself into an infinity of others. It may have been of an abstract value, a sum of money, a wild animal. Ought it to be considered or not as in my custody? Did it possess the character of a loan, a deposit, or a pledge? And so on of the rest. Observe, that though in these cases mention is made of contract, there are many cases in which I may have a thing without convention, without promise, without any act of will in reference to it.

The legislator has two shoals to avoid, that of restraining services, and that of favouring negligence. If you give too great an extent to responsibility, you incur the first of these dangers—if you give too little, you incur the second.

I am not about to enter here into a critical examination of the Roman contracts: it would be a work of deadly ennui. If we were to imagine all possible defects—in their division, in their nomenclature—it would be difficult to exaggerate them. The idea of reciprocal promises, of mutual dispositions, so familiar to all the world, finds itself so obscured in this mischievous and absurd system of jurisprudence, that the lawyers, who have not ceased to explain it, always feel the necessity of new explanations. In vain they heap volumes upon volumes, light never breaks in upon the chaos.

Everything here must be done over again: a language which pretends to be learned has to be forgotten—a simple and familiar language to be taught; and those who know nothing, possess more than half an advantage over those who have to forget what the lawyers call among themselves by the name of science.

Section 2.

Division of Contracts.

A contract subsists between two parties when there exists between them a disposition either of goods or services, or a legal promise made by the one for the profit of the other.

A disposition or a transfer of goods is an act, in virtue of which a change is made in the legal right of two or more persons with regard to a certain object.

Contracts may be either momentary or permanent.

They may be divided into three classes:—

1. Promises.

2. Disposition or transfer of goods from one party to another.

3. Mixed contracts, containing both dispositions and promises.

Dispositions and promises may be either unilateral or bilateral, according to whether there is reciprocity in the engagement or not.

I.

UNILATERAL PROMISES.

1. Bail.

2. Simple deed of donation, &c.

3. Unilateral promise of marriage.

II.

UNILATERAL DISPOSITION.

1. Gratuitous donation.

2. Legacy.

3. Gratuitous loan.

4. Deposit to be gratuitously kept.

5. Hypothecation in futurum.

III.

BILATERAL PROMISES.

1. Agreement for sale, purchase.

2. Agreement for exchange.

3. Wager.

4. Agreement carrying an obligation to enter into a certain contract.

5. Bilateral promises of marriage.

IV.

BILATERAL DISPOSITIONS.

1. Exchange.

2. Sale and purchase.

3. Exchange of money.

4. Purchase of bills of exchange.

5. Purchase of rent without mortgage.

6. Purchase of rent with mortgage.

V.

MIXED CONTRACTS, CONTAINING DISPOSITIONS AND PROMISES.

1. Loan of money, gratuitous or at interest.

2. Assurance, gratuitous or for a premium.

3. Renting a house, &c.

4. Letting a house, &c.

5. Pledging.

6. Marriage contract.

7. Contract of apprenticeship.

8. Hiring of a servant, of a workman, in a manufactory, or in agriculture or other productive labours; of a clerk, of a shopman.

9. Voluntary enrolment.

10. Donation in trust.

11. Legacy in trust.

12. Articles of partnership in commerce.

13. Deposit under an order of court.

14. Articles of partnership in manufactures.

15. Deposit in respect to a price to be paid in futurum by the depositor.

16. Loan of goods for a price in futurum.

17. Adoption.

SPECIES OF DEPOSITS.

These species are constituted by the different ends for which the contract is established.

(1.) On account of the depositor:

1. Simply to keep the thing—housekeeper, innkeeper.

2. Simply to transfer from one place to another—carrier, captain of a vessel, for transport.

3. To improve—farrier, dyer, miller, tailor.

4. To employ without amelioration, but without consumption, that is to say, entire destruction—as tools, fixed capital of a manufacture, servants.

5. To be consumed—as wood for firing, drugs for dying, ink for writing.

(2.) On account of the depositary:

6. Deposit of a thing gratuitously lent.

7. Deposit of a thing hired.

(3.) On account of the depositor and depositary:—

8. Association with regard to things acquired by a co-associate, for the profit of the society.

(4.) On account of the one or the other, according to the event:—

9. The pledger, and receiver in pledge.

[* ]A horse is lent: he falls ill: ought the lender or the borrower to pay for his cure? A room is let, without mention being made of for what time—what notice ought to be given to the occupier before he is obliged to quit? According to the variety of contracts, and of things which are the subjects of them, a corresponding variety of adjective obligations is required.

[]The species of contract called wagering ought to be an object of particular attention. According to the application which is made of it, it may include in itself all the force of a law, and of a law which acts with the double sanction of punishment and reward. It may be employed in the way of subornation for all imaginable crimes. Bet, for example, that a certain person does not live beyond a certain time, and trace the consequences which such a bet may have.

In the case of losses by fire and shipwreck, assurance is only a species of wager; and its effects as an instrument of subornation are only too well known.

It may have a mischievous effect by its application to adjective law—to procedure. During the time that the sex of the Chevalier D’Eon was doubtful, it became the subject of a wager. The action was brought in one of the courts of Westminster, and many persons were called to appear and depose upon this subject. This species of wager might be designated by the name of wager of vexatious inquisition.